







not payable in gold. As the payment is thus, find the path of the
United States. There is hereby pledged. His payment is also
absolutely guaranteed by the pledge of Fifty Millions of Dollars.
We must, however, be aware of two and three and four
the hundred Dollars per acre.
And millions of select acres of land, found in the same States of
the value of from One to Fifty Dollars per acre. Also by the pledge of
Eighty per cent of the land. And that there was coming from Paul Jones, in

[illegible]

Joe M. Lawrence
 Secretary, American League
 and San Francisco Giants
 for trial within next day
 UNION CITY, N. J.

Allen
William C. Reid

8-27

ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

BY

EDWARD I. BELL

Formerly Editor and Publisher of "La Prensa" and the
"The Daily Mexican" of Mexico City

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INTRODUCTION

IN this book are described many occurrences which the writer saw and the characters and acts of many persons whom he knew more or less intimately. The knowledge which came through direct observation was supplemented, while it was being acquired and afterwards, by very fortunate investigations undertaken in the beginning as a business necessity. During the time when the responsibility for Mexico was so securely fastened upon the United States that it could not be shaken off, the author of this volume was most favorably situated for the acquirement of information — and by that word is meant the core and not the rind.

The distinction is vitally important, for in Mexico things are never what they seem. This general truth seems there to have a particular manifestation, for though Mexico is next neighbor to the United States, the government at Washington, if one may judge by its acts, has seen on the far side of the Rio Grande nothing but a series of illusions many of them artificially produced in a manner which I have here attempted to describe.

It may be asserted with confidence that the mere outward and visible story of Mexico, a record of what happened on the surface from the last days of Diaz to the most recent incident of American interference, would puzzle rather than enlighten the usual reader, even though accurately told. A view of the events more interesting and influential which took place behind the scenes is requi-

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site for just judgment of the actors. This view I have tried to give by offering material which I have had the opportunity to gather not from books, for none contain it, but from men. The vast outpourings of the daily press have contained much important truth which the person already well informed could recognize; but it is fair to say that the paths by which the United States and Mexico reached the point where collision was inevitable have never been disclosed.

In the recent astonishing relations between the two countries the part played by President Wilson has been so puzzling and so prominent that the antecedent characters and events have lost something of their proper value. Justice to the President demands more than an analysis of his own acts and intents. He received the Mexican trouble, loaded with a high explosive charge, from the hands of his predecessor, and no right judgment of his course can be formed unless one knows the contents of the sealed parcel and how that contents came to be within. In order to reveal this it is necessary to get close to the actual human interplay, beyond the obvious, behind the conjurer, where the eggs are actually broken for the omelet which later seems to come out of a borrowed hat.

Keeping faith with facts will involve criticism, implied or open, of the men who guided the devious policy of the United States in this affair, a policy almost invariably honest, almost invariably mistaken, sometimes innocently, sometimes grimly amusing, as destiny or the hidden acts of men determined. The situation calls for an interpreter of facts, for a teller of the story. The difficulties which have beset President Wilson, the problems of the recent past and of the unfolding future, are unsolvable without a knowledge of it.

The promptings to constructive statesmanship unheeded

INTRODUCTION

by President Taft, the evidences of official irritation, the errors due to complacent misconception of the Mexican people — these and other vital phases of a course that seems inexplicable, need to be opened to view so that broad and practical application of American ideals may take recognizable form in a fixed and comprehensive policy toward Mexico and Latin America which shall not be subject to political bias or official whim, but shall stand unchanged in vital principle from year to year and from term to term.

With understanding, this may be possible; without it, the recent past may be repeated with increasingly deplorable results, and our country may go on indefinitely from one blunder to the next, guided by impulse and the varying dictates of political expediency.

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THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

CHAPTER I

IN order to justify the text that in Mexico things are never what they seem, let us cite an instance very conspicuous. This will necessitate glancing back a little way, four years or thereabouts, along the panorama of that country's recent history. So glancing, the observer's eye is naturally attracted to a brilliant spot, in a physical sense surely the best lighted scene of Mexico's drama. The reference is to the great Diaz celebration with its myriad lamps. There we shall come upon a clue which will lead us to the end of the story, out of the brilliance into the shadow, and through paths exceedingly obscure, hopelessly difficult for those that have no guide.

The centenary of Mexico's independence was celebrated in September, that dazzling September of 1910. For the entire month the "asphalt section" of Mexico's capital was cleared of its twelve hundred beggars and dressed in its party clothes. Receptions, banquets, parades — all the spectacular extravagances of a nation's festival — filled the days and nights with obvious rejoicing. The most beautiful women from interior and coast cities and from the haciendas of the "hot country" were gathered in Mexico City and distributed like flowers to grace a thousand entertainments.

Special envoys from all the great nations and most of the little ones of Europe, Asia, Africa and every variety of America — torrid, temperate and frozen — were present to participate in the events that marked the realization in Mexico of the fabled golden age, the season of prosperity and peace. Such honors as come only to the exalted were heaped upon Porfirio Diaz. He was "The Moses and Joshua of his people" by the phrase of Andrew Carnegie, "The prodigy of nature" according to Tolstoy, a personage "to be held up to the hero worship of mankind," as Elihu Root expressed it.

The thirty September days of bunting and glitter and military show, the thirty blazing nights of electrical effulgence toned to tenderness in the seclusion of patio and boudoir — the never-to-be-forgotten Centennial nights — floated away at last upon the river of time whose somber bosom they had brightened for a space. The President's ball, that Belshazzar feast of the Diaz régime, at which Mexico's monarch aided by seven thousand of his richly attired people received the gold-laced diplomats of the world — that revel where twenty carloads of champagne were poured out by five hundred picturesquely costumed servants in rivers and lakes of wine flooding the Palacio Nacional and overflowing into the Plaza de la Constitucion — that gorgeous celebration went flaring into the past. And in the light of ordinary day the government of Porfirio Diaz loomed as large as it had seemed amid the torches, and the voice of his authority was as loud as the innumerable instruments of music which had just performed an anthem to his glory.

All these things surely happened, and there was no unusual lack of sincerity among the participants; but what is the truth that lay behind? The way to discover it is to forget for the moment all the personages present at

this remarkable celebration, and concentrate our attention upon one who was not there, the most powerful man connected with the Mexican government at that time, the man upon whom, far more than upon the aged dictator, the safety of the State had for some years depended. His absence, rightly understood, may rank among the most notable features of the occasion and provide us with an essential clue to the long train of subsequent disasters. The man was José Yves Limantour.

The name is well known to financiers in Europe and America, but for the information of the general reader a few words of introduction will be necessary. José Yves Limantour is of French parentage, the son of that José Yves Limantour who in the eighteen-forties attempted to establish claims to important parcels of land on the coast of California, including four square leagues now covered by the city of San Francisco. The claims were based on grants dated in 1843, and bearing the name of Manuel Micheltorena, governor of California while it was a Mexican province, prior to the cession of 1848.

More than six hundred thousand acres were in controversy, and the parcels had been judiciously marked out along the shores of bays that would be harbors populous with shipping. The grants purported to have been bestowed in consideration of certain moneys, supplies and services furnished and rendered by Limantour. They were, however, disallowed in their entirety by a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in 1858 after much complaint of inconvenience suffered and expense incurred by persons desiring to transfer property situated within the area. If the grants had been sustained, the present José Yves Limantour might be now the richest man in the world. Judge Ogden Hoffman, who rendered the decision in a paper exceeding 25,000

words, estimated the value of the San Francisco property alone at \$15,000,000, and that was fifty-six years ago. The document printed on paper now yellowed by time, is to be found by the curious in the public library of the city of New York.

To the authentic and recorded story of the Limantour claim, sufficiently romantic in the coldest recital, tradition has appended a tragic sequel. Appeal, so runs the tale, was to be taken from the judgment of the court, and two important witnesses were brought from Mexico to aid the new contention. These witnesses are said to have been waylaid in San Francisco, with consequences mortal to the men and to the cause which they would have supported with their voices. Thus it died, and the courts knew it no more.

José Yves Limantour, the son, did not inherit the metropolis and other choice bits of California. He did inherit, or at any rate he has disclosed, a marked ability in finance. His gifts, if one may judge by his management of personal affairs, did not include his father's very distinguished temerity, but refined and modernized they became one of Mexico's strongest assets.

His heritage of talent was not his only portion, for although the elder Limantour suffered defeat in San Francisco, he was more successful at Mexico City. When Benito Juárez closed the nunneries and monasteries of Mexico, and sold the church property at auction and appraisal, Señor Limantour was very favorably placed for profit, and he laid the foundations of a comfortable fortune.

José Yves, the son, was born on March 19, 1855, and therefore took no part in these ventures which later furnished him with capital which he has jealously guarded. Close scrutiny of his administration of the property which thus came to him fails to reveal the slightest tendency to financial hazard on his own account. It may also be defi-

nitely stated that those who did business with him in his official capacity found him a hard bargainer. His early career as a lawyer need not be detailed. The law did not attract him, and he was speedily drawn away from it by the superior fascination of financial study.

The financial problems of Mexico, as that country struggled into cohesion and order, afforded a broad and fertile field for Limantour's talents, and the attention of Porfirio Diaz was drawn to him. He was made Sub-Secretary of Finance in 1893, and succeeded to the portfolio in 1894, and it was as Minister of Finance that he carried out the plan which placed Mexico on a fifty per cent. gold basis — a plan which bears his name. Values had for a long time been shifting up and down with the unceasing fluctuations of the silver market. The Limantour plan introduced a kind of stability by which the nation profited. Individuals also were benefited, none more conspicuously than the business managers of the circle which had developed from the Society of the Friends of Porfirio Diaz, and which came to be known as the Cientificos.

The significance of the name, Cientifico, is difficult to convey; it was not in every instance a brand of odium. The Cientificos who were members of the Diaz cabinet accepted the title as a distinction. They were proud of their positions and jealous of their personal honor. They were over-rated men with two exceptions, Limantour and Ramon Corral. Limantour possessed even a greater brain than popular estimates credited him with; Corral was quite correctly placed as unfit for preferment.

Outside of the cabinet the term Cientifico stood for scientific business. The science lay in methods similar to those which have been followed by political rings in the United States and elsewhere, and the ring had existed several years before it was christened. Its chief source of profit was

government patronage. By means of this it became well entrenched throughout the length and breadth of the land, and grew to dominate the government of Porfirio Diaz more fully than the head of that government was aware of. Thus the Cientificos from 1903 onward became increasingly powerful, and popular judgment drew no fine distinction between those who were Cientificos for personal profit and those whom higher motives actuated.

The leading spirits of the Cientifico ring met fortnightly to plan current and prospective business and to maintain the equilibrium of their affairs by means of the suppression, the dissemination, the coloring of news, the division of profits, and the distribution of rewards and punishments to friends and enemies. The men who so met included Reyes Spindola, then owner and editor of *El Imparcial*, the leading daily newspaper of Mexico, and Francisco Bulnes, the cleverest parliamentarian of Mexico and most effective writer, whose function it was to direct the so-called "independent" element in the Mexican Congress, a spurious opposition party which was in reality as subservient to Diaz as any other factor in the government. One of these men operated the Diaz press agency, and the other did the "floor work" in Congress for the ring.

There were fourteen other men in this inner circle, including officials of the Banco Nacional, the Banco Central, and the Banco de Londres y Mexico; the Governor of the Federal District and a few men of influential families with powerful business connections. The Paper Trust, or the San Rafael Paper Company, which held a monopoly of news-print paper by means of protective tariff amounting to about two American cents per pound, was one of the great interests represented. Another was the Cigarette Trust, "El Buen Tono," which made practically all the cigarettes of Mexico, and was managed by a shrewd French-

man. The Pulque Trust which included many of the great pulque growers, and dominated the distribution of Mexico's national beverage, had its delegate among the Friends of Diaz, the Cientificos.

The active manipulators of the Bancaria were members. This institution carried departments for banking and contracting, and was the clearing house through which big business was carried on, and the profits thereof divided. The Bancaria took the contracts for internal construction work throughout Mexico, for buildings, sewers, paving, waterworks, etc. It subcontracted to favored men, who frequently again subcontracted to local companies or individuals. The last price received by the contractor who did the work was generally a very small fraction of the original figure secured by the Bancaria—as low as four forty-ninths in one instance.

No city or town in any state of Mexico could lay a gas pipe, or pave a street, or remodel or erect a public building without the consent of the governor of the state. If the project was approved such press matter as was deemed desirable for preparing the public mind was printed in *El Imparcial*, and the contract for the work was arranged between the governor and the Bancaria. The major part of the "graft" was provided for in this transaction; the minor state and district officials arranged for their shares with the subcontractor.

Close observation of the business morals of the Diaz régime disclosed strange contradictions. Most of the operations carried on by the governors of the various states reeked with graft, and it is certain that deals were made by some of the departments of the central government itself which brought larcenous profits to the parties thereto at the expense of the treasury. On the other hand that government, as revealed to foreign gentlemen in heavy

transactions covering many years, was characterized by remarkable integrity. "The most scrupulously honest of modern governments," is the certificate of character bestowed upon it in personal statements to me by men whose opinions are among the first that would be sought by any competent inquirer. It is a hard saying, to be interpreted only through some difference of definition, or perhaps through the more intimate acquaintance which these seeming eulogists of Diaz have with the other governments to which they referred.

It should be noted, also, that these distinguished witnesses dealt usually with Porfirio Diaz direct, or with his ministers who feared his wrath; not with the Cientificos of business whose operations were openly for revenue with little regard for scruples. The dictator was not a grafter in the ordinary sense, nor was he tolerant of this iniquity; yet there was vast and various grafting in Mexico, accruing to the temporary benefit of Diaz politically if not pecuniarily, for these operations steadily widening in scope were used to weld a nation-wide interest in support of the political system which the Society of the Friends of Diaz was thus enabled to maintain.

The Cientifico business circle had a highly developed system to prevent intrusion upon its field. This central organization came to be known as the "Full Car," but the term Cientifico was broadly used to designate any person actually or supposedly connected with these operations, even in a state remote from the capital. The great combination was spread over the whole country; its members were held together by what has been called in America the cohesive power of public plunder. They were shouters for Diaz, a great army of the bandits of business, a strong defense for the throne so long as he who sat thereon could manage

them or could avail himself of the services of a grand vizier equal to that task. No one else was ever so successful in this rôle as Limantour.

It would be absurd to say that the ring had no corrupt point of contact with the central government; but I should be sorry for any one who would assert and try to prove that the point of contact lay in the Department of Finance under the eye of Limantour. This gentleman was not in the cabinet for profit, but for reputation, for enduring fame. He was rich already; he was not to be bought. What he had set his heart upon was to make his genius shine upon the pages of his country's history, so that the record would inevitably survive his mortal body. The more immediate reward he hoped for is to some extent a secret of his own bosom, and may be permitted to remain there without serious detriment to the exposition which I am here attempting; but the more important of those labors by which he expected to achieve a permanent distinction are essential features of any clear statement of the Mexican problem as presented for solution to the United States.

The greatest of these labors, and the one that is likely to have the gravest consequences, is the merger of Mexico's railways, a piece of high finance not unworthy of comparison with even the welding together of the United States Steel Corporation. There were staggering difficulties in the way of this consolidation which placed under the control of the Mexican government nearly 8,000 miles of railway, and brought the diversified interests controlling the various companies under one management. No man in Mexico but Limantour could have accomplished it. The total authorization of new securities provided for in the resulting corporation was \$1,270,000,000 (Mexican). And this colossal affair was placed upon a practical operating

basis by the sale of only thirty-three millions of bonds to pay floating debts and provide for organization expenses and working capital.

This merger influenced the course of Mexico's fortunes in various ways, and the end is not yet, as I shall show in a subsequent page. The matter is important here because in the inwards of it will be found the chief reason for Señor Limantour's absence from the Diaz Centennial, and from his country for some months before and after that extraordinary festival. During that absence the mischief which the United States and Mexico are now paying for was hatched, and it is necessary to follow up the clues which promise an explanation of what took place.

The idea of the merger was not Limantour's; it originated in the brain of Edward H. Harriman — unless some mute, inglorious clerk conceived it while his skull happened to be in the range of his great master's vision. Let Harriman stand as the real author. He perceived in the disjointed railways of Mexico an opportunity to extend his own dominion, and secure a very valuable permanent advantage for the Southern Pacific which runs alongside the Mexican frontier from the Gulf to the Western ocean. He studied the subject with characteristic thoroughness, and was deeply impressed. Then he opened communication with Mexico City, making his approach not to Porfirio Diaz but to Finance Minister Limantour. This was in 1902.

Harriman wasted no time with the mails or in sending a representative to prepare the way. He cabled to Limantour asking for a secret interview upon important matters whose nature he did not state. The Minister of Finance replied agreeably, and a few days thereafter Harriman arrived at Mexico City incognito, proceeding at once to Limantour's house on Avenida Juarez, where the two men held a long conference.

Harriman set forth the situation with intelligence and power. He made it clear that railway traffic arrangements in the Mexican republic were ill contrived and inefficient. Between certain points there were lines engaged in wasteful competition, while many promising regions were wholly destitute of railway facilities. He instanced the Mexican Central, controlled by Henry Clay Pierce, which operated over the 1,200 miles from Mexico City to El Paso, and was waterlogged with debt. This line, said Harriman, if administered properly in a community of interest with others which then competed over a large part of the mileage would become a dividend-payer. He could secure control of the Central at any moment, but it would be useless to do so while the Mexican government held the National Line to Laredo and could make or break the Central at the whim of those who might come into power.

Under existing conditions, Harriman argued, none of the railways could be operated with efficiency or made to yield the profit which modern methods could extract. Until these methods should be applied the development of Mexico's resources must be greatly retarded. Mexico with its millions of acres of untilled land was importing wheat and cotton; its manufacturers of woolen and cotton fabrics were hampered by excessive costs of raw material. Flour was an untasted luxury for nine-tenths of the population. Native sugar was supplied in great cones unrefined. Many rich mines were remote from transportation. Stock raising, except in the northern states, was haphazard and unremunerative; and within fifty miles of Mexico City native farmers were plowing with a crooked stick.

The remedy lay with the railways, and the only practical solution of the problem which their inefficiency presented was a general consolidation. This he was prepared to undertake at once; he would guarantee its success, and would

carry through all necessary financial negotiations, in return for stock control of the merger.

José Yves Limantour is not an impulsive man. He absorbed all the wisdom that fell from Harriman's lips, understood fully that the proposals did not transcend the American railway wizard's power, and perceived the material benefits which Mexico would derive from accepting them; but he was not led by enthusiasm into the giving of any hasty assurances. He asked for ten days' time, and Harriman was forced to consent, reluctantly, and to leave Limantour unpledged.

Harriman went from Mexico City to California where an attack of acute appendicitis necessitated an immediate resort to surgery. When he had rallied sufficiently to attend to business, he received Limantour's regretful declination, expressed so definitely as to close the incident. Not long afterwards Harriman learned to his astonishment that from the day of their conference Limantour had applied himself to the great railway problem, utilizing the plans which the American had so exhaustively outlined. There seems to have been nothing questionable in this appropriation. Harriman was past his majority and his wisdom teeth were cut. He had sought the interview, had exacted no promises, and the bulk of what he had said consisted of facts open to any man's observation.

It was natural that Limantour should desire to do this important work so attractive to an ambitious financier. Patriotism doubtless urged him to put the achievement on the scroll of history to the credit of a Mexican. But reasoned distrust of American control of the railways could hardly have been the determining factor with him, despite his well known opposition to monopolistic tendencies of Americans. In this affair the real hazard would have been Harriman's, the Mexican government being in a position

fully to protect its interests through the concession which Harriman must secure. It suffices here that the Finance Minister himself assumed the task, and that his labors resulted six years afterwards in the Limantour merger, the National Railways of Mexico.

Six years would have seemed a long time to Harriman for the completion of this bit of business, but aside from any difference of ability and experience, there were obstacles which multiplied as Limantour advanced, and of course he lacked the pecuniary resources which the American would have had at command. Sharp criticism was inevitable; scandal was to be expected, for when have they failed to follow a consolidation of such magnitude? It was everybody's business, for the government was involved as the ultimate holder of voting control which necessitated a large capitalization, and as guarantor of the issue of second or general mortgage bonds of which three hundred and twenty millions (Mexican) were authorized. Critics thought the sum excessive, and they attacked the plan of the merger at various points as being burdensome and perilous. Scandal mongers found material in the array of counsel which Limantour employed, and in the distribution of fees — a matter out of which more trouble was manufactured than might have seemed possible.

Three prominent law firms of New York, Strong & Cadwalader, Cravath, Henderson & De Gersdorff, and Underwood, Van Vorst & Hoyt, received \$125,000 apiece for services which were said to have been the reverse of arduous. George W. Wickersham received \$20,000 for getting the New York end of the work done by a man under his supervision. Two lawyers of Mexico City, among the leaders of that bar, and of nearly equal rank, were engaged upon the intricate practical details of the immense consolidation. The fee paid to one of them, Pablo Macedo,

was \$150,000. The other, Pablo Martinez del Rio, died in 1909 while the work was still unfinished though the merger itself had been effected. To his estate was paid only \$25,000 in requital of his services which were said to have been quite as valuable as Macedo's.

This discrimination wears even now a somewhat mysterious aspect, but there could be no mysteries for the critics of Limantour and his merger. These persons must know all, or cover the deficit with ingenious fiction, and consequently they drew upon their very competent imaginations and brought forth a tale. There had been a private arrangement, so they said, among Limantour, Martinez del Rio and certain other men whereby a block of some thirty millions (Mexican) of National Railway bonds was to be sequestered and divided, but this proceeding had not been completed during Martinez del Rio's life. His widow, according to this legend, was aware of the agreement whose terms were in a written instrument, but she encountered difficulties in persuading Limantour to deliver her late husband's share of the bonds or even to set right the inequitable fee. Vain efforts to obtain a satisfactory adjustment brought her to the end of her patience, and she laid her wrongs before Porfirio Diaz, who was incensed by the injustice of Limantour in the matter of the fee, and shocked by the disclosure as to the bonds. Immediately he called the Minister into his presence, and a violent scene ensued wherein their friendship of so many years' endurance was disrupted.

If the story had stopped there, and nothing out of the ordinary had been visible in the course of affairs at Mexico's capital, the effect would have been inappreciable; for in the sixteen years that Limantour had served Diaz and the State as Minister of Finance, opportunities for his personal profit had been innumerable, yet his record was clean. But

the scandal was set going at a time when enmities were ripening on every hand, and bitter feeling was the order of the day. It was relished by many, and magnified in the retelling. The dictator was said to have thrown his cane at Limantour as he drove him from his presence with threats which put the minister in fear of death, so that he hid four days at Tlanepantla, a suburb of the capital, and finally fled disguised as a priest across the frontier into the United States. That he still retained his cabinet office could not be denied, even by the least responsible of his detractors, but it was asserted that the quarrel with Diaz was a final breach, and that some months later Limantour joined with the enemies of the tottering dictator to ensure his overthrow.

In the course of a thorough investigation I have found no proof of any part of this story which assails Limantour's integrity or charges him with disloyalty to Porfirio Diaz. Much of it is pure myth, defying obvious truth with an audacity to which the climate of the Mexican capital seems peculiarly favorable. For example, Limantour's departure from Mexico City, July 11, 1910, was anything but secret. He and his wife who made the journey with him set out from the Colonia Station to which they were accompanied by President Diaz, Donna Carmen Diaz, and many prominent Mexicans. Hundreds of citizens were in and around the station; vivas were shouted in Limantour's honor, and the popular favor was amply shown.

At the risk of seeming to digress and to confuse the narrative with dates beyond its present stage, I must here permit certain documents to throw their light upon the injurious rumors which I have thought it unwise to ignore. The fiction as to Martinez del Rio and the railway bonds must not be suffered to obscure the relations between Limantour and Diaz, for too much depends upon an accurate

comprehension of them. Indeed the dates themselves may indicate that this scandal was a hardy weed difficult to root out of the public mind.

On March 18, 1912, the attorneys for Señora Martinez del Rio made a statement in the columns of *El Imparcial* of Mexico City, which translated runs thus:

MEXICO, May 18, 1912.

SR. LIC. D. FAUSTO MOGUEL,
Director of El Imparcial.

My dear friend and colleague:—

In No. 31 of the *Diario del Hogar*, of April 26 last, there appeared an article referring to the consolidation of the National Railways of Mexico. It is alleged that the widow of Sr. Lic. Don Pablo Martinez del Rio was on the point of not being able to receive the commission of 3,000,000 pesos, which, it is stated in the article referred to, was due to Sr. Martinez del Rio on account of the fusion of the railroad lines.

As the assertions of the said article are false and inexact, we, as legal agents of Señora Vincent Martinez del Rio, believe it our duty to contradict them, because neither Sr. Martinez del Rio, nor his heirs, received any commission whatever, and therefore there could have been no difficulty in regard to the payment of a commission.

The distinguished lawyer gave his professional services to the reorganization of the railways, and the fee agreed upon, which of course was nothing like 3,000,000 pesos as it is said, was paid to his estate without any difficulty whatever and without it being necessary to have recourse to the schemes referred to in the *Diario del Hogar* nor any others of that kind.

With a view to having the facts established, and in justice to truth, we request you to give publicity to this letter in your popular newspaper.

We thank you in advance and remain, your friends,

LUIS RIBA,
SALVADOR M. CANCINO.

This statement was confirmed on March 24, 1914, by the Señora herself, in a cablegram of which the following is a translation:

MEXICO CITY, March 24, 1914.

JOSÉ YVES LIMANTOUR,
8 rue Presbourg, Paris,

Confirm in every detail letter eighteen May one thousand nineteen hundred twelve subscribed by my legal agents Luis Riba and Salvador Cancino addressed to the directors of the newspapers *Nueva Era* and *El Imparcial* of the city of Mexico relative to the interest of my husband in the organization of the National Railways of Mexico.

B. VINENT DE MARTINEZ DEL RIO.

It should be added that cordial relations exist between Limantour and these persons whom it is alleged he wronged. On the occasion of his fifty-ninth birthday, March 19, 1914, among the callers at his house in Paris, 8 Rue de Presbourg, were ex-President and Madam Diaz. Pablo Martinez del Rio, son of the deceased lawyer, is the chum at Oxford, England, of Guillermo Limantour, son of the former Minister of Finance.

As for the bond sequestration story itself, careful reading of the disposition made of the issues of the merger discloses no open seam through which any of the bonds could well have slipped. Moreover there is no evidence that Limantour's fortune was augmented at this time. His great wealth, so far as I can discover, is a myth; if it exists, where is it, and in what form? I have heard the sum variously estimated at ten, twenty, forty millions in gold, but my own investigations have disclosed no holdings and no interests of consequence, except the real estate in Mexico City. His own property there, combined with that of his wife, seems to fall short of five million pesos in value. To

be exact the schedule prepared in his business office in the Mexican capital on January 1, 1913, showed a total of \$4,791,885.18 (Mexican).

It would appear, therefore, that the story of a violent quarrel with Diaz over the Martinez del Rio affair must be disregarded, and that another explanation must be found for Limantour's absence from Mexico City for more than eight months—July 11, 1910, to March 20, 1911—in which period the revolution of Francisco Madero became a serious peril to the State, and the attitude of the government at Washington toward that of Diaz underwent so great and significant a change.

Never before during his tenure of office had Limantour absented himself for so long a time, and never had his government so needed his guiding hand. He was in close touch with Mexican affairs during the entire period. Seventy-one neatly labelled letter files standing side by side on the topmost row of shelves in his library—with its red leather fittings, its beautiful Gobelin tapestries, and pleasant windows overlooking the Avenue Victor Hugo in Paris—are filled with Mexican correspondence, by cable and mail, for those months. It is surely remarkable that thus informed he should have remained abroad, even upon an errand important to his country's credit, while influences were at work on the other side of the ocean to undermine the government on whose stability that credit in a great measure depended.

The truth seems to be that the departure and protracted absence of the ablest financier and statesman that Mexico ever possessed were due to a sense of injury. There is a kind of self esteem which partakes of the nature of vanity without descending to the trivial; and Limantour is full of it. He was influenced thereby to choose the task abroad which would round out his own career, and to abandon

other tasks at home which involved humiliations and the unbearable annoyance of small, daily defeats at the hands of inferiors. Such contention often induces in men of large capacity and fine fiber a nauseating discouragement which causes them to fail by default, while success lies easily within the scope of their powers. There had been no mortal quarrel between Limantour and Diaz, though I scent a graver disagreement than I am able to substantiate by proof; but what certainly had taken place was quite as influential with the Finance Minister as the fabled threats of vengeance and hurling of canes would have been.

Limantour's hold upon the dictator as his one really capable adviser had been weakening for many months, and early in the year 1910 the truth became too plain to be ignored. It was then that he laid his plans for an extended absence. The railway merger was completed; he would undertake a new labor in the refunding of the national debt to a four per cent. basis, putting the credit of his country on a par with that of leading nations, and by the same stroke establishing his own fame—for the bankers with whom he must deal would represent the world's financial judgment, and their acceptance of the refunding plan would be in effect an endorsement of Limantour's life work, his record of sixteen years as Minister of Finance. It was along the lines of his policy that Mexico had advanced to so strong a position in the money market of the world. His three conspicuous achievements, the method by which the parity of the peso was maintained, the system for the issue and control of the circulating medium, and the merger of the railways would all be covered by this certificate of approval. Here was undoubtedly a tempting prospect, with small risk of misadventure.

His position as chief counselor to Diaz had become so difficult that some of his most loyal friends had advised him

to resign from the cabinet and give the dictator a chance to find out who was the strong man in Mexico. By others he had been urged to offer himself as a candidate in the elections of 1910 in opposition to the perennial president. There is no evidence that he considered seriously either of these courses, surely not the latter. More definitely than his friends were aware of he had made up his mind to leave Mexico for a while. Doubtless the weaker part of him ached for rest; he had toiled more than seven years on the merger and its numerous sequels, with plenty of work besides, all the time; but his own unwavering assertion that the need of relaxation and change was the determining factor of his choice to go away must be taken with many grains of salt.

As has already been said he desired to escape from little enemies who had gained the ear of the aged chief of the state. Among the opposing advisers were certain relatives of Madam Diaz, persons newly arisen to appreciable influence, and with them desiccated veterans who had long been impotently jealous of the Finance Minister's power at court. The merger had been a great help to all of them, because it touched upon a weakness in the dictator, to whom all matters pertaining to finance on a large scale were an impenetrable mystery. He had never in all his long life been able to set down ten million pesos in figures that could be depended upon for accuracy and legibility; they would fail in one or the other particular, often in both, if a decision on such a point might be hazarded; and for this reason the discussion of the merger with him had been attended by difficulties. These interminable problems with their prodigious sums rising beyond a billion were sources of infinite irritation to Porfirio Diaz; and if ever he really threw his cane at Limantour it was probably upon some question of arithmetic.

When he gave his consent to placing the government's guarantee on three hundred and twenty million pesos of National Railway bonds, he made a leap into the unknown which startled him, and his misgivings with regard to this act were used by Limantour's malicious critics to lower the Finance Minister in the dictator's esteem. The result of this was made manifest in certain acts of Diaz affecting state governments, executed without consulting Limantour, a slight which the latter felt very keenly.

For these reasons, Limantour, in the beginning of the summer of 1910, was not well disposed toward participating in the Centennial celebrations of September, and no doubt he hurried his departure because of these coming events. In the official etiquette of Mexico the Finance Minister ranks seventh in the order of precedence. There were many banquets and receptions on the centennial program at which special ambassadors and dignitaries from all over the world would be present, and it is said that Limantour was not pleased at the prospect of being constantly on exhibition seven covers distant from the chief. Moreover, there were features of the celebration as planned which did not meet with Limantour's approval, wholly apart from his disinclination to figure in them in a minor rôle.

There is reason to believe that Porfirio Diaz saw his Finance Minister depart on his refunding errand with sentiments akin to those which a man who looms large in business affairs experiences at parting with a mother-in-law who has made his house her home. For a time at least the relief from restraint would be gratifying. Diaz could do as he pleased without speculating on the thought behind the penetrating eyes of José Yves Limantour.

It is beyond doubt that Diaz failed to understand his position. He was in his eightieth year and the thirtieth of his reign. His powers had greatly declined, far

more than he himself was aware, for he was no less deceived than the outside world by the incessant chorus of flattery which had so long sounded in his ears. The spectacle of a ruler surrounded by sycophants is one of the most familiar in history, but the courtiers of Diaz possessed the immense advantage of modern business methods; they were in effect a corporation, a trust, admirably compact as to the central body, and for a long time fortunate in the weakness and incoherence of the opposition. To exalt Porfirio Diaz was a business policy, which had been carried out with such ability and persistence that it deceived all nations including the one which was being exploited, and the man who sat upon its throne.

The truth is that Mexico began to outgrow Diaz in the nineties. Let it be admitted that as a ruler of a monarchy masquerading as a republic he showed distinguished ability; that his system of Diaz-appointed state governors, and governor-appointed *jefes politicos* resulted in the preservation of order, so that men's lives and property were safe from open violence, and there dawned in due season a new era of commercial progress. By that same token it was not the era of Diaz, for he was no business man. Stories of his wealth are common; only the other day a learned professor at Harvard endorsed them in a newspaper article. But Diaz is not rich and never has been; he did not put away vast sums in Europe, nor carry two millions in gold out of Mexico when he departed. His ambition was for power, not for money; and as for his capacity to understand large pecuniary transactions, it may be inferred from what I have said, in all seriousness, about his childish blundering with figures.

The organization of the Cientifico, though it was never so advanced as its members supposed it to be, was yet so much more modern than Diaz, that he was wholly incapable

of understanding its performances. Looking back upon him now one sees him like a rough old fort, conspicuous and picturesque but out of date, surrounded by the pits of disappearing guns and other mechanism of scientific warfare. It was essential, however, to defend the old fort, for its fall would involve the gravest consequences. Therefore, the Friends of Their Own Pockets enrolled themselves with the Friends of Porfirio Diaz and helped to develop his system of government. It is undeniable that the political apparatus of the Diaz rule was brought to a remarkable efficiency, and that for some years there was maintained over every square inch of Mexico's 765,535 square miles, an accurately adjusted machine which worked for the preservation of the existing order of things.

That is precisely what was wrong with it, the same fault that has invariably been found in similar organizations using the mechanism of government for personal profit. The truth that capital favorably situated can always increase abundantly, if conditions can be held unchanged, seems to be too plain; it deceives men of strong minds and apparently excellent foresight. There never has been and there never will be a condition on earth or elsewhere that can be kept at a standstill, for science knows no section of the universal code which tolerates a state of rest. The lack of a constructive policy to cope with inevitable change has been the weakness of big business in its relations with the government of the United States. This folly might very well have wrecked the country, but that the ship was too strong for the rocks and drove clean over them. As to this matter Limantour once said of the United States: "Its bad government is the surest evidence of its greatness." Unwise conservatism of able men throws constructive work into the hands of inferiors. The need of renovation is perpetual, and the only question is, who shall undertake it.

That need was very urgent in Mexico during the last years of Diaz; it became imperative early in 1910. The doctrines of Francisco Madero, Jr., were beginning to spread, and they included some solid truths which the masses were too ignorant to comprehend; but if the people learned nothing else, they learned discontent and ways of expressing it in crude argument.

Business relations were daily more complex, and the problems introduced by the increasing entry of foreign capital were further beyond the comprehension of Diaz with every set of sun. It was obvious that the government must advance, and equally obvious that the propulsive force was not in Diaz. The proposal that he should reelect himself for an eighth term was reactionary, and should have been resisted; but if the dictator and the ring which hoodwinked and used him were too strong to be defeated on this issue, a compromise at least was possible. This should have included the elimination of Corral as Vice President and Minister of Gobernacion, and the formation of a progressive cabinet.

Nothing whatever was done. The Cientificos continued noisily to clamp all their machinery to Diaz, thus inviting complete disaster when he should fall. The bankers, the business men, the lawyers, the big grafters and the little politicians joined in a kind of conspiracy—in which the few were active and the many passive—to make right progress impossible; and the climax was reached in September with the apotheosis of Diaz at which the world applauded. A few months later the ancient fabric fell with every evidence of its inherent weakness, and those who would not be builders of new walls while there was time, saw the work of reconstructing the Mexican government devolve upon Francisco Madero, Jr., the last man they would have chosen.

He would not have been my last choice because he was honest, nor would he have been my first because he lacked certain qualifications. His character and capacity, and his unmerited misfortunes are to be considered in their place. Upon one point there can be no difference of opinion; it was a lamentable thing for Mexico that he should come to power through revolution, and revive the habit. He did not win by conquest, yet armed revolt was to some extent encouraged. He disturbed northern Mexico and that was regrettable for particular reasons which will be pointed out by and by. Moreover he failed; he was overthrown, with every circumstance of treachery and villainy, and with consequences ruinous to his country.

The alternative to all this should have been sought by Mexican patriots in 1910, if not earlier, and it would have consisted, as I have already said, in a progressive government. What would have been the sign of it, admitting that the substitution of a progressive man for Diaz was not practicable? It would have been the development of strong support behind the most advanced and capable person who could be found. The choice would have been easy. I am no eulogist of Limantour, as will readily be discovered, but he was the man.

No other Mexican had a record of constructive work that was comparable to his. He was the author of the banking system which had been in operation since 1897, and was generally approved. His long service as Minister of Finance had been successful beyond precedent in the history of the country; it had been of immense value to Mexico and had won for Limantour a reputation abroad which was an important national asset. Mexico's government had shown retarded development in other branches, but in that of finance it had been healthily progressive from the date when Limantour took hold.

But the Minister of Finance was out of favor with the Científico business ring because he had urged upon Diaz the cleaning up of the states, Puebla for example, with Mucio Martinez as governor and Joaquin Pita as his jefe politico at the state capital. By far the greater part of the corrupt profits of the ring came from its dealings with the states, and depended upon the retention of such men as Martinez in office. The large works undertaken for the national government were not scandalously remunerative to the contractors. S. Pearson & Son, Limited, got the most important contracts at figures reasonable in the circumstances, and gave a fair return for the money. But the jobs that were done by the Cientificos for the states involved graft, far beyond what would have been possible except through utterly shameless corruption. It was useless for Limantour to attempt to explain the details of these transactions to Diaz, but he was often able to convince his chief that one or another of the state governors was unfit.

"Yes, Limantour, that is so," Diaz would say. "The man is bad and ought to be removed. We will attend to it to-morrow."

And though to-morrow rarely came, the influence of Limantour was felt upon the side of decency, and he was more and more distrusted by the Cientificos of plunder who naturally did not lose a chance to stir up and disseminate scandal as to the railway merger.

This was the state of things early in 1910 when it became known that Diaz intended to be president for another six-year term, and that he would reelect Ramon Corral as vice president. It was not well for Mexico that Diaz should continue in office, but every peril in that obstinate blunder was intensified by the addition of Corral. Here was a man tainted morally and physically, the chief protector of vice in the capital; no secret sinner, for the worst parts of his

record were the most widely known, and those redeeming traits, which I have recently been told that he possessed, so hidden that my own eyes never saw a trace of them. And to cap the climax the disease with which Corral was afflicted was mortal, so that it might be guessed he would outstrip Diaz to the grave despite the difference in their years. "Diaz and Death" was the phrase made by an American resident of Mexico City when the ticket was announced to him.

Limantour supported Corral. His own explanation of this is twofold: first, Corral was not so black as he was painted; he had recondite merits; was not altogether unfit for office; and second, it was entirely futile to oppose him, because Diaz would not accept anybody else.

Diaz was not jealous of Corral — how was it possible that he should be? But to find another man of whom the great dictator was not jealous transcended the ability of his counselors. There had been a time when Diaz had looked with favor upon Limantour as his successor, and had expressed this view to those who had his confidence. Influences which worked to make him change his mind have already been indicated, but jealousy was more potent than any of them. The situation was undoubtedly difficult, yet the weakness of Limantour's resistance makes a singular contrast with the power he disclosed a year later. It is true that the conditions had greatly changed in the meantime; but in my judgment he is not excused for the compliance which he showed in the months immediately preceding his departure from his country.

If he could be regarded merely as an ambitious man shrewdly choosing the path to power which seemed the easiest, the safest and the surest, his course might be explained without injurious reflection upon his sagacity. To avoid dangerous contention with Diaz; to support Corral

from motives similar to the dictator's; to silence criticism by withdrawing from the arena; to win favor by the refunding of the national debt, while retaining and strengthening a hold upon the nation's credit; and all the time to be waiting for the inevitable wreck of the old régime, and for the frightened call of Mexico to her most powerful son for help in that hour of disaster: these would seem to be the elements of a consistent policy whose failure in the spring of 1911 might be ascribed to alteration of circumstances beyond control or prevision; but I can not find that it was Limantour's policy, or that he went abroad from any other motives than those which have been mentioned already — to escape from an unpleasant situation, and to round out his career with an achievement in finance. He must be blamed for removing himself as a prop of the Diaz government, lacking which it would be the more likely to fall; but he can not be accused of any design to hasten the disaster or to profit by it. I am told that he was so far from planning to return and take the chair of Diaz when it should be vacant, as to be dubious about returning ever.

And yet the presidency might have been well within his range of reasonable ambition. The allegation that he was ineligible, that he was not born on Mexican soil, as the constitution prescribes, would not have been used effectively against him, had he openly aspired to the first place in the government. Contrary to current report the subject of his eligibility was never brought before the Mexican Congress.

Whatever may have been his private hopes and personal desires, it is certain that he should not have left Mexico in 1910. Nothing that he could do in Europe was to be compared in importance with the things to be done at home. The prime necessity was to strengthen the central government so that its continuity should not depend on Diaz alone. All who had the good of the nation at heart should have

perceived this need, and should have made sacrifices of their interests and animosities to avert the curse of disorder. Diaz should have put aside his jealousy without waiting for the compulsion which came so soon; but the old Indian was incapable of it, until swayed by the more primitive impulse of fear whose whisperings were inaudible amidst the tumult of flattery culminating in September. The corrupt men in the Cientifico ring who were afraid that Limantour would instigate reforms injurious to their pockets should have faced that danger to escape a worse, bethinking them that though the state governments should be intrusted to the cleanest hands in Mexico there would still be cakes and ale. Men engaged in legitimate business, and leaders in the professions should have shown political sense and courage, but they utterly failed to do it.

And to one who understood the inside of affairs in Mexico this failure, and predatory folly, and suicidal jealousy—the drunken confidence in what was old, outworn and trembling to its fall—were typified at the Centennial festivities by a vacant chair which the mind's eye could see, seventh from that of Diaz. The whole glittering fabric was undermined, and a good ear could hear the clockwork ticking toward the moment when all should be blown skyward; but the man most capable of detecting and averting the disaster was five thousand miles away across the seas. Understanding what his absence implied, I repeat with confidence my statement that it was the most notable feature of the celebration.

It is not to be understood that Limantour and his errand were hidden by any veil of secrecy during his absence. On the contrary the public was kept constantly informed that he was in Europe negotiating the new loan of twenty-two millions sterling at four per cent. to replace a like amount at five, the transaction covering half the national

debt. Reports of his progress were studiously disseminated by the press agents of the government, and helped to exalt Diaz, as the fount of all good works from whose beneficent rule this well considered measure of finance flowed naturally. The refunding operation was not permitted to escape the knowledge of the twenty-one newspaper and magazine writers from the United States who attended the Centennial by special invitation as the guests of Diaz. A solid credit was thus seen by them to underlie the lavish festival, and if they saw nothing of a contradictory nature it is not surprising. They were personally conducted to the capital, and throughout the asphalted center of the city; then to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and back; then to the frontier whence they were sent home, with all expenses from the outset royally paid. There could be no doubt as to the prosperity of Mexico, or if any may have been excited, it must be charged to the shrewdness of the guests, not to inadvertence on the part of the entertainers.

On the tenth day after the close of the Centennial celebrations Francisco Madero, Jr., who had been in prison for his opinions, was released. At this time his cause had no visible organization worth considering, nor any known support which could excite the alarm of Diaz. The reformer, being free, crossed the northern border, and remained in the United States for forty days, but the Madero Idea was in Mexico, spreading fast. At the end of the forty days the little leader returned to his native land, and marshalled the peon rabble that had been waiting for him into a grotesque semblance of military array against the mighty Diaz, the solidity of whose government was still being trumpeted through the world. Here was a very small David to challenge so great a Goliath.

The news of this outbreak came promptly to Limantour

in Paris, and no man alive was better equipped to understand all the issues involved. At the least, it meant disturbances in northern Mexico which would certainly be followed by friction with the United States. As to the revolt itself, he understood perfectly that it was based upon the fabric of a vision, and built of promises impossible of fulfilment. Yet it had seized upon the imagination of the peons, and was gaining steadily in open opposition to Diaz. Sharp measures would suffice to put it down, but Limantour saw reason to doubt that they would be effectively employed.

The old fogies of the cabinet, grown stiff with age and inaction, were worse than useless. The army was honey-combed with padded muster rolls and petty larceny. More than half the roster were men of straw who were clothed and armed at regular rates, but from whom no bugler, not even Gabriel himself, could bring forth an answering "here."

Porfirio Diaz, dependent for many years on the word of others, and believing all faithful who extolled his name, could not cope with a condition demanding real vigor and penetrating sight. The "Cientificos" lacked at this crisis a broad-minded leader capable of apprehending larger things than the immediate profits of their schemes; they were too busy with their contracts and their privileges to bother about the "crazy" Madero. In no direction that one might turn was there a practical man of brains and initiative upon whom Diaz in his moments of uneasiness as to the future could rely to act with zeal and faithfulness and judgment. Surrounded by thousands of flatterers, the man of the "iron hand" was helpless and alone.

CHAPTER II

THE appearance of Madero as a leader of armed revolt in Mexico was on November 20th. At this time Limantour in Paris was closing the negotiation of the "Loan of 1910," amounting to more than 200,000,000 pesos, which was taken by a syndicate of French, English and German bankers. The beginning of December saw the task completed. Conditions at home did not warrant further refunding operations, in the financier's opinion; but he was not yet ready to return. In that month of December Diaz first invited, then urged him to come. Without Limantour, the dictator wrote, he was drifting he knew not whither. The Minister of Finance replied with every expression of loyalty and an obedient spirit, but he gave excellent reasons for remaining abroad, not touching upon the subject of the unsatisfactory conditions which had made him wish to leave Mexico, though these were still in a great measure unchanged, and were doubtless influential against his going back.

No language can exaggerate the dictator's need of a competent adviser at this time; it was vital. Behind the Madero revolt were mysteries far beyond the analytical powers of Diaz. Even in the purely administrative problems, the paralysis of the military arm of the government, the impossibility of getting anything done, there was more than he could understand. Those of his advisers who might have enlightened him were busy organizing a cabal of liars for their own protection, rather than an army of soldiers for the preservation of the state. Diaz needed an

interpreter of the situation, and he turned to Limantour who had so often acted in that capacity.

Whoever has sought the truth about the origin and seemingly impossible success of the Madero revolt will have found abundant reason why Diaz did not understand it. The influences which proceeded from the United States were tangled and obscure; they were not comprehended even by those who were exerting them. The Washington government complained of the revolt as a disorder in Mexico which Diaz was commanded to put down, yet the pressure exerted was contradictory of the desire expressed, and promoted insurrection and brigandage by weakening the central authority opposed to them. In the innumerable contradictory tales that are told to-day, by those who attempt to explain the Mexican muddle, one may hear occasionally the bare and meaningless assertion that the United States government overthrew Diaz. One may hear also that the Waters Pierce Oil Company financed Madero's operations, and that a document proving this is on file at Washington. It is needless to say that the document, as described by ex-Ambassador Wilson, would fall far short of proving anything.

The truth about Madero's pecuniary backing will be stated presently. It is sufficient to say here that Diaz could see no reason why American corporations should support Madero in preference to himself. In their own country they certainly showed no good will toward ranting reformers; and in that class Diaz would certainly have placed young Madero. And, moreover, he saw the revolt in the same light in which it was really seen by American corporate interests, as a thing not worth support because it was destined to fail, and the money spent would never come back. Yet Diaz knew something of the political situation in the United States, and could not suppose that the Taft

administration would assume so hostile an attitude toward him if the Guggenheims, the Rockefellers and the Aldriches who stood so close to it were not advising measures of coercion for business reasons.

The dictator's true relation to these interests was beyond his comprehension. He did not know that they had always regarded him merely as a good policeman, the best that could be found in Mexico, yet decidedly inferior to Uncle Sam in that capacity. He seemed to himself to have dealt fairly and amicably with American capitalists. He understood that they could get more favors from their own government, and would be glad to see its authority extended over at least the northern half of Mexico, if the thing could be done without too serious and too protracted a disturbance; but this situation had rather amused than alarmed him hitherto, so confident had he been of his ability to hold the Gringos in check. It was no longer easy to deal with them or with their rulers, and Diaz did not know why. He believed that Limantour was the one man who could tell him what was wrong and what to do.

In every respect the situation became more perplexing and more menacing in the month of December. To Limantour in Paris came reports from many sources, the news generally disquieting, ample in volume yet imperfect, because there were secrets still locked in the bosom of destiny. He perceived in part the lessening cordiality between Washington and Mexico City, and was at no loss for a reason; the heavy American interests in the northern states of Mexico were exerting their influence. These interests were close observers of conditions; they saw the government of Porfirio Diaz seriously threatened and were preparing to gain such advantage as the situation afforded.

A good understanding gathered from many years' dealings with the men controlling the American mining and



JOSE YVES LIMANTOUR

"Arbiter of Mexico's destiny." Finance Minister of Mexico from 1894 to May 25, 1911. The man who assumed charge of Mexico's finances when that country was insolvent, and in 1910 placed them on a four per cent. basis.

rubber enterprises aided Limantour in interpreting their desires with accuracy. Intervention in Mexico by the United States government would result in immense gains for them; it would be their first choice. But if intervention should not come, they hoped for a government to succeed Diaz which would be amenable to the propositions which Diaz, ever encouraged by Limantour, had steadily rejected. The American corporations which had invested heavily in Mexico, were managed by men who had accomplished sensational results in the United States by methods which Mexico, thus far, had not permitted them to use. With Limantour out, and Diaz deposed or resigned, they could barter Washington recognition of the succeeding Mexican government in exchange for the privileges they coveted.

It was not conceivable to Limantour that these interests were satisfied with looking forward to a Mexico presided over by an idealist reformer such as Francisco Madero, Jr., but it was quite credible that they viewed with composure the efforts that young man was making to disrupt the Diaz government. While this was going on, the prospects for intervention were good. But failing this great desideratum, which would be the precursor of annexation of a large part of Mexico's territory, a new government must be set up. That new government the American corporations were planning to dominate, but they must have some other man in view than Madero.

Francisco Leon de la Barra, Ambassador of Mexico at Washington, was in the best position to learn what was afoot, and to be a source of information to Diaz and Limantour, so far as direct, confidential communication with the latter might consist with diplomatic decorum. His reports to his Government at home confirmed the impression which Diaz gained from Henry Lane Wilson, the Amer-

ican Ambassador in Mexico City: namely, that the United States was increasingly unfriendly. The Zelaya incident offered itself as an assignable cause of irritation. Zelaya, dictator of Nicaragua, had been overthrown, and in the course of the warfare which preceded that event his troops had captured two Americans name Groce and Cannon, who were presently executed for having given aid and comfort to the rebels. The United States sent a warship to Nicaragua with designs upon Zelaya's freedom, but he escaped through Guatemala to Mexico, where he was received at the capital and treated with more consideration than Washington thought right. Between friendly governments this matter would have been adjusted readily, but in the existing situation it caused friction.

Far more serious was the controversy over the alleged alliance—or attempt to form one—between Mexico and Japan. The Mikado was supposed to have his eye on the shores of Magdalena Bay as a good place for a coaling station, a naval depot, a Japanese colony, whatever you please. A story went the rounds that Ambassador Wilson forced Diaz to tear up the draft of a treaty with Japan. These rumors were perhaps more important than the facts they tended to obscure, for they were seized upon and made the most of, by those who hoped to see the United States encroach upon the sovereign rights of Mexico. That influence, all the time at work, yet without consistency or definite purpose, baffled not only Diaz, but everybody else, including those who were exerting it, and the officials at Washington who were affected by it.

De la Barra's communications and the outgivings of Henry Lane Wilson brought darkness rather than illumination to the mind of Diaz. He was aware of hostility inexplicable and therefore the more dangerous, and there were many adverse omens in Mexico. Governors of states

in whom Diaz had reposed especial confidence now held aloof from him, showing no zeal. He detected in the press a new and harsh tone. Newspapers which had observed an unwritten law against printing the dictator's name without a title, "General" or "President," now became lax in their observance and began to deal fearlessly with a Diaz unadorned. He saw his own anxiety for Limantour's return spread through the upper circles of the capital. In January this feeling became widespread, as I had special means of knowing, and many urgent messages were sent to Paris. All these signs indicated a waning confidence in the strength of the Diaz autocracy.

Limantour's advices must have been sufficiently full and accurate to enable him to understand that the situation was grave, and that some of his forebodings in the previous year were being justified. The error which Diaz had made in taking the reelection in the summer of 1910 was revealing itself even more promptly than might have been expected. Diaz had said at that time that he did not intend to retain the presidency until the end of the term; that he would resign when satisfactory arrangements for the succession should have been made. These arrangements, to be acceptable to any prudent person, must exclude Corral, who might live a year or even two, but no more. As for Diaz himself, he would never resign voluntarily; his words, even though he uttered them sincerely, were not to be relied on. He would hold the presidential office till death or some other irresistible exigency should delete his name from the scroll of reigning potentates.

Meanwhile Mexico was suffering severely from the world's perception of the uncertainty of her future. Limantour had received plain intimations of this fact in the course of his refunding operations. That he was able to carry through the transaction just closed, had been due to

his own standing with the bankers more than to any other element of strength in the Mexican situation, except the recognized value of the country's natural resources. It would be useless for Limantour to return merely to temporize with evils which could be remedied only by stable adjustment. He was a man very jealous of his reputation, with a long record of honorable successes, and he had a strong disinclination to go back to Mexico and be swept away by the tide that was setting against Diaz.

There is no evidence that he then believed that tide to be irresistible. His sentiments were expressed on January 27th in two letters which will be of interest here, before we pass on to an account of the remarkable negotiations which he presently conducted. It must be borne in mind that Limantour was very kindly disposed toward certain of the Maderos, and especially toward Evaristo, head of the family, then far advanced in years. Evaristo viewed the proceedings of his grandson, the reformer, with unmitigated disfavor and acute alarm. Early in January he addressed a long letter to Limantour, setting forth the troubles that had come upon the family through young Francisco's war upon the constituted authorities, and begging for advice and assistance. To this appeal the Minister of Finance responded as follows:

PARIS, Jan. 27, 1911.

SEÑOR DON EVARISTO MADERO,

Monterey, N. L.

My dear old friend:—

I should like to treat the subject of your esteemed letter of Jan. 11 with the fullness which the matter calls for; but I am extremely busy these days and I shall not delay in returning to Mexico, these being the reasons why I prefer to leave until after my return

the many reflections suggested to me by the subject referred to.

Each day I regret more and more what is happening and the impossibility on my part of helping in any manner to prevent the evils which are derived from the situation created for the country in general and especially for your family, by the foolish acts of your grandson, who, as you well say, by taking the part of redeemer, has sacrificed everybody. I understand perfectly how delicate and annoying is the situation in which you find yourself in respect to the government and also in respect to the men of order and good judgment. It must, however, be understood that this straining of relations is the fatal consequence of the disturbance of public order, responsibility for which does not assuredly rest on the government, and of certain acts which would not have been interpreted in a manner unfavorable to you and your family if from the beginning, and even now, all the members of the family had adopted a resolute and energetic attitude which would have allayed even the suspicion of sympathy, if not with the cause, at least with the persons who have initiated and upheld sedition.

It is not my purpose, nor would it be of any practical value, to indicate to you what you could have done to avoid the consequences for which you are now suffering. Nor am I going to excuse from all responsibility those persons whom you refer to as "gratuitous enemies of the family." These are things of the past. My intentions for the future, or rather my desires, cannot be otherwise than, on my return to Mexico, to work with all my heart to prevent the evils, already too great for the fatherland, from increasing and to prevent, if it be possible, the prolongation of the present distracted condition and the outbreak of new disorder. For this task it is necessary to count on the loyal and decided coöperation of all who represent or may represent a serious and judicious factor in our political life and I count on you and the principal members of your family for sincere and effective collaboration to that end. In the meantime I pray for your good

health and for the decrease each day of those evils referred to which embitter your existence and ours.

Your old friend who esteems you highly,

(Signed) J. Y. LIMANTOUR.

On the same day the Minister of Finance addressed a note to Rafael Hernandez, who though quite closely associated with the Cientificos of Mexico City was a valued friend of Limantour's. To complete the connection of Hernandez with all important threads of the Mexican tangle, he was cousin to Francisco Madero, Jr., the reformer, the trouble-maker, the man who came to be the president of that great country and was murdered to clear the way for the régime of Huerta. The note to Hernandez ran thus:

PARIS, Jan. 27, 1911.

SR. LIC. DON RAFAEL L. HERNANDEZ,
Mexico.

My dear colleague and friend:—

Inclosed you will find copy of a reply which I wrote to a letter which was written to me by Don Evaristo at the same time as your letter of Jan. 12. I cannot say more at present than I said in the letter to which I refer. I hope that while I wait to see you the whole Madero family will demonstrate the greatest prudence in regard to the government and show their firm intention to combat by every means in their power the promoters and supporters of sedition. In that hope I remain, as always, your affectionate friend.

(Signed) J. Y. LIMANTOUR.

Direct communication with members of the Madero family who deplored the revolt but were well informed as to its meaning and its progress, supplemented Limantour's other advices, and gave him to know that the movement could not be halted by means of any influence that could be brought to bear upon its leader. It had attained a meas-

ure of organization. There were centers of its influence at many points in Mexico, even in the capital itself. It had a junta in Washington, ill sustained and not very able, with Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez at its head. The military aspect was not formidable, yet the attempt to put it down by force of arms would result at best in long guerilla warfare and the spread of banditry throughout the north of Mexico, disturbing the relations with the United States and involving constant peril of aggressions by the powerful and petulant neighbor. The conclusion seemed to be that if the Madero revolt was not to be suppressed, and could not be restrained through influence, it must be traded with.

Limantour knew in advance that the terms which the revolutionists would demand would be unconditional surrender to them of the Mexican government. This surrender he must prevent. He might not be able to stop bloodshed in Mexico by flat refusal, but he hoped to accomplish it by strategy. In that strategy the attitude of the American government was an essential feature. For a further knowledge of that attitude he must depend on de la Barra.

During the few days immediately following the receipt of the answers to his letters of January 27th, he was busily occupied in cabling to Mexico, to New York and to Washington. On the 27th of February he left Paris in response to his country's call, and on the 7th of March, stepped from the French Liner to the New York pier.

He made the fifth in an oddly assorted company assembled in the American metropolis to play out a game of cards with Mexico as the stake. In a suite on the fourth floor of the Hotel Astor were Francisco Madero, Senior, and his son Gustavo, brother of the reformer. They were the financial managers of the Madero revolt. In another apartment under the same roof was Francisco Leon de la

Barra, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States. At the Hotel Imperial was Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez, chief of the Madero junta at Washington. José Yves Limantour, Minister of Finance to Porfirio Diaz, went to the Hotel Plaza, and as soon as he was properly installed, he sent out for the newspapers of the day. The headlines startled him, as in various forms they had startled the people of the United States from ocean to ocean. Señor Limantour saw in those lines of heavy type a threat that the game of cards which has been mentioned would be interrupted by the great policeman of the Western World, and the stake confiscated. For by an odd coincidence that was the day when the news was published that President Taft had ordered twenty thousand troops to be sent at once from their widely scattered posts to San Antonio, Texas, ready for active service.

The Minister of Finance was too wise, however, to infer that this meant intervention. He was inclined to believe that de la Barra would be able to assure him that it was only a threat intended to favor one side or the other in that game of cards, not to break it up altogether.

CHAPTER III

AFFAIRS of moment to Mexico, and as events have proved, to the United States as well, were to be arranged by Finance Minister Limantour while in New York, but he showed no haste. Except to drive in Central Park with his wife whose health was not of the best, he went out but little. In his apartments at the Plaza he received numerous visitors, nearly all of whom were bankers. Ambassador de la Barra called, as was appropriate, and indeed the list included only one man whose coming to see a high official of the Diaz Government might have excited remark. This was Francisco Madero, Senior.

But the visits of Madero were brief and far from satisfactory to himself. Several times he was not admitted. In all respects, ostensibly and actually, the attitudes of the two men were strictly in character — Limantour the sought and Francisco Madero the unsuccessful and perturbed seeker.

On March 11 a sharp disagreement between the Maderos and Doctor Vasquez Gomez occurred in Room 411 at the Hotel Astor, and an open break was narrowly averted. Vasquez Gomez criticized the elder Madero for attempting to usurp the functions of chief of the Madero junta in the United States. He complained also that his bill for board in Washington remained unpaid for lack of funds, and that he was being restrained from seeing Limantour which was the object of his coming to New York.

The Maderos took counsel of expediency and gave ground; they consented to pay the bill, and to inform

Limantour of the desire of Vasquez Gomez without delay. A refusal was expected, but to the surprise of the Maderos, Limantour readily consented to meet the man who at that time was slated as provisional vice president of Mexico to succeed Corral when the revolt should have triumphed. The Minister of Finance would receive Doctor Vasquez Gomez at the Hotel Plaza, he said, or would call upon him at the Hotel Imperial.

Vasquez Gomez declined both proposals. He would not place himself in the position of suppliant to the Minister of Diaz by calling upon him, and he would not receive him at the Imperial because the rooms he occupied were not suitable. Francisco Madero did not offer to engage more stately apartments for the head of the junta; instead he politely conveyed the doctor's objections to Limantour who was very amiable. He would meet Doctor Vasquez Gomez at the rooms of Ambassador de la Barra in the Hotel Astor.

The meeting took place on the following day, March 12, and its result was that Vasquez Gomez wrote a letter addressed to Limantour, in which were set forth the demands which the Madero party at that time made upon the Diaz government. It was mildly expressed and quite informal; it summarized the reforms for which the revolution stood, and asked for the resignation of Corral as Minister of Gobernacion. Neither the resignation of Diaz as president, nor that of Corral as vice president was mentioned.

Doctor Vasquez Gomez was not a man of the first importance in Mexican affairs, but it might have been possible at that time to rank him with the most ambitious. He undoubtedly felt that his services to the Madero cause would entitle him to honorable rewards in the day when these should be distributed. A close perusal of his letter, which he wrote as a summing up of the verbal statements he had made in the interview with Limantour, provokes the thought

that it was written for exhibition, and in support of some purpose with which the person addressed was acquainted. It was notable principally for that which it did not contain; and I find some difficulty in accepting it as covering fully the substance of the preceding conversation.

Limantour occupied himself on the 13th of March with carefully analyzing the situation. It differed materially from his previous understanding of it only in the weakness of the Madero enterprise. As a military rebellion against the solvent and well entrenched government of Porfirio Diaz it was too flimsy to be seriously considered. There had been no battles worthy to be so named. The Maderistas held a few towns in the North, but they lacked arms, organization, and competent leaders; and they had no money, if the information which had come to Limantour from banking circles was to be relied upon. As a military menace to the existing government of Mexico it was grotesque.

The social features were more impressive. Disaffection had spread through many states of the Mexican republic, and the Madero Idea had taken hold of the ignorant. Reduced to simplest terms the Idea which had caught the peons might be expressed by the words, Freedom and Land. Laborers more or less skilled, clerks, students—all the classes from which come recruits for popular rebellions against vested interests and the established order—had been attracted to the cause. An accurate estimate of the disaffection was impossible, but Limantour saw reason to believe that the number of excited dreamers was sufficient for an uprising formidable at this unfortunate moment when the harassing of Diaz by the United States already constituted a crisis for Mexico. Francisco Madero, Junior, had sown the seed of national disaster, and designing men were preparing to reap benefits for themselves. This must not

be permitted. The popular discontent could not be met at such a perilous time by harsh repressive action; it must be discreetly guided into circuitous channels where it might expend its forces without harm to Mexico.

Such work would require extremely deft manipulation, but somebody must do it, answering whatever was reasonable in the demands of the dissatisfied by the accomplishment of essential reforms. An arrangement for orderly succession in the presidential office was undoubtedly one of these. It would tend to placate the United States, and to weaken the arguments of Madero and his partizans whose violence was a constant menace to Mexico's credit and to the reputation of the Minister of Finance who had built that credit up, and had so recently put what may be called his personal endorsement upon it in the refunding operations.

The first thing to be sought was order in Mexico, to which end the Madero Idea must be deprived of its force. In the more decorous parts of the world similar emergencies were met by strategy, by concessions more apparent than real, by laws which temporized, yet seemed progressive. Mexico must be saved by the same means, and keep its place in the family of advanced nations capable of dealing with political and economic problems.

The sense of injury which had driven Limantour abroad in July of the previous year had been succeeded by a feeling of triumph; for Diaz had now given him a free hand. His plan called for delicate negotiations but he was ready for them. They should be so conducted that his loyalty to Diaz could never be questioned. He knew the name of the man who must succeed Diaz, if it should come to that, but he was determined that no act of his own should lay him open to the imputation of having consented to the shortening of the Diaz rule by so much as one minute. The fact

that Washington knew the successor's name and had approved it must be regarded as affecting the situation, but Limantour was not thereby constrained to do anything which did not seem to him consistent with the strategy demanded of a cabinet minister of Diaz charged with the duty of defending the government against its enemies.

On that day, the 13th of March, Francisco Madero, Senior, received from Finance Minister Limantour a suggestion that on the morrow they should hold a conference. The invitation came to the father of the revolutionary leader with ominous import. For a week he had been dancing attendance on the great man, and as a result he was in a state bordering on nervous collapse. When he had seen Limantour during the preceding days, he found him cold and reproachful. Limantour's private interview with Vasquez Gomez had contributed to Madero's uneasiness. He did not repose implicit confidence in the junta chief. Who could tell what disclosures he had made or what secret bargain might have been reached?

The importance of the meeting now to be held was emphasized by the fact that Francisco's son, Gustavo, was to accompany him to the Plaza and be included in the conference.

Limantour would undoubtedly make some important proposal, perhaps of a coercive character, and it was exceedingly improbable that Madero could meet the terms. If total failure of agreement should result, the active and immediate antagonism of Limantour must be accepted as an element of a situation already bad enough, and precisely of the sort that could be made impossible by the maneuvers of an adversary having influence with so many channels of finance. For the fatal weakness behind the Madero revolutionary array was the empty treasure chest, and no opponent would be so likely as Limantour to know its empti-

ness and to count upon his own power to prevent its ever being replenished.

The Maderos were very rich in property rights, but poor in cash. Barely fifteen hundred dollars remained of the money which Gustavo Madero had been able to extract from a railway deal and had devoted to the revolution in a manner not rigidly scrupulous. The total fund so secured had been but \$375,000, advanced by the Paris branch of a Madrid banking house against an underwriting of bonds for the construction of a railway across the Mexican state of Zacatecas. And Gustavo's achievement in finance had been the last. Not another dollar had the Maderos managed to obtain.

An embargo had been laid in Mexico on every industrial, mining, agricultural and banking activity of the entire Madero clan. Their estates aggregating several million acres were valueless in this emergency; they could be neither sold nor mortgaged. No railway would transport their goods. No bank would forward to them drafts made in their favor for goods previously delivered. Their own bank in Monterrey was in charge of a government "interventor" and not a peso could go from it to a Madero.

Francisco I. Madero, Junior, the leader of the cause, had previously mortgaged his house in Monterrey, and since that time had sustained his "army of ragamuffins" on small loans or contributions from sympathizing friends, and by preempting supplies from captured towns and haciendas. Arms and ammunition to the value of 50,000 American dollars had been bought by Gustavo, but only a part had been received. There was no money to pay the army which consisted of not more than 1500 men in the main body. The other small bands throughout Mexico were subsisting on forced loans for which they gave receipts.

With such slender resources he was attacking the long established government of Diaz, a government perfectly solvent, with a \$63,000,000 (Mexican) cash balance to its credit, and with the vast private interests of the Cientificos pledged to its support. His best hope of success lay, of course, in natural processes, chiefly the mere lapse of years, which had brought Mexico to the point of inevitable transition. Diaz was falling before the scythe of Time, the car of progress rumbling close behind. Already the dictator had made futile plans for one who was to follow him; and it was a knowledge of these facts which had made Secretary Knox so facile in the hands of those who had large investments at stake. Somebody must follow Diaz shortly.

Francisco Madero, Senior, was fighting for the success of his family and his own personal interests, in a period of governmental disintegration and change,—a familiar situation. But it was of little moment to him that Diaz must fall. The thing must be brought about by the agency of the Maderos, and there were a thousand chances that the Diaz régime would outlive the present revolution. It would certainly do so unless more money could be found, or some strong influence arise to hasten the culmination of the struggle. Madero, Senior, was shrewd enough to perceive the instability of every hope, the uncertainty of every plan, the cruel pressure of pecuniary need; and as he prepared to meet the cool and formidable man with whom he must contend in this emergency it is no wonder that he walked the floor, groaning, with his nervous hands pressed to the sides of his head.

He was all fiddle strings, tense to the breaking point, when he went to the Hotel Plaza at the appointed hour in the afternoon of March 14; but Gustavo seemed steady enough, though his stake on the rebellion was as great as anybody's since it included his honor. He was already

under criminal charges for the use he had made of the railway funds, and the agents of the law were close upon his heels, though of that he was unaware. He knew that he and his father had the Mexican revolution in their pockets, so to speak, and that they were about to be searched by a high officer of Diaz. But Gustavo possessed a gambler's nerve; he had made his play and would abide the turn of the card.

There was no delay at the hotel; Limantour was ready for them. Imagine him the picture of a French aristocrat, a man of good height and unspoiled figure, admirably dressed. He has steel gray eyes — eyes which in the history of the world, even among dark races, have so often been the natural insignia of distinction. His head broadens above the line of the gray eyebrows, and is perhaps a little flat on top; his hair has turned silver, and is somewhat thin. He expresses his personality through the medium of a manner quietly engaging, yet not altogether open when one studies it closely. An interview with him which has involved contention may leave upon the other person's mind the impression of an unobtrusive, baffling reserve.

The elder Madero, at that time on the shady side of sixty, might have been mistaken for a prosperous farmer from the western parts of the United States. He had iron gray hair and a chin whisker; was short of stature, vigorous, and inclined to be emotional, as I have already intimated. His eyes were Mexican.

Gustavo was larger than his father, and of the blonde type. The one thing to say of him is that he looked like a good fellow; that was his first trait, to the eye. As for any racial sign, he would have passed on Broadway without remark for an American, whatever that may be in these days.

The two guests, who were the business managers and press agents of the Mexican revolt, were received by the

Finance Minister of Diaz with a cordiality in which no flaw could be detected. The elder Madero's previous visits to the Plaza, both those that had been abortive and those that had resulted only in brief and disappointing interchanges, seemed now to be ignored by Limantour whose manner disclosed no burden of a business purpose, no hint of possible disagreement, but only the most exquisite sincerity and kindness. Indeed he appeared to have so little on his mind and to be so simply desirous of placing his guests at their ease, that the excited father of the rebel leader felt a sinking sensation within his bosom as if he were falling into the unimportant from the apex of a thrilling situation.

Passing on from the formalities of greeting, Limantour deftly reverted to an incident of old days. Long ago, when he began the practise of the law, his first client was Evaristo Madero, father of Francisco, Senior. Of this earliest case and fee of three thousand pesos, valued also as an expression of confidence, he now spoke pleasantly, saying that it constituted a debt of gratitude to the family which he had always gladly remembered.

This extreme suavity at the outset tended to increase rather than allay Francisco's fears. He knew the Mexican method with the intimacy of a veteran practitioner; it begins with your excellency's very good health, and ends with a thrust under the fifth rib. Nothing was to be gained, however, by hastening the transition, and therefore he replied smoothly, saying that the legal work for his father, like everything else to which Señor Limantour consented to devote his mind, must have been exceedingly well done so that the debt of gratitude was laid upon the client. Pleasant and inconsequential exchanges followed; then Limantour touched for the first time upon the business of the hour by asking the elder Madero somewhat suddenly

what it was that he had most seriously in mind. What did he desire the most?

Francisco answered without pause.

"The success of the revolution," he said.

"What are the so-called reforms that are demanded?" Limantour asked. "I would like to have a list of them, verbally from you."

Madero knew what to say, and he gave the headings promptly:—

"Effective suffrage, no reelection to the presidency, state autonomy, abolition of *jefes politicos*, land for the poor—the opening of the public lands and the cutting up of the great estates."

The Minister of Finance seemed somewhat amused, as he ran over in his mind the glibly recited items. He understood the situation of the Madero family with respect to land; he was well acquainted with Francisco, Senior, and had been learning many things about Gustavo. They were not precisely the men he would have selected to manage a sincere political movement directed towards accomplishing the ends that had been specified.

That Francisco Madero, Junior, was a sincere man, he might have been willing to admit, but that was not the point. Limantour's object was to learn whether the leaders of the movement had gone beyond catch words, whether any plans whatever had been laid to make the reforms effective, if the revolutionists should find themselves possessed of power. He now questioned Francisco, and Gustavo too, as to this matter, and their answers seemed to confirm the gist of his gleanings from Vasquez Gomez. No practical system of conducting a government along new lines had been formed, not even an outline of such a system could be sketched. "Effective suffrage" provided no well ordered method of nomination; it was election without safeguards. "No re-

election" was the same shelf-worn article Diaz had used in his campaigns against Benito Juarez more than forty years ago. "State autonomy" as the Maderos thought of it was an open invitation to anarchy, and no workable alternative to the jefe político system had been devised.

The land distribution idea, so prominent in the "Plan of San Luis Potosi" and so perfect a slogan for promoting social unrest, was vague and impracticable. The educational program was no better. Only the exercise of arbitrary force could effect these reforms speedily, as the followers of Madero expected them to be brought about. The chances were that instead of the beneficiaries being the poor, the men who secured the prizes would be the rich. Limantour had never distinguished himself in inventing or advocating methods for extending the school system among the peons, or for facilitating their acquisition of land. Those departments were not under his jurisdiction, and his studies of government needs for Mexico had not gone far in such fields. He was not strongly in sympathy with the Madero theories on these subjects, and he was intensely critical of the course the revolutionary leaders were pursuing in promising to the peon land they could not give him.

As he questioned Francisco, Senior, with now and then a turn to Gustavo, he saw the emptiness of the pretense as never before. The actual head of the revolution doubtless believed that in some way not yet determined, the success of the movement would provide the power to do all things. But these men before him were business men and the elder of them possessed a reputation for thrift. It was with difficulty that Limantour restrained a smile at the thought of Francisco Madero, Senior, one of Mexico's great land-owners, advocating a plan which contemplated dismemberment of estates at government condemnation rates.

No clue to what was passing in Limantour's mind could

be found in the expression of his face or in his words. The Maderos were puzzled; they knew that they were being weighed in the balance, but the result was a mystery, hidden behind the agreeable but perplexing manner of their questioner.

Discussion of the revolutionary demands had taken a long time, and the Maderos were still uncertain of Limantour's intentions when he startled them by saying that he purposed giving all the assistance in his power to effect the reforms which they desired. He was convinced, he said, that the movement they represented was entitled to consideration because it evidently was becoming popular. What he could do to bring about a peaceful solution should be done.

Concealing his astonishment and joy as well as he was able Francisco, Senior, accepted the statement literally and proceeded at once to practical details. Diaz must resign; a provisional president must be placed in office, and a fair election held.

Limantour stopped Madero's flow of words by emphatically declining to say or to hear anything whatever upon the subject of the resignation of Porfirio Diaz. Even from Madero's standpoint the resignation of Diaz should be seen to be an error, Limantour asserted, adding that he himself would view it as a calamity. He spoke sharply, in a tone of command. The words seemed more than a rebuke; they warned that it was the friend of Diaz to whom the Maderos were talking and not a conspirator. Father and son looked at each other in dismay. Without the resignation of Diaz their hopes were vain.

There was a silence that seemed long: then Limantour spoke. The sharpness had gone from his voice; his manner was calm and dignified. He could not but recognize the possibility, he said, that a vacancy might occur in the

presidential office. What might bring it about he did not know. One thing he knew; it would not be due to his agency or consent. But it was necessary that he should consider the results to Mexico of such a lamentable event. Had Don Pancho a suggestion to make as to a provisional president in such an emergency and pending an election?

Don Pancho had a certain person in mind for that position, but he was diplomatic.

"I can think of no one," he said, "so admirably fitted for it as the present Minister of Finance."

Gustavo Madero, who reported this conversation to a friend that night, declared that he was never so proud of his father as at that moment. He also said that Limantour was either greatly embarrassed or very angry because his face flushed and paled by turns, and it was some moments before he could speak.

When he did speak, his utterance was smooth and deliberate as he expressed the hope that the offense Don Pancho had just committed would not be repeated. To prevent such a possibility he would make a suggestion himself by mentioning the present ambassador of Mexico at Washington.

"De la Barra!" The two Maderos made the exclamation simultaneously, and rose from their chairs. Limantour also rose, intimating by a gesture that private consultation was permissible; and with that he walked to the window. When he returned, his guests had finished taking counsel together, and had resumed their seats.

"The suggestion is wisely made," said Francisco. "If a provisional president shall be demanded, de la Barra will be acceptable under suitable pledges."

Both Gustavo and his father were watching Limantour narrowly as this announcement was made but neither could detect an indication of the relief which the Minister of

Finance must have experienced. Discussion passed to methods by which, always premising that there should be need, such a result could be effected by orderly process. Arrangements for communication by private code were then outlined, and the Maderos rose to go.

Limantour was now more than the kindly host; he placed his hand on Gustavo's shoulder, and said in a tone of fatherly admonition:

"Young man, you have committed grave errors. You have converted to improper use funds entrusted to you, and you have attempted to sell repudiated bonds. For your family's sake and for the sake of your aged grandfather I counsel you to mend your ways."

While Limantour was yet speaking the telephone rang. Having answered it he came rapidly across the room and spoke a few words in Gustavo's ear. For an instant the young man stood motionless, recovering from a very considerable shock. Then, without giving Limantour time to offer his hand—if he should wish to do it—Gustavo turned away with a gesture of gratitude and farewell, and hurried from the room.

Ten minutes later, from a booth at the chemist's on Sixth Avenue at the corner of Fifty-seventh Street, he called by telephone a friend of his, an American who speaks Spanish.

"The secret service men are after me," said Gustavo, in that tongue. "I have just had a rather narrow escape. Somebody has made an application at Washington to have me extradited to France."

That night and the two succeeding days Gustavo remained in hiding at his friend's home on Sixty-ninth Street.

Shortly after Gustavo's abrupt departure from Limantour's rooms, Francisco Madero returned to the Hotel Astor where three of his younger sons awaited him with informa-

tion as to Gustavo's safety and present whereabouts. This immediate anxiety disposed of, Señor Madero immured himself alone in number 411 of the suite, and behind locked doors reviewed the extraordinary scene through which he had just passed. It was necessary that he should analyze the true inwardness of the somewhat vague understanding that seemingly had been reached.

On the surface the gains seemed entirely on the side of the Maderos. Limantour would go at once to Mexico City and effect the cabinet changes which would place de la Barra in the constitutional order of succession, and he would use his influence to further the reforms which the revolutionists demanded. Limantour's reasons for recognizing the principles of the revolution — whether he would do it to secure peace in Mexico or for his own secret interests, or for those of Porfirio Diaz — mattered little, so far as Madero could see. Advocacy by the Diaz government of such principles could not be other than a Madero triumph. The value of the conference to the Madero cause depended not at all upon Limantour's apparent friendliness, which easily might have been assumed, but upon the genuineness of his intent to do the things he had said he would try to do.

Madero had as much faith in Limantour's pledged word as in anybody's; but he could recall no pledge which had been made without qualification. The Finance Minister had admitted being impressed with the spread of the idea known as Maderism; he had spoken easily and generously and without reproaches. But what had he said? He would use his influence to effect the reforms the revolution demanded. This statement had been so unexpected and had seemed to imply so much that it had carried Madero into a tactical error which Limantour at once had made plain. The utterances had then become guarded and diplo-

matic on both sides. Singularly enough, progress after that had been more rapid, and the concluding arrangements had seemed to bring them closer together than ever before. But had they?

Francisco Madero was too emotional to be a really first rate analyst. He had come from the interview possessed of the belief that the Madero revolution had that afternoon been fought and won. As he now thought it over he was oppressed with doubts and unable to resolve them. The great desideratum, the retirement of Diaz, Limantour had emphatically declined to discuss.

Yet he had admitted such a possibility by agreeing with the Maderos upon a temporary successor, one whose intrusion would entirely set aside the plan Diaz had arranged with Corral as its beneficiary. Even this, as Madero examined it closely, did not imply the least unfriendliness to Diaz. The dictator was known to be eighty years old and might be much older, for no record of his birth was in existence. He had been baptized on September 30, 1830, and his age for convenience and by courtesy, was reckoned from September 15 of that same year. Accepting the age of Diaz as slightly more than eighty, it seemed unlikely that, even with normal conditions in the country, he would live out this, his eighth term as president of Mexico. The "Unspeakable Corral," if still alive, would then succeed to the chief place in the government.

Limantour was not known to have opposed Corral, but had probably decided against being his Finance Minister. It did not seem reasonable that a man of Limantour's qualities and great reputation would be disposed to act as a cabinet minister in the government of a slave trader. And surely all the world knew that Corral had trafficked in the freedom of the Yaqui Indians, embittering this historic tribe against the Mexican nation. Not only had he seized

their fertile lands along the rivers of Sonora, which they had held for centuries, but he had captured the peaceful Yaqui to the number of thousands, had shipped them like cattle in box cars two thousand miles across Mexico, and had sold them into peonage or virtual slavery to the hennequen growers of Yucatan.

Madero knew how the people of Mexico hated this Científico leader who roamed the capital streets at night, and protected its vice and crime. He also knew that the thrusting of such a man upon Mexico as the successor of Diaz had powerfully helped to incline the ears of the poor to the doctrines which Francisco Madero, Junior, had been teaching; and he could understand why the polished and resourceful Limantour would not be disposed to support with active service the dangerous rule of one so viciously and openly corrupt.

But the probability that Corral would not outlive Diaz was now generally accepted, and Limantour, in his negotiations in Europe for refunding the national debt, doubtless had been urged to make better provision for Mexico's future. As he had learned of the growing strength of the new movement he had become convinced that any arrangement to safeguard Mexico must include an agreement with the Maderistas. This interpretation of his motives would answer the description of being in the interest of Mexico without being disloyal to Diaz.

By no stretch of imagination, however, could Limantour be conceived of as believing Francisco Madero, Junior, to be a desirable candidate for the presidency. Francisco, Senior, had quite visibly ignored this item when he stated the revolution's demands, although he knew that it was the actual aim of the entire movement as viewed by its managers, and an indispensable feature of it in the eyes of his idealist son himself. As the elder Madero walked the floor

and thought upon this matter he seemed to see a vision of de la Barra, well guarded by competent advisers, becoming the buffer against which the Maderista movement was to be thrust so that it might be softly stopped.

As ambassador at Washington the amiable de la Barra had doubtless acquired a good understanding of the American government's real purpose in sending the army into Texas, where the troops by thousands were now arriving from all parts of the United States. It seemed quite believable that Pancho de la Barra had sounded the American State Department on the subject of the Mexican presidential succession and had reported his findings to Limantour. If this was so, was it unlikely that something had been contrived "for Mexico's good" which in practical application might mean the good of José Yves Limantour and Francisco Leon de la Barra to the exclusion of Francisco I. Madero, Junior, and the one hundred and seventy-three acknowledged male members of the Madero family?

The line of argument which has been indicated was supported in Madero's mind by a thousand considerations impossible to reproduce. He was alone with his thoughts for almost two hours, and not till long afterwards did he make known to any person the conviction which he had attained, or the steps which had led to it.

This conviction was that Limantour intended to assist the Madero revolution up to a certain point, in the hope that the government which should succeed Diaz would be satisfactory to conservative men. A government with Francisco Madero, Junior, at its head would hardly meet the requirements of this definition. The understanding with Limantour was therefore transitory and illusive, and must inevitably lead to cross purposes and conflicting interests. But for the present it was of enormous, of decisive value. The struggle with Limantour would come after-

wards, and must be faced when it could no longer be postponed. The thing now to be done was to trim the sails for the strong favoring wind that had so suddenly arisen, and to steer a bold course since there was no safe one possible.

Meanwhile, in his refuge in Sixty-ninth Street, Gustavo Madero and an American friend were arranging a cipher to be used in secret communication with Limantour, who was to depart next day for the Mexican capital. No ordinary cryptogram would serve; something must be devised that might be counted on to baffle the acutest puzzle-solvers of real life or fiction. Beyond question the attempt completely succeeded. The cipher was based on the little used Spanish version of the Fifth Edition A. B. C. Code but ran to arbitrary deviations beyond human power to trace without a key. It was not a method which could be used for messages of quick-acting commerce, as its interpretation involved time and painstaking accuracy.

I have held this cipher in my hand but was not permitted to copy or photograph it. It consisted of nine numbers and eighteen words placed in squares. As prepared, it occupied a space about two and a half inches high by six inches broad, with the numbers in the squares at the left. The figures were not to be used in the despatches but indicated the positions of the actual code word carrying the meaning intended to be conveyed. As a cipher for limited use it answered all purposes, being hopelessly untranslatable by any person not equipped with the key, and thus was quite in keeping with the grave importance of the information which Limantour supposedly would send from the inner chambers of the Diaz government at Mexico City.

The cipher when exhibited to Limantour the following morning received his approval. Of the three copies which had been prepared, one was given to him and the other two were retained by Gustavo Madero and his father. That day

Señor Limantour, his business in New York completed, set forth for Mexico City, planning to make one brief stop on the way. On March 19 at Laredo, Texas, he received a telegram from Francisco Madero, Senior. It advised him of the shipment to Mexico City of the Fifth Edition Code to be used in connection with the cipher previously furnished, and ended with the words "my cable address is Wardnot." It carried no signature.

The system of private communication had, in fact, been completed by registering on March 16 this cable address which was made known to Limantour alone. Messages addressed to "Wardnot" were to be delivered to Edward Ward, a clerk in an office at 69 Wall Street, room 65. This office was occupied by friends of the Maderos, and had been used occasionally by Gustavo in his work pertaining to business features of the Madero revolution. At this writing the "Wardnot" card of registry is still on file at the general cable office under the New York Stock Exchange.

But the four or five days immediately following Limantour's departure were not without anxieties to the father and brother of the man who was "campaigning" in northern Mexico for his idealistic cause. After supplying the members of the party with small sums of expense money, less than thirteen hundred dollars remained of their revolutionary capital, to which no additions could be made by any method their ingenuity could devise. Francisco Madero possessed properties in Mexico normally valued in the millions, but useless at the moment as a basis for credit. Neither in America nor Europe could he place a loan for any sum whatever. Gustavo was still dodging the police. Without funds to defend himself, or friends who could furnish bonds, the outlook in event of being apprehended was not bright.

Their negotiations with Limantour they dared not attempt

to communicate to Francisco, Junior. They were, in fact, not quite certain that the entire Limantour episode was not a trap to learn their strength. Might not the Finance Minister of Porfirio Diaz, having discovered that their supposed strength was utter weakness, return to Mexico and overwhelm them? If the Diaz government, awakened from its lethargy by Limantour, should send a real army of no more than 3000 men against their forces in Chihuahua, the Madero revolution would resolve itself into small bands of hunted men hiding in the mountains of the land they had planned to rule.

Advices from Mexico indicated steady growth of sentiment in favor of the Madero Idea, but as yet there was no real strength in the field. One sharp experience of modern warfare with a strong government force would fill the peons with dismay. Yet even so small a military array, living largely off the country and by its own wits, was costly to maintain. Barely four months had passed since Francisco, the younger, had taken up arms against Diaz, but the little revolutionary fund was gone, and there was no hope of replenishing it. Not a man in the United States would risk a dime on Madero's chances. The last card had been played; they were in the hands of José Yves Limantour.

On the twenty-fifth of March, Gustavo Madero and his father, with twelve hundred dollars in their treasure chest, left New York for El Paso, Texas. They were to stop a few days in San Antonio to await developments and to arrange for a meeting with Francisco, Junior, at some point on the border. Their work was ended. The "Madero Idea" and the influence of Limantour must do the rest.

Several anxious days were spent by the Maderos in San Antonio. The newspapers of that city on the morning of April 2 reported the convening of the Mexican Congress

on the previous day, and the strange pronouncements in the message of President Diaz. Puzzled and apprehensive the Maderos awaited developments. They were not kept long in doubt. On April 3 they received a telegram which had been repeated verbatim by their friend in New York from an unsigned cable despatch dated that day at Mexico, addressed to "Wardnot" and delivered at 69 Wall Street. The name Adolph Gonzalez, which appears at the head of the telegram repeating the cable despatch, had been taken by Gustavo Madero; it was an adaptation of his mother's maiden name. The message from Mexico City came to Gustavo in this form:—

"NEW YORK, April 3, 1911.

Adolph Gonzalez, Esq.,

437 Main Street, San Antonio, Texas.

Largitate maieneust backbeest hablome desu conversation hackbank feltrader desarrellando demarching reformas confie en sincere winsome parippo detidos.

This strange mixture of code and cipher, with ordinary words from the English and Spanish languages—further complicated by the errors incident to two transmissions and several relays—required a long time to translate comprehensively, but it was worth the trouble. Backed by the publicly reported changes in the Mexican government it was in the highest degree reassuring. The steps had been taken which placed de la Barra in direct order of succession, and the Maderos already counted upon providing a successor to de la Barra. They were confident that the message came from Limantour because they had given the cable address "Wardnot" to no one else, and the cipher also was possessed by Limantour alone. In this they were not deceived; the Minister of Finance was the author—

which means only that he was still adhering to the method of procedure heretofore described.

A verbally accurate rendering of the message was never made, because of the errors above referred to. A free translation is as follows:

“Received your letter of March 27. De la Barra spoke to me of his conversation with you. Government reforms continue developing in sincere accordance with the understanding.”

CHAPTER IV

JOSÉ Yves Limantour had reached Mexico City on the evening of March 20, 1911, and the writer was among the thousands who gathered in and about the Colonial station to greet him. Many other Americans were present. It was the most pronouncedly personal ovation ever accorded the Finance Minister of Porfirio Diaz in all his career.

Officials of the government, and científicos of all stripes, were in the welcoming throng admitted to the trainshed. Those who prayed for remission of sins, those who hoped that their sins were unknown, and those who dreamed that their merits might command preferment were conspicuous in the foremost ranks of that assemblage. From the inner gateway, through the station and across the station yard to his waiting automobile, two rows of federal soldiers formed an avenue through which the great man walked. The famous Police Band was playing "La Paloma," but the music that sounded sweetest to the ears of the returned traveler was made by the onlooking crowd as it raised in swelling volume its tumultuous shouts of "Viva Limantour!"

Outside the station yard, in the little park and along the street to the Paseo de la Reforma, his slowly moving car passed through throngs of people — Europeans, Americans and Mexicans — from whose throats rose the spontaneous cheer of the multitude for the man of the hour. The spell that had seemed to hold the government inactive would now be broken and the fossils in the Diaz cabinet would take on the semblance of life. Limantour, the magician, the

worker of miracles, had come. Viva el Ministro! Viva Limantour!

It is not likely that even the Government itself at that time understood the conditions existing throughout the Mexican Republic, and it is certain that few others at the capital believed that the Madero movement had assumed proportions of real menace. Only six months had elapsed since the great centennial celebration of September, 1910. Newspaper reports had been closely censored for many weeks, and every encounter between rebels and federals in the North had been chronicled as a federal victory. Despatches giving a different version were not delivered at newspaper offices. A government censor sat in the receiving room of the Associated Press. Private correspondence was opened and examined at the post office. If harmless it was marked with a cross and delivered; if it contained contraband news it was destroyed; if disloyal to the Diaz government the addressee was placed under arrest.

Newspapers from the "States" gave meager accounts of military activities in northern Mexico, but telegraphic items bearing date lines of border towns had ever been unreliable, and few credited them in preference to the opposing reports in the dailies of the capital. Travelers from the States of Coahuila and Chihuahua brought varying versions. Bands of rebels were operating not far from Mexico City, in the South and East, but actual violence, except at the hands of Zapata and his men, was rare. Whatever was appropriated by the "legitimate revoltosos" was solemnly receipted for.

Yet all was mystifying and alarming to those who for many years had found Mexico peaceful and secure. The suggestion of challenge to the Diaz government which Diaz soldiers did not instantly dispose of was puzzling. The fact that incorrect reports appeared in the newspapers

leaked out and bred anxiety. Business was suffering through the uncertainty which hung over the capital. All were expecting the "iron hand" of Diaz to descend in a blow, swift and sure, that would end the agitation for good and all.

Few persons at the capital understood the Madero enterprise. When the man himself had been in Mexico City in 1909 and had lectured to the poor, he had been looked upon as a harmless enthusiast who was tolerated by a strong government. Scarcely any of the poor to whom he preached his doctrines knew that he belonged to a great land-owning family. The Madero name was associated with certain brands of cognac and wine. For a long time Madero was referred to as "the cantini keeper." Not one American in fifty comprehended the seriousness of his undertaking. His book, "The Presidential Succession," had not then been translated into English, and I have never known an American who had read it in the original Spanish.

It was the offense of this book, aggravated by Madero's speeches criticizing the government, which caused his arrest in the spring of 1910, and his imprisonment until October, when an Italian of Mexico City furnished the bond of 8000 pesos on which he was released.

It was only since then that the condition of things had developed, which, four months later, caused the insistent call for Limantour's return—the call which brought him that night in March, 1911, to the aid of Mexico's inertia-ridden government and to a demonstration quite fitting for a conqueror.

And it seemed as if Diaz had handed him the scepter, for it was as a conqueror that he gave his orders. The fruit they bore was obvious. On the third night a special railway track was laid from the arsenal, through the quiet residence street called General Prin, and across the Paseo

to connect with the main line of the "National." The following day every member of the Diaz cabinet, including Limantour himself, handed in his resignation. This was action; it was almost revolution. Not in twenty years had such a significant housecleaning taken place.

The capital of Diaz the Benevolent Despot was visibly shaken with expectancy. With new men to the fore, new things would be done. The days of dalliance were over and the strength of the Diaz system was about to be made manifest.

Announcement of the new cabinet came quickly. It was made up of perfect gentlemen who were politically colorless. Certain ones were specialists in the fields of work to which they were assigned; others were wornout veterans. It was a cabinet for fair weather and smooth seas; as a council to guide a government during a period of stress it was picturesquely useless. Aside from Limantour himself who reappeared as Minister of Finance, the new organization was a fair mark for scoffers.

And scoffers there were in plenty. The business men of Mexico City, mostly Americans and Europeans, were reveling in a new freedom of speech, and had become open critics of the government. Many of them now challenged Limantour's motives, and his defenders could urge only that he was ignorant of the change which had taken place in his absence. Especially unkind remarks were elicited by the puzzle involved in the new appointment to the State portfolio, but not a man in the capital, other than Limantour and possibly Diaz, understood the significance of recalling de la Barra from Washington to take the chief place of the cabinet.

There followed quickly concessions to the people which have been likened to those of Louis XVI of France. Pronouncements came from the Diaz throne at the opening of

Congress on April 1 which confessed government helplessness. The social and economic demands of the revolution were adopted and solemnly put forth as government policy. Diaz, who had served seven terms as president — six of four years each and one of six years — and was beginning his eighth, declared for “no reelection.” The “suffrage” which had been a myth, could not well be so acknowledged; but “effective suffrage” was now to be guaranteed. The public lands were to be opened for small buyers on liberal terms. Arrangements were to be made for the vast, unproductive, privately-owned tracts to be cut up and offered for sale and settlement. The government, so it declared, in its concern for the welfare of its people, had long contemplated these reforms of a system which Mexico had outgrown. Mexico had become a great nation. The economic systems of the world had been studied to discover the fairest and most successful for the citizens of the Mexican Republic. Viva Mexico!

It is difficult to comprehend the amazement of the Mexican people, and of the resident foreigners, at these manifestations of a government which had ruled by fear. If this was the best that the great Limantour could provide, the Diaz régime must be tottering and the revolution of “Don Panchito” was indeed a serious matter. Americans who had manifested no outward anxiety, rather had been amused at government inaction, now wore a troubled air. Was the Diaz government then but a bubble?

The subsidized press of the capital lauded the government's liberal attitude. Everything the people had demanded had been granted them. If the little Francisco, the Diaz organs piped, was honest in his statements, he would now cease making trouble. If he continued, he could no longer claim to be a patriot. Nothing remained for him to fight for, except to further his own evil ambi-

tions. Many columns of this argument were printed and no voice was louder for the government than that of the one American daily, which was a loyal supporter of Diaz and of Limantour — for a just and true consideration of 1100 pesos a month. *El Imparcial* was getting 5400.

A government which had thus publicly adopted a paternal and benevolent attitude toward its people could not at once reverse itself by summary treatment of those who argued the case. Meetings were held in the streets, in which the government was accused of double dealing by speakers who were not jailed. This made the people bolder. The meetings were broken up by the police, but the methods employed did not possess their old snap. The mounted gendarmes rode through and told them to disperse. To those who did not move they applied the flat of their sabers instead of the edge or the point as formerly. What did the people want? the newspapers asked, now that the government had conceded their open demands. Presently the answer came: "The resignation of Porfirio Diaz."

It was a faint murmur at first, but day by day it grew louder. Posters demanding the Diaz resignation were pasted at night on fences and buildings. Processions carrying rudely painted banners to the same effect marched through the streets. Opposition newspapers ventured out with similar demands. Nothing happened to them. One newspaper made a blunder: it attacked the War Department and Limantour, and was promptly sealed up. Its editors were jailed. The name of Diaz no longer was sacred, but some other name was. Limantour said it was that of the Minister of War. The Minister of War said nothing.

On April 20 a five-days' armistice was arranged, but nothing came of it. As the month of April neared its close, it became generally understood that the Maderistas were

winning their battles in the North. Almost bloodless battles they were, for the federal troops refused to fight against them. Surrender or evacuation of positions was the usual outcome of a hostile meeting. Cheers for Madero were beginning to be heard on Mexico City streets, but not, as yet, in close proximity to the police. The Diaz yoke was being slowly lifted from the people's necks.

Then Diaz made another pronouncement, not without pathos. He would resign when he could do so "conscientiously." Let the insurgents lay down their arms, let peace reign throughout the country — his resignation would then be forthcoming. He could not desert his people in the hour of their need. He must pilot them into smoother waters. Then he would go.

It was before the Chamber of Deputies that he made these statements, having ridden there in his state carriage for the purpose, and it was my fortune to stand at the corner of Avenida San Francisco as he passed. He was attended by twelve outriders of his presidential guard. As usual their blue uniforms were spick-and-span, their silver helmets polished to glistening brightness. With difficulty they held their spirited horses to the deliberate pace of the coach.

The top of the coach was lowered, and contrary to his custom, Diaz sat alone. He wore a black civilian suit and tall hat. The few people who had halted at the street intersection, waiting for passage through, were all that had gathered. Not a cheer was uttered. There was none who bowed or uncovered. Straight ahead, with his stern features set in grim determination, the aged dictator stared as he rode along on what proved to be his last visit to the Chamber. When he had gone by, the people on the street passed unconcernedly on about their business. The man who but a few weeks before would have been greeted with

outbursts of applause wherever he moved, had ceased to interest them.

His latest announcement was openly jeered. Since when had Porfirio Diaz possessed a conscience? the people asked. What of the despicable Corral, his vice-president? Would Diaz carry Corral with him in the same satchel with his conscience? What of the Cientificos, the ring of blood-suckers which had absorbed the nation's wealth and controlled every good place in the government? What of the governors of states, those one time retail bandits promoted to the wholesale grade and made immune from the law? The "smoother water" he and his crew were guiding them to was the river of death. Abajo Diaz! Viva Madero!

In the Chamber of Deputies farcical and fierce debates were held in which members loudly proclaimed their independence. Recriminating charges were freely exchanged. "Thou also wert of those who haunted the ante-rooms of 'Cadena Street'" was a frequent retort between members as the rats scampered to desert the Diaz ship. All Mexico knew that every member of the Chamber wore the Diaz tag. It laughed at these antics. Diaz sycophants of good and regular standing pointed the finger of scorn at "Porfiristas." Men who had done valiant service for the commercial ring hurled the word "Cientifico" at orators who ranted of a square deal. It was the open season for vaudeville at the Chamber.

The opposition press grew more and more outspoken. One satirist in a Mexico City journal declared that no one was more astonished than Diaz himself to discover that the iron hand was a hand of putty. Proceeding, he said that Diaz awoke one morning and peeping through the slats saw the people making a demonstration. Listening, the great dictator heard shouts of "Viva Madero!" and waited for the rattle of musketry with which his troops would avenge

the insult to himself. The cheers continuing, he called his chiefs of departments together and wild with rage demanded the truth. Informed for the first time of the Madero gains, he bellowed orders that his entire army be called into immediate action.

Alas, the facts could no longer be concealed. Every available man had gone to the front. The force retained at the capital was already insufficient for defense. Stunned to speechlessness he sat for minutes staring at one and another about him, his dark Indian eyes narrowing in the heat of an anger that all his life had called for the shedding of blood. In cold, sharp, incisive tones, he asked his questions. Each answer was a stab. There were 50,000 men on the rolls of the standing army, but 36,000 were men of straw. They had been equipped and maintained, but they were myths. The great sums expended had gone into private pockets. Those whom he had befriended had betrayed him for personal gain. It was retribution, said the satirist, for his own evil deeds.

This picture is too simple to be veracious. Obviously Diaz must have been awake to many of the pressing difficulties of his situation when Limantour in response to repeated calls returned from Europe. It is believed, however, by those best qualified to judge, that Diaz still hoped to control Mexico, arrange the presidential succession, and dictate the policies to be pursued, until the vanity of those hopes was revealed to him in the first conference with the returned Minister. Some say that Limantour exaggerated the difficulties, but if so Diaz could not disprove the statements, and circumstances were corroborative.

A great change had taken place in the relative positions of the President and the Minister since their last interview, eight months previously. Then Diaz was looking forward

to the new glories which the centennial celebrations would add to his name and the advice of Limantour, already impaired in influence, had fallen upon inattentive ears ; but now the dictator's hope for the solution of vexing problems rested in the Finance Minister, and his words must be heeded. Beyond question Limantour used his advantage ; he had planned his course, and his reception by the people confirmed him in it. Immediate action had been called for and he did not hesitate to make known what form that action must take. Concessions to the people, already recorded, were the sum and substance of the Limantour policy.

On May 10, the Madero " army " advanced upon Ciudad Juarez, opposite El Paso, Texas, and occupied that important port of entry after the federals had made a brief show of resistance. Censorship at Mexico City having been practically suspended, news of the fall of Juarez was promptly printed in all newspapers and the capital did not attempt to restrain its enthusiasm. Open and unchecked cheers for Madero rang through Mexico City streets, coupled with demand for the resignation of Diaz.

A conference was held on May 15 alongside the Guggenheim smelter at El Paso, between commissioners of the Diaz government and the Madero managers. A protocol of peace was drawn up and was signed on May 21. Few of those participating knew that they were carrying out a program previously cut and dried. Maderistas demurred at the Diaz suggestion of de la Barra for interim president pending an election. But Francisco Madero, Senior, and his two sons, overcame the opposition of the others and the bargain was struck. The cabinet was to be made up of Maderistas, but the provisional presidency was to follow the order of succession which the constitution prescribed. De la Barra, who had been made Minister of Foreign Relations in the Diaz cabinet changes of the pre-

ceding month, would automatically become acting president when the resignations of Diaz and Corral should be placed before Congress and accepted.

The plan did not please the bulk of the people. They could see no reason why Madero should not at once take office. That this would have been a high-handed measure and unconstitutional did not impress them. They smelled a Diaz trick, de la Barra being an aristocrat of the Diaz plutocracy. Their idea of the constitution was more than vague. They had heard that Madero was wedded to it and some of them took the statement literally. In my presence a peon servant was asked by his employer in the plainest terms, what the Mexican constitution was, and his answer "La esposa de Madero"—the wife of Madero—was illuminating in its ingenuousness.

But Maderista leaders and Maderistas of intelligence all through Mexico took the cue from the consent of the Maderos themselves and helped the unlettered to understand. By the 20th of May while yet the peace agreement was not signed there was general acceptance of the arrangements that had been made, and clamor for the Diaz resignation was loud and insistent. Parades of pajama-clothed peons marched everywhere by day and by night through the streets of the capital. Small bodies they were of men and boys, sometimes fifty, sometimes two or three hundred. Occasionally there was a drum, but usually the music for the march was made on a tin vessel normally for domestic uses.

They did no damage except to buildings in course of construction. From these they wrested rude staves which they carried at their shoulders. Poverty in the last degree was evident in the peon parades, but the paraders knew what they wanted and they said so fearlessly—the resignation of Porfirio Diaz.

Foreign residents of Mexico City who had passed through various degrees of anxiety, and who had been reassured by the outcome of the El Paso conference, were alarmed at these demonstrations. Every place of business was barricaded. At any moment the parading hundreds might combine, and there was no knowing what a peon mob would do just then to force recognition of their demands. Few Americans or Europeans believed that the "renouncement" of Diaz would ever be written. The fiction of the dictator's "iron hand" and his indomitable courage had taken deep root and was generally accepted as fact. "The old warrior will die with his back against the wall," they said, "but he will never resign."

Day after day passed and the resignation was not forthcoming, though each day rumors of its delivery to Congress ran from mouth to mouth. The tension constantly tightened. Parades held the right of way through the city. Foreigners were threatened because they owned the great stores. Cientificos were threatened because of their beautiful homes. Impending calamity was in the air. So the fever culminated in the great riot of May 24.

The Plaza de la Constitucion, in which the riot occurred, is an open space in the heart of the City of Mexico about twice as large as Union Square in the City of New York or Trafalgar Square in London. It is bounded on the north by the Cathedral, on the east by the Palacio Nacional, on the south by the Palacio Municipal and business structures, and on the west by business structures only. The most important street of the city, Avenida San Francisco, leads from the center of the western side in a straight line west for half a mile to the uncompleted National Theater. Here it widens into the Avenida Benito Juarez, which at the end of another half mile curves majestically at the equestrian statue of Carlos IV of Spain — best known to

Americans as "The Iron Horse"—into the broad and beautiful Paseo de la Reforma, the exquisitely kept and shaded boulevard extending for a mile and a half to the historic Castle and Park at Chapultepec.

In the middle of the Plaza de la Constitucion is a little park called the zocalo with the band-stand in its center. North, south and east of the plaza lie the more ancient parts of the city, wherein bands of paraders formed all day long on that 24th of May. With a new alacrity in their movement they spread over the streets of the center and western portions, sweeping along the Paseo, overrunning the new foreign residence sections or Colonias, and circling back in long detours to "old Mexico" at the far eastern end. As they marched, the paraders were recruited to many times their original numbers. How many distinct bodies were parading one could but guess. At no time that day was there a moment when a squad of Maderistas was not in sight or within hearing of the Alameda, the park of unfailing green alongside Avenida Juarez, west of the National Theater.

The rainy season was well under way and ominous clouds made the afternoon dismal, but the rain held off. Those in the center of the city toward nightfall could hear volleys of musketry over in the north and east. Along Avenida San Francisco all business houses were closed, shuttered and barred. In narrow, central openings of the barricades stood managers or clerks watching the crowds and the paraders pressing toward the zocalo. Balconies, roofs and windows were crowded with people. In all streets leading to the plaza similar conditions prevailed. In front of the Diaz residence on Cadena Street, two streets south from Avenida San Francisco, was a strong military guard. The tension of the town was near the breaking point.

By six o'clock the noise in the streets had become an in-

cessant din of catcalls and discordant sounds of pounding on tin. By seven the macadam space between the zocalo and the Palacio Nacional was filled with peons calling aloud upon Diaz to "renounce." The side streets toward the east upon which the Palacio abutted for two hundred yards were jammed. From all directions the crowd was gathering. By eight o'clock the entire plaza seemed filled with Mexicans, and the streets from north and west and south were a solid mass of people moving toward their goal — the Plaza de la Constitucion and the Palacio Nacional.

On the roof of the Palacio Nacional a dozen machine guns stood ready for action. In the towers and on the roof of the great cathedral, on the north, were several companies of riflemen. On the roofs of the Palacio Municipal and the adjoining structures on the south side, a regiment crouched behind the parapets waiting for the word of command. The long flat roof of the Centro Mercantile, a large business building on the west, was manned by two companies of sharpshooters. Below, in the open square, and wedged in the tributary streets was the mob. How many were in the mob could not be guessed, but seventy-five thousand must fall short of the total.

Between nine and ten o'clock three separate attempts were made by mounted police, issuing from the main entrance of the Palacio Nacional, to effect a passage through the clamoring crowd, and each time they were forced back. Many of the mob were trampled, many were struck by sabers, but the jam was too dense; it would not be penetrated. At each sally quite one-third of the police were unhorsed. The mob was armed only with staves; with these weapons they made the horses unmanageable. At each retreat of the police yells of derision followed them.

It was about ten o'clock that carnage began. The police on the fourth advance began shooting over the heads of

the mob and the mob charged them in earnest. Unmindful of the many who went down, the peons dragged the police from their horses and the real battle was on. All across the great arc-lighted square staves were madly waving. From a multitude of throats went up blood-curdling cries of vengeance. Then into the center of that surging mass of human beings the riflemen in the cathedral towers poured their fire. No need to aim; to miss was impossible. Almost immediately afterward three of the machine guns on the roof of the Palacio Nacional let loose a shower of bullets. The peon hosts in the immense square, cursing, groaning and dying, were but rats in a trap of death.

A miracle saved Mexico that night from what bade fair to prove a scene of unparalleled butchery. For five minutes the Maxims on the Palacio directed their devastating fire full into the mob. It killed and maimed and maddened but did not effect a stampede. Yells were fierce but there were no deserters, when the heavens opened and a deluge of rain drenched the crowd to the skin. The firing ceased, but the rain did the work more effectively than the rifles; it cleared the plaza. The storm was several hours overdue and it came with accumulated violence. A torrent of water fell from the sky that drove the mob in all directions. In an incredibly short time the vast crowd had vanished to its holes and its hovels, and the thrice-blessed storm was raging over a deserted scene.

Soon through the rain came soldiers with litters and carts for the disabled and the dead. Without delay all evidence of the *mêlée* must be hidden. Published accounts admitted seven killed and forty wounded. A better estimate is thirty times those numbers. One reliable person of my acquaintance counted a hundred and forty-six bodies in one "*comiseria*"—police station—another had seen a heap of dead piled under the portales by the Palacio

Municipal. Still another man, hemmed in his office back of the Palacio Nacional had seen forty-two men killed in front of his windows before nightfall — shot down, two and three at a time, as they hurried toward the zocalo. Including the dead carried away on the backs of friends, and the wounded disposed of by the police to save trouble, it is probable that two hundred is a moderate estimate of the number slain in that riot, before Providence interfered with its gentle weapons and stopped the deadly hail.

And in what manner did Diaz pass these final hours, while the nation he had ruled so long was breaking from his grip? In complete oblivion, save for a few minutes of partial consciousness. He had been contending with a foe closer than the mob that rose against his rule, no other than the most ancient enemy of man, sheer pain. His delay in signing his resignation had not been due wholly to natural reluctance or to lingering hope. For some days he had suffered tortures from a tooth which, it is said, had been unskilfully treated by his dentist. The resignation of Corral, conditional upon the president's, came to hand on May 23, but Diaz between pain and opiates was incapable of considerate action, and the business was put off.

On the afternoon of the 24th, while the nation waited, and the rioters were gathering in the city, the dictator, who had at last gained relief from his physical distress tottered feebly into the library of his house on Cadena street, and sat down at his desk to sign away the power that was so dear to him. His wife who had assisted him into the room withdrew to avoid the sight of his humiliation. How long he stared at that paper, or what attempts he made to set his name to it, no one knows, not even himself. Probably quite soon the sleep, of which his aged body had been cruelly deprived of late, enfolded him irresistibly, and he passed to where lost kingdoms, and even youth itself, are won again in dreams.

Three times his wife looked in upon him as he slept. She would not rouse him, and it was after nightfall—when the mob had overrun the plaza, and the mischief was under way—that he opened his eyes. Still but half awake he was led away to bed, and for the whole night he lay in profound slumber. It was next morning that he wrote the name of Diaz for the last time on an official document. His wife stood by his side, steadying his hand.

On that day, May 25, the City of Mexico was as quiet as on any ordinary day of normal times, except for one small disturbance in front of the house of Julio Lemantour, on Avenida Juarez. There were no parades or demonstrations. But the silence was not reassuring; it carried a hint of the mysterious. In squads of twenty-five, mounted police stood for hours at one block's distance from the Chamber of Deputies in all directions, and guarded every approach to the building where the session was going on.

Business of importance was being transacted in that chamber; actual history was in the making. The resignations of Porfirio Diaz as President and of Ramon Corral as Vice President of the Mexican Republic were being acted upon. The formalities were brief. They were disposed of in silence and despatch. It was the subsequent proceedings that carried the interest, that stirred enthusiasm. Diaz was a dead cock in the pit, but his successor was at hand. To him the oath of office must be administered. Briefly and solemnly the puppets performed their parts; then came the mighty cheer for Mexico's new Chief of State. Viva El Presidente! Viva de la Barra! Viva Mexico! The first act of the comedy was over.

Within an hour the news had traveled to the furthest corner of the capital and the peons who had been quiet all day now mustered into line. There was management in this, not accident, not spontaneous movement; yet all was

joy. By eight o'clock that night a monster parade wound through the capital streets. Police, military bodies, students, peons, clerks, participated. Soldiers fraternized with the men upon whom the night before they had poured a murderous fire. The lion and the lamb walked side by side in peace. Cheers for Madero rent the heavens. The revolution had won.

Both nights I had dined at a restaurant on Avenida San Francisco, three squares from the zocalo. The second night at midnight I walked with a friend along the now almost deserted street to its ending at the plaza, scene of the vast assemblage and the cruel massacre, so little while ago. Perfect peace reigned everywhere; the square and its environs lay deserted under a brilliant moon.

But even as we moralized over a people who faced bullets but who ran from rain, a new sensation was brewing. At that hour Diaz in disguise was making his way from his town house on Cadena Street to the residence of Governor Gonzalez of the State of Mexico. Over beyond the zocalo to the east, well past the San Lazaro station of the narrow gauge railway to Vera Cruz, stood a train that had been waiting for three days. On the train, watchful and ready, was a crew of trusted men. Out on the line ahead was an "advance guard" locomotive. On a siding was a "follower" train filled with troops, under the command of General Victoriano Huerta.

At two o'clock the Diaz family began to arrive in motor cars — Donna Carmen and her maids, Porfirio Diaz, Junior, and his father's chief secretary, eight household servants and endless baggage. Quick work was made in loading. Soon there came two motor cars bearing sympathizing friends to say farewell.

At half past two the big yellow automobile of Governor Gonzalez showing but one small path-finding headlight,

dashed alongside. From it emerged a muffled figure. There were hasty embraces with the waiting friends, and as the figure mounted the steps of the Pullman, the wheels of the train began to revolve. Porfirio Diaz, dictator of Mexico, had fled from his capital.

CHAPTER V

SO the grandson of Evaristo Madero rose to power in Mexico and lifted the Madero clan to a disconcerting eminence; and it is quite certain that few persons in that country or out of it were more astonished than the clan itself at the success of Francisco's stupendous adventure.

The aged grandfather, founder of the family, had succumbed under the strain of anxiety; he died seven weeks before the flight of Diaz, in the belief that the entire clan was doomed to disaster and its princely possessions to confiscation. He had been a very notable figure, old Evaristo Madero, a man of sterling integrity, a builder in every sense of the word; prudent, and energetic, ambitious for the Madero name, that it should neither perish nor be associated with failure. When he died at Monterrey on April 6, 1911, at the age of eighty-two, he left fourteen children, thirty-four grandchildren, and fifty-six great grandchildren. His property in land was three hundred square leagues (about 1,728,000 acres).

Most of the land he had purchased as early as 1872 at eight or ten cents an acre and had used for cattle raising and agriculture on a large scale. The building of the National and International railways between 1880 and 1889 opened the resources of Northern Mexico for development, and Evaristo's holdings became very valuable. Since his death they have been divided among the immediate heirs. His sons and grandsons have acquired land on their own account; the daughters and granddaughters

have married men who owned or have purchased large tracts, and many parcels in the guayule rubber districts have been taken under lease. Altogether the area now controlled by the Maderos and the families that have intermarried with them is three or four times that owned in fee by the head of the family at his death.

Evaristo Madero was interested quite heavily in banking and industrial enterprises, but spent nearly all his time in his country home at Parras, Coahuila, from which place he supervised the management of the extensive rubber properties, factories, vineyards, wine-presses, ranches and cotton plantations which steadily broadened as his sons joined him in the various enterprises.

He held aloof from politics as far as he was able, and steadily counseled his sons to do likewise. His one political experience, three years as governor of Coahuila, had been thrust upon him, and had proved so disagreeable that, although elected for four years, he declined to serve out his term. The four years were the same as those in which Manuel Gonzales was nominal president of Mexico from 1880 to 1884, but in 1883 Evaristo Madero resigned his office and returned to his home in Parras.

It was a shock to him when his grandson Francisco became inspired with a sense of political duty and began to give voice to his advanced theories of government. Francisco had been educated in the United States and he drew comparisons unfavorable to Mexico. He was convinced, he said, that Mexico could never become a really great nation unless the lower classes should be allowed fairer opportunities. A nation, eighty-five per cent. of whose people were illiterate was out of place in the twentieth century, said he; it must progress or it would lose its identity.

Upon this foundation he built his plan of a government

in which oppression of the poor, injustice of courts and despotic militarism should have no part. The rule of Porfirio Diaz, he said, was more than monarchical, it was a tyranny which none dared oppose. As long as the central power could dictate the government of states, no betterment need be expected. While a president of the nation could perpetuate himself in office, the people of the nation would be slaves.

All this was understood by the grandfather; but that old gentleman had seen Mexico grow from a chaotic mass to a well coordinated system, and he believed that another generation or two must pass before radical reforms could be introduced. The patriarch, and his sons too, were inclined to be conservative, but young Francisco was of the third generation more open to modern influences, and he could not be satisfied to see progress wait till tyranny had exhausted itself. His studies and his reading made clear to him that the spirit of freedom was stirring oppressed people everywhere in the old world; why must Mexico be content? More and more the need for action became a personal demand upon him; what better thing could he do with his life, he asked, than devote it to the regeneration of his country?

His first active opposition to the established order was in 1905 when he applied himself to furthering the candidacy of Doctor Garcia Fuentes, a man of progressive ideas, for the governorship of Coahuila. He canvassed the state in the interest of Fuentes and aroused great enthusiasm for his man, while Governor Cardenas, who desired reelection was very generally hated and despised. Nevertheless Cardenas was renominated and, after the Mexican fashion, elected unanimously.

The system did it. Nominations were made by the various *jefes politicos* of the state who were the governor's

own appointees. Elections were carried on under their supervision. Doctor Garcia Fuentes merely achieved the result of making himself ridiculous — and a marked man.

The experience, however, was illuminating to Francisco Madero, Junior, who understood now more clearly than before the absolute power of the political machine which ruled the country. With this system in operation everywhere, no reform was possible.

The only remedy was a complete national overturn. Porfirio Diaz and the Cientificos must give place. They boasted that the byways of Mexico were safer than Hyde Park in London, that the burglar and the brigand had gone out of business. There was truth in this, said Madero; it was not the highwayman or the housebreaker that was feared; it was the Diaz bandit in office.

He enlarged the scope of his labors and in doing so used all his own available funds. His father and grandfather, alarmed by his audacity, would not aid him. He owned a house in Monterrey which he had bought with money realized from cotton raised on land allotted to his use from the Madero estate. He mortgaged this house and spent the meager proceeds in his enormous task of assailing an intrenched and powerful tyranny. His wife, Sara Perez Madero, entered into his plans with her whole heart. They had no children; they would adopt the oppressed children of Mexico.

The apprehension of the elders of the clan was well founded. As has already been told, the widespread interests of the family were embargoed early in 1910 by the Diaz government. Against their convictions, and to their infinite distress of mind, the Maderos found themselves committed to the hopeless revolutionary enterprise of Francisco, Junior, and believed themselves doomed to ruin. Francisco, Senior, eldest son of Evaristo, gave up hope.



FRANCISCO I. MADERO, SR.

Father of President Madero. Eldest son of the late Evaristo Madero, founder of the family.



FRANCISCO I. MADERO, JR.

Inaugurated President of Mexico, Nov. 6, 1911. Deposed by violence Feb. 18, 1913. Murdered Feb. 22, 1913.

He wrote to those of his younger sons who were away attending college, that they all must face poverty and be prepared to go to work, for the family property was irretrievably lost. One son, Carlos, at college in Geneva, Switzerland, studying forestry, expressed the loyal sentiment of himself and brothers.

"Never mind, father," he wrote in answer. "We will all work hard and support you and mother. I am ready to begin at once."

Gustavo Madero, the reformer's brother, was the only member of the family to join the black sheep who had brought all this trouble about, and to risk, so early, his life for the cause. He was naturally an adventurous person, though he had attained the age of thirty-five without displaying this trait in any large way. He looked very unlike a Mexican, with his smooth shaven face, light brown hair and blue eyes—the left eye made of glass, a fact uncommonly difficult to detect.

He was in a printing business in Monterrey at this time. The money to buy it had been obtained from a cotton acreage set apart for him by his father. This business was now included in the general embargo by virtue of which nothing a Madero owned could be sold or mortgaged. Lands, factories, crops, mines, cattle, merchandise, all these the Maderos possessed, but no cash.

It was then that Gustavo took the lead; the situation was desperate and some one must act. But the project he engaged in was as fantastic a gamble in long chances as any ever undertaken.

In January, 1910, a man named Henri Rochette was carrying on at No. 1 Rue St. Georges in Paris, a branch of the Banco Franco-Español of Madrid. Rochette, who has attained since then a wide notoriety, was at that date in disfavor with the Paris Bourse on account of the disastrous

collapse of certain mining and industrial companies which he had floated with capitalizations reaching to many millions of francs, and was desirous of securing some well authenticated offering as a card of reentry to public and official favor.

A mining company in Mexico had been corresponding with Rochette in an endeavor to interest him in a large bond issue on its properties, and Rochette despatched an agent, one M. Carbonneau, to look the proposition over. M. Carbonneau was not long in discovering that he could not, at that juncture, recommend to his principal the big issue of bonds which the mining company wished to float, and was about to return home when Gustavo encountered him in Monterrey and asked him to look into a railway concession in the state of Zacatecas.

Gustavo had secured this concession from an Englishman named Cooper. It carried the right to build and operate a railway from Gomez Farias, a station on the National Railway, to Comacho on the Mexican Central, on the opposite side of the state of Zacatecas, thus connecting the two great trunk lines of Mexico.

The country to be crossed by the railway offered no great engineering difficulties, but it produced little except cactus, while inhabitants, other than jack rabbits, it had none. Still it was a short cut between two productive sections and might assist in developing the state; and Gustavo, with the cooperation of the governor of Zacatecas, secured a guarantee by the state of the interest charges on a bond issue of 27,000 Mexican pesos a kilometer, or 6,210,000 pesos for the two hundred and thirty kilometers—one hundred and forty-three miles—of the line, sufficient to build the road and provide it with a modest equipment.

This interested M. Carbonneau, who took up the matter by cable with Henri Rochette and closed for 3,900,000 pesos

of the issue at 72. A railway company called "The Mexican Railway of the Center," capitalized at 3,000,000 pesos, was promptly formed by Gustavo, with his father as president, his cousin, Rafael Hernandez, as vice-president, himself and his uncle, Alfonso Madero, as directors, the other two being the manager and a clerk of the Bank of Nuevo Leon in Monterrey, an institution controlled by the Madero family. Matters were at this stage when Francisco Madero, Junior, was imprisoned for sedition and members of the Madero clan were at their wits' end.

Gustavo looked the situation squarely in the face and promptly decided what to do. The bond underwriting of the railway provided cash—that cash must be applied to save the family and win the revolution. The revolutionary project was entirely without organization as yet and the soul of the movement was the imprisoned brother. But organization involved little besides labor, and Francisco would presently be released, so Gustavo argued as he made his plans. The really important thing was to secure physical possession of money and by means which would involve no one's honor except his own. With money, all things were possible.

The bond underwriting of 3,900,000 pesos at 72 would net 2,800,000 pesos. Gustavo succeeded in persuading himself that with this fund in hand or any approximate sum in actual cash, the revolution could be carried to success, and that the treasury of Mexico would reimburse him for all outlays. The money could then be restored to the treasury of the railway which would go forward to completion with increased rapidity as the favorite of the government, and to operation which that government could easily make abundantly profitable. But how could he secure personal control of the money without committing the others?

This question he solved by means of a construction com-

pany in which no member of the family appeared. The cash would be paid to the railway company by the underwriting bankers and must then be transferred to the construction company. This he must manage without committing the railway company's officers. Withdrawing the funds from the construction company would then be easy. And as for restoration, the revolution would take care of that.

Avoiding a full disclosure of his plans to those of his relatives who were directors in the railway, Gustavo, in May, 1910, accompanied M. Carbonneau to New York, to which point drafts from Paris to the amount of \$375,000 or 750,000 pesos had been forwarded by Henri Rochette as the first payment on account of the underwriting. This sum appearing wholly inadequate to Gustavo, he induced Carbonneau to go with him to Paris to see Rochette.

Early in June the two men arrived in Paris, where they remained for two fruitless months. Rochette would not or could not advance a larger amount until actual construction of the railway was begun. The first week of August found Gustavo and Carbonneau returning to New York, where they arrived on the 13th. The following day Carbonneau turned over to Gustavo the \$375,000, which the latter deposited in a New York trust company to his own credit, dispensing with all the formalities he had originally planned. Four days afterwards he was in Mexico.

He was well assured in his own mind that the sum he had received was too small for the bold operation he had planned; with millions all could be accomplished, but with a third of a million the effort would be a fruitless hazard of his honor and reputation. But twenty-four hours later he threw discretion to the winds. The family situation was more desperate than ever; it must be relieved at all haz-

ards, and the only effective way to do this was by utterly destroying the Diaz government.

The Madero Idea had made much progress during the three months he had been away. Francisco was still in prison, but that very fact had been an eloquent pleader. Wherever two or three peons gathered, the talk was all of Madero. When he should be released all the oppressed in Mexico would rally around him with any weapons they could find. Let some one in whom they had confidence help them prepare.

All this was explained to Gustavo as soon as he reached Monterrey and he was not proof against the demand. Come what would the revolution should go on; he would back the popular sentiment of Mexico with the pitiful sum of money in his possession against the Cientificos, the army, and the treasury of Diaz, the despot.

He loaned a third of his small capital to relieve the family distress; then he took the road from town to town. Traveling steadily through Mexico while the Centennial celebration was in progress at the capital in the month of September, he organized Madero clubs in all sections. There is no doubt of Gustavo's personal magnetism or his ability as a political organizer. The secret of his movements was well guarded and the thoroughness of his work was unsuspected. On October 1 Gustavo was arrested in Mexico City charged with attempted bribery of an army officer. The charge was a subterfuge and three days later he was released. After arranging with an Italian gentleman of the capital to offer bail for Francisco, Gustavo made all speed for the border and on October 14 met his brother in San Antonio, whither the latter had traveled in disguise as soon as the bail, eight thousand pesos, had been accepted. From that time forward Gustavo and his father were the

active financial managers of the revolution, with headquarters in New York.

Many stories have been printed and direct charges made that revolutionary capital to the amount of millions was furnished by American corporations to aid Madero. The stories were fables and the charges unfounded. There was logic behind them but no facts. This was not due to Gustavo's unwillingness to receive such help or his failure to solicit it, since for many weeks he besought bankers and corporation men in vain. Not one of them would take the risk of being charged later on with having contributed to this cause. Perhaps a more potent reason for their declination was the apparent hopelessness of the Madero movement.

To the Standard Oil Company, Gustavo offered five millions of repudiated bonds which had been issued nearly half a century ago by General Carbajal, who served under Benito Juarez. The general was held to have exceeded his authority, and the issue became worthless. The bonds were to be recognized at face value by the Mexican government if Madero won. All the junta at Washington were to sign the agreement to this effect. One million dollars, or one-fifth of the par value, was the sum Gustavo asked of the Standard Oil Company. The same offer he made to the Waters Pierce Oil Company in St. Louis, and to various other corporations and bankers with present or prospective interests in Mexico. Not one of them would rise to the bait. Not a dollar of American money, or any other money, except that belonging to the railway did Gustavo secure.

The committee of the United States Senate appointed to investigate this matter searched for two years in vain for evidence to fasten financial assistance to Madero upon "persons or firms or corporations of the United States." The committee learned something of the railway fund, but

the amount seemed utterly inadequate. The thing which had been accomplished by the Madero revolution had cost millions, the committee argued. Such a sweeping overturn must have involved an immense outlay for arms alone. If the gentlemen of the committee had known the inner history of the fall of Diaz, the affair would not have appeared in so mysterious a light.

A Canadian lumber company admitted to a representative of the committee that it had contributed \$30,000 to Pino Suarez for certain rights to mahogany in Yucatan, but it could not be established that even this sum was used in the interests of the Madero cause. It is certain that none of it passed through Gustavo's hands.

Gustavo paid \$55,000 for arms and \$50,000 to Sherbourne G. Hopkins of Washington as counsel for the revolution. The arms were sent forward in three shipments, the largest of which did not arrive till after peace had been established. The two smaller shipments were all that were received from sources outside of Mexico itself. Hopkins accomplished nothing of importance in return for his fee.

Organization expenses in Mexico, junta expenses in San Antonio and Washington, publicity costs in the United States, and the thousand and one incidentals of the enterprise used up Gustavo's little fund. As has been stated the balance in hand was only \$1,500 at the time when the meeting with Limantour took place, and it had dwindled to \$1,200 at the end.

The repayment of the funds abstracted from the railway treasury by Gustavo was included in the peace agreement signed by the delegates of Diaz and Madero at El Paso on May 21, 1911, but the source from which Gustavo had secured the money was not named. Giving this item such importance seemed to stamp the Maderos as greedy men; it could not be openly set forth that warrants were out for

Gustavo in the United States in connection with these funds, and that no time must be lost in repayment of them.

An appropriation to refund 700,000 pesos to Gustavo Madero for advances he had made was passed by the Mexican Congress among its first acts after de la Barra succeeded to the presidency. This evoked comment from one end of Mexico to the other and was the foundation upon which Gustavo's reputation as a grafter was built.

Among the injudicious acts of the Maderos this hasty and obvious reimbursing of Gustavo takes high rank. The family owed this brother of Francisco Madero a debt of gratitude. It would have been easy for them to arrange a loan at the moment of their victory to shield Gustavo's character from attack. Later on an adjustment of the matter could have been made. Much adverse peon sentiment was based upon this badly managed affair, which was never allowed to disappear from view while Madero ruled.

CHAPTER VI

IN describing the overthrow of Diaz I have dealt very lightly with the influences exerted by and through the State Department at Washington. There is no doubt that the framers of policy, both official and unofficial, had lost in a few months their good will toward the Mexican dictator, and had come to desire that he should be deposed and that a man more amenable to control should take his place; but de la Barra was their candidate, not Madero. De la Barra had given satisfactory assurances on the Japanese question, and was acceptable to business interests. He was not the man to involve his country in trouble with the United States, but there was no longer any confidence to be reposed in Diaz. The latter might force intervention which many desired, but which no one in authority dared undertake.

Francisco Madero, the younger, was undesirable for many reasons, in regard to some of which the views of Washington statesmen and their advisers were contradictory. It was said that Madero was a reformer of the type peculiarly obnoxious to the Taft administration and to Americans having large investments in Mexico. On the other hand it was asserted that he and his family — especially the latter — were seeking to control the government from purely selfish motives, and would inaugurate an era of graft. There were those who even went so far as to view the prospect of Madero's ascendancy with complacency, because of their belief that he and the men who would serve him could be bought.

But what Washington hoped for was that de la Barra might retain the presidential seat for a considerable time, and that the Madero upheaval might subside, so that when an "election" should finally be held, a safe and sane man would be counted in. It is alleged that there was an understanding between Diaz and de la Barra, with the approval of the Taft administration, prior to March 7, 1911, but so far as Diaz is concerned this is an error. De la Barra knew that he would have the approval of the United States, if he should succeed to the Mexican presidency as provisional incumbent, but Diaz was not a party to the bargain. He meant to remain in office, and if the proper measures had been taken in his behalf he might have held the place against anything except armed intervention by the United States.

I have described his government as undermined, and as falling with every evidence of its inherent weakness; and I have elsewhere spoken of it as solvent and as powerful beyond comparison with the rebellion that assailed it. There is no real contradiction in this. The Diaz autocracy was doomed, in default of vigorous and radical action in its defense. Fraud and incompetency had weakened the military arm. But money can recruit soldiers, buy munitions, and even hire competent officers, and Limantour could have secured all the funds that Mexico needed for these purposes. Beyond question the Madero revolt might have been conquered in the field, if the central government could have been protected from external foes. And if de la Barra could give pledges satisfactory to the Taft administration, Limantour could have given them equally well, and could have forced their acceptance upon Diaz. Washington would then have been left with no cause for aggression except that which has since proved to be so embarrassing — resentment toward an individual. It is

obvious that Diaz, as an object of personal disfavor, would have attracted far more sympathy than has accrued to Huerta.

The Madero movement, considered as a political wave, rolled up by agitation against economic abuses, need not have been permitted to overwhelm the government. It is my opinion that the elimination of Corral alone would have sufficed. Unquestionably it was essential, and no plan to save Diaz which did not have this as its first article, can be said to have been good. In fact I have the greatest difficulty in understanding how a plan which lacked this feature could have been conceived in sincerity. Everybody knew that Corral must be thrown overboard. No other Jonah was ever so reliably guaranteed to sink a ship of state.


The land question which many American observers believe to be the simple root of Mexican revolts is in reality so complicated that it lends itself to policies of delay and subterfuge. Seriously considered, the merit of any program depends upon the method of solution which it contains. The mere proposal to take land from large holders and give it to landless men would never prevail, even in such a country of general ignorance as Mexico. Persons having some regard for property rights and legal procedure would exercise a controlling influence, though outnumbered. The distribution of so-called public lands is confused by state rights, and involves reform of state governments. Whether public or private lands are considered, there is no validity in promises unbacked by a good working plan, hostile alike to existing wrongs and to sentimental clamor for spoliation. Even in so poor a field for intelligent discussion the too enthusiastic land scheme of Madero could have been beaten, if the government had met the issue boldly and sincerely.

But affectation of sincerity was useless and nonsensical

while Corral and all he stood for were retained, and a cabinet which stood for nothing in particular was installed. The timidity of the proceeding was so obvious that it evoked laughter, even from business men who were disappointed and alarmed. Every Maderista from the leader to the humblest of his followers felt a sense of personal triumph as the government's weakness was exposed more and more thoroughly to view. Direct antagonism to Diaz was enormously stimulated, and his fall was made inevitable.

It came, and the suave Minister of Foreign Relations took the vacant chair; but this seeming victory was really a defeat for those who had hoped to prolong de la Barra's provisional term, and to evolve from that situation something more agreeable than the presidency of Madero. The manner in which Diaz was unseated had so strengthened the Madero Idea that the Washington Idea had no chance against it in the Mexican political arena. And with de la Barra in the seat of Diaz there was no excuse for forcible interference. Recognition and a show of friendliness toward Mexico could not be avoided without such obvious double dealing as would have turned the stomach of the world. The enemies of Madero worked hard, as will be shown more fully hereafter, but his cause had been too greatly helped and had gained too much headway to be quelled in a few months.

These events took place under my observation, and excited my interest and amazement. I had great faith in Limantour's ability, and still retain it. I saw him come to the Mexican capital to extricate Diaz from his troubles, with the visible result that every measure which seemed to me essential was neglected, almost every possible folly was committed, and complete disaster was achieved in



FRANCISCO LEON DE LA BARRA

Minister of Foreign Relations and Provisional President of Mexico, May 25-Nov. 6, 1911. Minister of Foreign Relations in the Huerta Cabinet, Feb. 19-July 30, 1913. Since then Minister to France.

sixty-six days. This seemed clearly to indicate the existence of obstacles unperceived and causes too obscure for my discernment.

And yet it was plain that in some respects Limantour's position was difficult. Here was a man preeminent in ability, and quietly but very earnestly ambitious of distinction, who was playing the leading rôle, at a crisis of the Mexican drama, with no rewards offered him whether by men or destiny. He could not then aspire to the presidency as the immediate successor of Diaz without exciting suspicion of disloyalty. Even had this been possible to a man of his character, the thing could not have been accomplished, except through directly antagonizing those influences at Washington which were behind de la Barra.

It would seem to have been wise for the State Department at Washington, when conveying to de la Barra the intimation that he would be acceptable as provisional president, to send with it a stipulation that Limantour should be Minister of Finance. This would not have been agreeable to Limantour, but it is probable that his consent could have been extorted, if he had seen the autonomy of Mexico depending upon it. And if Limantour had in this manner been chained to the de la Barra régime, he might have permitted less to be done that would weaken it, and have devised some means by which it could be strengthened. In the actual event, de la Barra was left without adequate visible support, and the fight against Madero had to be made chiefly by secret methods.

But to some of those divided and uncertain counselors who exerted their influence at Washington, the well remembered Limantour was *persona non grata*. Despite his Científico affiliation, and good standing with the bankers, his too close connection with the new government in Mexico would not have been favorably viewed by certain

great business interests. There had been notable instances of his opposition to the plans of Americans, when they seemed to tend toward monopoly — none more telling than his rejection of Harriman's offer to take over the control of the railways. Wherefore there were commercial powers standing close to the Taft administration which preferred a Mexico without the opposing force of Limantour for them to cope with. If they could not have a Mexico with the American flag over it, to multiply the value of their holdings there by two or three, a president possessing *de la Barra's* amiable qualities would be the best available substitute. And this is not to be taken as alleging against *de la Barra* anything worse than weakness.

It will be seen that Limantour was seriously handicapped in his efforts to save Diaz from the consequences of his quarrel with the United States and from the menace of a revolt which it might be unwise forcibly to put down. Yet his procedure seemed to me to be open to severe criticism and to involve besides an element of mystery. The truth of my text that in Mexico things are never what they seem is here borne in upon my own mind potently, for though I am entirely persuaded that Limantour was loyal to Diaz, his conduct wears an aspect so perverse as to deceive my eyes if not my judgment. Following upon his interviews with Maderista leaders in New York between March 7 and March 15, 1911, his acts in Mexico as reflected in the policy of the government from March 20 till Diaz fell, curiously resemble the accomplishment of a definite undertaking. The cabinet changes, and the hasty, ill managed adoption of the revolution's economic platform lifted Madero to a position of such advantage that he became almost unassailable. Failure to force action in the cases of Corral and the bandit governors, together with silence on the subject of the *jefe politico* system, robbed the Diaz pro-

nouncements of their last claim to credence. As an invitation to disaster this was truly masterly.

The foregoing statements charge Limantour with grave errors, not with improper motives. I have expressed an opinion as to the appearance of his conduct. It astonishes me that a man so acute and so jealous of his reputation should not have known what his performance looked like, while he was about it.

Criticism was not lacking at the time. Limantour was severely censured by the "Porfiristas" for the measures which he caused Diaz to adopt, and simultaneously he was assailed as a Cientifico by those who were threatening the men of the old régime with retribution, declared to be long overdue. Scandal mongers revived the stories of the railway merger, and added fantastic embellishments. When, in the relish of new freedom, harmless but vociferous mobs of Maderistas marched in the streets, shouting vivas for their leader, and muerras for "Los Cientificos," they often added a special muerra for Limantour. It may seem that they should have cheered him for his recent acts, even if they were too ignorant to appreciate his distinguished services to his country.

It is possible that his departure was somewhat hastened by fears for his personal safety, but popular applause could not have induced him to remain. He now saw de la Barra as a passing, unimportant figure, with Madero already treading on his heels. Despite the muerras of the mob he might have been Minister of Finance in the Madero Cabinet. The little reformer invited him, but Limantour was not tempted. He preferred to view from a distance the unfolding of the scroll of fate.

Limantour's explanation of his course in the spring of 1911 is that nothing better could have been done in the circumstances; or, to be more exact, that he was unable

at that time to devise and put in operation any measures that seemed more promising. To have opposed the Madero revolt by military force would have bathed Mexico in blood, and might have involved other lamentable consequences which no patriot could bring himself to contemplate. Peace was essential.

The elimination of Corral was a subject useless to discuss with Diaz, indeed impossible to broach. The adoption of the Maderist program of reforms seemed unavoidable because of the widespread and aggressive popular support. The cabinet was the best that could be brought together. Its members were able; they were politically inoffensive, and suitable to the obviously correct policy which was conciliatory. A good government would have resulted, but adverse influences were too strong in that hour of excitement, and the structure was overthrown. He had done what he could, actuated by love of country and loyalty to its constitutional ruler under whom he served. The situation passed beyond his control, beyond the stage where his immediate influence could be of value. He withdrew, therefore, from contact with public affairs, and did not voluntarily exercise his influence upon them afterwards,—so he assured me late in the winter of 1914, in Paris.

About three years had elapsed since his departure from his native land, seven days after the fall of Diaz. Mexico's disordered condition had become the foremost topic for the world to talk about, and intervention by the United States seemed close at hand. To my request for light upon his policy Señor Limantour responded with the question, "What would you have done?"

Proof sheets of a portion of this book were before him, but obviously he addressed all his critics with that question, not myself alone; wherefore I was not unduly flat-

tered. My reply followed the lines of what I had written, and resulted in a protracted discussion. Five hours a day for five successive days that man of inexhaustible patience listened and spoke, with never a flaw in courtesy. And in the end I was unconvinced; the policy still seemed to me to have been erroneous, and the constraining power of circumstances insufficient to excuse it. For that reason I have given only a brief summary of the case from Limantour's point of view, leaving an extended statement to some chronicler possessed of the requisite sympathy and conviction.

After the cause of Diaz was lost Limantour prepared for permanent residence abroad, and if this involved a real detachment from Mexico's affairs, the decision was extraordinary. The financial structure which he had built with so much devotion and with such pride in the work, he must leave to inexperienced men in whom he could have had but little confidence. The railway merger whose continuing success would depend upon the peace of the country and the development of its resources, must be subjected to all the hazards faced by the incoming government, whose precarious existence no one was better qualified than Limantour to foresee.

This seems incredible. A man of Limantour's talents and character would naturally plan unceasingly for the future. He must have perceived that though the Madero Idea had captured Mexico, its exponents in the government were confronted by the alternative of carrying out the violent economic changes which they had promised or of abandoning them with the result of losing popular support. An era of treachery and plots was plainly dawning. The de la Barra episode would last barely six months, but even in that space much trouble would be brewing; and afterwards would come Madero, new to his task, visionary,

sure to be deceived by conspiring enemies and by some of his associates who were unscrupulous and hungry.

Limantour had been too long the chief factor in Mexico's commercial advancement to abandon all interest in that country's future. The financial world still looked to him as the only authority on the national credit. His active brain must have been filled with thoughts of possible combinations of men and events that would develop after the Madero Idea should have spent itself. Many active brains in Mexico were already busy with these problems, and many hands were secretly at work to hasten the disintegrating processes which would bring about new situations and disclose attractive opportunities. It was in such conditions that the de la Barra interlude began.

With commendable lack of ostentation the prominent Científicos of the Diaz régime removed themselves from the local jurisdiction. They were confident of de la Barra's intent to protect them, but they did not care to take long chances with the sentiment of the people which they doubted de la Barra's ability to control. Finance Minister Limantour, General Mondragon, Científico Chief Pineda, Federal District Governor Landa y Escandon and various others departed from Mexico without ceremony for Paris, London and New York. The "Bancaria," the Científico clearing house and contracting concern, organized a subsidiary company in the United States, to which it could transfer its property at a moment's notice if threatened with revocation of its concessions, and began to look for business in Cuba. The handsomest automobiles and the finest teams of high-stepping, imported horses were no longer in evidence in the Sunday parades. The great change in Mexico had begun.

The Diaz bubble had burst. No longer did the Diaz bugaboo perch above the chamber door or listen through the walls or sit beside one at table or walk with one along the

street. Not now did the gendarme, that outward and visible sign of Diaz omnipotence, politely beckon forward those who loitered in converse on Avenida San Francisco or halted a moment in the doorway or on the steps of a public building. The Mexican National Anthem could now be sung at will; it could even be whistled without fine or imprisonment. The days of Diaz the tyrant were over.

Madero, the people's friend, had freed all Mexico from espionage and placed the Mexicans on their honor. De la Barra was the man who rode through the streets escorted by the outriding, resplendent presidential guard, mounted on imported, matched bays; de la Barra was the grave, handsome occupant of the presidential coach who bowed politely to the feeble salute as he passed, but Madero the comrade of the poor, was now the real god within the machine, soon to step forth. Muerra los Cientificos! Viva Madero!

Yet it was not until a week after Limantour's departure that Madero's hold upon the imagination of Mexico's ignorant masses was fully made manifest. Not in the history of the modern world has such an exhibition of idolatry been given as that of Mexico's lower orders for Madero as he traveled from his home in Parras, in the State of Coahuila, to Mexico's capital. His train was four days making the seven hundred miles journey. Starting on the third of June, 1911, nine days after de la Barra had been made provisional president, he did not reach Mexico City until the seventh, after a triumphal progress to the music of a ceaseless shout of "Viva Madero!" By day and by night this chorus rolled from the throats of multitudes gathered along the track at crossings, at water tanks, at bridges, at culverts, at trestles, and in all the towns and cities to do him honor.

It was more than honor this primitive people bestowed

upon Madero; it was worship. From great distances the peons came to greet him, to listen to his voice, to look upon his face, to touch the hem of his garment. He was heralded as the savior of his people; not a human, but as a god. The date of this journey was unknown even to Madero himself until three days before his departure from the home of the Madero clan. Yet all across northern and central Mexico the word was carried, by letter, by telegraph, by grapevine; and those who were not bedridden arose and made their way at the best possible speed to the nearest point on the railway along which the Deliverer was to come.

Those who had money traveled by train from distant points, but immense numbers who had no money came on foot, on burros, on mules, on horses, and in ramshackle carts, from as far as two hundred miles, by forced marches, praying that they might arrive in time. They came in rags and bare of foot. They brought their baby children in zerapes swung upon their backs. The aged came with bent shoulders and quaking limbs. The lame and halt came hobbling with cane and crutch. Over mountain trails, across cactus-grown wastes, the strong carrying the weak, children of tender years, like suckling calves, toddling beside their mothers — in every manner by which a primitive people of all conditions of age and action could move about, the poor of Mexico's northern and central states made their way from their customary abiding places to a point on the railroad through which Madero, the peon Messiah, the conqueror of the great Diaz, would pass.

At lonely stations in the mountains where one train a day might stop and where the only human being in sight would normally be the sleepy agent of the line — at such places hundreds gathered from everywhere and nowhere for the great event, and when the train bearing the man who

had performed the miracle of deposing the tyrant steamed into view, its noise was inaudible for shouts of "Viva Madero!" The man with the "spirit call" to free Mexico appeared, and magically the tumult ceased as he prepared to speak. God knows what those poor creatures, children in all but years, fancied that they heard their liberator say. They never failed to be attentive or to accept the words of hope and promise as a gospel of immediate salvation. At the conclusion shouts broke forth anew; the crowd surged forward to grasp his hand, to touch his clothing—and the train moved on, leaving across Mexico a trail of dreams as unsubstantial as the steam that vanished in the air.

From an eye witness only, of such scenes, can a true measure of peon devotion to Francisco Madero be drawn. In Mexico City there were fully three hundred thousand visitors added to the city's normal four hundred thousand, and the entry of Madero on that seventh of June was greeted with a testimonial of popular rejoicing beyond anything in the city's history. The severe earthquake of the early morning by which 207 persons lost their lives was forgotten two hours later when the Madero train was due. The streets and plazas were jammed with people without police or military guard. Foreigners of all nations mixed freely with natives. Exemplary good nature and good order marked the day. A new order of affairs had taken possession of Mexico. The people were "on honor" and they bore their dignity well.

From the day Madero entered Mexico City, de la Barra was president in name only. Maderistas filled the cabinet offices. Madero's uncle was now Minister of Finance. Madero's ideas of personal freedom and freedom of the press had free rein. Madero's measures were put through Congress. Madero's office at number 99 Paseo de la Re-

forma was the real seat of government. De la Barra at the Palacio Nacional was a figurehead.

Promptly came Washington's recognition of the de la Barra government. Followed quickly that of France, England and Spain. Ready made diplomacy performed its evolutions in the open with smoothness and despatch. No annoying demands were pressed in an unfriendly way by any government. Washington was considerate and kindly. Madero sat down to dinner at the American Club beside Ambassador Wilson who, but a few months before, at that same table, had publicly denounced him as "imbecile." Belief was general among Americans in Mexico that the Washington government was extremely cordial to the Madero cause and was preparing to aid "the little fellow" when he should become president, with its full moral support. It had seemed clear that to Madero had been granted unusual privileges while he was perfecting, on American soil, his plans for revolution in Mexico, and it was thought that Washington's extreme courtesy to de la Barra was earnest of its intent, when Madero should come into his own, to second his efforts toward real democracy by every influence within the range of its far reaching power.

The United States troops which had been "maneuvering" in Texas were presently withdrawn to their various posts. This pleased and reassured the Mexicans whose attitude toward Americans took on an unwonted friendliness. Americans were thought to be in high favor with the new ruling powers in the country, and Mexicans in general took the cue. Uncle Sam was not such a bad fellow after all — he had had a chance to walk over and "take" their country and he had let it pass.

Many resident Americans laid plans for enlarging the scope of their activities. They were close observers of sentiment and movement and were not deceived by surface

smoothness. They saw the indications of intrigue and double-dealing which bubbled through the crust. But they expressed full confidence in Washington's vigilance and did not believe that any political moves of material moment could be made without their significance being understood by the American government and provided for. An opening was in sight to advance American interests and pave the way for large increases of trade in staples across the border. Strong American support for Madero, the advance agent of democracy in Mexico, was the key to the commercial situation and to the well being of all concerned.

The Madero clan moved their active business headquarters from northern Mexico to the capital. Plans were quietly made to modernize the supply departments of the government. The diversity of manufacturing carried on by the Maderos at their own towns and haciendas of Coahuila and adjacent states afforded facilities for the readjustment of government patronage on practical lines. Materials and provisions for the equipment and sustenance of the army had previously been purchased of favorites on a basis unduly profitable to those directly concerned, and the result had been scandal. The business men of the Madero family now took charge of these affairs, and they had not far to look for honest people with whom to deal — they found them in themselves.

Francisco Madero, Junior, occupied in efforts to harmonize contending social and political interests, paid little attention to these sordid details. There is no doubt that he was honestly devoted to the cause of good government in Mexico. He held substantially the same opinions that he used to express in those curbstone lectures which Diaz did not take the trouble to interrupt. Upon this point of consistency in doctrine I may presume to speak, for I was often an auditor of Madero's in the days when the revolution

was only a dream. The apostle to the lowly occupied for some months, in 1909, a rented white house on the 3a Calle Berlin, corner of the Calle Liverpool, and many of his orations were delivered before his own door.

I lived but a block distant and would sometimes hear the applause of the rabble assembled in front of the white house, and be led to stroll that way. I was not greatly moved by the matter of "the little man's" discourses, but they never failed to interest and thrill the peons in pajamas who made up the overwhelming majority of the audience. Tense silences would testify to the speaker's hold upon his hearers. Then would come, perhaps, a choked cry of applause from a single person, the sound seeming to be forced out of an overburdened bosom through clenched teeth, and the whole assemblage would burst forth into a chorus that sounded sometimes as if it were made up chiefly of sobs that could no longer be suppressed.

The orator must have had a certain gift, but it defies analysis. He had no personal magnetism that an American could discover, unless it may have lain in an effect of courage. He was always a brave man; no good observer ever doubted it; and in his sympathy with the oppressed he was sincere. Let no one persuade you to the contrary. But in appearance and manner he was the reverse of impressive; barely five feet four in height, with nothing especially distinctive in the face or figure; with little fire in the brown eyes. The caricaturists found his beard the salient feature, but it was really very ordinary, a plain, small beard of a brownish tinge, a little lighter than his hair.

His social and political theories were set forth in a book, "The Presidential Succession," which a few months later was translated into English and printed in the Mexican *Herald*. The work aimed to show that the evils which the nation suffered were due to an unchanging government

hostile to progress. It attacked the Científicos very justly, and was in that part an anti-trust argument stated with considerable intelligence. Now that his theories had won political success he still held to his ideals, strove vainly to make them into realities, and in the end gave his life for them, not cowardly, as every honest man who knew him will admit.

His uncle, Ernesto Madero, the ablest and most active business man of the Madero clan, was Minister of Finance in the de la Barra cabinet. His father, Francisco Madero, Senior, held no office, but was diligently cooperating with Ernesto in all practical matters. Other members of the elder generation of the Madero family were aiding in the work. Confident that the provisional government was being well guarded in its routine business affairs, Francisco Madero, Junior, applied himself to his own special problems. His knowledge of business was limited to paying his own debts scrupulously. He congratulated himself on being a member of a practical family.

President de la Barra looked smilingly on as the Maderos arranged the government patronage. He understood that the Madero clan had been made to endure material hardships, and that it should now have an opportunity to recoup its losses. He himself had three deserving brothers; these he placed as comfortably as he could in departments of the close corporation government, and let the Maderos have their way.

De la Barra soon found the ready-made cabinet which had been handed in from the El Paso conference a sore trial to his delicately adjusted organism. He was politically opposed to many of its members, and only his infinite tact prevented frequent clashes. With Ernesto Madero, with his cousin Rafael Hernandez, who was Minister of Fomento and with Jorge Vera Estañol, Minister of Public

Instruction, surface contact was smooth because they were gentlemen, but confidence was lacking on all sides. The schemes of the others were harder to manage. One of the Vasquez Gomez brothers was dismissed by common consent for sufficient reasons; the other was frozen out. Not till to Garcia Granados was given the important cabinet position of Minister of Gobernacion did de la Barra possess a friend, a man of his own kind, in his official family. In one respect he was fortunate. As Acting President only, he still retained his former office—he was his own Secretary of State.

Gustavo Madero promptly became the most talked of unofficial member of the Madero family. Much of the gossip affecting him had its origin in business enterprises which might well be described as escapades. He was indifferent to public opinion and the public took its vengeance; it pilloried him for the sins of the family.

Too open in his dealings to be shrewd; too emphatically a man of his word to succeed against the double dealing about him, Gustavo Madero was ever being referred to as a grafter, yet was never known to achieve practical grafting results. That he was a gambler in long chances, that his undertakings were ill-advised, and that his operations were not guided by the rules of conventional business cannot be denied; but he was unselfish, true to his friends, and of undaunted personal courage. His father and uncles were jealous of his influence with his brother and they presently weakened it. In none of their dealings with the government did he participate.

Socially, the Maderos introduced a new and refreshing element into the life of the capital. In the Madero invasion of Mexico City their women folk were a notable feature. Unsophisticated and prudish, but fresh-looking and attractive, they made a distinct impression as they moved

about the asphalt section of the city and became good buyers at the French shops downtown. Flocking in from their haciendas and villages, they provided a sharp contrast to the liberally powdered women of social prominence in capital affairs. The Paris-gowned beauties of the old régime looked at them with amusement. It was a social inundation from the northern provinces which must not be allowed to rise too high.

The schemes of Madero's enemies to discredit him during the de la Barra interim were comprehensively planned and tactically correct in execution, but the reformer's hold upon the people was too strong to be shaken loose in the allotted time. There was nothing dilatory however in the work of the trouble makers. Within forty-eight hours from the day Madero entered Mexico City the conspiring against him began. It progressed steadily to the day elections were held, October second, and it developed more rapidly still from that day onward. Traps without number were laid for him, many of which were frustrated by the vigilance of his family or by his own bravery. Wherever there was a manifestation of discontent, there Madero appeared in person, and the threats, which in his absence had been uttered against his life, melted into cheers at his approach.

Among his enemies there were some quite capable of arranging for his secret assassination, but they recoiled from the frightful conditions which would result. The only effective and safe way to dispose of Madero was to have him killed by his own followers. To stir up sufficient resentment among them to cause this to be done was the aim of certain men who had been shorn of power. Many of these were absent from Mexico, but their emissaries were everywhere active.

Tricks to discredit the new government, to foment trouble

and to disgust the people were played by holdover clerks and officials of the post, the telegraph, the railways, the customs and the departments of government both federal and state. These men knew that their employment would soon pass to others and be permanently lost, if Madero actually succeeded to the presidency, and they let no opportunity escape to complicate and disarrange what had become a ponderous but exceedingly effective and precise operation of civil routine.

Disbanding the Madero forces also afforded openings for the trouble makers. When all the various bands were reckoned up, the number reached to nearly twenty thousand men, many of whom had fought for loot rather than democracy, while many others had not fought at all. The hold-over Diaz congress made difficulties about payment for the "military" service of these men. Every proposition to this end was fought. The final award was meager in the extreme. With a few pesos each the Maderist "soldiers" were asked to go home and lay down their arms, while the soldiers of the federal army which they had defeated were left with jobs and the pay.

Madero's mountaineer officers who had won battles against generals of Diaz educated at Chepultepec Academy were a distinctly menacing element to deal with, because each had partisans and followers standing ready to resent any slight put upon their leaders whose deeds were now, in the general exultation of complete success, magnified to prodigies of personal valor and military skill. The old line officers would not consort with the new and uncouth Maderist victors, yet the old officers could not be dispensed with, else the troops would mutiny.

In these difficulties the trading and the pacifying were done by Madero in person, while de la Barra sat calmly on the presidential seat, apparently aiding Madero's ef-

forts to solve the riddles. The Maderist cabinet officers were jealous of the members of the Madero family and connections, whose influence constantly interfered with official routine. Vague charges of graft were spread through the country to promote disgust among the fanatical followers of Madero who had received scanty rewards.

Also during these months Madero's wild promises came home for fulfilment and added to his burdens. He had promised freedom, and the lower classes had taken the promise literally. To pick up that which they desired in the public markets, to "squat" upon private lands they coveted—this was the peon idea of freedom. For appropriating market stuffs they went to jail; for squatting on private lands they received the prod of the bayonet. Disgust, disenchantment and dismay resulted—and de la Barra looked politely on.

The most winning argument of Madero, as he had lectured from town to town prior to the actual opening of military operations, had been his promise to cut up the great estates and open them for settlement by the peons. Millions on millions of acres were lying fallow but held tight in ownership by rich men who had secured them through favor or by extravagant grant for real or supposed service to a previous government of Mexico. The titles of these estates were to be attacked, and the peon, to whom possession of a few acres was wealth untold, was to have his chance.

Fulfilment of these promises was now demanded, and their emptiness exposed. What had seemed feasible to the dreamer on fire with zeal to benefit his people was found to be practically impossible. In no way without disruption of the social order could Madero bring about confiscation of estates. There were government lands which were more open to treatment, but the process of arranging

for their cutting up was slow. It must await a new congress.

These demands upon Madero for land were insistent, insulting, denunciatory, but he was helpless. He sparred for time until he himself should be in office, but found it difficult to pacify the impatience of the peons for fields to call their own. The fact that the Madero family held millions of acres in the north of Mexico was alleged to be a reason for Madero's failure to seize private lands for the benefit of the poor. Also the charge was made that members of the Madero family were affiliating with the Cientificos and other big landowners whom Madero had sworn to destroy. The Cientificos themselves took care that the reports should be spread. So discontent and disillusionment worked their way to the remotest corners of Mexico.

Madero's own errors contributed to the disquiet among his followers. Selecting José Maria Pino Suarez as his vice president was a costly blunder which aroused strenuous opposition, especially from those who held that Doctor Francisco Vasquez Gomez, former head of the Madero junta in Washington, was entitled to the place. Both men were unfit for the position but Pino Suarez, an obscure editor from Yucatan who had taken no part in the revolution, was a dead weight. Also the enmity of Vasquez Gomez partizans added to the complications, and played into the hands of those who were trying to ruin Madero in the estimation of the people.

While these unsettling agencies were at work, Madero himself was confident. That he was losing ground as the elections approached was clear to him, but he was certain that his margin of safety was sufficient to withstand all inroads upon it. So convinced was he of winning that he scorned all suggestions of a party organization to system-

atize and modernize election arrangements and act as support to his administration of affairs.

Untutored in the political necessity of party mechanism operating from the center to remotest sections, he looked upon such a device as a means to thwart popular will. His ideas of practical democracy were as vague as they were visionary. He would not consider the possibility that the people whom he hoped to serve faithfully would become so distrustful as to turn against him in great numbers. To him, even then, the presidency seemed omnipotence, but he declared that he would use his power for the public good which could not fail of appreciation by a grateful people. He maintained that the Mexicans were gentle in disposition, and under fair treatment would give a good account of themselves. He saw the disintegrating influences at work but was confident that he could cope with them, once he was seated in the presidential chair.

The elections were held on October second and, as all the world knows, he was successful. Those who have stated that his total vote was but 20,000 out of a possible 3,000,000 are in error. They have taken the numbers of electors chosen at primaries, not those of the whole electorate. As a spectator of a curious phenomenon, I watched the voting operations that day in two small districts of Mexico City. Nearly one thousand votes were cast in these districts. It was an interesting exhibit, being the first free election ever held in Mexico. There were scattering votes for barbers, for bullfighters, for brigands. There were votes for Porfirio Diaz, for Limantour, for de la Barra, for Zapata the bandit, for Orozco, a Maderist officer. But Madero, though steadily intrigued against for months and discredited by every means his enemies could contrive and his own errors invite, Madero, "the peon Messiah," received more than ninety per cent. of the total in these "pri-

mary" election districts, and there were more than 14,000 such districts in the republic of Mexico.

Election, however, in Mexico, is one thing; and inauguration, as Madero discovered, is another. For a few days Madero cheers rang through the streets with something of the early enthusiasm, and Madero himself caused a demonstration whenever he appeared. But the undermining influences were working now with increased vigor, and began to make themselves felt in vituperative articles of the scurrilous press, in obscene and disgusting pictures of comic weeklies, and in real or manufactured scandals which were bruited about.

Business and banking circles in Mexico were solidly against Madero and all who sympathized with him. To be a Maderista was to lose credit at all big banks except one, which declined to be influenced by the political affiliation of its customers. Partizans of Madero, during the month succeeding his election, were objects of open ridicule. The Maderista was scoffed at for expecting that "the little chap" would be allowed to take his seat.

In the closing days of October an incident occurred which brought suspicion on de la Barra and put Madero on his guard. Zapata, who has since achieved world-wide fame as bandit chief of southern Mexico, was not then so deeply dyed in outrageous villainy and innocent blood. Like many Maderista leaders he was charged with brigandage, but until that time, he had asserted that he maintained his marauding bands only to enforce delivery of certain agreed-upon property rights for the poor of the State of Morelos. He had been an ally of Madero, and the latter declined to credit the charges of wanton outrage and killing laid against the "Attila of the South," insisting that, if a fair treaty should be made with him, the bandit would become a good Indian and disband his men.

Zapata would treat with none but Madero, and, declining a proposal that he visit Mexico City, suggested that he might meet Señor Madero at the ancient town of Cuautla, eighty-five miles distant from the City of Mexico, in the State of Morelos. Both men were to be without escort, and government pursuit of Zapata's band was to be suspended for the two days he would be absent from his camp. This arrangement was agreed to in precise terms, Madero giving his written word that no hostile move should be made during the stipulated term, relying upon President de la Barra to issue the necessary orders.

Apparently the orders were not made sufficiently explicit, for Zapata, who had secreted twenty men about the plaza in Cuautla to guard against a possible misadventure, was awaiting Madero's arrival at the appointed hour, when a hard-riding courier dashed into the town and informed him that their main body had been attacked by federal forces, several men had been killed, and the band chased over the mountains; also that several hundred federals were at that moment waiting outside Cuautla to capture Zapata on his return to camp.

As Madero was without military guard, the presumed expectation had been that Zapata would either accuse him of treachery and kill him outright, or would carry him off as a hostage. In the latter case an attempted "rescue" by federal forces might result in an accident to Madero which would ever remain charged to Zapata's account.

This elaborate plan miscarried. Zapata understood its animus and laughed at its absurdity. There was a tie between these two men which placed killing out of the question. Those who had framed the trap had been ignorant of conditions. Madero alive and president of Mexico was a Zapata asset. Madero killed or in his custody was a liability of the deadliest sort.

The interview was held and a treaty made which Zapata did not attempt to keep. Madero returned to Mexico City unharmed. Zapata made a detour and reached his men in safety.

But the disclosure of double dealing was so complete that Madero took steps to protect himself. Through a hastily organized secret service squad of ten of his most trusted followers he learned on November third, that on the tenth he was to be decoyed into a suburb and disposed of in a way that would tend to throw suspicion upon certain men who would call upon Madero that day and make demands which he could not grant. This information determined his course of action. He now saw that his enemies were desperate. Tricks and traps having failed, they would take long chances—his death by violence had been decreed. Porfirio Diaz methods were to be used—kill first and argue afterward.

Inauguration was slated for November twentieth. On November sixth, without ostentation and without prior notice to any except those trusted ones having to do with the legal formalities, Francisco I. Madero, Junior, to the discomfiture of all those who had intrigued against his ambitions and his life, took the sweeping oath and became constitutional President of the Mexican Republic, in place of Francisco de la Barra, retired with thanks to private life.

CHAPTER VII

THE Taft Administration had various points of contact with men interested in Mexico, and its policy toward Madero seemed to result logically from information so acquired. The prominent interests represented in these contacts were the Rockefeller-Aldrich rubber enterprises, the S. Pearson and Son, Limited, contracting, and the Lord Cowdray petroleum concerns, and the Guggenheim mining, smelting and allied companies. None of these interests had desired the success of Madero; none could discern in his ideals the promise of any business advantage for themselves; none believed him to possess the qualities of a ruler. Some of the interests were active business competitors of the Madero family.

The Rockefeller-Aldrich group needed no special conductor to the inner circles of the Taft Administration, but a convenient one existed. The active head of the Rockefeller-Aldrich rubber interests, which operated heavily in the Mexican State of Durango, was Nelson W. Aldrich, one of whose many titles to fame was the Payne-Aldrich tariff law in which rubber was not neglected.

The rubber interests of the Rockefeller-Aldrich Mexican Continental Company were directly opposed to those of the Maderos which extended over several million acres of northern and central Mexico, and included factories conveniently placed for transportation of their product to the border. If the Madero government should become firmly intrenched, and should choose to exert its influence upon the State of Durango, the Rockefeller-Aldrich rubber in-

terests in that State might be placed at a disadvantage and be coerced to buy, at an excessive price, the properties of the Maderos in adjacent states.

The contact of S. Pearson and Son, Limited, with the Taft Administration was intimate. For several years the American counsel of this big English contracting concern had been the great New York law firm of Strong & Cadwalader with which Henry W. Taft, brother of President Taft, and George W. Wickersham, Attorney General in the Taft Cabinet, were allied, Henry W. Taft being a member of the board of directors of the English company. Prior to Mr. Wickersham's appointment as Attorney General, he had been the one who appeared as the active and visible representative of the law firm in the affairs of S. Pearson and Son, Limited, with Henry Taft directing associate. While Mr. Wickersham was Attorney General of the United States, his law firm continued to represent the British contracting house in American matters. At this writing the relationship remains unchanged.

That a company of international importance should select an eminent law firm in the city of New York as its counsel in America is in every way fitting. The selection was made long before William Howard Taft was thought of as a probable candidate for the Presidency, and came about, it is said, through the connection of Henry W. Taft with various Mexican concerns, including his directorship in the old Mexican National Railroad over which the Mexican Government under Diaz held a protectorate, and which was absorbed in Señor Limantour's railway merger.

That the New York law firm, through the periodical shift of American politics, was brought so close to the Washington government could not have been foreseen. It was Weetman Pearson luck. But the channel which this close relationship opened to the Taft Administration could

hardly have been neglected when information about Mexico was sought, nor can any just person blame Mr. Taft or his associates if that information seemed reliable. It must have coincided very accurately with that which came from Rockefeller-Aldrich sources; and none of it was calculated to inspire confidence in the government which "The Little Reformer" had set up in Mexico.

The house of S. Pearson and Son, Limited, whose head, Sir Weetman Pearson, was raised to the English peerage as Lord Cowdray in 1908, ranks very high in both hemispheres. Its fame has been spread, by achievements of engineering and construction, from East India to the East River, as the greatest and most successful contracting company in the world. But the undertakings of Lord Cowdray have not been confined to the engineering of notable works; in recent years they have reached out to oil operations in various lands on a scale so vast as to stagger the imagination.

Its engineering conquests have usually followed the English flag, but it has long been engaged in large operations in Mexico growing out of negotiations with Porfirio Diaz. The great drainage system of the broad valley of Mexico in whose center stands the capital, the harbor works at Vera Cruz, and the Tehuantepec Railway across the Isthmus of that name are among its notable achievements in the Aztec land.

The Mexico operations of S. Pearson & Son, Limited, have been so constant and so varied, that permanent headquarters have been maintained in Mexico City, with branches at various points. Sir Weetman Pearson enjoyed a nearness to Porfirio Diaz and to his Finance Minister, José Yves Limantour, which no other foreign gentleman ever attained, and was able, in 1907, to secure a concession for fifty-seven year prior rights to bore for oil in the vacant

government lands and along the water courses and lagunas of the 75,000 square miles of area comprised in the two Gulf of Mexico States of Tamaulipas and Vera Cruz, and the intersecting but mostly inland State of San Luis Potosi. Boring rights in "hot country" lands south of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec were also conveyed.

Granted at a time when little demonstration had been made of oil land values in Mexico, the concession did not then possess the significance which it has assumed in more recent days. These fields are at this date regarded as the richest yet discovered, having an immediate possibility of output equal to the combined yield of all other present productive sources.

The Pearson concession was a move approved by Limantour to prevent Standard Oil domination. The Waters-Pierce Oil Company, then a subsidiary of Standard Oil, had held a monopoly of the oil trade of Mexico, and at the time of the concession was engaged in bringing in oil from the United States and selling twenty-liter cans of good illuminating grade at \$3.59 Mexico money, a price equivalent to thirty-five American cents a gallon.

If there was one thing that Limantour objected to more than monopoly in general, it was American monopoly; and the Waters-Pierce Oil Company had forced the retail prices for oil of all grades beyond the limit known in the parlance of trade as "all the traffic will bear." If Lord Cowdray, in the guise of a Mexican corporation, could be encouraged to compete with the Waters-Pierce Company, the results must be beneficial. It may have been on this account that the concession to the English nobleman who speedily associated himself with prominent Cientificos presented to critics the appearance of excessive liberality.

The competition thus introduced presently became the "great oil war in Mexico," commonly so called. The

result was not agreeable to Lord Cowdray, as prices dropped below the level at which he could do business at a profit. Pierce, with his more effective organization, was less seriously hurt, although the figure of \$3.59, above quoted, was cut to eighty cents, Mexican, or about eight American cents a gallon. The Mexican people were the gainers; for the first time they were getting oil at a fair price. After a year or more of this extreme competition, the warfare assumed a more moderate form, and rates gradually stiffened to \$2.

The real value of the Pearson oil concession from a practical business standpoint will be discussed in another part of this book. At this point it is enough to say that among the definite and difficult things which the Maderista leaders had promised was the curtailment of Lord Cowdray's privileges. As recited by political agitators and enthusiasts, and by Lord Cowdray's competitors in the oil war, the provisions of the grant had not been well observed and grounds for revocation existed. Whether there was actual justification for such revocation is less important than the fact that reports to this effect were in circulation, and could not well have promoted sentiments of regard for the Maderist rule in the English oil man's bosom. The advice of his American counsel was essential in such circumstances, and whatever influence the counsel could properly wield to protect his client Lord Cowdray was entitled to. If the counsel's sense of propriety was outraged by the peculiarities of his position, the remedy was at hand: he could either withdraw from the service of Lord Cowdray or request his brother to resign the presidency of the United States.

By 1911 the Mexican oil affair had lost few of its spectacular features, and had gained in international importance. The stupendous quantities of crude petroleum which the

Mexican fields could produce had been indicated by the "bringing in" of certain record-breaking "gushers"—one under perfect control flowing upward of four million gallons a day—and the Lord Cowdray plan to furnish fuel oil to the British Navy had been formed. If the Washington Government should stand too strongly behind Madero and permit him to carry into effect his concession-wrecking program, such an attitude might be misunderstood by the British Government, and unpleasant complications result.

The Tehuantepec National Railway was another item in the relations of S. Pearson & Son, Limited, with the Mexican Government. With that government assuming a critical attitude toward Lord Cowdray and his Cientifico associates in the oil rights, it might be difficult for S. Pearson & Son, Limited, to unload their heavy investment in this trans-isthmian railway upon the Mexican national treasury before the completion of the Panama Canal. The railway at that time was a liberally patronized short-cut for transporting Hawaiian sugar and other Pacific Ocean freights bound eastward, but the ease and economy of the canal route would be likely to divert this trade, and the railway, in consequence, assume the physical appearance of two winding streaks of rust in a region not over popular as a place of residence or conspicuous for its industrial activity.

Also as S. Pearson & Son, Limited, were under contract to operate the road for fifty-one years from July, 1902, and to receive but thirty-five per cent. of its net profits for the first thirty-six years, the prospects were not brilliant, and desire to realize on the investment in exchange for surrender of the operating contract was keen.

There were other projected works in Mexico which S. Pearson and Son, Limited, had planned to execute on a

basis approximately as liberal as in the Diaz days, and it suited them ill to contemplate bidding for the business against American contractors. With no friends near the source of Mexican patronage to take adequate account of the eminence of their position and the excellence of their services, S. Pearson & Son, Limited, could see but a poor prospect of contracts on the satisfactory terms to which they had been accustomed. Madero was likely to prove an incompetent trader and a bad judge of competing concerns. The new inspectors and interventors for the government might be oppressive in their demands when details of plans were submitted for approval. For which reasons any pressure from Washington that might restrict Madero's freedom would be welcome, and there were no American contractors who stood so close to the power which could exert that pressure as the English firm.

The Guggenheim contact with the Taft Cabinet has been the theme of volumes. Even the briefest summary would be superfluous here. Richard Achilles Ballinger, who was Secretary of the Interior in the Taft Cabinet as originally constituted, was in various ways closely connected with the Guggenheim interests; and there is no evidence that the Ballinger-Pinchot disclosures alienated the Guggenheims from the Administration.

The Guggenheim name is associated with the modern development of mining affairs in Mexico quite as it has been in the United States. It does not imply that a man should know overmuch of Mexican matters that he should be familiar with the common phrase "when you think real Mexico mines, think Guggenheim," which is intended to be a way of hinting that the Guggenheim operations have reached out to the best mining and smelting properties in that country and gobbled them up.

This epigram is too sweeping, but that is not the fault

of the Guggenheims whose endeavors to control mining matters in Mexico have been constant. In 1911 these enterprising persons had reached the zenith of their power in Mexico's mining affairs. It is true, nevertheless, that many great mines owned by the English, French and Belgians, with stockholders all across Europe drawing dividends therefrom, were still free of the Guggenheim yoke, and many independent American companies were operating profitable mines in which neither the Guggenheims nor their Exploration Company, nor yet their American Smelting & Refining Company, held ownership. But as compared with any other group of mining operators in Mexico, the Guggenheims were far in the lead, and where they could not secure ownership on a satisfactory basis, they managed, more or less effectively, to extract toll through the operation of a chain of smelters to which the ore of many independents was shipped and sold.

The Guggenheim method of utilizing their smelting plants to facilitate acquisition of mining properties at attractive rates is too well known to require explanation here. The method was not more conspicuously in use in Mexico than it has been in the United States. But the Guggenheim way with a miner in northern Mexico who shipped ore to a Guggenheim smelter was unfavorably compared with the way of the Maderos at their antiquated smelting plant in the city of Torreon, and the kings of the smelting world were not pleased with the local impression which these comparisons created.

The experiences of the Maderos with the Guggenheims make a good story, necessary to be told. In 1906, the Madero smelter, lacking modern equipment, was not highly remunerative. In that year it was offered for sale to various persons and corporations of which the American Smelting & Refining Company was the most likely buyer, as it

needed the Torreon plant and business to complete its grip on mining in northern Mexico. But for two excellent reasons the Guggenheims did not intend at that time to buy the Madero smelter. One reason was that to do so would tend to sustain the charge of monopoly, which, singular as it may seem, was a disturbing business factor more potent in Mexico, even in the Diaz days, than it had been in the United States. The other reason was that purchase of this Madero property at any price seemed unprofitable, because the plant was out of date and would have to be replaced by a new one.

But the Guggenheims were not ignoring opportunity for acquiring information, and when the Madero smelter was offered to them they made a thorough examination of the business, including its ore contracts with mining companies thereabouts, and then declined to deal — an old trick, but one which the Maderos were not suspecting.

The nearest Guggenheim smelters were located at Monterrey, 260 miles east of Torreon, at Aguascalientes, 340 miles south, and at Chihuahua, 290 miles northwest. Immediately this negotiation was called off, the Guggenheims bought a smelting plant at Velardeña, fifty miles southwest of Torreon in the State of Durango, and equipped it for extensive operations. By 1908, they were in active competition with the Maderos for the business of the section.

But by 1908 the Maderos had added to the contracts which the Guggenheims had examined in 1906, and when the new "Trust" smelter was ready for business at Velardeña its principal occupation consisted in treating the ores of the Guggenheims' own mines at that point. From that time onward the Velardeña smelter of the American Smelting & Refining Company, when not closed for lack of business, was operated at a steady loss, a state of things which

the thrifty Guggenheim family discovered with astonishment to be beyond their power to remedy. Not in all their spectacular career had they encountered a similar experience.

The fact that relations between the Guggenheims and the Maderos were outwardly cordial did not alter the underlying facts. The Maderos felt that they had been tricked by their big business rivals into a full disclosure of their business secrets, and the Guggenheims resented the position in which they stood of operating a losing venture in a rival's territory and spurring the rival to activity in spreading discontent among their own patrons in adjoining districts, east, south and north.

In the year 1910, when the Madero family's operations were embargoed by Porfirio Diaz, the Guggenheims saw light ahead. The Maderos would lose their revolutionary venture and the smelting business in northern Mexico would then be simplified. The outcry against monopoly had by that time ceased to give them pause, and the Guggenheims could plainly see the miners of that section contributing to recoup their losses.

But the spring of 1911 put a different face on matters. Madero's victory over the Diaz government indicated that the Torreon and Velardeña smelting conditions would continue indefinitely, and that certain plans the Guggenheims had formed for securing foothold in English and French mining camps further south would meet with opposition at the national capital. It was then that they offered to pay the price the Maderos had asked for their Torreon smelter, together with the overrated mines connected therewith, and their offer was smilingly rejected,—the property was no longer for sale.

During the summer of 1911, the Guggenheims along with

others hitched their hopes to the possibility that de la Barra would be perpetuated in the presidential office; but when November came and with it Madero's inauguration, the smelting kings of the American continent saw check-mate written large across their plans for expansion in Mexico. They charged off the several millions of loss at Velardeña and maintained the semblance of unbroken relations with the Maderos; but their sentiments, adverse to the Madero ascendancy, were not concealed from their friends in Washington.

CHAPTER VIII

DIPLOMATIC supremacy at Mexico's capital is accorded to the United States, because no other nation distinguishes Mexico by making it a diplomatic post of the first class to which an agent of ambassadorial rank is accredited. Representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and other nations are ministers, and their official residences are legations. The representative of the United States in Mexico is an Ambassador. His official home is an embassy. By virtue of this superiority of rank the American Ambassador automatically becomes dean or ranking diplomatic officer of the post.

To him as dean are given a precedence and a right of initiative that may be developed into formidable powers which his home government expects its representative to assume tactfully and exercise with discretion. Therein lies the advantage for whose sake this scheme of statecraft was contrived. An Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, possessing the confidence of the Washington Government, becomes a definite challenge of the free agency of Mexico's president, if the ambassador is inspired with desire to demonstrate the range of authority which, in this way, has been conferred upon him.

The office of ambassador to Mexico carries none of the pecuniary hardships which limit to wealthy men other diplomatic appointments of the first grade; the salary is the same but the overhead and operating charges of the plant are much less. While \$17,500 a year on the London, Paris or Berlin stations is little more than a cipher to off-

set the budget of costs, in Mexico City, converted into the normal equivalent which is 35,000 Mexican pesos, it leaves an attractive working margin in the hands of a thrifty man. Thus the range of choice, when the Washington State Department seeks a man for this position, is wider in the field of political expediency, because the property qualification of the candidate need not be considered.

In 1910 the Taft Administration changed its diplomatic representative at Mexico's capital. It recalled Ambassador David E. Thompson, for reasons obvious to Americans in Mexico City, and appointed Henry Lane Wilson as Thompson's successor in a position which since that time has been as important as any other in the diplomatic service of the United States.

Mr. Wilson was then fifty-three years old. He had served his country at foreign posts for thirteen years, seven or thereabouts as minister to Chile and six as minister to Belgium, when he was promoted to the Mexican ambassadorship. His arrival in Mexico was heralded as an auspicious event. Americans there breathed a sigh of relief. The "too much Thompson" days, with their United States Banking Company and Pan American Railroad accompaniments, were ended, and with them the era of misrepresentation of American ideals.

"A representative qualified to uphold American tradition and carry with dignity his responsibilities as dean of the diplomatic corps," was the inspiring advance announcement made by the American newspaper in Mexico; "a man of sense and fitness." All agreed that such a man was needed, and Henry Lane Wilson was received with enthusiasm.

Among those who had awaited the arrival of Ambassador Wilson with keen interest was a man who, during the last few months of the Thompson régime, had been in-

volved in the enterprises which centered at the Embassy, and was now quite familiar with the field which the new ambassador was to enter. This man was Lebbeus Redman Wilfley. He was then forty-four years of age, had been Attorney General for the Philippine Islands from 1901 to 1906, and Judge of the United States Court for China from 1906 to 1909. But at the time of his arrival in Mexico, in the year last named, he was not visibly attached to any service except his own.

It is necessary to effect a prompt placing of Judge Wilfley, in sketching the operations of Ambassador Wilson in Mexico, because he was intimately connected with them. On the day of Mr. Wilson's arrival, his association with Judge Wilfley began. From that day onward the ambassadorship was in reality a partnership. It resembled a law firm in certain particulars; the ambassador was the man who appeared at court and carried the public honors, while the judge was the active counsellor in the office. He soon became known to the iconoclasts of the capital as the Embassy's "framer up."

The Ambassador's adoption of Judge Wilfley as his friend and unofficial guide was a distinct shock to many resident Americans. The Judge had been quite diligently devoted to Ambassador Thompson and a helper in the Thompson schemes which were not looked upon with favor by the critical. The schemes were holding Thompson in Mexico after he had been superseded, but the Judge had dropped him like a hot potato, and had transferred his allegiance to the new ambassador. Suspicion quickly spread among the Americans, and wherever three or four of them were gathered, this question in one form or another would be asked: "Are Thompson, Wilfley and Wilson tarred with the same stick?"

A systematic inquiry was instituted in the interest of "the

Colony " to learn how the appointment of Mr. Wilson had been brought about, and who his political sponsors at Washington had been. The result was not reassuring. The inquirers discovered that Henry Lane Wilson's brother, ex-Senator John L. Wilson, was Republican boss of the State of Washington, and that Richard Ballinger was associated with him in the management of political affairs of the Northwest in the interest of the Guggenheim family. They found also that Mr. Ballinger, then Secretary of the Interior in President Taft's cabinet and under charges of ultra-Guggenheimism in Alaskan matters, had actively pressed the promotion and transfer of Mr. Wilson from Brussels to Mexico City.

The new Ambassador was thus seen to have strong backing at Washington; he was one who would be sustained. Therefore, the nature of his connections in Mexico City was the more interesting to American residents. The prompt alliance with the Hon. Lebbeus Redman Wilfley — known to the jokers of the American Club as "Leb, the Red" — excited both surprise and apprehension. Presently an inquisitive person learned the disquieting fact that when Judge Wilfley arrived in Mexico, in 1909, he carried a personal letter from President Taft to President Diaz commending its bearer to the latter's good will. Following this discovery a whisper went about that the Wilfley adjunct of the Embassy would be approved by the Taft Administration, and that a powerful clique was forming which would dominate the American colony.

It began to be known by various names, "The Colony Proper," "The Kitchen Cabinet," or, in allusion to the circle that had formed around Diaz in former days, "The Society of Friends of the Ambassador." The principal members besides Judge Wilfley, were a banker of American training, an American lawyer, an American newspaper publisher, an

American representative of a large news-gathering association, an American official of the National Railways, an American business man who was outfitter of government offices, and several other American business men of minor importance.

These arrangements were perfected during the closing months of the Diaz régime; there was indication that a change was coming in Mexico's government, and it seemed prudent to these Americans to strengthen the ambassadorial position. Whatever the situation called for, in their estimation, could then be undertaken by the ambassador with what was in fact the endorsement and approval of the "leaders of the American Colony."

Thus the power of the Embassy by reason of its ranking diplomatic quality was materially increased through the active local cooperation of its own nationals. Through the lawyer and the banker and the newspaper publisher and the press correspondent, Americans in Mexico City could be well controlled. Whatever seemed expedient to Judge Wilfley, to the Ambassador, and to the cabinet, would be likely to stand as the "sentiment of resident Americans."

Under these conditions Americans in that section of the Lord's vineyard tempered their initiative with discretion. The business experiences of an active Gringo who did not fraternize with the Embassy were not uniformly felicitous but were never dull.

The influence of the Embassy cabinet was not confined to Americans, but spread to wider range. The member who was president of the National Railways of Mexico—besides being a director in the Banco Nacional and in various other banks and enterprises—and the business man who dealt heavily in government supplies, were in close touch with the system of nerves which reached from the center of Mexico to every government connection at home

and abroad. These two men held their own by virtue of qualities among which adroitness was as conspicuous as any, and whatever move of the Embassy seemed wise to them would very probably be made with, or without their open agency as they saw fit.

It is necessary to look sharply at these two men because they were the most influential Americans resident in Mexico, and because the closeness of their business relations with Limantour made it practically impossible for them to take part in or countenance any movement which would tend to affect his interests adversely. They were Edward N. Brown, railway president, and George W. Cook, who did business as Mosler, Bowen and Cook.

The business offices of these gentlemen were on opposite sides of a narrow street once called Calle Vergara but now known as Calle Bolivar. They were rarely found, however, on the opposite sides of anything else. The concerns of which they were the heads were housed in Limantour property and paid Señor Limantour nearly as much in rentals as all his other real estate holdings in Mexico combined. It was not necessary to go beyond Brown and Cook to find the actual "leaders of the American Colony."

The influence of these two men in Embassy matters was in no wise diminished by their close business relations with Limantour, and the possibilities of confusion and cross-purposes in Mexican affairs are well shown by the effort made at the close of February, 1911, by Ambassador Wilson to induce the Washington government to send troops into Mexico to protect American interests. The Ambassador visited Washington personally to ask that this be done, carrying with him a supporting petition signed by a few men who styled themselves "the Committee of the American Colony." The signers were members of the Ambassador's private clique, and Messrs. Cook and Brown were

among them. I am tolerably certain that these two would not have taken part in such a movement if they had believed that in so doing they would displease Limantour.

The project was not one in which chances could be taken and excuses offered for error. Diaz was then president and Madero was making trouble in the North. Limantour was just starting from Paris to return to Mexico via New York after his eight months' absence. The actual entry of American troops into Mexico at that time would have amounted to intervention. The action of the Ambassador and his friends was hasty, and the meeting to decide upon it was secretly held in the private office of the newspaper publisher who was one of the Embassy cabinet. I sat in an adjoining room with no suspicion in my mind that anything beyond the usual incantations of the circle was taking place within twenty feet of me. Certainly I did not dream that these persons were assembled for the purpose of urging Washington to order a military movement which might be construed as an invasion of Mexico.

The sudden departure of the Ambassador on the following day caused surprise and inquiry; and the cat came out of the bag. An indignation meeting of the larger American Colony was held at once, and a counter petition was cabled to Washington in advance of the Ambassador's arrival. Intervention did not follow, but what seemed a preliminary step in that direction was the rush order of the Taft administration for twenty thousand regulars to entrain for San Antonio, Texas, the order which was being executed at the time of Señor Limantour's arrival in New York on March 7.

The favoritism shown by the Diaz government to Cook who supplied equipment at extravagant prices for offices and schools; the universal belief, now said to have been unfounded, that Limantour was his silent partner; the

practical monopoly by Cook of Cientifico patronage in his line; his intimate association with government officials; his great establishment in Mexico City, all emphasize his importance in the Embassy clique. Cook plus Brown, whose relation to Limantour and the Mexican government was of necessity an intimate one, amounted to something very close to a dictatorship in Colony and Embassy affairs; and it seems clear that the Ambassador's trip to Washington at their instance, on so questionable an errand, was a political move of notable significance.

Ambassadorial activity during the de la Barra period was confined, aside from its social features, to routine matters and formal presentment of claims. President de la Barra possessed a sense of humor; he permitted himself to be amused by Mr. Wilson's patronizingly protective attitude. Diligently graceful deference was shown by that polished Executive of Mexico to the Ambassador of the United States as he exalted him in his own esteem — and successfully procrastinated. Even the apparently urgent matter of Judge Wilfley's desire to separate an American named Hamilton from a valuable mine in the State of Oaxaca for a consideration which Hamilton thought inadequate, failed of support from de la Barra as it had from Diaz. But de la Barra's exquisite manner was a caress, and in rather sharp contrast to that of Diaz who, having learned that the argument was between two Americans, told them to "Go ahead and fight it out."

But when Madero came into office, Ambassador Wilson found his opportunity. Madero had regarded Washington's friendliness to de la Barra as an indication of its attitude toward himself, and was quite unprepared for the contest with Washington's diplomatic agent which awaited him. It was a contest which began when Madero took the presidential chair, and it ended only with Madero's death.

Early in the Madero régime the contest became more disconcerting and more menacing in its possibilities than any other element with which the new president was called upon to deal.

Internal affairs threatened trouble from every quarter; heavy disbursements were reducing the treasury surplus; but Ambassador Wilson's crossfire of demand, with the ominous power of the United States behind it, produced a peculiar irritation from which the mind of Madero was rarely free. There was a persistence in it which Madero could not reconcile with any visible reason. He was unwilling to believe that Washington was ill-disposed toward him, yet evidence was not lacking that the Ambassador's acts had the approval of his home government.

A man of deeper cunning and more subtle method than Madero could have laid plans to win over the Ambassador and profit by his power. But Madero was too simple and transparent for such a course. He was on the defensive toward Ambassador Wilson from the hour of that official's first demand upon him, and he manifested his sentiments so clearly that open personal antagonism promptly ensued. The contest over every item that arose for consideration soon ceased to be the argument of men representing great interests; it was rather that of two children to whom favor on the one hand and fate on the other, had entrusted explosive toys—a campaign of annoyance with progressive resentment as its result.

It was as a presser of claims that Ambassador Wilson made his earliest contact with the Madero government. The large number of more or less legitimate American claims for damage during the Madero revolution which had been filed while de la Barra was President, but had been elbowed along by that genial procrastinator for action by the "constitutionally elected president," were now to be

considered. These claims afforded the American Ambassador daily opportunity to make his appearance at the National Palace where his arrival and departure soon became a feature of entertainment scarcely less notable than the bugle-announced coming and going of the President himself. The American diplomat's official calls were not confined to the National Palace, or to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, or to the President's official residence at Chapultepec; they were made at whatever department of Mexico's government the Ambassador felt moved to honor with his presence, his business instantly halting whatever was going forward at the time of his arrival upon the scene.

But it was not pressing legitimate claims of his countrymen, even upon the harassed government, that aroused the deepest antagonism of Madero and his cabinet members toward the American official; it was his insistence upon early settlement of claims which were not regarded as within the limits of the American Ambassador's province — of large demands for damages which were not American.

Two such claims in particular took prominence in the Ambassador's eyes as matters calling for quick adjudication and settlement. The pressure he exerted upon these big outside affairs militated against progress of any kind with the smaller concerns of his own people. Also it emphasized the influences which spurred him to excessive zeal, and rendered him conspicuous as a man whose undertakings might embrace a wide range of activity and receive the unquestioning support of his home government — a dangerous man to thwart.

One of these claims had been handed down from the days of Diaz; it was that of an English corporation owning an immense cotton plantation in the Laguna District near Torreon. It set forth that the Mexican Govern-

ment had permitted the change of a water course which irrigated this property and by shutting off the water had inflicted damages to the amount of some eleven millions. The other big claim was that of the Chinese Government which charged the massacre of three hundred and odd Chinese in the City of Torreon in the month of May, 1911, was an act of wanton barbarity and that nothing less than ten thousand Mexican dollars for every Chinaman so killed would be considered a fair adjustment of the unpleasant event.

The attitude of the American Ambassador in these two cases was unfortunate. It was declared by the Madero Government that there was no logical reason which demanded his personal service in either the matter of the English corporation or that of the Chinese Government. It was true that there was an American, one James Brown Potter of New York, who was a stockholder of the English corporation, and it was also true that the attorney for the Chinese claim was L. R. Wilfley, chief advisor to the Ambassador himself.

But Madero held that to admit the American Ambassador's right to press these claims would constitute a precedent which he could not take the responsibility of establishing. He said that to do so would give notice to claimants of all nations that if they secured an American attorney or possessed an American stockholder, the Ambassador of the United States could be made their active and acknowledged advocate before the Mexican government. He also urged that the claims were of extraordinary character and size, and involved lengthy and careful procedure. The Ambassador disagreed with all of this, and insisted that short-cut methods be employed to adjust the affairs with despatch, and the open friction which discussion of the matters induced brought Madero face to face with the only possible

solution — the Washington government must be asked to effect a change in its representation at Mexico City.

But demand for recall of an envoy of the United States as *persona non grata* is a serious matter. It is so serious that it has rarely been resorted to by even the strongest nations of Europe where the American representative has been outranked in diplomatic precedence. Madero, greatly as he desired to make a peremptory demand of this character, was far from being in position to make so violent a move and face the grave consequences of an open quarrel with Washington.

He procrastinated in the matter of the claims and caused a subterranean hint to be conveyed to Washington that all was not well in his relations with its diplomatic representative, and left it for Washington to take such action as it saw fit.

To Madero's astonishment and chagrin Washington saw fit to do nothing, and if Madero had required a declaration that the Taft Administration was not in sympathy with his attempt to establish democracy in Mexico he was now in possession of it. But it was not until later that he understood how Washington had been confirmed in its impulse toward inactivity in this matter by Manuel Calero, his own Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was Ambassador Wilson's close ally and intimate friend.

This friendship was another and probably valid reason for Madero's dislike and distrust of the American Ambassador, because Calero, almost immediately he became foreign minister, assumed a supercilious air which displeased Madero and offended the other cabinet members by whom he was cordially hated. Also Calero was an ambitious man and while quite openly and offensively displaying his impatience with the crudeness about him, yet was well pleased to remain foreign minister, because, as such, he stood in

direct line of succession to the presidency when Madero and Pino Suarez, as seemed inevitable, should be forced to resign their offices as president and vice president, and the absurd attempt to make over a military dictatorship into a sentimental democracy should be abandoned.

When the hints of Madero regarding his sentiment toward Ambassador Wilson were started for Washington it was not difficult for Calero to arrange a method of minimizing their effect on an Administration which was sustaining its Ambassador in all his acts, and was known to desire that he remain at Mexico's capital. And it is not unlikely that the Ambassador, duly warned by Calero, was in position to operate machinery at Washington in his own behalf to the end that Madero's effort by unostentatious means to rid himself of a diplomatic dean whom he tolerated with difficulty, reacted upon himself and caused the sentiment to be intensified, which President Taft later described in an official communication as "extreme pessimism" toward the man who had said that he would place the Mexican people on their honor and would get an honorable result.

Madero's appointment of Manuel Calero as Minister of Foreign Affairs was a blunder which he soon had grave cause to repent. His advisers to a man were strongly opposed to the appointment and urged its unwisdom upon him. But Madero would not listen. That Calero had been Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies under Porfirio Diaz, and was known to be in full sympathy with the old régime which Madero had been elected to destroy, were outweighed in his reasoning by the accepted fact that Calero possessed one of the brightest intellects in Mexico, had experience in state affairs, and was a lawyer of position and fame. Nowhere in the ranks of the Maderistas could he find a man at the time whom he thought capable of creditably handling the Department of State.

But when Calero and Ambassador Wilson formed an alliance and made it part of their almost daily routine to dine together, Madero realized his error. He had voluntarily placed an opponent in the most important post of his government to cooperate with and encourage an unfriendly influence outside of it. He knew, as did every one at all informed of Mexican politics, that Calero's ambition to become president of Mexico amounted to an obsession, but he also knew that Calero had little or no following even among the Científico affiliations of the Díaz régime, and he had regarded the ambition as natural but entirely harmless—until it assumed serious proportions through the minister's intimacy with the Ambassador of the United States.

Nothing was clearer to Madero than that Ambassador Wilson hoped for his early downfall, and he did not hesitate to credit the Ambassador with willingness to expedite matters to that end, with Calero as his successor in office. When the Ambassador became so insistent in his efforts to carry through the two big claims, Madero saw that in these claims lay sufficient reason for the American envoy to welcome a change in Mexico's presidency, that would place a close friend in office whose attitude toward those matters might not be so persistently adverse.

The Calero advantages in this combine were especially alluring to a man of dominating qualities. The ability of the United States Ambassador to facilitate presidential succession in Mexico—not yet practically demonstrated to the world at large—was even then a good venture in probabilities, and alliance with the man who carried such potentialities in his pocket possessed fascinations for a Calero whose leading characteristics were faith in himself, hope for his own future and charity for very few.

The intimacy between Ambassador Wilson and Foreign

Minister Calero did not lessen, and Madero fretted and looked apprehensively on, awaiting the moment when he could rearrange his cabinet pegs. Discordant and sporadic outbreak spread through Mexico. The press, from which Madero had removed the Diaz gag, challenged every act of the government, and the caricaturing weeklies perpetrated their obscenities against Mexico's President and all his works—and then, in the first week of February, 1912, less than three months from the day Madero took office, the Government at Washington dealt him a thrust which it is scarcely an exaggeration to number with the wounds that killed him. And it spilled a river of blood besides Madero's.

CHAPTER IX

ORDERS were issued by the War Department at Washington, on February 4, 1912, that all troops in the United States be prepared for field service. Commanders of the Departments of the Gulf, of the Lakes, of the East, and of California, were directed to hold the forces under their command in readiness for concentration on the Mexican border.

No exigency of actual war could have evoked an order more comprehensive than this, so far as the regular army is concerned, for it included the entire force available between the two oceans, 34,000 men in all branches of the service. But lest Mexico should entertain fallacious hope of issuing victorious from the impending conflict, an enormous reenforcement was provided for, from the more numerous establishment of the National Guard. Instructions were transmitted to the commanders in the various states that they should be prepared to furnish quotas of volunteers aggregating 66,000, a grand total of 100,000 American troops.

Though the newspapers of the United States did not give appropriate attention to these proceedings, the importance of them was appreciated in Mexico immediately. Press despatches on the night of February 4 conveyed the menace of war, and on the following day the newspapers of the capital spread the information far and wide. Journals nominally conservative expanded their headlines; those that were frankly "yellow" became hysterical. Vera Cruz dailies carried the news along the Gulf Coast.

The press of Monterrey and of border cities on the American side thrilled northern Mexico.

The two million Mexicans who could read used that accomplishment instantly to enlighten the thirteen millions who could not. By the evening of the sixth the entire Mexican Republic, barring the Yucatan Peninsula, was in possession of the story magnified many diameters. The resulting sensation was electrical. The effect was cumulative, and it was extremely demoralizing as any person even moderately well acquainted with Mexico would easily have foreseen.

The peons were moved not so much by the thought of American invasion as by the disclosure that the "Estados Unidos" was hostile to Madero. Their inconceivably ignorant minds were dangerously excited. The middle classes gave their fears a voice in endless, ill informed discussion. Many wealthy Mexicans were pleased; some rejoiced openly, not without reason. For there is but one thing that the rich require in Mexico or elsewhere; namely, settled conditions. In any society where the laws are comprehensible and reasonably permanent, where order is maintained and the future may be counted upon, the rich will inevitably grow richer, and many of them understand it. If the United States should "come in," property would increase in value; so reasoned Mexicans of large possessions, except the very few who were in satisfactory relations with the Madero government.

A considerable number of European residents were of the same mind. Merchants whose trade was lessening believed that "under the United States" it would improve. Dozens of them said this to the writer, by way of getting his confirmation of their opinion. Americans, as a rule, were dismayed; they naturally wondered how they should protect themselves while the troops were getting in. They

showed very little confidence in the discretion of the Washington authorities, seemed to expect mistakes, and to dread the early incidents of war. Few doubted that war was at hand.

The bandits took prompt action. Madero's government must be weaker than they had supposed, and surely it had now upon its hands all that it could attend to. The United States was coming in with a very strong force, next week, next month, who knows when? "Now is our time," said the bandits.

This is not conjecture. Within a fortnight the hundred and eighty correspondents of the newspapers under my management reported brigandage on the increase in all sections. The marauders had been operating on a small scale, except the Zapata bands in the State of Morelos, south of the capital, and the Zalgada brigands in the State of Guerrero in the Southwest. Many others now appeared with magical suddenness, the obvious suitability of the occasion to their special industry stimulating them to deeds of unusual atrocity. Murders for loot, murders for no assignable motive except cruelty gratified by indescribable tortures; crimes against women, the invariable accompaniment of Mexican brigandage—all these in a few days began to stain more broadly the page of history.

The news of these horrors produced little effect in the capital. Mexicans are callous and imbued with a kind of fatalism. Always at the back of their minds may be perceived that conception of destiny which tends to weaken the sense of personal responsibility. In the days of Diaz there had been outrages, but the rulers, not the people, had committed nearly all of them. Nobody who knew Mexico expected men in power to take preventive or punitive steps from motives of mere humanity.

At this time, however, there was at the head of the Gov-

ernment a man susceptible to sympathy, one that could be grieved by wrongs not personal. This sudden blast out of the north had blown Madero's house of cards about his ears; he was harassed by a thousand anxieties that touched his own vital interests, but he had still a nerve in his body which could ache at the thought of what the same ill wind was bringing to his people, fanning every sullen spark of evil into quick flame of violence and outrage from the Rio Grande southward through the whole of Mexico.

Madero believed that this unfortunate action and the attitude of the United States toward his government resulted from representations made by Ambassador Wilson, but neither Madero nor any other person was able to discover what that attitude really meant. It is easy to say that the disturbed conditions in Mexico had reached a stage where intervention by the United States seemed to be justified; but the difficulty is that with the first step toward intervention the disturbances vastly increased. The warlike order was not in itself remedial, and nothing followed but vain attempts to explain. The threat remained, darkening the air, and in the shadow that it threw on Mexico much evil was done, but no lightnings came from the cloud. No honest man, no friend of peace and order, received encouragement or help, but the children of the devil ran riot as they always do in the excitement of a notable disaster.

The deplorable treachery of Orozco was begun in this unfortunate time. Whether it would otherwise have come to maturity, whether Madero with a mind less burdened and under clearer skies would have perceived its seriousness and checked it early, are questions hard to answer. But there is no doubt that whatever he meant to do or might have done toward the establishment of a solid government not dependent for its preservation upon perpetual

bloodshed was nullified in whole or in part by the ill considered and unfriendly action of the United States.

How painfully Madero was affected by his situation I had abundant means of knowing from persons in Madero's office and members of the Chamber of Deputies, but more than a week passed before I saw the President himself at close range.

The interview took place in the innermost of the presidential reception rooms of the National Palace. It happened that as I entered, there appeared at the opposite end the undersized, frock-coated figure of Madero coming from his private office. In my mind was the impression of the immense and ponderous building stretched across the Plaza's eastern boundary; of the great stone stairway, its steps hewn for giants so that the knees of an ordinary person are lifted almost to his chin as he climbs panting in that rarified atmosphere; of the long corridor, and dwindling series of reception rooms; and it seemed to me that I had walked down the diminished vista which one sees through a strong field glass reversed, and in the vanishing point of this perspective stood "the little man," dwarfed by his huge responsibilities, so desperately circumstanced, so pitifully doomed to failure and extinction.

All illusions aside, he was greatly changed from that enthusiast who was my neighbor so little while ago, and taught political economy to his curbstome pupils in the Calle Berlin. His cheeks which used to curve smoothly from his broad forehead to his narrow chin were now sunken and lined; his brow was wrinkled; a dozen years had been added to his apparent age, a fair half of them in the last seven days. He showed loss of sleep and was extremely nervous, with the impatient manner of a man who is trying to do too many things at once, and knows in his heart that they

are none of them done well, but he had not lost a grain of his courage nor an atom of his essential self respect.

"Señor Bell," he said, after greeting me, "your papers have been printing some sensational matters."

I said that there had been no desire to attract readers by exaggeration of statement or of headline type. What I had desired to attract was the attention of certain persons, in order that the true inwardness of the Washington policy might be disclosed. He seized upon this instantly, and responded with expressions which will savor of melodrama to an American reader, but that is the way the Mexicans often speak, and what is worse they run to rising inflections at the ends of sentences, by which abuse the Spanish language is habitually deformed by them, and sometimes, as upon the present occasion, the English also. In any language, in any country, in any circumstances, there is but one even quality of utterance appropriate to a gentleman, and the extent to which Madero now abandoned this mastery to which the fibre of his soul abundantly entitled him, was an index of the injury he had suffered.

"Why does your nation treat me like a worm?" he cried. "Why does it place its iron heel upon me, and grind me into dust?"

I answered that it was because himself and his aims and his environment were not understood.

"That is true; that is obvious," he said. "I find constantly, at every point, that the Government of the United States is misinformed, that the truth does not penetrate. Certainly in no other way can that military order be explained."

I replied that to the best of my information the order was already seen to have been an error. It had created a storm in Congress and was now a dead letter.

"A dead letter, Señor," he exclaimed. "Already it has

done its mischief. Thousands of Mexican lives will be sacrificed before the work of that military order is undone."

To attempt a contradiction would have been dishonest and futile. I expressed, however, the hope that the relations between the two governments would adjust themselves more speedily than he expected, and that with the moral support of the United States won to his side, he would be able to carry out his policies for tranquillity in Mexico. He honored these empty phrases with no more attention than they deserved; he moved about nervously, clasping and unclasping his hands, and I saw drops of sweat on his forehead.

"I do not want to kill my people to make them good," he declared in a shrill voice, at which a knot of Mexicans awaiting audience in a far corner of the room turned questioning eyes upon me as one who was being roughly lectured in a tongue they did not understand. "I could have controlled them," he went on. "I am preparing to open lands to them. I am arranging employment at good wages for all Maderista soldiers and many other men, on public works. Does your government suppose that I have given no thought to conditions here, or that extensive plans such as mine can be carried out by magic in a day? I ask of no man or government anything but a reasonable chance. Why is this unfriendly effort made to force me to violate my pledges against the shedding of blood? What influence is at work secretly to accomplish this injustice? Surely the United States has nothing to gain by making me a tyrant and a madman!"

He strove for calmness, and attained a very creditable measure of it.

"I am speaking to you more freely, Señor, than I should have done a week ago," he said. "You have questioned

your government's act in your newspapers in such a way as to show that you possess unusual comprehension of conditions in Mexico, and of the difficulties under which I labor. I do not regret having spoken to you in this manner."

I asked him whether he would be willing to make a statement for publication, and obtained in answer the only other significant utterance of the interview.

"Alas, Señor, I cannot," he said. "I should merely make more enemies, and give another opportunity to your Ambassador."

Explanation of this remark was unnecessary with me, and Madero knew it. He smiled sadly, took me by the hand, and that was the end of it. The business which had taken me into his presence had not been so much as mentioned. My sympathy for this well-meaning man, the victim of so grave injustice, the focus of a hundred treacheries, had driven personal considerations clean out of my mind.

On Sunday, February 11, 1912, two days before my call upon President Madero, I had cabled an account of Mexican conditions to the *New York Herald*. The following morning the cable despatch appeared on the first news page of that journal under the heading: "American Jingoism Blamed in Mexico for New Uprisings."

This article had been prepared after several days spent in gathering the latest information by mail and wire as to conditions in Mexico, and after many conferences with unbiased and clear-thinking men at the capital. It is repeated here verbatim as a fair statement of the Mexican situation at that time:

(By cable to the *Herald*.)

Mexico City, Mexico, via Galveston, Texas, Sunday.
— It is being openly charged here that big American business interests are fostering the present unrest in

Mexico in the hope of intervention by the United States. Many American residents in this city declare such a movement would place lives in instant jeopardy.

President Madero's statement, issued on February seventh, which, at first, was regarded as too optimistic, now is proving to be a fair estimate of conditions. Its appearance has helped public opinion, a most important factor. President Madero's endeavor to avoid harsh measures was mistaken for weakness, but now his relentless pursuit and slaughter of bandits indicates his desertion of democracy, and the iron hand is in evidence.

The State of Morelos is nearly cleared of marauding bands, but in the State of Guerrero this task is more difficult as the region is mountainous and wild. However, federal forces are giving no quarter and Zapata is being closely pursued. The States of Chihuahua and Durango are quieter and the Michoacan rebels are insignificant in numbers. The finding of Mauser rifles in the hands of Zapatistas indicates disloyalty of part of the army and points to hidden support for the uprising, in Mexico City. It is supposed that certain men here are acting in concert with prominent men in the United States to depress values. Otherwise no reason has been found for Washington's preliminary order to hold troops in readiness. It is thought that a big metal manufacturing association is aiding in exploiting Mexican troubles. Many reports are published in newspapers of the United States either wholly or partly false, and it is believed powerful interests are sending out "press agent" reports with ulterior designs.

What is considered the most dangerous element in the Mexican situation is the Washington attitude, and the Taft order is a deep mystery; it is not considered justified by conditions, but is causing deep anxiety.

Mr. Wilson, the American Ambassador, denies responsibility for a statement credited to him in last Sunday's New York papers that hostile journals here are exploiting the American attitude. The press is absolutely free, and *La Prensa*, strictly independent, which

has been criticizing the Government for its ineffective methods, now recognizing the improvements in the situation will to-morrow ask editorially: "What causes Washington to act prematurely?" Many Americans here are asking the same question and wondering if Americans at home understand the consequences of mobilization of troops along the Texas border with the implied threat of intervention.

Hope is expressed that public opinion in the North will prevent an army movement. It is declared that one American regiment crossing the Rio Grande would place every American here in peril.

Washington and New York despatches, both special and press association reports, printed by newspapers here this morning are a tissue of absurdities, showing how exaggerated is the view of conditions. Such despatches are doing untold injury and driving public sentiment here to extremes of discontent and distrust of General Madero's Government. Every day confirms the suspicion that the American press and the United States army are "jingoing" to boost the commercial schemes of interested persons desirous of helping Mr. Taft.

The projected trip of Mr. Knox, Secretary of State, is viewed with suspicion as confirming the idea that the present agitation is mixed up with "dollar diplomacy."

It is suggested here that it would be well for Washington to send disinterested men directly to different parts of Mexico to ascertain facts before complicating the situation further through ignorance of conditions.

In an editorial that same day, February 12, 1912, the *New York Herald* said:

Threatening as the Mexican situation is, the Administration at Washington should bear in mind the fact that in one respect the demand for intervention is based largely on the same grounds that were disclosed in connection with political unrest in Cuba.

American financial interests in Mexico, just as in Cuba, are clamoring for American intervention. Capi-

tal that went to Mexico well knowing the risks of investments in a republic composed of such elements as those which go to make up the population of these Latin-American countries, wants the display of military power.

Such demand should always be closely scrutinized. President Taft handled the last great Mexican revolution which preceded the retirement of General Diaz with great skill, and good fortune attended him. But there must be some other argument than that American capital is in danger before the Administration will be justified in duplicating what it did in March, 1911.

A special cable to the *Herald* from Mexico City last night gives the view of the Mexican metropolis on the question of intervention. This is that the agitation comes from capital and not from Americans who are in peril.

In the *New York Herald* of February 13, 1912, is a despatch from its Washington Bureau received the previous night. The item carried the headline: "The *Herald's* Mexican Cable Cleared Atmosphere of Doubt." Following is a quotation from it:

The *Herald's* special cable despatch from Mexico City to-day, pointing out that Madero's adherents believed special interests in the United States were fostering unrest in the hope of provoking American intervention is described here as killing two birds with one stone. It nipped in the bud a campaign of misrepresentation which has persistently found expression in a portion of the press, and at the same time delivered a knockout blow to the latest "intervention bugaboo" — a report that Germany and Great Britain had demanded that the United States step in and protect their Mexican interests.

This report was a myth, pure and simple, according to declarations from President Taft, Secretary Knox and other officials, and at the British and German Embassies it was characterized as pure fabrication.

I paid in dollars and cents for the satisfaction which resulted from evidence that the right thing had been said at the right time; for while the foregoing items were being read by the people of the United States, the printing of similar sentiments in *La Prensa* and *The Daily Mexican* in Mexico City was causing cancelation of all advertising patronage of concerns holding close business relations with the American Smelting and Refining Company.

My despatch to the *New York Herald* was an injustice to the Guggenheims to the extent that it seemed to single them out as trouble makers while, as a matter of fact, I do not know of any large interest in Mexico which was exerting its influence to strengthen the Madero government. All were critical of it. This applies not only to American but to Mexican and European concerns. Madero was on trial for his official life and every substantial business man with a Mexican connection was prosecuting attorney. This was a suicidal policy whose results have since been made manifest.

But if I were to accept at face value and repeat in this place the statements made to-day by men of large affairs who were most critical of Madero when he was in power, the result would be a general whitewashing. Their acts and their motives would be cleansed of all unfriendliness to the Madero administration. I am deterred from making such a presentation by the fact that my necessary contacts with large and lesser business men at that time resulted in my knowing precisely what they were doing and saying. I was also in position to learn from members of the government the adverse effect of such influences upon the stability of the structure they were trying to erect; and I cannot view the course pursued by men whose stakes in Mexico were heavy, as other than destructive. The influence of the Guggenheims was harmful; so was that of the

concerns whose head is Lord Cowdray. To these must be added the influence of the men who were accountable to Limantour.

I can see resentment and disapproval in the opposition of these men, but no business logic. The closest investigation fails to reveal a helpful word or deed contributed by them to preserve a government that certainly was constitutional, with a strictly honest man at its head.

The Guggenheims were not open in their resentment; their moves were made through Washington and the American Embassy. Lord Cowdray's position was clearer. Of three large contracts placed by the Madero government he secured but one, the other two going to American concerns at prices and under conditions which S. Pearson & Son, Limited, would not accept. This was displeasing to the firm which had built Mexico's most notable works and which expected the quality of its service to dispose of opposition.

In Lord Cowdray's petroleum operations also there was cause of controversy. In the concession given to him by Diaz the Mexican government reserved the right to have a representative accompany all prospecting expeditions and be present at all borings. Another clause gave the government the right of access to all reports from the oil fields. None of the rights of inspection and oversight had been exercised by the Diaz government. When they were insisted upon by Madero's Minister of Gobernacion, Rafael Hernandez, Lord Cowdray was displeased, and his subordinates continued to ignore the government's rights. The interventors who were sent to the fields were not permitted to inspect the works. Reports of operations were withheld.

There was trouble also with the negotiations for sale to the Mexican government of the S. Pearson & Son. Limited,

interest in the Tehuantepec National Railway. The affair was dragging along while progress in constructing the Panama Canal, the railway's deadly rival, was hastened by urgency at Washington and efficiency on the scene. The result of all this was most decided unpleasantness.

The pressure of the men who were commonly supposed to wait for Limantour's nod, was strong but it was not directly exerted. Mr. Cook, the merchant, found it less easy to do profitable business with the Madero government than he had with that of Diaz. There were reports that the Maderos were going into furniture and office fittings. The situation was far from agreeable to Mr. Cook whose establishment was costing him 80,000 pesos a month to operate. Mr. Brown, the railway president and bank director, found management of the railway system hemmed about with difficulty. The Maderos were crowding Americans off the lines, and replacing them with inefficient men; the government's inspection was too rigid and its regulation of rates unbusinesslike. Government dictation in general was too pronounced. The government's attitude toward the Banco Nacional was not as considerate as it might have been. Mr. Brown was annoyed and apprehensive, as a result of these and other developments.

The things which affected Mr. Cook and Mr. Brown, affected Limantour also. If the Maderos crowded Mr. Cook, the big Limantour building for which he paid 4,000 pesos a month rental, might one of these days be vacant with no tenant in sight. If the Maderos handicapped Mr. Brown in operating the railways, the success of the merger, not yet strong on its pins, was threatened. The merger, Limantour's proudest achievement, was being closely watched by bankers; it had suffered already in the North, and prospects were not bright owing to lack of business confidence in Madero's government. Limantour's stand-

ing with the big financial men would be hurt if the merger should not do well. If actual disaster should befall it, the 5,500 pesos a month paid to Limantour as rental of his building — which he had erected for the general offices of the National Lines — would be subjected to hazard.

The Banco Nacional was going under French management but the deal was held up because of the government's attitude toward the institution. Mr. Brown's disgust was contagious. Señor Limantour resigned from the bank's directorate.

These are a few of the items which account for disapproval of the Madero government by Lord Cowdray and Limantour. Broader reasons may have existed but these were personal and pertinent. The surviving Maderos believe that Lord Cowdray used his influence against the permanency of their régime. They do not think that Limantour did.

I am inclined to the opinion that neither of the gentlemen believes that he was trying to weaken Madero, but I have been unable to discover anything which either of them did to sustain him. That both were critical is certain. That Lord Cowdray viewed Washington's strange maneuvers with composure, there is little doubt. That Cook and Brown were able to guide Ambassador Wilson at will was so evident that many members of the American colony referred to their influence as paramount. In so far as their advice contributed to the Ambassador's overbearing and aggressive attitude toward Madero, the logic of the case is quite clear; they were serving their own ends, but they were not running counter to their understanding of the wishes of Señor Limantour.

There were elements of comedy in the use these diverse influences made of the Washington government and its diplomatic agent. Lord Cowdray is of the opinion that

he was embarrassed by the fact that his counsel, Henry Taft, was the brother of the president of the United States; that his movements were less free on that account. Still he did not change his counsel.

The Guggenheims and Señor Limantour were not bosom friends by any means. To Limantour's dislike of them, the mining and smelting kings quite justly credited many exacting features in the concessions they had been compelled to secure for the erection and operation of their smelters. To the same unfriendly source they charged the "monopoly talk" which had held them back from administering the last sad commercial rites to the competing smelters at Monterrey and the Madero smelter at Torreon. But all business men of northern Mexico held it to be a matter of common knowledge that friendship between Limantour and the Maderos had long existed; and the Guggenheims joined with others in supposing that through this friendship Limantour hoped to increase his power. Madero's fall, they thought, would insure Limantour's permanent effacement as a factor in Mexican affairs, and would thus greatly facilitate the expansion of Guggenheim operations in Mexico.

Various negotiations of the Guggenheims with the Diaz Government had bred in Limantour dislike of the mining kings, and a personal experience with Daniel Guggenheim in 1904 had developed the aversion into hostility.

At that time a number of Mexican capitalists, headed by Limantour, held title to the immensely valuable Real del Monte Mines situated about seventy miles north of Mexico City and just over the mountain from the big British silver camp of Pachuca. The romantic history of these famous mines is of no special significance in the present narrative; but two centuries of operation by the primitive methods of the Spaniards, followed by an over elaborate system of a French Company, had but prepared the properties for broad

success under scientific management. The mines then fell into the hands of Limantour and his associates at so low a figure that they were offered for sale at four million pesos.

It was an opportunity for the Guggenheims to enter a promising field four hundred miles southeast of Aguascalientes, their southernmost point, and Daniel came to the dicker with a thrill of business joy. Four million pesos was far less than the value of the mines, but Daniel was too close a bargainer to pay any man his asking price. He called upon Limantour in Mexico City and offered him three millions. But he had mistaken his man. Without an instant's hesitation Limantour rose and walked to the outer door of his private office which he opened wide, holding the knob in his hand.

"We are both busy men, Señor Guggenheim," he said in his politest tones. "The mines are no longer for sale. I bid you good morning."

As the bargain hunter, moving uncertainly toward the open door, attempted further speech, Limantour withdrew his hand from the doorknob, made his caller a courteous bow and passed from the room by another exit leaving Daniel to find his bearings at leisure.

The mines were presently sold at four million pesos to the United States Mining and Smelting Company, a Boston concern closely allied with the United Shoe Machinery Company, but they were sold under definite bond that neither directly nor indirectly should the Guggenheims be permitted to acquire an interest in them. It was the last chance of the Guggenheims to acquire a good foothold in southern Mexico; the eye of Limantour was ever afterward upon their movements and in the many ways at his command he caused his opposition to become a recognized element for the Guggenheims to reckon with. But in February, 1912, Limantour was so peculiarly situated that though he classed

Ambassador Wilson with those likely to act in the Guggenheim interest, Limantour's friends would not be deterred on that account from using the same influence to coerce Madero.

Meanwhile the administration at Washington continued to act in error, and the newspapers of the country to report current matters in a way which helped to conceal the underlying facts. Turn to the files of that month of February and you will be surprised to find how little they contain as to the true effect in Mexico of the threatened military movement. The facts on the surface, the facts reported, were these, that trouble was increasing in Northern Mexico, and that Texans individually and by delegations were calling upon Washington to do something about it. Several regiments were actually sent to the border; some thousands of soldiers were in San Antonio and El Paso before the end of the month. Various persons speaking with a strong Guggenheim accent arose in Congress and elsewhere to declare the inadequacy of the Madero Government, and to tell inspired tales of injuries sustained by Americans in Mexico. But even the least accurate accounts of those days do not fail to reveal that neither the threat of military action—practically repeated on the 24th of the month—nor the sending of a few troops to the border, nor the warnings and other messages transmitted through diplomatic channels to Mexico, accomplished the least good.

The truth is that there was at that time only one power for peace and order within Mexico, and it was the established government of Francisco I. Madero. His scattered opponents in the field, and his open and secret enemies whose interests were personal or commercial, offered to a grown man's judgment no deceptive aspect. As material for the formation of an honest, stable and civilized government they

were certainly no better than the Villas, Carranzas and Zapatas, the oil, the metal and the railway interests conspicuous in the fall of 1913. There lay before the United States one plain and simple choice, either by all possible friendly acts and expressions to encourage Madero in his obvious efforts to restore order, or to give up hope of him, announce existing conditions to be intolerable, and acknowledge serious responsibility for them by beginning actively to set them right. Instead the United States took a third course; antagonized the administration in Mexico City while doing nothing to cure the ills of its imperfect rule; stimulated disorder by a thin show of force; and increased the contempt and hatred of the Mexican people toward Americans, a proceeding whose fruits were to be harvested in a grievous and inevitable day.

The visible occurrences on the other side of the border were not pleasant to contemplate. In the north of Mexico bands of "rebels" under Salazar and Campa moved westward through Chihuahua plundering as they advanced in the holy name of revolution. They charged that Madero had not carried out the "Plan of San Luis Potosi" which was the Madero creed. For this he must be deposed. The bands called themselves "Vasquistas" or followers of Emilio Vasquez Gomez who after having been ousted for cause from the de la Barra cabinet, had gone to San Antonio, Texas, where he began to plan and plot. His brother, Doctor Francisco Vasquez Gomez, whose insubordination had caused his dismissal from the post of Minister of Public Instruction, had resumed the practise of his profession at his home in the Calle Rosales in Mexico City. It was believed that he was associated with his brother's enterprise, but he was not caught in any overt act. His consulting rooms were popular, but suspicions that his patients were

not all in search of medical treatment could not be verified. It was a novel method of recruiting, if such it was, and it amused the Madero Government more than it annoyed.

But the Vasquistas took several towns and on February 27 occupied the City of Juarez without firing a shot, the Madero Government having directed the Federal garrison to evacuate in order to avoid a battle so close to the American city of El Paso. Entering Ciudad Juarez ragged and half armed, the four hundred Vasquistas were promptly fitted out with full war regalia from supplies which had been waiting in El Paso and which were sent across the river immediately the "insurrectos" had secured possession of the Custom House, for at that time the United States openly permitted the sale and delivery of military equipment to all in Mexico who could pay for it.

The following day, Pascual Orozco, Junior, turned traitor at Chihuahua. The money demand which he had sharply pressed upon Madero immediately after the American military order of February 4 had been followed by repeated threats of resignation. He would withdraw, he said, from the service of a government which was not keeping its pledges to its supporters and was discredited at Washington — unless he received two hundred and fifty thousand pesos. This sum, he declared, should have been paid him months before as an honorarium earned by invaluable services. Instead he had received but one hundred thousand.

Madero would not grant Orozco's demand, but he did not take the threats seriously; he had become used to men who placed a money appraisalment on their loyalty. He had made Orozco commander of the most important division of the federal army, and now declined to be impressed by the evidence that this fully trusted man was an egotist whose conscience was in his pocket. Instead of deposing

him from command of the northern forces, as many advisers urged, Madero permitted him to remain at his post until his traitorous plans were complete.

With Orozco went six thousand seasoned troops and their officers, a great quantity of military stores and the State of Chihuahua — seemingly a leveling blow to the Madero Government.

There was more behind the Orozco affair than Madero understood at the time; the younger members of the wealthy Terrazas family had drawn the northern general from his allegiance to Madero and attached him to themselves. Possessing enormous tracts of land with many thousands of cattle and horses, besides heavy business interests in Chihuahua, the Terrazas clan ardently desired the United States to take charge of Mexican affairs.

Undoubtedly the family had suffered severely, but the means they took to secure redress have not been blessed in the event. By way of justification, however, it is alleged that for more than a year Terrazas cattle had been the means of subsistence for bandits and revoltosos, and that nearly every cavalryman and freebooter of the North was riding a Terrazas horse. The Terrazas claims for live stock, for destroyed crops and for commandeered supplies of all descriptions were named in millions, and Madero did not manifest enthusiasm in giving these claims consideration. Possibly an itemized account might help to explain why, for a Mexican's bill of damages is always an interesting document.

But the logic of the Terrazas position is clear enough; if the United States should take Mexico in hand, the depredations would cease, the properties would double in value, and some part of the claims would be paid. The Washington military order for 100,000 troops seemed the first step toward such a consummation, and the Terrazas family be-

lieved that they would win the favor of the American Government by weakening Madero.

Orozco was their weapon; his desertion would promote and solidify general disaffection. Madero, they thought in common with others, could not maintain his government against such odds, and if the United States did not come in, Orozco would succeed Madero, and the Terrazas family would be well recompensed for their losses and for any outlay they might make.

This then was the backing upon which Orozco depended in his treachery to Madero,—this, added to the peon sentiment in his favor based on valorous deeds which he had not performed. His desertion cast a gloom over the Mexican Capital and the depression was deepened three days later, on March 2, by the Washington State Department, which wired Ambassador Wilson the following instructions:

“Referring to all recent telegraphic correspondence: you are instructed in your discretion to inform Americans that the Embassy deems it its duty to advise them to withdraw from any particular localities where conditions or prospects of lawlessness so threaten personal safety as to make withdrawal the part of prudence, specifying localities, if any, from which withdrawal at any time seems advisable, and stating that in any such cases consuls may take such charge of abandoned effects as may be possible under the circumstances.”

The Ambassador's discretion clothed itself with language and came forth as an announcement from the Embassy, which was printed by request in the two English newspapers, of the capital. It warned Americans to hasten from so many sections of the country that it was construed as meaning the whole of Mexico.

The effect was demoralizing; the more because the Washington Government had shown, thus far, so little concern

for its nationals in Mexico. Americans in trouble had formed the habit of appealing first to British influence, and they now glanced instinctively in that direction. The British Minister was calm; no European nation was warning its people to flee. Therefore the danger which Washington had seen must apply to Americans alone. Did this mean that intervention, which the military order had foreshadowed, was now imminent? Was the disturbed condition of the country merely the nominal reason why Americans should leave it, and impending war the secret behind the warning?

The first and most notable stampede of Americans instantly ensued. Within twenty-four hours sleeping car accommodations on all trains to the frontier had been engaged for the next fortnight, and applications had far exceeded the usual facilities. Additional cars were placed on trains. Trains were run in sections. Mexico City hotels were jammed with Americans who had abandoned property in the interior and were awaiting opportunity for escape. Bookings on the weekly liners to New York from Vera Cruz exhausted the capacity of the ships for a month ahead. Steamers for European ports, touching at Havana, were crowded with Americans hurrying to obey the bugles of their country which had sounded a retreat.

Men of scanty means booked their wives and children first class and for themselves took quarters in the steerage or rode in third-class cars with the malodorous peons. Men who could not or would not leave the property or business which represented their livelihood and their hope sent their families and stayed behind. Men who had engaged passage or Pullman for themselves, gave their tickets to the mothers or daughters or wives of other men who could not secure quick transportation for their women folk at any price.

Anxiety did not cease with the departure of the trains from Mexico City. For half of the eight hundred miles to the border, the railway lay exposed to marauding bands, now greatly excited by the wave of feeling against Americans. There was abundant reason to fear that trains might be attacked, in which case robbery would be the least of the crimes committed, and murder not the worst. Every morning a great sheaf of telegrams reached the capital from Laredo, bearing relief to the minds of men: "Safe over the border. Don't wait. Come on."

This must not be taken as a portrayal of unreasoning panic. Apprehension for the safety of women was well founded. Men showed anxiety as to their own skins in about the usual proportion. Those who decided not to be caught in Mexico by an outbreak of war lost no time in escaping. The others stayed, and behaved according to the dominant racial strain within them, as men always do, except when habitual or impulsive imitation modifies their conduct.

While the exodus was at its height, the friction between the American Embassy and the General Consulate in Mexico City which had developed into personal rancor between Ambassador Wilson and Consul General Arnold Shanklin, culminated in the suspension of Shanklin from office by the Washington government.

On the evening of the sixth of March Shanklin started for Washington, and his appearance at the crowded Colonia station to take the night train caused a stir which illustrates the tension then existing among resident Americans. Carrying his own hand baggage he came into the trainshed whose long platform was filled with those who were saying goodbye to friends and relatives.

The whisper, "Shanklin is going home suspended," passed through the crowd ahead of him and quickly be-

came a roar of protest. No other American official in Mexico had so impressed his straightforward honesty upon his countrymen or been so uniformly helpful to them as the man now leaving under the disfavor of his government. The common thought was that he was being ground up in the mysterious machinery operated by the Ambassador whose ultimate purpose was then an unguessed riddle.

Shanklin received an ovation which was a personal tribute. Those who were leaving experienced sharpened anxiety for the ones left behind. Those who were not going — myself among them — feared that with the departure of Shanklin the only dependable avenue of approach to the home government was closed. The twelve-car train was a quarter of an hour late in starting; the Shanklin demonstration had lasted twenty minutes. Cries of "Good old Shanklin!" and "Don't be smelted and refined!" followed him as the long train drew out for the border.

But though Consul General Shanklin came back, the particulars of his reinstatement, and the exact cause of his infelicitous relations with Ambassador Wilson were not disclosed. The two men were of different types; it was impossible that they should agree.

In the ordinary course of business I learned much that was beneath the surface of this affair, but the facts would not be relevant here. It is necessary, however, to touch upon the curious matter of that shipment of arms from the United States for the protection of Americans in the Mexican capital, because there has been misrepresentation which should be corrected. The shipment was of three thousand discarded Krag-Jorgensen rifles with cartridge belts and ammunition, and the details were arranged by the "Committee of the American Colony" through the Embassy. As the goods came in free of duty, by permission of the Mexican government, it was supposed that the cost of each

outfit would not be much above the transportation charges ; but in fact the figure was forty pesos.

Naturally there was criticism. It was not a pleasant thought that a man's home government was exploiting his need by charging him much more than current retail prices in the United States for an outfit of arms which was not to become his property and was not actually delivered to him, but held in storage to be used only upon occasion in the common defense. The Englishmen in Mexico found the affair amusing. For several weeks succeeding the arrival of the arms for the "American Guard" a favorite toast at the British Club, and at other places where the convivial assembled, was "to thrifty Uncle Sam." In fairness it should be said that no blame attaches to Mr. Shanklin, who was not in any way responsible, but on the contrary was in sympathy with the great majority of the Americans who contributed to this total payment of \$60,000 or thereabouts, and who believed that a more moderate charge had been within the possibilities of careful management.

While the comedy of the American Guard was being enacted, the Madero government was making strenuous efforts to prepare an army for offensive operations against Orozco, but demands upon it for bandit warfare and minor revolts made this difficult. The capital itself was swept almost clean of soldiers and for a fortnight or more there was hardly an officer above the rank of lieutenant in Mexico City. General lack of enthusiasm for the Government service made recruiting tedious. The executive order issued at Washington on March 14 prohibiting the shipment of arms to the rebels in Mexico failed to lift the gloom and Mexican officials were openly scornful; they understood the ease of illicit border traffic through the scanty patrol on the American side.

Orozco, with the Terrazas influence, made himself

Governor of Chihuahua and was placing a bond issue of two millions upon the state to maintain his army. Lloyds accepted Mexican risks on terms which amounted to wagering that Madero Government could not endure for six months. Everywhere was criticism of Madero. Merchants and mining men who had thrived under the old Diaz régime were bitter in denunciation of Madero as a trouble maker. Banks discriminated more severely in their credits against those who were known to be strongly loyal to Madero. Daily information from the office of the President through private channels revealed a state of nervous excitement over general conditions and apprehension as to the next Washington move. Foreign Minister Calero and Ambassador Wilson dined regularly together, and those of us who knew Calero's real sentiments drew disquieting inferences. By a hundred indications all well-informed persons perceived that the situation was approaching a climax.

News reached Mexico City on March 17 that de la Barra was in Paris, and preparing to return. He had been sent abroad by Madero soon after the latter's inauguration to carry the thanks of the Mexican Republic to Italy's sovereign for courtesies extended to Porfirio Diaz during the centennial celebration of September, 1910. Solemn announcement of this mission had at the time convulsed the capital with laughter, but in the rapid march of events the jest had been forgotten. Such errands are the means by which distinguished citizens of Mexico are deleted from the scene when their absence is desired; and it is the prescribed etiquette that they shall stay abroad until invited by their Government to return. If de la Barra was ignoring the recognized rules there must be significance in his act; and the news occasioned much speculation. The common belief was that conditions indicated opportunity and de la Barra thought it well to be on the spot. But in fact other

men, then residing in Paris, had done the thinking, and were sending de la Barra home to await orders.

It was on the 24th of that depressing month of March, 1912, that the most vicious blow of all was dealt the Madero Government. This was the crushing defeat which met the army sent against Orozco in the North. The Minister of War, Gonzalez Salas, cousin of the president, took command of this force in person, because of the importance of the enterprise. He was aided by the ablest of the Federal generals, Trucy Aubert, and Blanquet, and the country had been scoured for troops to make up the eight thousand men with which they advanced to attack Orozco who with seven thousand rebels was marching southward from Chihuahua toward Torreon.

The tension at the capital was high while the battle was awaited. Many thought that the life of the Madero Government hung upon the result. Defeat of the Federal forces would leave the way open for Orozco to move rapidly southward along the Central railway to the poorly garrisoned capital in which were many sympathizers who would join him on arrival.

The fight took place at Corralitos and Rellano, eight hundred miles distant from Mexico City. The Federal army was conveyed by troop trains to a point within a few kilometers of Orozco's position, and then formed in three columns with the center commanded by Gonzalez Salas, Blanquet and Trucy Aubert having taken charge of the right and left wings respectively. Meeting with the main body of Orozco's troops and being sharply repulsed, the center fell back in confusion. Gonzalez Salas took refuge in a train which by his orders was started at speed toward Torreon. Bridges were destroyed behind him.

This left his army cut off from orderly retreat, and resulted in the complete demoralization of the Federal

forces. Gonzalez Salas realized the magnitude of the disaster, with its probably vital consequences to the government, and made the only amends that remained in his power. In the car which had carried him from the lost battle he committed suicide.

CHAPTER X

THE first official message telling of the Federal rout at Rellano was dated at Torreon, a hundred miles from the scene of the battle, and it reached the government offices a little after nine o'clock in the forenoon of March 25, the day following the defeat. Less than an hour later confirmatory details began to arrive. The cabinet was hastily called together in the President's wing of the National Palace, and the little man who sat at the head of the table read consternation in the faces of his advisers, for even those that were not loyal to his cause beheld the immediate future with alarm. What part of the army had escaped from this disaster, and might be rallied to oppose the advance of Orozco on the capital, no one then knew. The military situation doubtless seemed to offer the problem of the hour, but the danger of violent uprisings in the city was a matter too obvious to be ignored, too urgent to be postponed. No official statement was prepared, however, nor were any measures taken to prepare or calm the public mind.

Flurries of rumor were whirling here and there in the streets, before midday, but they dissolved in an atmosphere of disbelief, for the people had not looked for a battle to be fought until some three days later. The regular noon edition of the only evening newspaper carried no mention of the affair at Rellano, and the business men of Mexico City went home to dinner at one o'clock, as usual, with no especial apprehension of impending riot to disturb them at

their meal or in the customary fifteen minutes of siesta afterwards.

At half past two the clerks were on their way back to the stores and offices; a quarter of an hour later came proprietors and managers. By this time the central part of the city knew that something serious was afoot; everywhere about the streets were knots of people talking earnestly. An occasional shout of "Viva Orozco!" could be heard, and mounted police, in squads of twenty-four, were on patrol in the business section.

A few copies of an extra edition of the evening newspaper had been circulated, but despite the bold headlines there was little in this issue more authentic and convincing than the rumors which had been discredited a few hours earlier; but the fact that these had found their way into print, and especially the uncertain, questionable nature of the report sufficed to stimulate the nervousness of the people into excitement. That same morning rudely lettered notices from the bandit chief, Zapata, had been found tacked to trees in the suburbs. Within forty-eight hours, the notices declared, Zapata would descend upon the city, and this threat assumed a more serious aspect when combined with the indefinite, perplexing rumors of disaster in the north. It was known that the capital was almost bare of troops. No one placed confidence in the valor or the loyalty of the three thousand police. The silence of the Government increased the alarm, but it was impossible to secure for publication a statement from any official whose name was worth appending to his words.

The situation of the capital with reference to armed assault merits a word. There are neither natural nor artificial defenses. The city lies in the center of the Federal District which occupies 579 square miles of the Valley of Mexico, and corresponds in political status to the District of

Columbia in the United States. Beyond the city's boundaries at all points of the compass are small suburban towns, most of which are connected with the main plaza of the capital by the very complete electric tramway system. The edges of the city thin out to open country quite like an American town, and all sides are open to the approach of friend or foe. The plain extends to the hills which at a distance of twenty miles or so form the uneven rocky rim of what is said to have been the crater of an enormous volcano.

The Zapata threat was very real and its fulfilment easy. If the bandit chief should come in with two or three thousand of his followers, his ranks would immediately be swollen to an enormous uncontrollable horde by eager pillagers within the city itself.

Untold wealth for Zapata and his band awaited their attack. Millions of value in diamonds and pearls in the German and French jewelry houses, millions of gold and silver coin in the vaults of the banks, rich treasures of every kind in the department stores and in the residences of the wealthy — loot inconceivable to such men except as the horizon of desire, was probably theirs to be won by a bold dash.

Dynamite was in daily use by these bands. Railway trains and bridges, stores and houses and banks in smaller towns had been wrecked with explosives and looted. Why not the Banco Nacional? Why not La Perla or La Esmeralda?

The Mexican knows nothing of volunteer organizations for common defense; the system of Porfirio Diaz had not permitted it. To defend one's own house against the entry of a burglar was a crime under the laws of that ruler. Imprisonment was the portion of any householder who shed

blood in ejecting an intruder. The laws and the army were the means upon which Diaz had taught the Mexicans to depend for their protection. With the army scattered and the public indifferent what could the 450,000 people of Mexico City now do except tremble for their own safety and rail at Madero for leaving them helpless?

It required no unusual penetration to perceive that the conditions on that 25th of March were ideal for the development of a formidable riot. Business men, when they learned that the report of a serious Federal defeat was in print, and that nevertheless the truth remained unknown for every big and little alarmist to announce as his imagination and his terrors dictated, were not slow in acting for the protection of their property, in the only way available. Department stores and lesser establishments along the central avenues, San Francisco, 5 de Mayo and 16 de Septiembre were closed immediately. All over town iron shutters rattled down and wooden protective devices were set up at windows and doors. The capital was preparing for trouble.

In the newspaper district there was rapid movement of events. *El Heraldo Mexicano*, the evening daily, had begun to print a sensational extra at two o'clock when a strong detachment of mounted police was placed on guard before the entrance of the building to prevent delivery of the papers to the crowd of impatient newsboys waiting for their merchandise. Unable to pass their papers out in regular method, and incensed at the Government for its interference, the management of the newspaper ordered bundles of *El Heraldo* carried to the roof from which they were thrown to the loudly clamoring mob of newsboys below. In the mêlée which followed a few of the boys escaped between the horses of the police with copies of the paper

and rushed down Avenida Juarez to the center of the city where they promptly raised the price from two to twenty-five centavos each.

That was the end of *El Herald* for the day. An attaché of the Department of Communications invaded the building armed with a formidable document which successfully stopped the press and confiscated every printed copy of the extra as "seditious" and maliciously incorrect. The news editor of the journal, being hustled to jail, passed the office of *La Prensa* where I was seated, and waved his hand derisively. Behind him, with an ominous roar, came an army of newsboys. The news editor of the suspended paper and his guards passed on, but the newsboys, seven hundred strong, swarmed into the *La Prensa* building from all sides. They perched on the reporters' and editors' tables and desks, on the linotypes, on the rolls of paper and on the presses, yelling, singing, pounding, stamping, cat-calling and whistling in a deafening chorus of demand for an extra that would be "bueno."

The news for such an extra was at hand, had that been all. Our Torreon correspondent had accompanied the Federal forces as they advanced to attack Orozco, and had been on the train which brought the body of Gonzalez Salas back to Torreon. From that city he had telegraphed an excellent account of the battle, the retreat and the death of the Minister of War. By discreet use of the facts in our possession we could do much to pacify the excited city.

But it was then three o'clock in the afternoon, and as both *La Prensa* and *The Daily Mexican* were morning issues, very few men of the reportorial, editorial and mechanical staffs were about. The extra, however, must be prepared and printed even though we should incur the Government's displeasure.

There could be no doubt in any sober mind that unless

some plain and credible statement should be issued to the public within a few hours, there would be a riot; in fact conditions in and around the office of *La Prensa* at that moment very nearly justified the term. The seven hundred newsboys — many of them far beyond boyhood — had done much damage to a newspaper building on a recent occasion when they had lacked the reinforcement of sympathizing crowds which now stood ready to the number of some thousands. I had no desire to see my modern plant and building wrecked, nor to cause by lack of tact an outbreak of disorder at a time so charged with possibilities of far-spreading violence. Private and public interests seemed to address me in identical language, except for the question as to personal loss and peril which might lie in running counter to the Government's mistaken policy of silence.

With difficulty word was conveyed to the ragged, howling mob of news vendors that an extra would be ready at five o'clock, and when this promise had been made audible above the tumult, there ensued comparative quiet, and the invading barefoot army evacuated the premises by all exits. Outside the building they raised shouts of "*Viva La Prensa*" and scattered in various directions to beg, borrow, and otherwise acquire capital for the unusual piece of business before them, and to advertise the forthcoming issue through the excited city.

The *La Prensa* building stood at the end of a long block and faced three streets — Calles Nuevo Mexico, Humboldt and Iturbide. As five o'clock approached all the unrest of the city seemed to gather about us. Trolley lines in that region suspended operation. The streets in six directions were jammed with apprehensive people who, but for the announcement of our extra edition, would have massed themselves before the National Palace. So dense was the crowd that our messenger who, with page proofs of the

hastily-prepared extra, fought his way to police headquarters a hundred yards down Calle Humboldt, for the "Vista Buena" or O. K. of the Chief, could not return.

The Chief waved his approval from the balcony of headquarters to our editors in the upper windows, and the throng in the street expressed its sentiments in triumphant yells. Up to that moment no demonstration had been made, but the outburst on Calle Humboldt was echoed on other streets and became a menacing roar. Immediately the Chief of Police despatched a hundred and fifty mounted policemen, who forced back the crowd and formed a double cordon around the three exposed sides of our building. With this aid the sidewalk was cleared for the line of newsboys who held tickets entitling them to papers already paid for, the total then exceeding a hundred thousand.

Printing from duplicate plates the output was fifty-five thousand an hour. The presses ran for four hours with no diminution of demand and slight lessening in the denseness of the crowd. All signs of rioting and ill-temper had, however, disappeared. At half past nine a second extra with fuller details was ready for the press when *La Prensa's* editor in chief, Francisco Bulnes, having forced his way in a taxicab from the National Palace through the thronged streets, came to me with the information that the Government had taken exception to some statement in the *La Prensa* account, and overruling the "vista buena" of the chief of police had issued an order of arrest against the news editor in charge.

The news editor, whom the great Bulnes fondly loved and each day roundly cursed, stood with colorless face listening to the announcement, his knees perceptibly shaking at the prospect of imprisonment for "sedition" during a crisis of the Government. With a characteristically sardonic smile about his lips Bulnes watched him a moment in

silence. Then he extended his hand—the daily admiration of manicures—and placed it upon the young Mexican's shoulder.

"Fear not, my boy," he said, "I, Bulnes, will save you."

Half a minute later the cab was bearing the rescued one to the beautiful home of Bulnes, at 108 Paseo de la Reforma. Having thus moved his protégé out of immediate danger, the cleverest manipulator of political intrigue in Mexico walked briskly to a telephone and in five minutes of discussion with the cabinet council still in session in the President's rooms, explained the facts already known to the Government, but perhaps not fully comprehended—that *La Prensa* had drawn away the crowds from the National Palace, and had probably averted an attack; that the publication of the truth had allayed to some extent the anxiety of the people, and had certainly occupied their minds during a critical time. The order of arrest was rescinded, but we printed no more extras that night. The crowds quietly dispersed and the police withdrew.

This first day after the great disaster had been lived through, but trouble now faced the Government on every hand. Orozco, who had been a popular hero during the Madero revolution, was openly cheered on Mexico City streets. Traitor and ingrate though he was the lower classes thought him a valiant and resourceful fighter and as such he carried appeal to their primitive instincts.

Zapata's threat to attack the capital hung over the city. Having no belief that the Government would offer effective resistance if the Zapata brothers and their bands of cut-throats appeared, the people made no secret of their hope that Orozco would follow up his victory in the North by a prompt southward movement to rescue the capital from the Zapatistas, whose atrocities were every day recounted at length in the sensational press. Madero was freely scoffed

at by the very peons who, a year earlier, had looked upon him as a god.

Congress, which assembled on April 1 for its final session, was still composed of Diaz appointees who had held over. Many who had trimmed their sails to follow Madero were now hove to, not knowing what course to steer. Others who styled themselves "Independents," used their newly acquired privilege of free speech to assail the Government with bitterness and charge it with crime. Bulnes, who had been a Deputy for many years under Diaz, representing Lower California which he had never seen except as pictured on a map, hunted with the hounds and ran with the hare. In phrases which convulsed the Chamber, he joked with the Government. To preserve equilibrium he would occasionally flay Madero's prominent foes, in sentences whose logic stung like a whip. The "Independent" sheep in Congress followed as closely as they could where Bulnes, the bell wether, led. It was even betting between Madero and Orozco, and the cue of the Independents was to hedge.

The caricaturing weeklies took this time to bring out their most offensive cartoons. In one, President Madero was pictured as tumbling headlong down a great stairway leading from the National Palace to a waiting ship bearing the name "Ypiranga," the ship in which Porfirio Diaz sailed for Spain. Again, in an elaborate drawing of "The Last Supper," a likeness of the President sat in the Savior's seat; Gustavo Madero was Judas, and eleven other Maderos were at table receiving bread from the Master's hand. The traceable resemblance between Madero's face and that of Christ in the most familiar representations made this cartoon effective and deplorably notorious.

There was a kind of wit in some of these crude pictures; they raised a laugh not only amongst the unlettered rabble

for whom they were especially intended, but in higher circles also. Ridicule has a natural advantage, and in the present instance novelty was added. The Mexican people had been accustomed to see the ruler of their country pictured as a personage of the highest dignity. The change to these indecent caricatures had been abrupt, and thus the insult was more gross, breeding more readily contempt for a president who tolerated such abuse.

Widespread dissatisfaction arose from the condition of business. Projected enterprises of German, English, Belgian and American capitalists involving the expenditure of many millions in various parts of the country were suspended. The building of new steel works near the capital was stopped. The great water power scheme on the Conchas River in the north was almost stagnant for the time. Construction of three hundred additional miles of the Federal District tramway system* was placed on the waiting list, though the plans were complete, the rails and necessary equipment ready. Many projected spurs and connections of the National Railways were put off till more propitious days should dawn. There was decreased activity in mining development and in irrigation enterprises, and public works were almost at a standstill.

There is no doubt that under peaceful conditions the

* Electric power for the Mexico Tramways Company is supplied by the Mexican Light & Power Company from the great falls of Necaxa, about eighty miles from the capital. A syndicate of which Dr. F. S. Pearson, an American, is the head controls these companies and also the Mexico Northwestern Railway in Chihuahua. The electric tramway and power services of Vera Cruz and Puebla are controlled by S. Pearson & Son, Limited, a corporation of which Lord Cowdray, formerly Sir Weetman Pearson, is the dominant figure. There is no business connection between these two groups of capitalists, and no relationship between Dr. Pearson and Lord Cowdray.

way would have been opened for an industrial movement in Mexico of broad proportions. How greatly those enterprises would have stimulated business activity was not appreciated until the orders were issued which shut down all new works and held in abeyance the plans for operations not yet begun. But one railway to the border and but one line to Vera Cruz were open for traffic. The forward movement had stopped, and industrial retrogression was under way.

The outflow of surplus funds of individuals, firms and corporations, which had been quietly proceeding for more than a year and had grown to serious proportions immediately following the Washington military order of February 4th, now again increased in volume. Attempts to realize on properties were depressing values of real estate and the market prices of Mexican securities. General trade was falling toward bare necessities; the best buyers had gone from the country.

Government finances were drawing near the danger line, and there was difficulty about loans. The sixty-three millions (Mexican) of cash balances left by the Diaz Government represented only about forty-five millions available for general uses. Parity funds under control of the Monetary Commission made up the balance. The forty-five millions of working capital with which the de la Barra Government began business had been reduced in the ten months to less than twenty millions by the extraordinary payments on account of the Madero revolution and by the drain for maintenance of armies on a war footing. Customs and internal revenues though above the normal, according to official statements, were insufficient. The demand for successful loan negotiation was therefore urgent.

Necessity for enlisting, equipping and maintaining troops to prosecute offensive operations against the Vasquistas,

the Orozquistas, the Zapatistas, the Zalgadistas and the roving bands of brigands, emphasized this demand. Every influence that could affect the money powers of the world must therefore be placated. News organizations which had been carelessly inaccurate in reports and were defiant under reproof must be tolerated. The American Ambassador, who was vigorously pressing claims exceeding in size the entire available treasury cash of the Government, could neither be silenced nor dismissed without an open break with Washington, which would effectively close the money chests of the world.

Fifty millions of money was needed, but no one would lend it on acceptable terms. Mexico's fiscal agents, Speyer & Company, could see no ready market for Mexican Government securities — which must compete, just then, with an unusual volume of more attractive offerings — and were not disposed to assume for themselves and their associates the burden of carrying them. After five months of rule Madero stood with his back against the wall, a target for traitors, ridiculed by insolent scoffers, a victim of diplomatic persecution and political intrigue, and a bad risk in the credit schedules of Europe and the United States.

In this critical situation his government suddenly developed unsuspected powers of resistance. To secure treasury loans on any basis that would be accepted by the Mexican Congress it was necessary to bolster the nation's credit, and it was indispensable to strengthen the local position of the Government. Movements looking to these ends received careful consideration, and when the first steps in a more aggressive policy were taken they were not without evidence of a certain subtlety.

Early in April, the Calero-Wilson alliance was broken up. An indiscretion by Calero's friends in New York had emphasized the unwisdom of retaining him as head of the

cabinet; and Madero took the occasion to effect needed changes. Ample evidence existed that Mexico required at Washington a man of superior intelligence, and the definition fitted Calero. He was asked to lay aside the Foreign Office portfolio, and represent his country at the capital of the United States.

However reluctant Calero may have been to do this he could not refuse, and he accepted the transfer with apparent good grace. Pedro Lascurain was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in his stead.

Lascurain was a great gain to the Madero Government. Forty-five years of age, a careful man of scholarly mind and sober bearing, he came to the difficult position with firm intent to give his best service. He was rich, but not from such transactions as were harmful to his repute. Men in all ranks admitted that he was both capable and honest, and his acceptance of office caused an immediate shift of local sentiment in Madero's favor. He was entirely unschooled in statecraft, but his natural abilities were well suited to the task. Among his qualities was an asset Madero needed badly; he was loyal to the core.

As Pedro Lascurain soon became a prominent figure in Washington eyes it is well to understand him. No Mexican was better known to Americans of the capital whose favorite phrase for him was "Good Old Peter." His real estate operations had been on a large scale in Mexico City where he had carried on the development of the modern residential section known as Colonia Roma. Opportunities without number had arisen for Lascurain to squeeze incautious Americans and others who were too ambitious in their undertakings, but he had never dealt unjustly. On the other hand he did not lack aggressiveness of the right sort, and he brought to the Mexican Foreign Office an undaunted spirit which was influential for good.

The second notable thing done by the Madero Administration in its uphill fight was to expedite negotiations with Lord Cowdray in the matter of the Tehauntepec National Railway. This move was good strategy. It tended to relieve the unpleasantness with Lord Cowdray, and to give him a motive for desiring that Madero's attempts at treasury financing should succeed. The Tehauntepec enterprise was covered by a contract between the Mexican Government and S. Pearson & Son, Limited, made in July, 1902, and providing for the completion of the abandoned railway across the Isthmus, 200 miles, with the development of the ports at both ends, Salina Cruz on the Pacific, and Coatzacoalcas, now Puerto Mexico, on the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican Government and Pearsons (Limited) each furnished half the capital and the latter undertook to operate the road for fifty-one years on a scheme of returns which shaded down from thirty-five per cent. of the net earnings at the beginning to twenty per cent. at the close.

S. Pearson & Son, Limited, now had the road on its hands, and in itself it was a good property. Lord Cowdray wished to sell the investment and be relieved of operation to avoid the probable loss which the Panama Canal would inflict upon the Tehauntepec affair. Differences with Lord Cowdray in the matter of his oil interests were adroitly shuffled out of sight, and Madero entertained proposals in the Tehauntepec matter based upon Lord Cowdray's accepting in payment part of a new issue of Mexican government bonds. Such endorsement of Madero's plan of finance would amount to practical participation and materially aid negotiation for a substantial loan at fair rates.

Any loan proposals by Mexico to banking interests of Europe or the United States would of a certainty be submitted by them to Limantour upon whose judgment in all

matters pertaining to Mexican finances they placed perfect reliance. If by means of the Tehautepec negotiation Lord Cowdray's active support of Mexico's credit could be gained, Madero's anxiety as to the answer that Limantour would give to the bankers would be greatly relieved.

The Madero Government was helped, besides, by the errors of its enemies in arms. The Zapatistas did not attack the capital, and Orozco did not push southward with vigor after his defeat of Gonzalez Salas. Had either of these men taken advantage of the opportunities that lay before them, the history of Mexico would have been different. But these accidents of timidity or indecision were of negative quality; there was another accident which accomplished positive results—the accident of Victoriano Huerta.

In March, 1912, Huerta was almost a nonentity in Mexico, unknown except for a reputation he had earned under Porfirio Diaz as an officer who had helped to carry out the stern measures Diaz employed to pacify the country. He hated Orozco as an upstart and believed him to be a coward. Also he hated him because Orozco, up to the day of his treachery, had occupied the best post in the army while Huerta, whose methods of warfare Madero did not like, was out of employment. When Gonzalez Salas met disaster, and the Government was in hard straits, Huerta went to Madero and asked for assignment to the desperate task of organizing victory out of defeat.

The situation forced Madero's hand. He accepted Huerta's offer of service because there was no alternative, gave him authority to raise an army with which to wrest the State of Chihuahua from Orozco and even placed him over Generals Blanquet and Trucy Aubert in full command of the campaign, with power to secure enlistment in whatever way he could.

More recent history has disclosed this man as one not easily discouraged, but in those April days of 1912 his resourcefulness was unsuspected, and the vigor with which he went about his task stimulated an enthusiasm for the government service that astonished all. He purposed moving against Orozco with a dependable army and he declined to use any but his own pick of the men in the remnants that were gathered up after the great defeat. He demanded, also, a modern and sufficient artillery and machine-gun equipment.

In and about the capital he operated his schemes for enlistment and his success was rapid. He possessed no personal following but he employed men to aid him who could influence others, and in a fortnight he had three thousand men. This was half enough, but they were green troops and constant drilling was necessary. The drilling and the vague promises of reward encouraged others to join. The Huerta forces were soon the talk of the capital, and the Madero star was in the ascendant. The tide had turned.

To this convalescing Mexico the Washington State Department on April 15 addressed a communication which deserves a prominent place in the long list of fruitless interchanges between the governments. Secretary Knox was then absent on his "dollar diplomacy errand" to Central America, and Acting Secretary Huntington Wilson, ostensibly impelled by reports of property damage and loss of life among Americans in Mexico, transmitted a note on the subject through the American Embassy. The "note" which ran to about a thousand words is of interest as showing that the pseudo ultimatum style of diplomatic address to Mexico did not originate with the Wilson Administration, as many now suppose. Other demands upon Mexico for protection of Americans and their property had eman-

ated from the State Department of the Taft régime, but none of them had been written in this key. A strain peremptory but vague, the unconvincing and inconsequential threat with which the world has since become familiar, was audible then for the first time in the Mexican duet of discords.

The communication was resented in Mexico, though it was regarded as weak. "American bluff" was a phrase often heard in comments. It was difficult to discover justification for its issuance unless the government from which it came had well considered the natural results and was prepared to enforce the demands it made.

Americans whose knowledge of Mexican matters was accurate were sorely puzzled by its terms. The following extract will suffice:

"The enormous destruction, constantly increasing, of American properties in the course of the present unfortunate disturbances; the taking of American life contrary to the principle governing such matters among all civilized nations; the increasing danger to which all American citizens in Mexico are subjected and the seemingly indefinite continuance of this unfortunate situation, compel the Government of the United States to give notice that it expects and must demand that American life and property within the Republic of Mexico be justly and adequately protected, and that this Government must hold Mexico and the Mexican people responsible for all wanton and illegal acts sacrificing or endangering human life or damaging American property interests there situated."

It was signed by Huntington Wilson, Acting Secretary.

To this demand the Mexican Government responded two days later, on April 17, 1912, in a note of considerable length signed by Lascurain. Its tenor may be gathered from these extracts:

"The Mexican Government has a full consciousness of its duties and neither by acts, nor by the manifestations of its functionaries has it given a reason to doubt the sincerity of its determination to cause to be respected the generally accepted principles of international law and the rules which govern the conduct of civilized nations."

"For these reasons the Mexican Government finds itself in the painful necessity of not recognizing the right of your Government to make the admonition which the note contains, and for the further reason that it is not based on any incident that should be chargeable to the Mexican Government and which could signify that it might have departed from an observance of the principles and practises of international law."

At the time this interchange of courtesies took place the newspapers of the United States were crowded with accounts of the *Titanic* disaster, and the diplomatic incident with Mexico received scanty attention. So meager was the space allotted to it that many diligent readers of American newspapers doubtless passed it by and have remained in ignorance of the entire affair to this day. But the Washington document and the Mexican answer were published in full in the Mexican press with an effect similar to that of the answer returned in August, 1913, from the pen of Huerta's Foreign Minister, Federico Gamboa, to the demands of John Lind: it strengthened the Mexican Government in the minds of the Mexican people.

In diplomatic circles of the United States and Europe, where Lascurain was then unknown, authorship of the Mexican reply was ascribed to Manuel Calero, who had not set out for Washington. It is difficult to understand how the State Department could have remained in error for more than a day or two; yet the mistake persisted, and the Washington Government made no haste to receive Calero when he arrived in the latter part of the month as Mexico's

Ambassador. Official utterance was lacking, but the story of a coldness was extensively published in the newspapers. Calero's port of arrival was New York, and there he waited several days for his welcome to mend. The State Department with due deliberation issued a disclaimer of ill will, and the Ambassador proceeded to Washington where he was received with a studied consideration which was an official condonation of his supposed offense.

But it was well known in Mexico that Lascurain and not Calero was the author of the reply to Washington, and the performance was applauded, to the very considerable advantage of the Government. American residents in Mexico, many of whom believed that as intervention must one day surely come, it would better come at once, nodded their heads sagely, and looked toward Washington for some extremely vigorous expression of resentment. European diplomats adjusted their long distance glasses and scanned the horizon for smoke of American war vessels steaming to sustain Washington's demand which Mexico had flouted. What really happened was that the United States communicated to Mexico the opinion that the answer which had been received was no answer at all; whereupon Mexico replied that there was no other. So the incident closed with the State Department at Washington talking to itself in an empty room. Some one presently came in, however, with the information that Lascurain was the offender, and the Department made a note of it for use on a subsequent occasion.

It was at this time that a climax was reached in the disagreement between the management of The National Railways of Mexico and its American conductors and engineers, and it is quite certain that the irritation which had developed in the diplomatic situation was not without influence in

the railway affair, the Mexican Government being in voting control of the system.

The National Lines system consists of 7956 miles of railway of which 6003 miles are in the merger proper, while the remainder is controlled by lease. The various railway companies which entered the merger or leased their lines to it had begun business with American employees and the merger had retained them. The president of the great billion peso company, several members of its board of directors, practically all of the superintendents and general agents in all departments, and nearly all conductors and engineers, when Madero became President of Mexico, were Americans. There had been many American firemen and brakemen, but these grades, by that time, had been filled with Mexicans as promotions, deaths, resignations and discharges had made vacancies. In the grades of conductor and engineer there were, in April, 1912, about 1000 men of American birth.

American railway men had long been a feature of the American representation in Mexico. They had, for the most part, begun their railroad careers on the Western and Southwestern roads of the United States, and they carried the social atmosphere of these regions along with them across the border. In the larger towns which marked the terminals of divisions the American social position was built upon the foundation which the families of these railway men had laid. In Mexico City itself the railway element was well represented in the life of the American Colony.

The merchants of the capital found the trade of the American railway men most desirable; it was liberal, not too discriminating, and strictly cash. American stores were established to cater to this patronage. Groceries, haberdashery, clothing, shoes, drugs, books, stationery and special-

ties, imported from the United States, were dealt in by American concerns formed for the purpose of selling these goods first of all to the railway men whose earnings, especially those of the conductors, amounted in Mexican money to good figures.

The railway men came to understand their commercial value to the colony and did not underestimate their importance in the operation of the big railway system. They did not view with complacency the disposition of the merger management to advance the fortunes of Mexican employees. American engineers grumbled, not without reason, at being compelled to put up with Mexican firemen. American conductors jeered, with or without reason, at Mexican brakemen. Now and then a Mexican was promoted to be engineer or conductor, and the sentiments of the Americans were not politely expressed.

Early in 1912 notice was given by the railroad management that all American employees must master the Spanish language; in a few months all train orders which had previously been written in English, would be issued in the language of the country. This action, whatever may seem to be its justification, was quite correctly taken to be a move to thin the ranks of American employees.

Protest in mild terms proved unavailing. The Americans held meetings and passed resolutions which were ratified all over the system, but the management, under orders from the Government, was immovable. On the seventeenth of April, 1912, while the diplomatic courtesies were being exchanged between Washington and Mexico City, the entire body of American engineers and conductors, after having given notice of their intention, quit the service of the National Lines; and they have never been taken back.

During the remainder of that April of 1912, the Madero Government made substantial gains in strategic position.

Huerta moved his army to Torreon and prepared to advance against Orozco. Calero's departure for Washington effectually disposed of the daily conferences with Ambassador Wilson; the Ambassador was finding it more difficult to make impression upon a government whose cabinet was now for the first time in full accord; his pet claims were stubbornly hanging fire.

Francisco Bulnes, whose disconcerting speeches in Congress had been a daily shock to Madero, was more or less discredited. De la Barra's return from the mission of thanks to Italy had made no stir; he was now a prominent citizen in private life. Opposition newspapers adopted a tone that was almost patriotic. Some of the indecent weeklies were suppressed. As April glided into May confidence in the Government rapidly increased throughout Mexico. Americans in the capital were saying that Madero "had got his second wind."

CHAPTER XI

THERE is no reason to believe that the improved position of Madero in May, 1912, was clearly perceived or rightly understood by the United States, by England or by any continental power. If truly sympathetic comprehension existed anywhere, its seat was in the minds of a few private persons, unrelated to one another, possessed of no authority and of little influence.

Beyond question the passing of the Diaz rule was regretted by all statesmen whose offices constrained them to take active interest in the Mexican situation; and to say this is to close the debate. Those who would have wished to reestablish Diaz — or a younger ruler of the same type — were by this preference debarred from an intelligent opinion in the matter of Madero. The rule of Diaz was held to have been favorable to business development. Under his iron hand the alien seeking his fortune in Mexico enjoyed the opportunity to gain the whole world and lose his own soul without peril to his physical existence or his goods, and consequently without giving rise to troublesome international complications. This constitutes good government in the eyes of diplomats and the conviction was well nigh universal that Madero would never establish it.

The Mexicans, in the view of Europe and the United States, required a strong president, indistinguishable from a king, except by greater scope than is granted nowadays to most that wear a crown. The briefest period of Madero, followed by the closest possible approximation to Diaz — so ran the sentence in the morning prayers of diplomats

kneeling before their antiquated idols. There is no indication that the Americans were so much as one century, scarcely a day indeed, ahead of the others.

There had been a certain period of anxiety among the European traders, following the accession of Madero, in which the possibility that the United States would see its opportunity and take advantage of it, had excited apprehension. Thus far Mexico's trade with the Northern republic though heavy, had been confined to specialties. Europe secured the great bulk of the business in staples — dry goods, hardware, groceries and a good portion of the machinery. Europe also controlled the banking. These advantages had been held in face of the fact that the money investment of the United States in Mexico's industries was greater than that of England, France and Germany combined. That condition had existed under the Diaz autocracy, but could it endure if the United States should employ diplomatic finesse, shrewdly supporting the new order and making the best of it, for the sake of trade advantages which might accrue?

Europe's anxiety, however, quickly passed away. With gratification it saw the inharmony between Madero and the American Government increase to dangerous irritation which found voice in threats embittering the quarrel. A well considered silence was the policy of onlookers. No European nation made open demands for protection of its people resident in Mexico, or of their property; if an Englishman or a German, or a Frenchman was ill-used or his possessions damaged, his Government acted with vigor and despatch, but quietly. Always it was the United States which advertised its complaints to the world, and accomplished nothing.

The month of May, 1912, widened the breach between the two governments. On its first day Henry Cabot Lodge

delivered his famous Magdalena Bay speech in the Senate. There were rumors that the Japanese had acquired or were about to acquire a holding in the Mexican Territory of Lower California on the shores of this bay in which the United States possessed treaty rights. Senator Lodge sounded a note of warning, very inopportunistly, for there was no danger.

Madero had not entertained and his Government had no intention of entertaining proposals from Japan of any leading character whatever. This was not because Madero was held back by friendship for the United States, but because he saw peril in any deal with Japan which would place Mexico between two fires. If foundation existed for the Senator's fears, it lay in the projected operations of an American syndicate which had acquired property on that desolate coast and was said to be negotiating with the Japanese for its sale.

The effect in Mexico of Mr. Lodge's remarks was to excite bitter ridicule as at a letting off of "American steam," but published everywhere in the United States the speech was harmful and excited feeling against Mexico as a potential ally of the little yellow men in their unproved but widely credited design to secure a foothold on the American continent.

On the third of the month two Russian Jews, the Ratner brothers, Americanized but not naturalized, were deported from Mexico as "pernicious foreigners" under the famous article thirty-three of the Mexican Constitution. These men managed a mail-order business under the name of the Tampico News Company in which at least two members of the American Ambassador's privy council were directors. The offense of which the deported men were guilty was extremely grave; they were caught in the act of delivering arms and ammunition to the bandit chief, Zapata.

The accusation was not made public and no trial was held. This afforded opportunity for criticism of the summary treatment they received. If it had turned out that the men were naturalized Americans, interesting developments might have resulted placing prominent members of the American Colony in a delicate position. Under a Government less forbearing than Madero's the Ratners might very probably have been executed and their American partners imprisoned for indefinite terms.

One of the Americans associated with the Ratners in the Tampico News Company was Emin L. Beck, President of the strictly American Mexico City Banking Company, and chief backer of a daily newspaper printed in the American language; the other was Burton W. Wilson, an American attorney. Though there was no reason to believe that they knew anything of this sale of arms, they were to some extent involved in the unpleasant atmosphere of the transaction by the mere fact of their business connection; and because they stood so close to the Ambassador, it was inevitable that he should suffer, though unjustly, a further loss of favor with the Madero Government.

The whole affair is an excellent illustration of the way in which business, and banditry, and international complications are related to one another in a disturbed country. The Ratners had moved their business from Tampico in the year 1909, and branched out on a larger scale in Mexico City, occupying one whole building on Calle Palma and a salesroom on Avenida 16 de Septiembre. While the industries of Mexico were going at normal speed the mail order business thrived. Fifty young women were employed as typists to attend to the correspondence, and dozens of clerks and employees were required for the details of the business.

Toward the close of 1910 the beginning of the Madero

revolution curtailed the volume of sales. In the spring of 1911 the business was still further depressed, and the Tampico News Company found itself deeply in debt to Mr. Beck's bank. But the Ratners were sharp men. With Mr. Beck's liberal backing they had secured an enormous stock of American firearms—rifles, carbines, revolvers, automatics, with abundance of ammunition—picked up at bargain prices in the States. Shortly after it was received in Mexico City the de la Barra Government issued an edict under which consignments of arms to dealers were held in the custom houses. Dealers were permitted to sell the stock on hand but could not replenish it. The Ratners had already brought in their great supply and now they had a clear field with monopoly prices. They advertised widely and their profits were large.

With the increase of reported and actual disturbances throughout Mexico, in the months following Madero's inauguration, the firearms sales of the Tampico News Company grew steadily. In February, 1912, the Madero Government became suspicious, and caused two secret service men to solicit and secure positions in the Ratners' employ. Using their best vigilance the detectives were unable, for several weeks, to find positive evidence of traffic with the enemies of the Government. But on the night of May 2 their efforts were rewarded; one of them was chosen as an aid to the Ratners in a delivery of arms. After midnight an automobile was brought into an alley alongside the Tampico News Company building on Calle Palma, the arms were placed on board and were conveyed out of the city beyond Tacubaya where the car was met by Zapata and a body of his followers who received the goods.

The detective made his report immediately upon his return. At daybreak the Ratners were taken into custody, and their remaining stock was confiscated. That day they



GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA

Minister of Gobernacion and Provisional President of Mexico, from
Feb. 19, 1913.

were sent to Vera Cruz, and thence to New York on a steamer. The Government discussed arresting the American directors of the Company, but refrained, upon information that certain Mexicans of standing were also involved. After Madero was killed, the Ratners returned to Mexico, and resumed business at the old stand.

In those early days of May, 1912, while the Madero Government was acting with some approach to harmony and not without efficiency in its administrative measures, the opera bouffe pretensions of the Emilio Vasquez Gomez element were much advertised in the United States. The movements and the fulminations of Orozco were also pictured in American newspapers, along with the operations of Zapata. Vasquez Gomez and Orozco sent separate representatives to Washington, but the envoy of the former claimed that his chief was recognized by all as head of the revolutionary enterprise. The Taft Administration took sufficient notice of the assurances of protection to Americans volunteered by these men to make a statement that "until more headway was made in unseating Madero," no communications from insurrectos would be received.

This statement was not well contrived; it was interpreted as a spur to greater revolutionary activity; and it seemed to ignore, as the sharp note of April 15 had done, the material gains made by the Madero Government. The Vasquez Gomez people held some border towns, and certain affiliated squads of bandits were moving about in northern Coahuila and Chihuahua. Orozco held the state government of Chihuahua. But the border press and correspondents dealt in exaggerated accounts of minor happenings which Mexico City regarded as of no moment; for there was confidence in the army sent north under Huerta.

The achievements of that army are really notable. Genuine military and engineering ability were displayed in

the course of Huerta's advance over the 294 miles between Torreon and Chihuahua, along the main line of the Mexican Central Railway. On the 2nd of May, Orozco, then at Jimenez, 150 miles north of Torreon, issued orders for his army of 7000 men to move south to attack Huerta, whose forces amounting to 6000 were divided between Torreon and the town of Mapimi, twenty-five miles north. On the 7th Huerta moved the Torreon force north to join the Mapimi division. On the 8th Orozco moved his headquarters south from Jimenez, forty-six miles, to Escalon, and here he remained, though his army was near Bermejillo skirmishing with the outposts of Huerta's forces seventy-five miles further south.

On the 9th Huerta advanced in force against the main body of Orozco's army just north of Bermejillo and on the 10th led a general attack which dislodged the enemy with considerable loss. And the retreat of Orozco's army which began that day steadily continued. On May 11, Huerta advanced to Peronal fifteen miles north of Bermejillo. On the 12th Orozco was driven north another fifteen miles, after twelve hours fighting in which five hundred men were killed. On the 13th Orozco's forces retreated north on the railway, forty miles, to Rellano, the scene of his great victory over Gonzalez Salas. Orozco now moved his headquarters back to Jimenez, thirty-three miles from his army.

The Orozco rebels having destroyed bridges, Huerta's advance was slower. On the 14th he reached Yermo, fourteen miles north of Conejos. On the 15th he moved ten miles further, rebuilding bridges as he proceeded. Orozco's base was still at Rellano, but his troops were at various points in the thirty miles between that town and Huerta's front. On the 15th Huerta advanced to Ceballos, and on the 16th he reported to Mexico City that Orozco's losses in

killed, wounded and prisoners thus far amounted to 2000 men.

The Government was calm; it had expected success. Huerta was cheered on capital streets; Madero stock was daily rising. The active aggression of the Federal campaign was a revelation of the Government's strength.

Rebuilding bridges and relaying track held Huerta from rapid movement, and Orozco reinforced his army at Rellano. On the 20th Huerta occupied Escalon, within eleven miles of the rebels whose skirmishing parties inaugurated the practise of turning loose box cars, containing dynamite, and starting them down the grade to explode in the Federal camp. On the 21st the skirmishing columns of Orozco's army were driven further north. There was hard fighting at Asunsolo, six miles from Rellano. On the 22nd, the vanguard of the Federals under General Rabago attacked Orozco's main body at Rellano. On the 23rd the fight became general and was the fiercest of the campaign thus far.

Led by Huerta in person, with Generals Blanquet, Tellez and Rabago supporting, the Federal army that day washed out the Rellano stain in rebel blood. The spirit of the conqueror was in the Madero forces. With irresistible momentum they carried the Orozco defenses, occupied his base of supplies and put his men to such precipitate flight that they abandoned arms and ammunition and left six hundred dead. In twelve days Madero's army under Huerta's vigorous leadership had driven Orozco's troops north more than eighty miles and had defeated them in every engagement.

The difficulties of the pursuit now multiplied. Orozco possessed the immense advantage of a railway in working order as a means of retreat through a section where the railway was the only means by which his adversary could advance. Also he knew that Huerta must rebuild the line

to keep in communication with his base of supplies which still was at Torreon more than a hundred miles in the rear.

Stung by constant reverses and desiring to gain time for recruiting before the battle which must be fought to decide the fate of Chihuahua, Orozco gave orders to turn the railroad behind his forces into as complete a wreck as dynamite could make. Not content with blowing up bridges, culverts and trestles, and tearing up track, his men destroyed the foundation and the grading upon which the track was laid. Ties were burned, the roadbed through cuts was piled deep with rock blasted from the sides, tunnels were rendered impassable and the instructions to "make that railway as if it had never been" were literally carried out.

Orozco prepared for the decisive contest at Bachimba, 142 miles north of Rellano and but forty miles south of Chihuahua in which city he established his headquarters, for at all times during this campaign he kept himself well beyond the zone of danger. With 142 miles of indescribable railway wreckage between his army and the Federals he believed it would be months before Huerta could rebuild the line and advance to the attack. By that time Orozco hoped to have an army of 10,000 men.

But he underrated his adversary's ability. Whatever unpleasant characteristics Victoriano Huerta later on disclosed to the world, it would be idle to deny the merit of his leadership at this juncture. Compared with famous wars his operations were on a small scale, the number of men in active service under him during this campaign never exceeding 7000; but for indefatigable energy, for ability to excite and retain the loyalty of his officers and men, and for resourcefulness in face of staggering difficulties, his record in that advance from Rellano to Bachimba may well be regarded as brilliant.

The Government at Mexico City supported him with constant reinforcements to hold the railway as fast as captured, and protect Torreon in his rear. It was no longer difficult to obtain recruits for the Federal army; enthusiasm for the military service came with success. Thus it was possible for Huerta to garrison the towns as they were occupied, and protect every foot of the rebuilt railway from being tampered with by small bands lurking in the mountains to cut off communication between the Federals and their base.

On June 26, one month and three days from the date of the Rellano battle, the vanguard of Huerta's army was within five miles of Bachimba, having advanced 228 miles in forty-six days since May 10th, the date of the first battle of the campaign at Bermejillo.

Several days were now spent in preparing for the final test of strength. Orozco had 8000 men well supplied with ammunition which had been smuggled across the border, and been paid for by the state revenues of Chihuahua, supplemented, it is said, by heavy contributions from the Terrazas family. Huerta had only 6500 troops; but what he lacked in numbers was more than compensated for by better equipment of machine guns and by the revengeful ardor of his men who under the guidance of competent engineers had been driven like slaves in restoring the railway which Orozco had wrecked.

On July 3 the Bachimba fight began and on the following day Orozco's army was cut to pieces. Refugees scattered across the country. Panic reigned in Chihuahua City, forty miles distant. That night Orozco and such of his sympathizers as could crowd into the cars boarded trains for Ciudad Juarez, leaving the capital of the State of Chihuahua open for Huerta's occupation the following day. The Federal victory was complete.

The Huerta campaign against the scattered remnants of Orozco's army and the insignificant bodies of men calling themselves Vasquistas, continued for several weeks with sustained success. On August 20, Ciudad Juarez was recaptured by the Federals and shortly afterward the main Vasquistas bands were broken up, thus quelling organized rebellion in the north against the Madero Government. But these latter incidents of the campaign were of the commonplace Mexican variety except that they were better done; it is the sweep from Torreon to Chihuahua that furnishes an exhibit of those qualities in this remarkable man, which, the following year, undoubtedly helped to raise him to an unenviable eminence.

To belittle the service rendered by Huerta in this campaign would be to do him less than justice. That his army was superior to that of his adversary in equipment of artillery and machine guns is saying only that which was equally true of the army which previously, under Gonzalez Salas, went to defeat against the same enemy on the same ground. Dogged determination and inexhaustible energy were the qualities which made superior equipment effective against the obstacles Huerta was compelled to overcome. No other Mexican campaign during the preceding half century can be compared with this as a genuine military achievement.

The victories which history credits to Porfirio Diaz were never quite free of the suspicion of double dealing. Rare is the occasion when Diaz did not have soldiers in both camps. But the series of triumphs by Huerta over Orozco was a clear record of fair contests conducted with skill and concluded with credit to the commanding general, his officers and the Government that supported him.

None was more astonished at the ability Huerta exhibited than the old line officers who regarded him as an

excessive user of alcohol, and, therefore, unfit for an important command. As in later days he surprised the world by the broad audacity of his methods so in almost equal measure his campaign against Orozco startled the Diaz generals who had known him from his youth.

Born of Indian parents in the State of Jalisco in 1852, Victoriano Huerta entered the military service at the age of twenty as a cadet. In the Diaz military operations from 1876 onward he was always a dependable but not conspicuous officer. The Diaz principle "shoot first and take no prisoners" was thoroughly instilled into him by this training. Opportunity for application of these military ethics was not lacking during the years in which the Diaz system of rule was making Mexico "safe as a church." Along with many other Diaz officers Huerta acquired the reputation of a man from whom no quarter was to be expected.

His abilities as an executive were recognized by Diaz who assigned him to departmental duty in organizing the general staff of the Mexican Army and in superintending the preparation of military maps. During this period he became an inveterate student of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose methods appealed to him as ideal for Mexico. He was made a brigadier general by Diaz in 1902.

The Mexican army in the latter Diaz years deteriorated in efficiency through the development of a system of graft which profited most by clothing and arming soldiers who did not exist, and Huerta fell in with the general tendency among the officers to regard active service as of the past. He was considered the hardest and steadiest drinker in the Diaz army and in no way did he distinguish himself during the Madero revolution.

Assigned by the de la Barra Government to the task of subduing the bandit, Zapata, Huerta by his methods dis-

pleased Madero, who caused him to be removed from active service and placed on the waiting list, where he remained until the Madero Government found itself in hard straits in the month of March, 1912. Then Huerta discovered an opportunity to use Napoleonic methods against Orozco. He asked for the chance to "whip the traitor," and so obtained the prominence which enabled him eventually to succeed the man who set him in the way.

When the campaign was over the Madero Government directed Huerta to return to the capital, but he made excuses. The reason for this became apparent when he finally reached Mexico City: in accounting for the funds which had been sent to him to pay his troops and carry on the campaign, he was 1,500,000 pesos short in his vouchers. But he had received the popular applause on his arrival in Mexico City; many banquets were spread in his honor, and when Madero called his attention to the discrepancy in his accounts, he disposed of the matter with grimly amusing nonchalance. "I am no bookkeeper," was the only answer he deigned to make.

Manifestly there was nothing to be done. To prefer charges would seem to indicate jealousy. The Madero Government rose to the occasion; it made him a major general.

Victoriano Huerta did not lose his self command in the momentary enthusiasm which his victorious campaign had aroused. He had lifted a government, with whose declared principles he was not in sympathy, to a position which commanded respect, but he seemed entirely indifferent to the praise which he received.

While the military operations of the Madero Government were making notable successes the Department of Finance was not idle. Reserving details for more extended treatment in a subsequent chapter attention at the moment

centers upon the loan that was effected in the early days of June.

Revenues, according to Government statements, were increasing in volume but extraordinary charges for "pacification" had made loan negotiations necessary. The fifty millions, gold, that was needed on long time to place the treasury in a strong position was not obtainable for reasons already indicated. It was not wise to ask for Congressional consent to such a plan until the matter could be laid before the new Congress to be elected in July and to convene in September; and it was not yet possible to arrange with a new banking syndicate in Europe against the adverse influences that were at work.

Rumors that Speyer & Company were making difficulties about a loan were denied by that house in a statement to the press on May 1st. Rumors that Limantour was aiding in loan negotiation were denied by the Mexican Government on May 15th. On June 7th a loan was placed with Speyer & Company to the amount of ten millions, in one-year, $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. notes at 98 "less banker's commissions in Europe."

This short-time note financing for general treasury purposes was new in Mexico, and caused much comment. By some it was looked upon as a serious blow to the Mexican credit; by the Mexican Government it was stated to be—and the Mexican Congress so authorized it—a special fund for "pacification." But the fact of the matter is that it was the only negotiation which, at that time, could be concluded, and the figure at which it was floated when all charges were deducted was much nearer $94\frac{1}{2}$ than 98, the surface price.

The July elections for members of the Chamber of Deputies, the Mexican lower house, and for one-half of the Senate, were not quite of that open order which had distin-

guished the Madero presidential election of the preceding October. Yet the time honored Diaz system of "tagging" a Congress into office can not have been followed strictly, for certain of the new members were not those which the Madero Government preferred.

The Catholic Party developed unexpected strength, especially in the Senate, where half the members still held over from the Diaz times. The new Catholic Party members when acting with the "old régime" men were sufficiently numerous in the Senate to block the operations of the Madero majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Mexican custom permits one man to hold as many offices as he can conveniently lay hold of. One of the new Senators was also some months later seated as Governor of the State of Mexico, in a corner of which is the Federal District containing the capital. The man was Francisco Leon de la Barra.

CHAPTER XII

THE notable thrashing of Orozco, the creditable moderation of procedure which marked the July elections, and the vitality displayed by the Government during the summer, stirred the enemies of Madero into increased activity. Around this unfortunate man there was formed a network of conspiracies, interwoven at certain points deliberately by men who understood what they were doing, at other points by blunderers; and wherever there were two loose ends the fingers of the fates tied them together.

Events upon the surface gave little indication of effective causes. It may fairly be said that the comprehension of Mexico affairs from outward appearances ceased to be merely difficult and became impossible in September, 1912. The situation at that time might be presented as a riddle; it was in fact so offered to the world, and very wild were the guesses.

As an example of the grotesquely erroneous opinions which were held and widely disseminated it would be possible to take the despatches from Beverly, Mass., printed in the newspapers of September 8, and disclosing to the public the alleged and probably the actual view of President Taft, who had just come to that town from the capital.

When President Taft was in Washington on Wednesday, said these despatches, he had a conference, it is understood, with Señor Manuel Calero, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, on which occasion the President made it more plain to the Ambassador that this Government was

dissatisfied with internal conditions in Mexico, and that the Government of Madero must take more drastic steps to protect the lives and property of Americans and of other foreigners in Mexico. "Mr. Taft," in the words of the accounts, "is opposed to intervention, except in the last resort. It is admitted, however, that conditions in Mexico have become much worse in the last few weeks, and if the Madero Government is unable to check the attacks on American citizens, the United States will be constrained to take some action."

I am willing to believe that the conference referred to actually took place, and that Mr. Taft addressed himself to Señor Calero in the strain described, and with entire sincerity. What puzzles me is that Calero kept his face straight. Possibly the Señor's natural regret that the Ambassador of the United States to Mexico was not listening at the keyhole may have sufficed to steady his countenance. For my own part, in the long volume of the human comedy I draw a line beside this scene to mark it as among the most ridiculous, but if one newspaper or one man in public life, north of the Rio Grande, knew Mexico well enough to appreciate the joke, I have not found the evidence of it.

Another example, in itself quite unimportant, will serve us well at this point. On a Sunday in that September, one of the more sober and reliable New York newspapers filled a page with an illustrated article by General Orozco, in which he stated with considerable violence his grounds of opposition to Madero, whom he denounced as a traitor to the liberties of Mexico. This publication implies, of course, that the newspaper in question,—and it was one of the best informed,—did not know the essential facts about Orozco, nor even suspect the nature of the considerations which impelled him to become a rebel.

Moreover, this newspaper, in common with a thousand

others, displayed on the same day and for many days succeeding, the current stories of the weakness of the Federal arms in Mexico as disclosed by the activity of its enemies in the field. But Orozco himself was the conspicuous and sufficient evidence of Madero's military strength and of the fact that he required only a fair chance to develop and employ it. Orozco had led the only formidable force against the Government and he had been beaten out of his boots. He was *vox et praeterea nihil*, the lonesome leader of a vanished host, even his own whereabouts uncertain, for he was here or there, in Texas, Arizona or Mexico, as the dreams of the correspondents changed from night to night. There was not in Mexico at that time, really existing at the head of an organized band, a leader capable of standing his ground against a very moderate force, with the exception of Zapata; and Madero would never have had any permanent trouble with Zapata, as is well known by those who understand the heart of Mexican mysteries.

It is not my intent to deny that there was grave disorder in Mexico, or that the United States had cause for anxiety as to the safety of its nationals on the other side of the border. The question turns upon a clear comprehension of causes and a right procedure in the circumstances as they actually existed, not as they seemed to be.

Far too much importance has been assigned by critics to supposed spontaneous local sentiment, and to what has been made to appear as a universal savagery and love of strife in Mexico's lower classes. Active agencies were at work stimulating sentiment adverse to the Government and causing it to develop into overt acts. It was the upper classes of Mexico which promoted and fostered this destructive work.

The upper classes were of Spanish or mixed blood. The ingredients of the mixture had been Spanish and native

or French and native, and the generation of the day looked down from a great height upon the Indian races from which it quite recently had sprung. The upper class families had been enriched by the means which Porfirio Diaz had employed to create the feudal system called by the world a strong government, and they now greatly feared that Madero would become powerful enough to attack their property rights.

These "rights" were, for the most part, infamous wrongs. They were acquired through the remarkable Law of Survey of the Public Domain which was passed or promulgated in 1884, in that interval when General Gonzalez, a tool of Porfirio Diaz, was permitted to hold the presidential office. Under this law the President could appoint surveyors who were entitled to one-third the land they surveyed and mapped, and to the privilege of purchasing the other two-thirds at a nominal figure. Favorites of Diaz were the surveyors appointed. They did little or no surveying. The maps they filed were designed in the City of Mexico. The titles created by the Law of Survey swept aside ancient boundaries and rights dating from the conquest. Thousands of Mexican families were despoiled of their property which thus was parcelled out to men who became the bulwarks of the Porfirio Diaz system.

Villages, farms, haciendas, waste lands — more than half of the Republic of Mexico — were in this way wrested from families long in possession, or from the Government itself. Corrupt and subservient courts sustained the "surveyors." At the hands of Diaz the despoiled ones got no comfort, except the few who could bring influence to bear or show their power to advance his plans. Landholders became serfs of the great proprietors, who, with their sons, their wives, their sweethearts and their daughters, maintained elegant homes at the capital and spread the fame of Diaz

in Paris, London and Madrid. Some of these men were Cientificos and some were not, but all were Porfiristas to the core. Terrazas and Creel, who held fourteen million acres in Chihuahua; Corral, with immense holdings in Sonora; Escandon, landed baron of Morelos, were among those who benefited by the Law of Survey.

The great landowners had confidently looked for Madero to meet with early disaster, but after the July elections they began to take alarm in earnest, for he now held control of the Chamber of Deputies and might be able to coerce the few who made up the opposing Senate majority. A new and drastic law of land taxation, or one conferring power of condemnation upon unfriendly officials of the Government might accomplish dismemberment of the great estates, a move which would bring the millions of discontented peons crowding back to government support.

The federal military victories had disposed of organized rebellion; if the peons could be made to believe that Madero's promises to give them land were approaching fulfillment, "the little reformer" would become too strong to be defeated, and the day of the land baron would be over. Any enterprise directed toward Madero's ruin could now command the haciendado's active aid. No time was to be lost; in all the ways by which the men of extensive property could exert influence upon the ignorant, they secretly stirred the peons to revolt.

It may be difficult to believe, but it is true nevertheless, that landed men aided and abetted bandits by whose followers the estates of those same proprietors were overrun, even though this result had been foreseen from the beginning. In many instances, of course, the marauders went far beyond what had been expected, lost control of themselves or of their men, and were the perpetrators of outrages having international significance. If this condition

had been understood, the remedy would have been seen to lie in the encouragement and support of the central government; for as long as it should seem to be unstable and to have no friends anywhere, these underhand proceedings must continue, but when its permanency should be reasonably assured, the more discreet of the conspirators would seek to make some composition with it. At least there would no longer be anything to be gained by financing and inspiring brigandage.

No sign of the times was more encouraging to the plotters of all stripes than the apparent attitude of the United States. Conduct calculated to increase the hostility of that country was the plainest business policy for those who wished Madero to be deposed, and this was well and widely understood. As to what would come after Madero's fall there was less clearness, in Mexico and elsewhere. The main thing was to pull away the props that held him up.

The women of the "upper class" families aided this undermining all through Mexico, and were at no pains to conceal their contempt for Maderista women, especially for the women of the Madero family. In their social circles they gossiped about them with a bitterness which disregarded veracity altogether. The mother of Madero, who in reality was a woman of high character, was called "La Diabla" and charged with inspiring her sons to all manner of evil. As the Madero women passed along the street, whether walking or riding, the women of the old régime who met them hissed the opprobrious term "sin vergüenza"—shameless one—through set teeth. The slanders of the Madero women which patrician ladies passed to their servants were spread through ever widening peon circles and blackened their reputations everywhere.

Nearly all substantial business interests of Mexico, whether controlled by Mexicans, Americans or Europeans,

remained solidly opposed to the Madero rule. This influence extended through credits of wholesale and retail trade, through discrimination in the employment of labor and through the never-ceasing discussion of political affairs.

There was no support for Madero indicated by the attitude of any European government or by that of the government of the United States. All nations were coldly critical; all were waiting, some patiently, some fretfully, for the change which would dispose of Maderism and set up a government in Mexico, which to be successful must be the "iron hand" of the Diaz order.

The secret efforts to promote and solidify opposition to Madero were guided from Paris through three streams of influence. One of these was Cientifico, artfully concealed and guided by the exiled Cientifico leader, Pineda; another was military, managed by Mondragon. The third may be called financial; it was also political, exerting a great power in the Mexican Senate. It proceeded in part from the Paris bankers who had been prominent in the loan of \$110,000,000 gold, in 1910. The security for this loan, as has been stated, was 62 per cent. of the customs receipts. Mexico now desired more money, and these same bankers were willing to increase their underwritings of that country's securities, if they could complete their hold by obtaining the pledge of the remaining 38 per cent. of the customs. They were decidedly opposed to any plan which would pass the control of that 38 per cent. to any other banking syndicate. Anti-Madero senators, for political reasons, were in accord with the sentiments of the Paris bankers, and were prepared to obstruct any competing financial legislation which would strengthen Madero's position.

The Cientifico influence worked in harmony with the military; it supplied the money. When the time should arrive for work in the open, the military must bear the brunt.

Porfirio Diaz, the aged ex-dictator, was not associated with any movement. He was finding life in Spain and France and Egypt a grateful relaxation after his long and strenuous career.

The intrigues of the Cientifico exiles were secret and far-reaching. They were carried on in Mexico by the men and women of the upper classes as well as by those who had formerly affiliated less prominently with the society of government beneficiaries. The wealthy landed proprietors were concerned in many enterprises of sedition, such as have been described, schemes which it would be flattery to call questionable. The anti-Madero sentiment which these men fostered was a steadily increasing menace; it made bandits of many who were peacefully inclined. Every empty demand of the American Government for protection of its nationals supported the plans of the Mexicans of property whose object, all too well accomplished, was to prove to the world that Madero could not maintain order.

The men of wealth whose haciendas were looted and burned, and the men of business who were robbed, were well assured that when "the little Madero" should have been disposed of, they would be reimbursed. The very men Madero had hoped to benefit were used as instruments to defeat his purpose. Probably no government in the world has ever been more systematically circumvented by its responsible citizens, though the situation is not novel except in its completeness.

The military influence directed by General Mondragon from Paris, and afterward from Havana, operated through officers of the Diaz régime who were now either actively in the army of the Madero Government or on the retired list with plenty of time on their hands and deep animosity in their hearts. Disloyalty to Madero was made to assume the guise of patriotism to these men who promoted this

sentiment in the army as rapidly as they found suitable occasion; also "the good old days of Porfirio Diaz" were held up as ideal for army officers, for under a restoration of such rule, they could supplement their pay-checks with a share of "easy money" gained by carrying dead men on the roster. To this method of undermining Madero many failures of the Government arms were due. It was this systematic work through military channels which may be called the proximate cause of February's tragedy, though to speak of it as if it operated alone, as some have done, is highly absurd.

The Paris financial influence above referred to was being opposed by government plans. During the period intervening between the elections of July, 1912, and the convening of Congress on September 16, Ernesto Madero, Mexico's Finance Minister, through Mexico's Minister to France, Miguel Diaz Lombardo, had been able to make a substantial advance in negotiations for a large loan with a group of French provincial bankers, quite distinct from the syndicate which had figured in the loan of 1910.

For the first time since it was established the Madero government was making headway toward establishing banking connections which had not been associated with the treasury operations of the Diaz régime.

The surface movement of affairs in Mexico during the months of September, October and November, 1912, was caused by systematic operation of the destructive influences which have been described. Although the Federal army was recruited to nearly 60,000 men, and was actively engaged in pursuit of bandits and small bands of rebels, brigandage increased upon the whole. No city or town of importance was attacked, but the looting of small villages and isolated haciendas in the north and south was of daily occurrence. In all of these depredations there was

more or less of bloodshed, accomplished with a brutality which spread terror through many regions.

The field for such enterprises was very broad, for Mexico abounds in small hamlets and there are more than fifty thousand haciendas, all of which at that time offered a tempting mark for the plunderer. Some of the operators were very bold; many bands were overtaken and summarily dealt with; but the Government was contending against no cause in arms, and the defeat of one brigand meant very little to another. The government forces in detachments of all grades, including the greatly increased rural guards, were moving everywhere against the peon bandits without lessening banditry. Not a single important brigand or rebel leader of consequence was taken; they were kept too well advised through secret channels, military, political or commercial.

The relations of the American Ambassador with the Madero administration were at this period unfortunate to the last degree. A superhuman tact on his part would have been required for the establishment of a merely tolerable status, after the innumerable irritations of the past. Surely he should have restricted his contacts with the Government to the unavoidable, and should have held himself to a careful observance of diplomatic etiquette in order that the personal element might be suppressed in the most effective manner. But these obviously necessary measures he neglected, taking the contrary course of incessant and strangely various activity. He supplied advice to the Government touching its negotiation of loans, tutored it in local policy, and interfered unwisely in the affairs of Americans whose enterprises were the subjects of departmental consideration, this interference being tantamount at times to the suggestion of practical discrimination between one and another.

Moreover, the Ambassador pursued an injudicious course in the matter of claims, taking up too many, and pressing them inopportunately with detriment to his own dignity, and with no benefit to the claimants whom he represented. These demands reached an enormous aggregate; they ranged from the English plantation claim for eleven millions and that of the Chinese for three millions, down to the mere pocket-money of a quarter of a million asked by the American publisher of *El Heraldo Mexicano*, the evening daily whose edition had been seized on the 25th of March, after the defeat of Gonzales Salas.

This journal died in the same manner as the Minister of War, by suicide, for no official word forbade it to continue. There were no issues subsequent to the one that had been suppressed, but the suspension was voluntary. The trifling misadventure of a day was hastily made final; the hopeful heirs of the deceased were prompt, and sods were on the grave of *El Heraldo* before the breath was fairly out of its body. Thus the publisher exchanged a spend-thrift enterprise for a claim against the Government, and *El Heraldo's* ghost became a private in that spectral army which, under the Ambassador's command, beleaguered the treasury of Mexico.

Madero and his advisers knew the truth; knew also that the publisher was active in that circle of *amigos* whose center was in the Embassy; and this affair, though empty of genuine importance, still contributed its part to aggravate the feeling of hostility. This claim appeared in that bill of complaints against the Mexican Government which was presented by the Ambassador under instructions from Secretary Knox, on the 17th of September, and though it was dwarfed by larger items its inclusion was significant, for Mr. Wilson must have known its history in full.

The accusation took the form of a voluminous diplomatic

"note" which was supposed to have been prepared by the Ambassador, from material carefully examined and sifted in Washington. Its text was not published, but there were innumerable references to it, in the newspapers of the United States, before as well as after its delivery. These references dealt, for the most part, with acts of violence against American residents in Mexico. The State Department was said to have investigated many murders, the number being variously stated, from forty to "more than a hundred." Persons fairly well informed as to affairs in Mexico did not doubt that the list would be long, and that it would include notable atrocities, which, through the inefficiency and partiality of the administration of justice in Mexico, had entailed no punishment of the perpetrators.

There is no doubt that the list was as long as the compilers dared to make it, that it included every case in which the evidence might have validity under "crown's quest law." And the true total was seventeen. Four of the crimes complained of were committed prior to the revolution of 1910. In three instances there had been convictions in the Mexican courts, and the guilty persons were serving sentences in prison.

An analysis of the seventeen cases seems to show that only two have any merit. In one of these the supposed perpetrator was a bandit who had not been caught in the month that had elapsed since the commission of the crime. In the other the difficulty seems to have been that the chief accuser would not identify positively the persons against whom he brought the charge. Upon vague grounds he alleged that the court did not act in good faith. Investigation was still in progress five months after the crime, a delay in securing conviction which will not seem long to any one familiar with the criminal courts of New York.

The presentation of civil cases was not more impressive.

Great space was given to the British irrigation claim already referred to. The Tlahualilo Company, whose capital was mostly English, but whose manager was James Brown Potter of New York, sued the Mexican Government in the days of Diaz for damages resulting from the failure to receive a supply of water from the Nayas River sufficient to irrigate the company's property in the State of Coahuila. In regard to this matter no more need be said here than that the case is extremely complicated, and in every way suitable to illustrate the essential faults and follies of legal procedure. It might drag interminably in the courts of any country unless expedited by the corrupt use of money or influence.

A protest of certain American oil companies in Tampico against a tax on petroleum was an item in the complaint of the United States. The quarrel of a press association with the Mexican Government was included, and a dispute about the transfer of a packing company's concession. This corporation was financed by British capital exclusively, a fact which British investors had cause to lament. The packing company itself had been the center of a deplorable scandal; and its failure—which resulted when several millions of its paper, kited on a triangle whose other two corners were in New York and London, went to protest—dragged down to ruin the United States Banking Company of Mexico City, and sent George I. Ham, the bank's president, to Belem prison under a twelve years' sentence. He was released in the jail delivery which was one of the early incidents of the bombardment, in February, 1913. Here was a somewhat unsavory client for the United States; and moreover the packing company's claim had been settled in its favor before the American note was presented. *El Herald*o, from its grave at four cross roads, marched gloomily in the procession—the whole a sorry spectacle,

surely, when all the attending circumstances are taken into consideration.

The Mexican reply was prepared by Lascurain, doubtless with adequate legal advice. He refers to the American note as "dated in this city on the 15th and received on the 17th of September"—which indicates that he supposed it to have been written by the Ambassador.

"I must readily confess that the tone of the above-mentioned note has been a source of great surprise to the Mexican Government," Lascurain writes, "because it never expected from the Government of the United States reproaches so much at variance with the spirit of amity invoked in said note and so pessimistic in their conclusions, many of which are based on manifest error or on inexplicable preoccupation."

He then proceeds to review the list of murders, and comes presently to this atrocious deed:

"Case of Henry Crumbley, July, 1912.—His death was due to a fight had with a peon who wounded Crumbley because the latter was courting the peon's wife. Investigation has been concluded, but the defendant, Santiago Alvarado, is at large and his whereabouts is not known."

It is to be presumed that following the domestic crisis in the life of Alvarado, another bandit was recruited for the light cavalry of the nearest leader.

Ten cases are briefly touched upon by Lascurain, who then proceeds:

"There is no data in the Foreign Office in the cases of Caradoc Hughes, Thomas Green and W. L. Randell. With reference to ten cases which have been reviewed, four of which occurred prior to the revolution of 1910, three in 1911 and three in the present year, judicial investigation has been instituted in each case. The culprits have been

convicted in three cases. In two cases the accused have been released for want of evidence.

"Therefore, the attitude of the Mexican Government with reference to the prosecution and punishment of persons guilty of violence against American citizens is adjusted by law, and it cannot be made a subject for reproach except under the suggestion of eminently partial and adverse judgment, which is not in keeping with the proofs of amity previously received and with the course followed by the Government of the United States with reference to crimes committed within its territory against Mexican citizens."

Taking up five cases in which the department alleges injustice the Minister says his Government earnestly rejects the imputation that it acted with unfairness, or manifested hostility toward American interests, and denies the charge made by the Ambassador that local authorities had taken advantage of their position to satisfy their greed and animosity by persecuting and robbing American interests. He says that the vagueness of the charge and its enormity relieve the Mexican Government from taking the point seriously.

The civil cases cited in the note are then discussed and Minister Lascurain concludes with the following remarks upon what seems to have been a serious breach of diplomatic etiquette:

"I should consider the matter as closed if it were not that the note I have the honor to answer contains, principally in its last paragraph, interlined expressions concerning the personnel of the Mexican Government, which is seldom given such treatment, by naming it as the administration which in Mexico controls business. Such treatment cannot be understood after the American Government has

officially recognized the Mexican Government as able to legislate, and then addresses it as if it only governed in the City of Mexico.

"Without any pretense to unusual consideration the Mexican Government thought it right to expect from a friendly government that the latter would not, as stated in the note referred to, depart from courtesy toward Mexico and seem to deem it necessary to refer to the personnel of its Government, a form probably without precedent to this day in diplomatic courtesy and so at variance with the always just, serene and honest spirit of President Taft, a recognized friend of Mexico.

"The personnel of the present Government deplores the incident and forgets it, and as homage to its true friendship toward the American people and in consideration of the high esteem and respect it has for the American President and its Government it prefers not to give reply to that portion of the note in the terms in which it is written."

The text of the American communication was never given to the press, so far as I know. The most extensive publication I have discovered was made by the *New York World*, February 24, 1913. It would appear that a copy of the American note was not in possession of the *World*, but that it had a full and intelligent abstract of Lascurain's reply, from which the essentials of the document to which he was responding could be inferred quite easily.

The withholding of the American note from the newspapers is much to be regretted. I know of nothing that would have been more influential in moderating the sentiments of Americans toward Mexico, in those last months when it was perhaps not yet too late for popular expression to effect some change in the policy of the administration at Washington, whereby the nation might have kept its hands clean in the tragedy which followed, if indeed that

tragedy could not have been averted. It is not impossible that by a proper course the term of a legitimate government in Mexico might have been prolonged with some resulting good, and even though its fall was inevitable, perhaps that event need not have been attended by the gratification of private vengeance through murder, nor have been followed by so much of loss in Mexico, so many humiliations to the United States.

It is necessary now to consider the causes which were actively operative against Madero, among them being the military conspiracy. Throughout the summer and fall, the corrupting of the Federal army, under the direction of General Mondragon and his associates, proceeded through a hundred subterranean channels. The results were widespread, and the control was loose, as is the rule with Mexican conspiracies. In them we read whole chapters of the Old Testament over again, seeing revolts so sentimentalized that they are as unstable as panics, cleaving along innumerable planes of personal desire; rashness and sudden spasms of timidity mingling in a manner incomprehensible to the colder Anglo Saxon; and always some impatient person trying to make hay of half-grown grass lest another should secure the harvest in the day of its natural maturity.

In the present instance the premature attempt was made under the banner of Felix Diaz, nephew of the ex-dictator. He had been an officer in the army, and chief of police of the Federal district in the days of his exalted uncle. Personally, he had little to commend him as a leader. It seems, however, to have been the plan of Mondragon to put him forward, tentatively at least. His vanity had been stimulated by this real leader of the conspiracy, and by Rodolfo Reyes, son of the lately revolting General Bernardo Reyes, who was then in prison. With a force barely strong enough

for his first move, Diaz seized Vera Cruz, the principal port of Mexico, on the 16th of October, hoping that his act would be a rising signal for disloyal officers and men throughout the country.

Preparations for concerted action on a broad scale had been grotesquely inadequate. No considerable number of the conspirators knew what to do, and even those that were well disposed toward the attempt did nothing of consequence. The revolt was a fiasco, scarcely more respectable than that of Bernardo Reyes in the north, a year earlier. Diaz surrendered to General Beltran of the Federal army on October 23, and on the 27th was condemned to death by court martial. But Madero was unwilling to order the execution of Diaz, and he remained in the old Spanish prison of San Juan d' Ullua, in Vera Cruz harbor, till January, 1913, when he was brought to Mexico City.

It had been the hope of Rodolfo Reyes that his father's release would result from the revolt of Diaz. The Government was to be overthrown, Bernardo Reyes installed as provisional president, and Felix Diaz elected subsequently under that constitution which all the rebels profess to love so dearly. Many pitfalls were in the path of this ambitious project beyond the point where the disaster actually occurred. Some of them were revealed by later events; the others are of no importance now.

According to accepted Mexican standards Madero gravely erred in refusing to send Diaz and Bernardo Reyes to death. It is possible that his own life might have been prolonged even to this day, and many grievous incidents in his country's history averted. But Madero, as the sequel will abundantly prove, did not awake until the very last moment to the danger that was in the military conspiracy. He fancied that his clemency would win applause and be regarded as an evidence of strength. More influential in

his own thoughts than any considerations of policy, was a personal distaste for the alternative course, the cold blooded killing of two men.

In fact, he gained nothing by this moderation except the approval of a few private persons. The military conspiracy was considerably encouraged; the Científicos cared no more for Madero's virtues, such as they were, than for the amiable nature of the President's white horse. These men wished him out of the way, and they continued to intrigue against him with a persistency which could not escape attention.

Madero was warned often, but in vain. He conducted his own fight very much in the open, and his enemies had no need of spies to find out what he was about. Even when Mondragon moved from Havana to Mexico City no steps were taken to interfere with his maneuvers, nor were any effective measures devised to check the various cabals, political and commercial, whose operations were so plainly visible to a disinterested observer.

Contrasts may profitably be drawn between Francisco Madero, plotted against on all sides and ignoring the plotters, and Porfirio Diaz arresting or mysteriously removing from the light of day those upon whom there fell suspicion of disloyalty. Madero, on his white steed, rode often unattended through the streets where those who wished him harm were the most numerous, while Diaz was always the center of an elaborate system of personal protection, his carriage strongly escorted by his outriding guards; or in the later days he would use two or even three closed automobiles, all driven at high speed, so that no stroke of vengeance could be aimed with certainty against the car that really bore him through his capital.

Possibly Madero was protected temporarily by his enemies' confidence that his downfall was at hand. They were playing a strong game and may have been content to wait.

CHAPTER XIII

BY December 1 the new Congress had developed an opposition which threatened to defeat the Government's plans of finance, and thus to disarrange the whole administrative program. As has been indicated the majority of the new Chamber of Deputies elected in July were Madero men, or Progresistas; the Senate was adverse to the Government by a small margin, and must be whipped into line on important measures. These conditions seemed to involve difficulties not essentially insurmountable, but the Government was not prepared for a minority in the Chamber so aggressive as that with which it soon found itself compelled to deal.

The most troublesome member of the minority was Querido Moheno, who a year later became Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Huerta. Moheno had been elected to the Madero Congress in 1912 as a Progresista or Administration man; but before his seat in the Chamber was fairly warm he abandoned Madero, flopped to the Independents, and vigorously attacked every Government measure.

No one charged him with serving the interests of any man but himself: there was a strain of the Irish in Moheno's blood which gave him an hereditary right to be "agin the Government." In fact, he was "agin everything" and he contributed so violent an opposition that on many occasions the sessions of the Chamber were stormy scenes in which orderly legislation could not be carried on, and the spirit of strife within communicated itself to the

streets, causing mobs to assemble alongside the building, where they remained making noisy demonstrations until dispersed by the police. Moheno was undoubtedly his own man, but unconsciously he was performing heroic service for those who schemed to limit Madero's freedom of action in matters of finance.

The Minister of Finance, Ernesto Madero, was the butt against which the sarcasm of Moheno and the others was directed. The Minister was not fortunate in his method of presenting his measures; he laid himself open to attack. He proposed two loans of twenty million pesos each, then doubled the figures, and finally increased the total to one hundred millions. This progression in his calls upon Congress for authorization to borrow money occurred during the months of December, 1912, and January, 1913, while Miguel Diaz Lombardo was concluding negotiations with his group of French bankers, and the Finance Minister's course may have been due to uncertainty as to the amount of long time bonds which could be placed.

Moheno, however, challenged the Finance Minister's tactics and his secrecy as to the bankers with whom he was dealing; he questioned the purposes to which the proceeds of the loan were to be applied, and by his boundless versatility in attack became a leader of the most various factions — the mere hotheads, the little, selfish opportunists, and those that were already marching under orders which happened to coincide with some impulse of the trouble-maker's, so that his coat-tails were their ensign for the moment.

Moheno's mischief greatly helped to waste the time so precious to the administration. The finance bill was delayed till January 13, when a five per cent. fifty-year loan of one hundred million pesos at a minimum of eighty-five was sanctioned by the Deputies. If the measure had been promptly passed by a vote such as the Government was

warranted in expecting, by the political balance in the Chamber, the indication of strength would have been valuable, and must have had some influence in the upper house despite the intricacy and efficiency of the control which was being exercised in that body by the invisible powers. In fact, the acrimonious debates in the Chamber had aided the Senate leaders charged with the task of obstruction, and they felt confident of their ability to prevent the passage of a measure really helpful to Madero.

For three weeks or thereabouts the bill was discussed in committee, where deft manipulation by de la Barra resulted in having the amount of the loan reduced below the mark of any real utility. Forty million pesos was the sum named in the committee's report submitted in the first week of February, 1913. Action on this report was deadlocked in the open Senate by a vote of twenty to twenty, and there was much criticism of the provisions of the bill. One senator declared that its vagueness was its most taking characteristic, and that it might be construed to authorize indefinite millions of indebtedness with no precise limitations as to maturity or cost; and the purposes for which it was asked seemed to have been constructed of guayule from one of the Finance Minister's rubber properties in the North. The struggle between the Government and the Senate was in progress with little gained on either side, when, on the 9th of February, the table was overturned, the lights were extinguished, and the game was ended.

The real merits of the contest, so far as it had proceeded, are worthy of brief review. In the open forum of the Chamber of Deputies, no reason was observable why the Finance Minister should not have dealt more frankly with the legislators. All the available dirty linen of the Madero régime, and some brought down from earlier days, was publicly aired in the sessions of the Chamber, and there

need have been no illusion on the part of inquisitive bankers as to the Mexicans' own view of their deteriorated credit. Charges of having deceived bankers with fallacious statements were freely made in that Congress, and one able statesman of the body likened its ingenuousness to that of the horse trader who painstakingly details the glaring defects of his own animal.

But Ernesto Madero was in combat with more subtle antagonists than any in the Mexican Congress. He was pitting himself against a powerful financial group in Europe, and there was danger in disclosing certain essential features of the Government's plan.

The Mexican congressional method of bringing the Ministers and legislators face to face in open session follows the European custom and is theoretically sound. Apparently its purpose is to expose all facts in important affairs before the public eye. But in the Madero Congress, as often in more dignified bodies, facts were of less consequence than the advantages gained by political tactics, and the grillings of the Finance Minister became a series of political and personal assaults. These led to a vast variety of conjectures in the city. "A big thing is coming off and the outs are trying to break in on it," is the way the situation was confidently stated to me by an American who watched the proceedings with interest. Others made their guesses in my presence as to the figures of the division which Ernesto Madero would be forced to make with the obstructionist leaders before his bill would be permitted to pass.

Whatever may have been accomplished in private, no outward sign appeared that any one had broken down the Finance Minister's guard. For weeks the loan measures were quarreled over with rough familiarity and sharp challenge of motive, but Ernesto Madero kept his mask in posi-

tion and fought the Chamber and the Senate as best he might.

He had referred repeatedly to bankers of London, Berlin and New York, with great stress on London; he had insisted on latitude in the matter of price as low as 84 or 85, and he had stood firm for the necessity of authorization to borrow on a basis of payment in gold. The truth is that the negotiations being conducted were for a loan of one hundred million pesos from the beginning, that the Minister was not dealing with London, Berlin and New York but with the "Syndicat des Banquiers de Province" in Paris, that the price definitely fixed was 92, and that the fifty year bonds were to be payable in Mexican currency.

Doubtless it was the Finance Minister's plan to report the actual placing of the loan on a basis much more favorable than the minimum terms authorized by Congress, and thus to gain for himself and the government the prestige of able financing; and it was evident to those who understood the real nature of the fight that he was cloaking his movements in mystery so as to minimize the hazard of adverse influences upon his pending negotiations in Paris. But during the tedious passage of his measures through the lower house he was called upon to listen to much offensive reference to himself and his methods; and the Finance Minister's attitude was supposed, even by impartial on-lookers, to imply that the loan affair was a supreme effort to acquire means by which the benefits of power could be bestowed upon the favored.

Moheno's violent speeches in the Chamber and de la Barra's quiet maneuvers in the Senate were substantially aided, after the first of January by Manuel Calero, who was called home from Washington at that time for conference with the President. The conference was in fact to impress upon the Ambassador the advantage of dis-

cretion; and Calero, taking mortal offense, resigned from the diplomatic service and took his seat in the Senate to which he had been duly elected. By the middle of January he had publicly burned the bridges which connected him with the Madero government.

He was an interesting figure, worthy of careful observation, as he emerged from the cover of his ambassadorship and became an open enemy of the administration under which he had held important posts. He possessed and still enjoys strong backing in the United States and may be marked for preferment in a propitious hour. We learned something of him while he was Madero's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Wilson's intimate friend. We know that during the time he was Mexico's Ambassador at Washington the relations between the two governments were marked by constantly lessening cordiality. When we come to consider his utterances after his return to Mexico, we see a certain logic in this. If Mexico's interests at Washington and Washington's interests in Mexico were in the hands of men who understood each other and were not well disposed toward Madero, how could cordiality, in those trying times, be maintained?

"I feel that the Republic is approaching an abyss of miseries and humiliations," said Calero on January 13; and in the same interview he gave as his reasons for resigning his office that he was "not in accord with the policies of the Government." These policies he described as "hitting out at random like a blind man with a stick." After two thousand words of discursive and vehement criticism of the Government, and especially of its Vice President, whose influence he certainly exaggerated, Señor Calero concluded the interview with this prophetic utterance:

"I consider it blindness to work for the downfall of the President, for at the present moment, with Señor Madero

deposed from office, there would be no alternative but a military dictatorship of whose disastrous effects we can judge only by what we have read of the last dictatorship of Santa Ana."

On February 3, six days before the outbreak in the capital, Calero made the most startling speech ever uttered in the Mexican Senate by a man of his prominence. "I lied to the American Government for ten months," he declared, during a discussion of the loan bill.

Later in this speech he said: "In the face of the deplorable failure of the public administration of our country, all are calling for the fall of the present Government, some through the violent measures of revolution which may overthrow it, others through financial embarrassment. I am of the opinion that those who hold this view do not weigh the terrible consequences which this would have for the country."

Senator Calero then attacked various features of the loan. "The truth of the matter," he asserted, "is that the Department of Hacienda (Finance) has not painted the situation as it really is. We should speak the truth though it destroy us. The truth is that the situation is desperate. The truth has not been spoken here. The condition of the country is terrible."

The orator's impassioned plea for truth, following so close upon the announcement of his own astonishing achievement in mendacity, drew instant, uncontrollable shouts of laughter from all factions in the Senate, and relieved the tension which his speech had caused. The Minister of Finance may have been tempted to take advantage of the situation by intimating that Calero's sins of duplicity had not been committed upon foreign soil alone; but the open Senate was not the place to tell the whole story.

"You were an indiscreet Ambassador and you are a bad

financier," was the opening sentence of Ernesto Madero's reply, and he kept fairly close to the question of the loan throughout his address.

There is, however, an interesting story which might not have been too remote from the subject to have figured in Ernesto Madero's address. It is appropriate here. While Calero was Minister of Foreign Relations and Madero was in hard straits after Orozco's defection, a banker of New York wrote a private letter to Francisco Alfaro, a prominent lawyer of Mexico City, to the effect that overtures had been made to him by friends of Manuel Calero. These overtures, so ran the letter, outlined a method of procedure. If the revolutionists of the North could be suitably encouraged by means of financial backing the Madero government would be placed in a position where prompt action would cause its retirement. And if at the right moment the financial aid were shifted to Calero, Madero's resignation would be forced, and the Minister of Foreign Relations would succeed to the Presidency.

Señor Alfaro who was not friendly to Calero, promptly handed the letter to Gustavo Madero who took it to his brother, the President. A copy was made, and the original was returned to Señor Alfaro who doubtless still has it. President Madero, unlike his uncle, the Minister of Finance, was a man of directness. He called in his Minister of Foreign Relations and held a pointed discussion with him over his intimacy with the American Ambassador, and the peculiar matter of the letter. Then he deposed him from the Foreign Office and sent him to Washington as Ambassador.

At Washington, Señor Calero for a time was more cautious in his methods. But toward the close of 1912 he spoke quite freely to a friend who also was a friend of Henry Clay Pierce, with the result that a letter detailing

the interesting features of the conversation was sent from Mr. Pierce's office to James Galbraith, manager in Mexico for the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. Mr. Galbraith made the same disposition of this letter that Señor Alfaro had of the other; he turned it over to Gustavo Madero, and the result was the calling home of Ambassador Calero for the conference with President Madero which was followed by Calero's resignation.

The employment of Calero as Ambassador to the United States after such a scene with the President as that which followed the disclosures by Señor Alfaro, seems a technical error to those who do not understand Mexico's lack of able men. Calero was certainly one of the ablest, and in many ways the best equipped for the work in Washington. He could not be ignored, and Madero did not wish him to be in the Senate. As Ambassador he could be called to account, but as a Senator he was above the law. His speeches hurt Madero but made few friends for the speaker. Like Moheno in his smaller belligerence in the Chamber, Calero in the Senate and elsewhere was his own man; but that his utterances helped the aims of the intriguers there is no doubt.

Manuel Calero had been closely identified with the Científicos and was an intimate friend of Pablo Macedo, a leading spirit of the circle. He was also counsel for the Huasteca Petroleum Company, and the Mexican Petroleum Company, concerns well placed in the Tampico fields and headed by E. L. Doheny of Los Angeles. After the fall of Diaz, Calero believed that he himself was better fitted than any other man to rule Mexico, and was greatly vexed at the delay he experienced in realizing his ambition.

Many of the statements he made in the Senate, on February 3, were founded on facts. Conditions were bad in Mexico and the Madero Government was making sad

blunders. Also the loan matter, as previously stated, had not been presented with sufficient clearness to inspire confidence. Calero struck on the secret of Mexico's internal disorders when, in that speech he demanded, "How is it possible that while the rebels are continually routed by troops of the line and the rurales, the revolution does not end? How is it that peace is not restored?" He asked this question with confidence because he knew the answer, and knew that none within hearing would give it voice. Hundreds of influential men in Mexico were secretly promoting the disorders. To stop banditry it seemed necessary to shoot Mexico into small pieces as Diaz had done in the early eighties.

But the fact is that peace in Mexico was in a fairer way to be restored at the time Calero asked that question, than ever before in the Madero rule, for a bargain had been struck with Zapata. The agreement had been made some weeks previously, and was to go into effect as soon as the loan measure should have been put through. This bargain with Zapata, in its terms and in the secret story of its consummation, bordered on the fantastic. Incredible as this may seem, it was made in the castle at Chapultepec one night in mid December. Emiliano Zapata, no less, was a guest of the President in that historic castle, and on that night Madero effected a trade with the outlaw chief for the pacification of the state of Morelos, and of all the territory south of the capital which made up Zapata's field of operations.

By the terms of this treaty, which if Madero had remained in power would have proved one of the most important incidents of his rule, a new governor was to be named for the state of Morelos in the person of Don Miguel Olivares. Zapata was to be *Jefe de Armes*, or chief in command of the forces of that section. One hun-

dred and fifty thousand pesos were to be distributed among Zapata's men who were then to be formed into a government body, under Zapata himself, to maintain order. No money was to be paid Zapata; he had already enriched himself in his own line of business which was banditry.

The undertaking also included the turning over of certain lands to persons who had been impoverished by the Survey Law of 1884. Rather than attempt to accomplish this by harsh government measures, Madero intended to purchase the properties from the Spanish holders then in possession. This he could not well do until the treasury was replenished by means of the new loan.

The incidents and the terms of this treaty, especially the fact that Zapata was at any time in conference with President Madero in Mexico City or elsewhere, have been strenuously and specifically denied. But the facts are as stated and were quite in order with precedents established by Porfirio Diaz.

With Zapata on the government side, the bandit leaders of the South, Genevevo de la O., Zalgada, Miranda and the others, undoubtedly would suspend activity. The bandits of the North also would be disheartened by Zapata's "reformation," and progress toward peaceful conditions would be rapid, notwithstanding the influences at work to encourage defiance of law and government. With this vital matter and so many others hanging upon the floating of the big loan, the Government's anxiety to complete formalities was intense; but the uses to which some of the funds were to be put must be kept secret.

Newspaper exploitation of banditry and rebellion was a definite aid to the development of disorder and the molding of opinion adverse to Madero in Mexico and in the United States; it fed the vanity of bandits and it supported the pessimism of Washington. In Mexico City it was a

poor day for news when a half dozen "scare heads" were not built in anti-government papers over reports of real or imaginary outrages. From border towns and from Mexico City similar items, always exaggerated, sometimes created from nothing, were despatched through regular press service and by special correspondents to newspapers in the United States. Special correspondents and Association men were not slow to catch the drift; Mexican matter, unless highly spiced with horror, would not be worth the tolls. The larger newspapers were receiving too much, and editors of every grade on the staff were wearying of the subject. The general tenor of instructions to correspondents on the spot was that only matter of a striking character was desired.

The correspondent is a business man and the editor is his customer. The failure of Madero, the increasing disorders, and the outrages upon Americans were the goods most in demand, and they were sent to market. No well-informed person can read to-day the files of that time, and not perceive that the result of the influences described was a very serious misrepresentation.

The Madero Government controlled three newspapers in Mexico City toward the close of 1912; one it had had from the de la Barra time, another it acquired in November, 1911, and the third was bought by friends of the Government about a year later. The first, *El Nueva Era*, was Gustavo's venture, with Sanchez Azcona, Madero's private secretary, as nominal owner. In this newspaper, which was presently capitalized at a considerable sum, many prominent men were invited to invest. Nothing could have been in worse taste than this, for among the stockholders of *El Nueva Era* were many Científicos. The paper carried no influence whatever; its circulation averaged about 10,000.

The second newspaper picked up by the Government was *El Diario* which had a circulation of about 8,000 and was tottering on the edge of the grave when the Government by undertaking to pay the newspaper's monthly deficit, secured the doubtful return of its editorial support. Under these conditions its circulation did not increase; no one believed anything that appeared in its columns.

Finally the Maderos bought control of Mexico's leading newspaper *El Imparcial* which had been the Government organ under Diaz. Upon its staff were men of real ability, and the new owners were enabled to put forward their version of current events in a better manner than before, but from the moment when *El Imparcial* became a government paper it lost prestige; its circulation declined from the 90,000 of its best days; and its advertising fell off because the best buyers of Mexico ceased to read it.

I count the methods of the Maderos with the press of Mexico City among their vital blunders. In the beginning of the de la Barra régime the announcement of freedom to the press and no subsidies was made. In June, 1911, I called upon Finance Minister Madero and congratulated him on this declaration. I told him that I was organizing a newspaper enterprise on the strength of it, and with a clear field would try to help make Mexico's free press an honor to the country.

Ernesto Madero is one of the most successful listeners I have ever addressed. He sat that day on the red sofa in the inner office of the Finance Department — which Limantour had fitted up a la Touraine — and with a faultless, infinitely patient courtesy permitted me to expound the benefits of independent journalism. He was pitying me, but I had no suspicion of it, so deeply intent he seemed upon my words.

Even when he asked me what concessions I desired, I

did not realize that he was saying to himself: "This grafting Gringo has a smooth tongue, but let us come to the point, if there is one."

I assured him that I had no concessions to ask for, but only a clear field for an independent newspaper. I wished to erect my building on an unoccupied lot owned by the Government, and would like a fair rental to be named. I hoped also that when my telegraph tolls should exceed 2500 pesos a month, a special rate would be made.

"You shall have them all," he declared, and his youthful, handsome face beamed with what I took to be enthusiasm. "I am in full sympathy with your views. Come and see me when you will."

I know now that I had not impressed him; that his agreeable interest was compounded of a natural suavity and a politic preference for my good will. He got it, and has never lost it. But I did not get the land that has been referred to, because a brother of President de la Barra demanded 8,000 pesos from my builder for "expenses," and I declined to pay. Nor was the special rate on press matter over Government wires ever granted to me, though the tolls that I paid, so they said at the Department of Communications, exceeded those of all the other newspapers of Mexico City combined. And the clear field is best described by the suggestion made one day to my Board of Directors that a "vacation" be voted to the American manager, myself.

The intrusion of the Government into the newspaper field of Mexico by its purchase of *El Imparcial* spurred the opposition press to extremes of attack and caused President Madero to employ repressive measures which he justified in a public speech early in December, 1912. This was the signal for renewed hostilities. From that moment no quarter was granted in the war waged by the newspapers

inimical to the Government. Attack and defense were nearly equal in the externals of dishonesty, but there was a hidden truth on one side, in the sincere convictions of the President, while upon the other there was nothing so respectable. Very moderate discernment only was required to see through the turgid rhetoric to the selfish interests behind.

El Manana on December 3 in an article of interminable sentences set forth the attitude of the press toward Madero in these words: "The press says to you day after day, Mr. Madero, that you have not the qualifications which are necessary for the high position which you occupy, and that the fall of the fatherland is the consequence. The press which defends you runs to license, but it can hardly be called the Mexican press since it is nothing but a Maderista press." To read this rightly one must know that it expresses the personal feelings of the Cientifico Deputy, Oliguibel.

In these crowded months while the disturbing elements which I have striven to describe were at work in Congress, and throughout the country, and beyond its borders, President Madero regained the optimism which had always been characteristic of him, and had been for only a little while disturbed. The nervous irritation which had afflicted him in the days of the Orozco rebellion seemed to have disappeared. To what extent he wilfully deluded himself after the manner of the various faith-cure cults, I am uncertain, but the result was very similar to their achievements even in the point of its ultimate fatality. He gained a more assured and cheerful attitude which had a value when he appeared in public, but he suffered the inevitable loss in judgment and in power to think honestly. It became more difficult than before to convince him by the plainest evidence against a preconceived opinion. He had posted a

deaf and blind sentry at the gateway of his life to cry "All's well," and there were times when he would hear no other voice.

It was impossible to make him take a reasonable view of the conspiracy within the army as an existing thing, but he dealt with it in the abstract when he addressed the graduates of the Chapultepec Military Academy, warning them that army men must not take part in politics. If he had followed up his own idea by practical investigation of the politics inside the army at that moment, or had countenanced the efforts made in that direction by some of his advisers, excellent results might have followed.

He spoke to the foreign diplomats with calm assurance, saying that if the nationals of their countries had suffered, they should accept their share of the common ills of the country to which they had come, and should be the more patient now, because in the past they had been benefitted. The crisis through which the country was passing was nearly over. It had been a wonderful awakening, and general prosperity would promptly ensue.

And he was speaking the plain truth as he saw it. Point by point he had seemed to defeat his enemies. The measures he had taken he felt sure would give him the upper hand of banditry. The matter of the loan would be thrashed out in Congress and presently would be carried through. Plots were idle gossip, and he declined to give his time to nonsense. The old Cientifico elements were arrayed against him, of course, but they were powerless. The United States was not so friendly as he could wish, but Mexico would survive its neighbor's unkindness, and the situation would improve.

There was much visible support for these opinions, but unhappily the President would not see the other side of the picture. Those who pointed to details unwelcome to an

optimist were sometimes laughed at and sometimes scolded. The President exercised, in this period, a more peremptory command over his assistants in the Government, and the members of his family seemed to be overawed by him at times — a strange thing, for he was at heart so gentle and so amiable.

In the early part of December a slight effect for good was produced by the remarks upon Mexico in the annual message of President Taft to Congress, laid before the two houses on the 3rd. I quote as follows:

“For two years revolution and counter-revolution have distraught the neighboring republic of Mexico. Brigandage has involved a great deal of depredation upon foreign interests. There have constantly recurred questions of extreme delicacy. On several occasions very difficult situations have arisen on our frontier. Throughout this trying period, the policy of the United States has been one of patient non-intervention, steadfast recognition of constituted authority in the neighboring nation, and the exertion of every effort to care for American interests.

“I profoundly hope that the Mexican nation may soon resume the path of order, prosperity and progress. To that nation in its sore troubles, the sympathetic friendship of the United States has been demonstrated to a high degree. There were in Mexico at the beginning of the revolution some thirty or forty thousand American citizens engaged in enterprises contributing greatly to the prosperity of that republic and also benefiting the important trade between the two countries.

“The investment of American capital in Mexico has been estimated at \$1,000,000,000. The responsibility of endeavoring to safeguard those interests and the dangers inseparable from propinquity to so turbulent a situation have been great, but I am happy to have been able to adhere to the policy above outlined — a policy which I hope may soon be justified by the complete

success of the Mexican people in regaining the blessings of peace and order."

Granting the sincerity of these expressions one can but deplore the existence of the something which prevented happier results than have been placed upon the record. "Your President means well toward us," said Foreign Minister Lascurain to me, "but he is misled by others."

The visit of "Good old Peter" to the United States indicated greater anxiety over the relations with Washington than any member of Madero's cabinet would admit. He was said to have gone to New York on private business but it was quite well understood that he was maneuvering to be officially received at Washington. The sharp retort of the preceding April which had marked Lascurain's début as a Mexican statesman, and his later achievement in controversial eloquence were not to be readily forgiven, however, and no official notice was taken of his presence in the country until he was about to return. Meanwhile there were persistent rumors of more strained relations between the two countries. The press agents of the trouble-makers sweated at their task. Their masters had detected a spirit of forbearance in President Taft's message, and were determined to drown in renewed clamor of discord any voice that spoke of peace.

Ambassador Wilson had been called over from Mexico City; it was reported that he would have something very like an ultimatum in his pocket when he should return to Mexico. Associated Press despatches under date of December '20 described at length Washington's determination to issue a "nearly unanswerable" demand upon Mexico. These despatches carrying four-column headlines were printed the following morning in the dailies of Mexico City. The next day the headlines were expanded to five columns

over another Associated Press despatch stating that "the American note is expected to be of historic importance as marking a distinct crisis between the two countries."

But the note was not sent. Possibly the Christmas season of good will to men may have exerted its influence upon President Taft and Secretary Knox; but I am more inclined to believe that they were dissuaded by the weakness of the case against Mexico as presented by Ambassador Wilson. Be that as it may, there was a Christmas change of heart in regard to Pedro Lascurain, and he was called to Washington, where he talked with President Taft on January 2, and with Secretary Knox on the following day. They must have gained important truths from this moderate, sincere man, full of accurate knowledge of his country. The result, I am sure, was good; the wonder is that it was not decisive, that it did not lead to the adoption of a proper course.

Lascurain's clear conception of American indifference and the attitude of the American Government, as well as the duty of Mexicans at that time, are disclosed in the interview he gave out on January 16, after his return to Mexico City.

"The great mass of the American people," he said, "has so far taken no interest in the affairs of Mexico.

"Certain political elements interested in an international conflict are the only ones trying to foment a state of feeling adverse to Mexico. Fortunately little has been accomplished as yet.

"The American Government and the classes which direct it, will be able to maintain the policy against intervention so long as the events in Mexico do not strengthen those who oppose this policy. For this reason the Mexican people should take serious thought on the actual situation and, inspired by the same patriotism which would make them

shed all their blood in the event of an international war, should try by all means at their disposal to restore order, pursuing those who break it until complete peace is obtained. They may then take up serenely the social and economic problems which can never be solved by armed strength. They should do this because it is more meritorious to be able to govern oneself as a nation than to stand face to face with a foreign enemy."

The words of Pedro Lascurain are especially worthy of quotation because he was the best friend of Americans in Madero's cabinet, and because he was a member of that cabinet for patriotic reasons only. He had accepted the portfolio of state at a time when the Government seemed doomed; in doing this he jeopardized his personal standing in Mexico. Never an active Maderista he was under no obligation to undertake what, in the beginning of April, 1912, seemed a sacrifice of himself in a very doubtful cause. But in January, 1913, when this interview was printed he was confident that Madero would succeed. If the benefits of his clear vision had been utilized beyond his own Department of State in the management of local Mexican affairs, the evil which befell Madero might have been averted.

There was another man whose vigilance would have proved a safeguard to the President if his warnings had been heeded; that man was his brother, Gustavo. Since the statement of the practical part he took in organizing and financing the revolution of 1910-11 he has had scant attention in these pages. This is not because of lack of activity on his part, but because of the necessity for caution, lest references to him should seem to be unfair; for in all that puzzling Madero régime no figure is more difficult to place with accuracy.

Advertised the world over as the arch grafter of the

period, and connected in local gossip with endless schemes for exploiting Government privileges, Gustavo Madero's name is spoken as that of the evil genius of his brother's rule; yet I know of nothing in which he greatly profited, no Government patronage in which he held a share. He may have been willing enough to participate in deals for Government supplies, but if so there must have been more able competitors, for very few of the good things fell to him. Like the unlucky boy in school he was nearest at hand when the teacher turned around, but the other boy had the apple. That Gustavo was heavily in debt when his enemies killed him is the best proof that others made the profits which the public believed had gone to him.

The other Maderos, especially those of the elder generation, managed matters more discreetly and with greater success. A person named Goodman in Mexico City supplied Government uniforms; he made them from cloth which came from Madero mills. A man named Jesus Aguilar carried on an *armoria* in Monterrey. He sold arms of various kinds to the Government. He was a nephew of Francisco Madero, Senior. A man named Antonio Zirion also furnished arms and other needful things. He was a son-in-law of Francisco Madero, Senior.

I wish to state in this connection that I can see no impropriety in these transactions, and I have never heard it charged that undue profits were made. It is certain that Gustavo had no share of them.

He was a busy man, nevertheless. He was the active manager of the Progresista Party which used the four-story building at Number 75 Avenida Juarez as its headquarters. The more private political affairs of the party were arranged at an office Gustavo maintained in his own home in Calle Londres, Number 14, just off Calle Berlin.

He was elected a Deputy in July, 1912, and held a seat in the noisy Madero Congress in which Moheno baited the Minister of Finance, attacked the President, lamented the sad condition of the country, and made himself generally useful—to those architects of ruin whose work the world has since contemplated with horror.

Gustavo was a favorite mark for Moheno's oratory. When no more convenient matter could be brought up for discussion, he demanded an accounting for the 700,000 pesos which Gustavo had received in June, 1911. It was Gustavo's business to steer political detail, maintain the equilibrium of the Chamber, watch the opposition, and keep a cool head. Every hour in the day he was sought by dozens of men with axes to grind or tales of distress to unfold. Unceasing demands for money were made upon him, the general impression being that the contents of the national treasury was at his disposal.

Gustavo was the one man ever watchful of the undermining movements that were being engineered through Científico and military channels, but his reports to the President of suspicious circumstances fell on the deaf ears of the optimist. Even when Mondragon and the arch Científico, Rosenando Piñeda, came back to Mexico, the President could not be made to perceive the significance of their return. Gustavo insisted that these men meant mischief, and were actively plotting to set it afoot.

In December, 1912, Gustavo found his position almost intolerable. In some respects the President was what New England people used to call "a trial" to his intimates. He was accused of instability, not without reason. A series of his judgments carefully reviewed would usually show how innocent he was of that consistency which is the vice of fools. If he saw the truth at noon, he would not fail to proclaim it and insist upon it as a rule of conduct,

though he had pledged himself to the opposite extreme of error over the morning coffee.

This virtue was beyond the appreciation of the practical Gustavo who saw nothing in it except that Francisco did not keep his word, a defect which made Gustavo's task as political manager extremely difficult. Yet he was loyal to his brother and had faith in his essential goodness, wherefore it was natural that he should always be relying just once more upon the President's promise, expressed perhaps in a form of words which seemed to be an authorization to proceed with certain negotiations. But in the few days or hours necessary for the completion of the arrangements, Francisco would have progressed to a new position from which no argument could drive him back to where he had stood before.

It would be necessary, therefore, for Gustavo to recall some part of his pledges or by the exercise of ingenuity devise a means to content the men on the other side of the bargain. Thus he was made to seem the unstable one, to the unjust detriment of his reputation. His father at this time was not in harmony with him on all points, and often interfered to prevent him from bringing the President to terms. Besides, there were, of course, a great number of jealous politicians who were working to destroy his power, much of which was mythical. He became a convenient scapegoat upon whose back were fastened many sins of others.

He was too shrewd to entertain illusions as to his status in the capital. One day he asked a friend of his, an American, what was the general estimate of his character. Doubtless he had already answered the question himself, but he desired to hear the opinion of this man in whose judgment and frankness he reposed especial confidence.

"You are called a damned thief," was the blunt reply.

Gustavo was silent for some moments, and then asked: "What do you advise?"

"I advise you to leave Mexico and be gone two years," said his friend earnestly.

And no less earnestly Gustavo answered: "You are right. I can accomplish nothing here but discredit for myself. Let them run the thing their own way."

Without fully disclosing his intention, he secured permission to visit Japan to carry the thanks of Mexico to the Emperor for his courtesies during the Centennial of 1910. Early in December it was announced that Gustavo would soon depart. But there were many matters for him to arrange and no date was set for his journey, until January, when February 19 was named. As fate willed it, this was the day upon which he was shot to death.

About half past four in the afternoon of the 4th of February, Gustavo Madero was at his home, Number 14, Calle Londres, in the room that was his office which overlooked the street. By a front window stood an American friend. Gustavo's automobile was at the curb, and standing a few steps away were two men. One was a colonel of the Mexican army in civilian dress, and the other a young Mexican named Saldaña who had been doorkeeper for Gustavo Madero, but had been discharged for exacting fees from men who wished to see him.

Saldaña had been endeavoring to secure entrance to the house, but had been excluded by the attendant; and now he made a gesture so despairing that it attracted the attention of the American who, upon an impulse, went out and asked the men what they desired. Saldaña's companion pleaded for an interview with Gustavo, and the American returned to lay the request before him.

Gustavo refused. "These fellows all want money," he said. (It must be understood that he was a kind of politi-

cal boss, subject to the importunities which the position entails.)

But the American had been impressed by something unusual in the manner of the colonel, and he urged upon Gustavo the wisdom of seeing him.

"You can never be positive, old man," he said. "This fellow has a story to tell and it may be worth the price."

"Oh, well," said Gustavo; "I'll see him."

For some minutes Gustavo and the colonel conversed in lowered tones, but the American by the window heard the officer's story which was really pitiful, and heard also the plea for one hundred pesos at the end.

"A hundred won't do you much good, Colonel," said Gustavo, pulling out some money from his pocket. "Take five hundred, and get on your feet."

The colonel, almost speechless with genuine gratitude, made the somewhat ridiculous exit which seems inevitable on such occasions, but he remained near the house; and a few minutes later when Gustavo and his friend had gone out, and were about to board the automobile, the officer came toward them. He was very pale as he begged Gustavo for five minutes more in private. Gustavo was late for an appointment at his office on Avenida Juarez, but the look on the colonel's face was compelling, and he led the way into the house leaving the American seated in the car.

Ten, twenty minutes, half an hour, passed and the men did not return. When at last they appeared the colonel went slowly down the street and Gustavo came to the side of the car. The color was all out of his face, and every sign of agitation which is permissible to a gentleman was plainly to be seen. He gave his friend merely a glance and turned to the chauffeur whom he addressed in a low tone, yet with such a mortal thrill in it that the man instinctively

drew his head down between his shoulders, as if dodging a blow.

"Chepultepec," said Gustavo, "and drive like hell."

Then he took his seat, and the car leaped ahead into the eye of the setting sun. Gustavo opened his left hand in which was a crumpled paper. The American took it and read a list of names. Perceiving that nearly all of them were men high in the army, he understood in part the meaning of the strange thing that had happened. He did not wonder that Gustavo had been stricken with terror. This must be a roster of chief officers in the military conspiracy, and if it was authentic it spelled ruin, for they could control by far the greater part of the troops then in the Federal District.

The American leaned forward and spoke to the chauffeur:

"Slow down," he said. "Keep to a usual speed."

At this Gustavo nodded approvingly. Under the circumstances it would not do for him to burn the dust on his way to see the President. The spectacle might set tongues wagging. With his finger he tapped the paper which his friend still held.

"There are twenty-two of them," said he, "but one name doesn't count. The colonel's comes off."

"Get the tragedy out of your face, if you can," said the American. "And don't forget to return the salute of those fellows," he added, as the car swung around the acute angle from Calle Londres to Insurgentes, and they saw a patrol of mounted police just ahead.

Gustavo managed the salute very well, and a smile besides. And he sat there smiling like a galvanized corpse, staring straight ahead, and saying never a word while they bowled into the wide Paseo de la Reforma and along it. Several cars were encountered on the way, among them

that of Pimentel, a corporation-jobbing Científico; and there were other men in the procession who had a keen eye for Gustavo as he passed, and could not have failed to note undue haste on his part.

The car rolled through the Chapultepec gates, to the castle's porte cochere. Gustavo took the list of traitors from the American's hand, and went up to see the man whom they were plotting to depose. A very long hour the American waited for Gustavo. When he came, his face was not pale; it was flushed with the excitement of futile contention.

"Pancho wouldn't believe it; he laughed at me," was all he had to say till the men were back in town again, with four walls around them, and the doors well locked.

CHAPTER XIV

IT must not be imagined that Gustavo Madero had sought the President merely to communicate his fears. He was a man of action, the practical politician of the family. His gifts and experience explain why he believed the colonel's story, instead of rejecting it because of the deplorable revelation of the man's character. Gustavo saw nothing incredible in what had occurred — that this fellow should come whining for money to one whom he was conspiring to destroy, and should then upon an impulse turn about and betray the other party from whose members he had obtained no help in his distress. Human nature in the raw will sometimes look like that.

The colonel had convinced Gustavo that the list was authentic, that the men whose names appeared upon it — with one exception, still doubtful as was indicated by a question mark — had pledged themselves for the overthrow of the Government. The date set was March 16. Two of the names were of men then in prison, another was that of a civilian. The officers included could probably control about 12,000 troops, a great majority of the garrisons in and near the capital. Even the commandant of the palace guard stood ready to deliver up the headquarters of the Government at the demand of the conspirators.

Eight men of the twenty-two were of commanding importance; the others were followers. The eight were:

General Mondragon — On retired list. Active organizer of the conspiracy.

Rodolfo Reyes — Lawyer. Counsel and guide of Felix Diaz.

General Felix Diaz — Confined in the penitentiary in Mexico City under suspended sentence of death for treason.

General Bernardo Reyes — Father of Rodolfo. Confined in Santiago barracks in Mexico City under suspended sentence of death for treason.

General Blanquet — In active command of 4,000 troops of all branches. Headquarters at Toluca, capital of the State of Mexico, 46 miles distant from Mexico City.

General Huerta (?) — Not in active service. Had not positively agreed to join the revolt.

General Beltran — The man who "captured" Felix Diaz at Vera Cruz in October, 1912. At this time commanding infantry at Tacubaya, a suburb five miles from the National Palace.

General Navarette — Commanding artillery at Tacubaya.

Gustavo perceived that in order to break up the conspiracy it would be necessary to deal effectively with the eight men noted. The thing was not impossible, provided that the President would authorize vigorous measures. Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes already were in close confinement. Blanquet, Beltran and Navarette could be transferred to distant posts, widely separated. General Huerta, who for reasons not quite clear, had given only a qualified pledge to join the plotters, could be, as had previously been suggested, sent abroad to study military tactics. Of the eight there remained but General Mondragon and Rodolfo Reyes who might be arrested; or, if the President was disinclined to take such a step they could be placed under such close surveillance that they would voluntarily leave Mexico.

General Villar, ranking officer in the capital, and General Figueroa, Chief of the Federal District police, were faithful; so was General Felipe Angeles in command of troops

BANCO FRANCO-ESPAÑOL

(Capital autorizado \$200,000)
21, CALLE DEL BARQUILLO
MADRID

SUCURSAL DE PARIS
1 Rue H. Haugue

CHEMIN DE FER MEXICAIN DU CENTRE

(Ferrocarril Mexicano del Centro)

Capital-Acciones: \$ 3,000,000 ('7,500,000 francs)

CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION

Don Francisco Madero, Administrateur de la Banque Centrale Mexicaine (1), Président;

- Rafael Hernandez, Député au Congrès de l'Union, Administrateur de la Banque Centrale Mexicaine (1), Vice-Président;
- Gustavo A. Madero, Industriel à Monterrey, Administrateur-Délégué;
- Rodolfo J. Garcia Directeur-Gérant de la Banque de Nuevo Leon (2), Administrateur;
- Alfonso Madero, Industriel à Monterrey, Administrateur;
- Rafael P. Urbina, Secrétaire.

Letterhead of Henri Rochette's banking house in Paris, which advanced \$375,000 to Gustavo Madero on account of an underwriting of bonds of his proposed railroad across the State of Zacatecas. This money Madero used to finance the revolution.

Heading of stock-subscription form used by Gustavo Madero in the attempt to float his railway corporation. His fellow directors were not implicated in his misuse of the funds.



GUSTAVO MADERO

Brother of President Madero; one of the most conspicuous men of the Madero regime, though he held no office except that of deputy in the Congress elected in July, 1912.
Murdered Feb. 19, 1913.



at Cuernavaca, only seventy-five miles away. With Angeles placed in command at Tacubaya the beginning of a dependable military protection for the capital would be formed. But all these precautions depended for their execution upon the President; and it may have been chiefly a foreknowledge of what his brother would do in this great crisis which had shaken the courage of Gustavo for the moment.

This foreboding had been abundantly justified, for the President had refused to take the matter seriously. The list, so he assured Gustavo, had been prepared for sale, and Gustavo had bought it. To base any stern procedure upon such evidence would be to make the Government ridiculous, and invite endless complications. The "not certain" after Huerta's name stamped the list as spurious, for Huerta in reality, was the officer most likely to be disloyal. He was not even taking the trouble to hide his sentiments from the public; within a fortnight he had spoken bitterly of his removal from command of the northern army. Huerta, with the unclosed gap in his vouchers staring him in the face, holding back against a general movement of this character? It was too absurd to consider.

Blanquet and Beltran, the President urged, had proved their loyalty beyond all question. Navarette was a creature of Mondragon, but would not be drawn into a move which would discredit the army. The whole thing was preposterous, and Gustavo might be better employed than in listening to such tales from men who wanted to exchange them for money. Mondragon was a malcontent and a plotter, as everybody knew. But what of it?

For an hour Gustavo had begged for some action to be taken, but the stubborn over-confidence of the President had been proof against any argument. Not for a moment could Francisco Madero see himself as others — and espe-

cially the old Diaz officers of the army — saw him. In his own view he was Mexico; disloyalty to him was treason. In the view of Porfirista army officers, as well as many others, he was an intruder who was making trouble, and to force him out would be a patriotic act. This was Mondragon's doctrine which he had disseminated through the army; it was Pineda's doctrine which had been made the creed of Cientificos, hacendados and business men of all nations. Gustavo understood the situation but he was helpless; he was dealing with a convinced optimist who would not listen to reason.

Far into the night Gustavo and his American friend discussed the affair in all its bearings, but they were unable to devise any plan which could be carried out without the President's authorization. The only course open to Gustavo was to fortify himself with more information in the vain hope that he could succeed in convincing his brother.

During the remainder of that week Gustavo was a busy man. He was here, there, and everywhere in the city and its suburbs; but the chief result seems to have been the alarming of the conspirators. His enemies were watching him. Why was he visiting every day the barracks at Tacubaya and the government ammunition works at Santa Fe? He had not been to either place for months. What caused this sudden activity?

His uncle, the Finance Minister, and his cousin, the Minister of Gobernacion, were inclined to view the warning more seriously than the President was, but they were busy men just then in their own departments. The Finance Minister was fighting for his loan measures in the Senate against Calero and the hold-over Porfiristas cleverly marshalled in opposition by de la Barra. The Minister of Gobernacion in whose department were all dealings with the Governors of the States, and control of the entire sys-

tem of *rurales* (rural guards) was actively engaged in combating Científico activity over the broad area of the republic. There was no time during those vital days from the 4th to the 9th of February, for close attention to a plot which was not scheduled to mature until March 16.

These reasons for lack of activity by officials of the cabinet seem inadequate, but it must be remembered that the President's firm stand against recognition of this or any other conspiracy was a strong deterrent. So Gustavo was without aid. Even the cooperation of the faithful chief of police could not be sought, for President Madero had expressly prohibited it.

The historical value of the warning which Gustavo received consists, however, not so much in its unheeded possibilities of salvation, as in the light which the names on the list shed upon subsequent events. Singularly vivid is this disclosure; it stamps the deadly combat that raged for ten days in the heart of Mexico City as wanton slaughter, as a terrorizing exhibit of destructive forces to mark the end of Maderism and destroy the appetite of the people for a voice in their Government.

The colonel had warned Gustavo that the word for action might be spoken at almost any moment, but he was somewhat astray in the statement that plans were nearly complete; there were several conflicting elements in that singular conspiracy which then had not been fully reconciled. Gustavo's constant moving about on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of that week, the 5th, 6th and 7th of February, had resulted in scaring the leaders of the plot, but it also inspired the chief organizer to undertake a movement which in effect, was a plot within a plot.

As has been disclosed already, the plan had been that when Madero and his Vice President should have been forced out, General Bernardo Reyes should become Pro-

visional President, and hold office until Felix Diaz could be elected constitutional President for what remained of the six year term begun by Porfirio Diaz in December, 1910. Mondragon himself was to be Minister of War, Rodolfo Reyes, Minister of Justice, and Victoriano Huerta, Commander in Chief of the military forces. The other officers in the conspiracy were to be advanced in rank and pay.

General Huerta had not agreed to this arrangement. He did not approve of Bernardo Reyes as Provisional President because Reyes had been disloyal to Porfirio Diaz whom Huerta greatly admired, and whom he had personally escorted to Vera Cruz when the Dictator departed from the capital; also, he believed in common with others, that Bernardo Reyes had shown himself deficient in stamina when, having defied Diaz, he meekly accepted the order to study military methods in Europe.

Huerta did not approve of Felix Diaz for President at any time because he thought him lacking in the necessary qualities. Porfirio Diaz, who greatly desired to perpetuate the Diaz name in Mexico's Government, had never considered his nephew as a possible successor. Felix Diaz was a man to take orders, not to originate and issue them.

So Huerta, disapproving of these arrangements planned by Mondragon, had not as yet consented to become actively concerned in the movement. Just what he would approve had not been stated in words, but subsequent history has made it sufficiently clear.

Manuel Mondragon believed that his own best interests would be served by the stated program; he believed this because he knew that both Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz would be subject to his adroit manipulations. He knew, of course, that Rodolfo Reyes had achieved a mental ascendancy over Felix Diaz, but he was confident of his

own ability to cope with Rodolfo when the time should come.

The stir in the conspirators' ranks which came with the suspicion that Gustavo Madero had learned something of the plot gave Mondragon an opening. If Gustavo had acquired any definite information, the date, March 16, must be part of it, and he would not be expecting the outbreak for several weeks. By immediate action, the Government would be taken by surprise and Reyes would be seated. Mondragon would then be in better position to deal with General Huerta. In this plan of operation the insurgent force at the beginning would be small, but with all the men in active command about the capital already committed to the main features of his program, Mondragon was confident that no really hostile opposition would be met. On the other hand, if action should be delayed for even a week, wholesale arrests might be made and the elaborately planned conspiracy come to an ignominious end.

That many friendly eyes were upon his movements Mondragon was well assured, though none but his intimates knew the details of his plan. This knowledge gave him confidence. All through Mexico, among men of property, word had quietly been passed that something of importance was brewing, and in every state the Cientifico clique was ready to applaud any successful enterprise to overthrow the hated Madero rule.

The military plotter knew that opportunity to do this could not rise from the ashes of a present defeat. Madero was more strongly entrenched than the world had been permitted to believe. His financial plan was being thwarted by a few votes in the Senate: his opponents feared daily that some deal would carry the measure through, and put one hundred million pesos in the treasury. With these ample funds Madero could make friends out of enemies,

provide employment for the idle, arrange agrarian schemes for the peons he professed to love, and influence public opinion in the United States and Europe.

The truth about the revival of business during the recent months had been kept from the world by means not wholly mysterious to Mondragon, yet he marvelled at the success achieved by those who managed the publicity for the solid men. The revenues of the Government for the six months to December 31, 1912, were seventy million pesos, twelve millions more than for any other six months in Mexico's history. Could the world be humbugged indefinitely into believing that all news from Mexico was bad news?

Mondragon was convinced that this systematic black-guarding of Madero's government could not be continued successfully after the loan bill should be passed. He did not arrive at this decision all by himself. Piñeda helped him to see it, so did Calero and de la Barra. These men may not have known the details of Mondragon's plan, but they did know very well indeed that Madero's fall, if it should come, would be accomplished by the military, and they credited Mondragon with the proper qualifications for a prime mover.

By considerations such as have been indicated, Mondragon was persuaded during those four days that prompt action was desirable. Never again would he find conditions so favorable to his own interests. But the arrangements for his personally conducted insurrection were far from perfect. Results were produced which shocked the world, and are yet to be dearly paid for, but Mondragon merely began the bad work; the course of events almost immediately passed beyond his control.

The revolt was a very uncertain affair as it struggled into action on Saturday night, the 8th of February, 1913. Let no one doubt it. Francisco Madero had been close to

truth when he had assured Gustavo that the captains and lieutenants of the army would not go on record as disloyal to their Government. The lack of coherence in the military plot was more than a division of interest among the leaders; it was a positive disinclination of the lesser commissioned officers to take part.

The President had been notably wrong in that he had taken no efficient steps to sustain the right spirit in the army; yet Mondragon could muster but eight hundred men and three batteries of artillery, in addition to the palace guard, for the opening scene of his drama,—an array that adds another fantastic touch to his effort.

Of these forces, let it be recorded to their shame, six hundred were *Aspirantes* or cavalry cadets from the military school at Talpam, a suburb of the Capital. On the other side of the account must be set down the loyalty of the cadets of the Chapultepec Academy, the West Point of Mexico. Not for a moment did these young men waver in fidelity to the established government until that government was definitely superseded under the contract signed in the American Embassy in the interests of what the traders called peace.

To follow easily the course of events in the small hours of Sunday morning, February 9, it is necessary to know the locations of a few important points in and around Mexico City. The castle and park of Chapultepec are about two and a half miles to the westward of the National Palace. The Avenida San Francisco, the Avenida Juarez and the Paseo de la Reforma really form a single highway from the Palace to the castle. Southward of the Paseo, at a distance of perhaps three-eighths of a mile, another broad avenue leads from "Old Mexico" to the castle: this is Avenida Chapultepec, along which — well fenced in — runs one of the heavy trunk lines of the suburban tramway serv-

ice. Beyond Chepultepec about four miles is the ancient village of Tacubaya, in which is a strong military post.

East of the Palace three-quarters of a mile, beyond the solid blocks of ancient one and two-story houses, is the penitentiary in which Felix Diaz was confined. Bernardo Reyes was held in the Santiago barracks, a mile to the northward of the Palace. Tlalpam, the home of the Aspirantes, is about fifteen miles to the southward.

Shortly after two o'clock on Sunday morning an officer of the Forest Guards of Chepultepec, who lived in a pretty brick villa in the park, was awakened by the rumble of artillery passing along the Tacubaya road. The hoofbeats of many horses, the clanking of sabers, told him that a considerable body of cavalry accompanied the guns, and all were moving toward the city.

The officer of the Forest Guards did not believe that this force was upon any errand of the Government's despite the fact that it was waking the echoes of the night within a pistol-shot of the President's bedroom windows. Much more probably this was the military uprising which had been the theme of gossip during the past two days.

The officer arose, and for some minutes looked from his window at the dark mass of the castle, but he saw no sign that any one had taken alarm. Adjoining it on the west was the Chepultepec Academy, and there, too, so far as he could discover, all was quiet. Was it possible that the President had not waked, and that amongst the great body of cadets there was not one to hear and understand these warlike sounds?

It seemed that this was true, and presently there dawned upon the soldier the light which revealed his personal duty. Presumably he had the usual regard for his own life; certainly he was aware of the extreme risk of interference, and probably this consideration determined his course. He

might have warned the President, or the Commandant of the Academy, but either of these acts would have been equivalent to publishing his connection with the affair. Moreover, it was probable that he would not be believed, and in fact he had no very solid ground for his conviction. The upshot was that he went to a man in whom he had personal confidence to discover the point where an attack would be made, if any were contemplated. The man was Adolfo Basso, intendente of the National Palace.

It happened that Basso had attended a theater, seeing one of those late performances which are given in Mexico City. He had heard in the course of the evening abundant rumors of revolt, and as he was loyal to Madero it is to be supposed that his mind was not at ease as he walked home alone. It was past two o'clock when he came to the plaza that lies before the Palace, and there he met the officer of the Forest Guards and heard his story.

The hazard of interference was now transferred to Basso, and he accepted it, but he too sought an individual instead of warning the Government directly. Doubtless he went to the man whom he thought most likely to know what to do, and safest to depend upon for prompt and vigorous action — Gustavo Madero.

To Gustavo, at his home in the Calle Londres, Basso made his report. From the Forest Guardsman he had learned that the troops had proceeded eastward on Avenida Chapultepec. From the rumors which he had heard, Basso thought it probable that they would go on past Belem prison and connect with the aspirantes from Tlalpam on the street called Cinco de Febrero, several squares south of the Palace. Detachments would doubtless be sent to release Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes, and these operations would consume time. The movement upon the Palace would probably be delayed some hours.

With these opinions Gustavo Madero concurred. There would be no haste to occupy the Palace with troops from outside, because the guards already in possession were corrupted. Such being the unfortunate condition of affairs, what could be done? Gustavo knew no place to get a military force in time, and he was not sanguine as to prompt action on his brother's part if he should go to Chepultepec and lay the matter before him. It was obviously important to prevent the setting up of revolutionary headquarters in the Palace for the sake of the effect on the public mind, and if the house of Government were to be held, Gustavo would have to do it himself, so he decided.

He seems to have been in rare form, on this Sunday morning. He was the Gustavo who with picturesque recklessness in the Diaz days had played a most unpromising hand in the game of revolution against an entrenched empire, and had organized Madero clubs throughout Mexico under the very noses of the Cientificos. He was Gustavo, the practical politician, who, as leader of the "*Porra*" or Progresistas, had developed the knack of cajolery to a fine art; who had studied the people and could call the Juans and the Miguels by their first names, and address them in the language which they understood. He was the gambler in long chances who had faced danger too often to be worried about it.

With his hat a little on one side, and a cigar between his teeth, he sallied forth from home upon his absurd and tragic task—to take the National Palace from four hundred traitors in arms, and hold it, heaven knew how, against the strong force which would advance upon it at the break of day or thereabouts. He rode in his touring car with Basso beside him, and with Tomas, his much-trusted chauffeur, at the wheel. As to what happened afterwards, I follow an intimate, detailed account, reliable for all that was

done and said. If it were desirable I could set down the challenges and orders, and could quote even more extensively from the extraordinary remarks of Gustavo, as he made a kind of stump speech for his own life and his brother's rule in the dim patio of the Palace, facing the rifles of four hundred men.

Gustavo's car, though challenged by the sentries at the central entrance of the Palace, was not halted. It rolled into the patio where Colonel Morelos, the commandant, and all his force were assembled, waiting to admit the troops of Mondragon.

"You are under arrest," said Morelos, and gave an order to his men so hastily that it included them all, not a small squad as he had probably intended. The ridiculous result was that the guns of the entire four hundred covered Gustavo simultaneously. He stood up in his car, the target for all those rifles, and burst into a laugh which may very well have been entirely genuine. There was smothered laughter in the ranks, and Gustavo was quick to seize his advantage.

"You are a perfect host, my Colonel," he shouted, so that all might hear; "never before have such honors been paid me. I was not an invited guest, but I heard of your little party here and I have dropped in. And see how you have welcomed me! Let me stand by your side, I beg of you, to greet your brave friend General Reyes and his fat fighting partner, our own dear Felix."

He knew what he was doing when he referred to Reyes and Diaz at a moment when he himself had taken the fancy of his audience by a picturesque display of courage. The "bravery" of General Reyes was a joke in Mexico, and Felix Diaz was called a lady's man. Moreover, Gustavo knew that he had private friends in that assemblage, for many a soldier of the guard had thanked him for a much

needed *cinco pesos*. Possibly the insubordinate laughter in the ranks was kept going by these men; at any rate, it continued, encouraging Gustavo and proportionately disconcerting the colonel, who began, not unwisely, to doubt whether he could rely upon his troops. And while the commandant was still uncertain as to his next move, Gustavo went on with his stump speech, treating the soldiers to the rude humor they appreciated.

"It isn't fair to you, my dear Colonel," he said, "to keep these hard-working muchachos up all night waiting for our illustrious friends. The beds at Santiago are very comfortable, and a fierce fighting man like General Reyes needs his rest. Tambien, he has to dress for the presidential part. Don Felix, too, you know, must curl his mustaches and oil his hair, and the boudoir arrangements in the bartolinas at the pen are sadly deficient. The escorts have come a long distance; they are only now arriving in town from Tlalpam and Tacubaya. It will be a good seven o'clock before our guests arrive. Before that time they will have roused all the town with their trampings and tootings, and there will be a fine audience out in front. Keep the boys in condition for the big show; let them rest their arms."

The commandant gave the signal and the rifles came down with a clang on the cement. He did not, in fact, dare to do otherwise, for the continued laughter showed the disposition of the guard.

"While we prepare for the grand reception, my dear Colonel," Gustavo went on, "bring these handsome caballeros from Tlalpam over to the right side of the patio where I can talk to them like a father. I can't see very well with my left eye."

A great shout of laughter went up at this, for everybody knew that Gustavo's left eye was of glass. The men of the regular guard understood the maneuver and were in

sympathy with it. They resented the presence of two hundred Tlalpam students who thought themselves superior, and nothing would have pleased the regulars better on this occasion than to have the two parts of the force lined up on opposite sides.

The commandant understood also, but he scented mutiny, and was afraid that the peon soldiers would obey Gustavo rather than himself, especially because Gustavo had been shrewd enough to enlighten them at the very outset in regard to matters which they had not understood. The movement toward separation had in fact been begun by the regulars before the colonel gave the order, and within a few seconds it was complete — Aspirantes on the right and the Guard on the left. Into the space between Gustavo walked, and he continued his harangue while the commandant stood looking helplessly on.

In a few minutes Gustavo learned that neither the Aspirantes nor the Palace Guards had known the part that General Reyes was to play in the affair in which they were engaged. With this he whipped the Aspirantes, who were Felix Diaz men, into line, and within forty minutes from the time he rode through the Palace gate he had gained effective command of the whole guard. Morelos he personally escorted to a room of the Palace, constructed for such purposes, and locked him in. At five o'clock he, Gustavo Madero, a civilian, was in active charge of the Palacio Nacional, and in ordering its guards about was committing one of the gravest of military crimes.

The two hundred Aspirantes had been won over for the moment, but could not be expected to fire on their comrades, or even to remain neutral if a fight should ensue, so by common consent they stacked their arms in the patio and were marched to a large court in the far interior of the Palace and placed under a guard of ten men. The two

hundred men of the Palace guard were now quietly disposed for protection to the entrances and for manning of the machine battery of twelve guns on the roof, but the final measures for defense were taken by General Villar, the post commander, who came to the Palace at six o'clock.

As Gustavo had jocularly advised the Commandant, General Reyes and his escort of two hundred cavalry did not appear until nearly seven o'clock. When they came they moved forward with the confidence of a perfect understanding; the Palace gates were to be swung wide for them and General Reyes was to be shown at once to the presidential quarter from which he would immediately issue a manifesto to the nation, denouncing Madero as a traitor and proclaiming himself Provisional President pending the action of Congress.

The awakening from this dream of a bloodless victory was violent. Instead of a welcoming salute, the advancing column was greeted at thirty paces' distance by a challenge. General Villar then came out of the Palace and warned General Reyes that the place was held against him, and that bloodshed would result if he advanced further. Reyes did not believe that the guard would offer resistance, and he pressed forward. There was a volley from the guard in the broad entrance of the Palace and Reyes fell dead. His men returned the fire, wounding Villar. Members of the guard dashed from the Palace, and took several prisoners, among them General Ruiz, who had stood near Reyes.

Promptly the machine guns on the roof began to sputter in all directions, inflicting some damage on the enemy and very much more on the crowd of peons which had gathered from all over that part of the town. It is said that three hundred persons were hit in five minutes of this firing. Then a few of the machine guns were turned upon the cathedral

towers, in which a small body of Aspirantes had been stationed to pick off any persons about the square who might feel disposed to interfere. The towers were promptly evacuated and the firing from the Palace stopped.

While this sanguinary engagement was going on Felix Diaz and Mondragon with their six hundred Aspirantes and their three batteries of artillery came down Cinco de Mayo, and were about to deploy their force in the Plaza when they became properly aware of the hail from the machine guns on the Palace roof. Not caring to advance in the face of this fire, Diaz and Mondragon swung to the left at double quick, and turning into the Calle Tacuba moved rapidly back along this street, which is parallel to the one by which they had advanced. Continuing on this course they passed out of Calle Tacuba into the street called Hombres Ilustres, which runs along the northern side of the Alamada. At Calle Balderas, one street west of the Alamada, they swung again to the left six blocks to the Arsenal, of which, after a short parley, they took possession. The Arsenal was the headquarters of Felix Diaz during the ten days of bombardment which ensued.

At the Palace enthusiasm for the President, and especially for Gustavo, had taken possession of the guard. They had been marshalled among the Government's enemies, they assured Gustavo, through no fault of their own, and had been determined to stand by him from the first moment of his appearance. He looked them over and believed them; how could these ignorant ones understand the right and wrong of such affairs, and if they did, how could they oppose their commanding officer without a leader?

The status of the Aspirantes, however, was different; they were wilful traitors. It would probably go hard with them and with the Commandant of the Palace, who though greatly respected throughout the army, and above the sus-

picion of having been bought, had done his best to hand over the Palacio Nacional to the insurgents.

Many dead and wounded were in the Plaza. The body of General Reyes lay within a stone's throw of the central gates, but no orders were given for its removal or for the relief of soldiers or civilians whose injuries held them where they fell. Gustavo Madero was no longer in command, and he refrained from assuming any further responsibility. General Villar's wound explains his inaction and that of his men. The bullet which had hit him was a very choice missile from the cartridge box of fate. My own opinion is that the whole clan Madero fell at that shot. For Villar was a brave man, not without ability, capable of holding his ambition in check at the demand of honor. To his position as commander of the post Huerta succeeded, with addition of authority such as might have been conferred on Villar but for his disablement; and it is not unlikely that he would have saved the State, winning an easy triumph where an abler soldier failed for lack of honest will.

The loss was not immediately appreciated by Gustavo Madero, to whom it seemed that the first skirmish had ended very well. The strain of that extraordinary night was now relaxed. One round in the game of life and death had been played through, and the chief loser's stake paid out there in the Plaza. The hour had come when a man might stretch his limbs and seek a little refreshment; and Gustavo ordered his car and rode forth into the morning air, to the home of his friend, Angel Casso, in the Calle Marselle, and sat down with him to breakfast.

Over the coffee there arose some question as to the killing of the spectators in the square, and Gustavo explained it, saying that it was due to the zeal of the peon gunners who, excepting two or three, had never before fired machine guns at a living target, and were curious to learn how

much destruction they could work by the mere turning of a little crank. Upon the whole, however, they had done so well that no immediate renewal of the assault upon the Palace need be feared.

It was not until nine o'clock that President Madero reached the center of the city. At that hour he appeared on Avenida Juarez on the southern side of the Alameda at the head of about one thousand men made up of Chapultepec cadets and mounted police. At the National Theatre he was urged to go no farther, and as he stood there in plain view he was shot at from one of the upper windows of the great unfinished theater building. Owing to a sudden movement of his horse the bullet missed him narrowly, and killed a negro on the sidewalk.

Turning to the officer in charge of his body guard of cadets and police, Madero directed him to see to the capture of the enemy in the theater, and then to return to Chapultepec to await further orders. The officer ventured to express astonishment. Was it possible that the President meant to ride the half mile through Avenida San Francisco alone, while the city was ablaze with insurrection?

Madero smiled. He turned his big gray horse toward the Plaza and without further parley proceeded on his way, his only attendant being a colonel who rode at his side. He had, however, an unofficial advance guard in an American Jew named Blum, who was apparently seeking personal advertisement. Blum was a dealer in horses and their pedigrees, and it was said that in a trade he would often furnish a pedigree much better than the one to which the animal was entitled. His carelessness in the assortment of the two commodities, the horse and the pedigree, had resulted in frequent expulsions from the Jockey Club racetrack, but he would always come back again. And it is quite accordant with the grotesqueness of this national tragedy,

that the well-known Blum—who afterwards sold milch cows to Felix Diaz at the Arsenal—should now precede the President who had just escaped by inches from assassination, and was inviting another attempt at every movement of his unguarded progress to the National Palace, on this Sunday morning.

Not until he reached the Plaza strewn with dead did Madero realize the seriousness of what had occurred. Hurrying to his official quarters he set in operation the work of succor and removal, personally directing that the body of General Reyes be brought into the Palace. Then the wheels of outraged government began to revolve swiftly. A cabinet meeting passed sentence of death and immediate execution upon the captured General Ruis, and Colonel Morelos, the Palace commandant. The sentence was carried out that afternoon, and before night General Victoriano Huerta, who was on waiting orders in the capital, was summoned to the Palace and placed in chief command of all the troops in and about Mexico City.

CHAPTER XV

AFTER General Huerta was put in chief command of the Government's forces, on February 9, cannon and small arms were the instruments of pandemonium in the City of Mexico, much property was destroyed, and many persons were killed, up to the time of the *coup d'état* on the 18th. There were opposing camps, so to speak; the Palace and the Arsenal, the established government under Madero and the revolt nominally under Diaz, were at war. But all this was mere seeming, and differed from the truth in every essential particular. There was no warfare, and even of anything that could be called fighting there was very little. The affair was dishonest, root, branch and twig; dishonest as a squabble started by thieves in a crowd to draw attention from the picking of pockets.

The mockery was plainly apparent to many who had no knowledge of military affairs; it could hardly have deceived any person of intelligence who was not blinded by some prepossession. The usual version of this ten days' riot in uniform, this random bombardment with modern weapons in a densely populated city, is that General Huerta served the Government faithfully as long as he had any hope of success; that the Arsenal in which the Felix Diaz forces were entrenched was found to be impregnable, and that to avoid further bloodshed, Huerta finally agreed to the dethronement of Madero as a compromise for peace. In the process of bringing this about, so runs the tale, his own ambitions awoke to personal opportunity with results now well established in common knowledge.

This version does Huerta's moral nature too much honor and fails in fair credit to his clear Indian brain. The various bodies of troops subject to his orders exceeded ten thousand men, while at no time did the Diaz forces reach eighteen hundred. The artillery at Huerta's command included siege guns and other heavy cannon of the Schneider-Canet and Mondragon-Canet types, while in light batteries and machine guns his equipment was greatly superior to that of Felix Diaz.

The report that the Arsenal was "impregnable" reflected credit upon the inventor of that fiction as a person of audacity and imagination. An attacking force which meant business would have operated from the south or southwest, and would have had no trouble in planting batteries in such convenient positions that the artilleryman who could not have landed every shot in the Arsenal's broad and fully exposed façade would have been one who had mistaken his calling. The land south of the Arsenal is almost entirely open for the six hundred yards or so to Avenida Chapultepec, and for a like distance farther to Indianilla, the headquarters of Mexico City's tramway service. Some of this region was alleged to be held by Diaz troops, a gentle attempt at humor considering the forces which, if their commander had been so disposed, could have swept the place clean by the simple expedient of walking into it.

A force which was operating seriously against the Arsenal would have advanced by way of Avenida Chapultepec to the broad Calle Balderas; and while a moderate assortment of cannon balls was being fired into the conspicuous stone building six or seven blocks distant, the force would have marched deliberately in wide column along the street named to the desired stations. In the thirty minutes which this advance would have occupied the operating batteries would

have reduced the building and driven its garrison into the open.

Except for the seriousness with which the military operations of that ten days were treated in current accounts, I should regard it as superfluous to point out even to this moderate extent the astonishing features of the farce that was carried on. With one-tenth the bloodshed that actually occurred, Felix Diaz and Manuel Mondragon could have been driven from their "stronghold" within twenty-four hours from the time Huerta was placed in command, and after that period, supposing that the proper dispositions had been made in the meantime, it could have been done in any designated half hour.

The military operations which in reality were carried on during that historic ten days were of decidedly obvious and novel character. Huerta batteries were shifted from point to point in residence and business sections to the north, northeast and northwest of the Arsenal. From none of these points was the building visible. Solid blocks of houses intervened on every range. Diaz placed batteries near his headquarters, and always at points from which neither the Palace nor the opposing batteries were in view.

For several hours each day there was firing by both parties. Buildings were damaged or demolished, inoffensive persons were killed in their own homes, incautious non-combatants in the streets were shot down. Projectiles of various kinds were fired through streets in which no enemy had appeared. Machine guns discharged thousands of bullets without having any target except some mere unfortunate who might happen to be in range, the purpose of the fusillade being to excite terror and advertise anarchy.

Isolated guns were set up by apparently irresponsible squads, and fired over and over again in whatever position

the pieces happened to assume after the recoil of the previous shot.

And during ten days of this terrorizing riot of blood the Arsenal was struck but once and the Palacio Nacional but twice!

The Madero Government all this time was bringing in troops and cannon from various points — Vera Cruz, Toluca, Cuernavaca, and elsewhere. Madero himself gave out bulletins and reports of favorable progress, and spoke with confidence of movements that would bring victory. Under flags of truce, he made demands upon Diaz to surrender. On Sunday night, February 9, he made a mysterious trip in an automobile to an out-of-town destination from which he did not return until ten o'clock on Monday morning. Whether he went to Cuernavaca, seventy-five miles over mountain roads, to summon the faithful General Felipe Angeles with his artillery and his thousand men, or to Toluca, forty-five miles, personally to beg General Blanquet to hurry in with his forces — which of these things he did that night mattered not at all. Felipe Angeles came in with his troops and was afterward courtmartialed for exceeding his authority; and Blanquet moved his picked regiments part of the way to the capital and left them outside while he went in alone to look things over.

And all this time Victoriano Huerta was in close touch with President Madero, consulting him in all his plans, cursing the slowness of the movements, and the inertia of the various branches of the service, but promising, ever promising, the decisive blow which would end the revolt and leave the Government solid as a rock.

He had for every question an answer technically correct; the one great essential, he said, was to avoid further defections in the army, while welding it together into a really strong and reliable establishment. While the

traitors still had so many friends in his own camp it would be unwise for him to force his officers to obey repugnant orders; in fact, this was at present impossible, but with prudence and patience the condition would be remedied. It was better that the Diaz force should remain where it was, receiving no accessions, than that it should be dislodged at the cost of further mutiny.

This argument prevailed with the President, who was constantly occupied upon matters not military; and even Gustavo was to some extent deceived, against the evidence of his own eyes—for he was in all accessible parts of the city during this time, and must have seen much that could not be explained by Huerta's sophistries. However, the fullest comprehension could hardly have enabled him to accomplish anything important, for he lacked the necessary authority. And so the noisy farce went on to the confusion of the world, and with many odd, significant scenes that passed unnoticed in the midst of the tumult. One of these, which has not yet lost its importance—to the United States especially—merits description here.

In view of the precarious position of President Madero if treachery appeared again at the National Palace, the sub-Secretary of Communications, Manuel Urquidi, formed a plan to provide a body guard composed of one hundred men of standing and unquestioned fidelity who would remain constantly with the President until the situation should clear up. Urquidi made his list, personally saw as many as he could, and passed the word to the others for a rendezvous. This was to be in the office of the sub-Secretary at two o'clock in the morning of Thursday, the 13th, and the password formula consisted of the inquiry addressed to the *portero* at the door: "Has my father arrived?" To this the answer was, "*Quien sabe?*" and the rejoinder, "I am his son."

No more than twenty-eight out of the hundred men came to this meeting, the sub-Secretary himself failing to appear. But Gustavo Madero, with forty-six Mauser rifles and a liberal supply of ammunition packed in the body of his automobile, was on hand. Among the faithful was a member of the Chamber of Deputies, accompanied by an attaché of the Japanese legation, who calmly set forth to Gustavo that in twenty-four hours he could muster two thousand Japanese dressed as peons and armed with knives. In the darkness which reigned throughout the city, these men, approaching from various directions, would attract no notice, and as the Arsenal guards, at night when fighting was suspended, were invariably under the influence of *pulque*, the Japanese could quietly dispose of them with their knives, after which they would rush the Arsenal where the troops were sleeping and knife the entire force, taking possession in the interest of Madero and ending the revolt at once.

The offer was rejected, Gustavo Madero announcing that the Mexicans would fight their own battles. From one who was present at the interview I have learned that the temptation to accept was strong, the feasibility of the plan being clear, but that Gustavo was held back by the fear that while the two thousand Japanese were taking the Arsenal, five thousand more which the attaché had said he could produce in an additional day, might be occupying the National Palace by the same means and so hold the entire government at their mercy.

Gustavo's declination of the Japanese offer is of value as reflecting the policy of his brother's government and demonstrating the lack of foundation for the fears of Senator Lodge expressed in the United States Senate that Madero might not be wholly unfavorable to Japanese aggression on Mexico's Pacific coast; but it is doubtful if Gustavo

would have followed the course he did if he had seen entirely through the clever head of General Victoriano Huerta. The "gentleman's guard" of one hundred was not formed, which may be counted as unfortunate now that one looks back upon it.

Day after day during that fatal period telegraph wires and cables were choked with despatches dealing with the desperate efforts of Madero to dislodge a formidable insurgent from an impregnable position. Square miles of newspaper space were used in printing this nonsense. The truth is that the defense of the National Palace on the morning of February 9 was the only serious fighting that was done in Mexico City in the interests of the Madero Government. It may be admitted that a few honest but not very effectual shots were fired by the troops of General Angeles. All the others were empty noise, except to the unfortunates whose bodies or property happened to be hit. The cannonade was the long prelude to a bargain; it served to put the terrorized city into a mood to accept what was to come; served also to bring the conspirators to a proper frame of mind, and to combine the various interests which they represented.

Reverting for a moment to the attitude of Huerta, I will add a few details. He declared that the generals under him were lukewarm in the service; that Blanquet was aggrieved because of the death of General Reyes as the result of an order said to have been given by Basso, a civilian. Possessed of these sentiments Blanquet was unwilling to push matters too hard against Felix Diaz. Huerta also reported that General Navarrette, who had charge of the artillery, would not fire directly upon the Arsenal because he feared that he might kill General Mondragon, to whom he owed a debt of gratitude for advancing him in the military service.

These statements of Huerta's were, in the main, truthful,

as were others affecting less important commands, but the real fact behind all was that Huerta himself was secretly applauding and promoting these sentiments. He was not pursuing this course because he grieved for Reyes or loved either Diaz or Mondragon; he was doing so because the master he served was his own ambition.

The natural question which here occurs to the surface observer is, if Huerta held the situation in his hand, why did he not take full advantage of it at an earlier date? Why did he wait until some four or five thousand persons had been killed and several millions in property destroyed?

The question will not be pressed after a moment's consideration of the immense personal advantage which he gained by delay. At the time of the outbreak on February 9, Huerta was not regarded as one to be seriously reckoned with. He had had no personal relations with the solid men of Mexico who were backing Diaz and Mondragon, and his knowledge of the remoter figures behind the conspiracy was incomplete. Up to that moment he had had his secret ambitions, but he had never played politics. This he now saw that he must do, if he were to retain the presidency which he was certain he could grasp at any moment. To stand permanently against the Maderistas, of whose numerical strength he was well aware, he must secure the united backing of Mexico's strongest men and the moral support of the United States. To make a spectacular leap from obscurity to power and be sustained by these influences afterwards, he believed to be among the possibilities of the situation, should his own skill not fail him.

When Madero placed him in charge of the Government's defense, it was a play directly into Huerta's hand. From this vantage point he could manage the military movements as a matter of obvious duty, yet with political ends always in view. He analyzed the situation, and chose with uner-

ring discrimination four of its components as the essentials.

First, the general public of the capital, the resident Europeans and Americans, including diplomatic agents through whom the governments they represented would be influenced. To all these must be afforded a perfect demonstration of Madero's inefficiency and of Mexico's emphatic rejection of Madero's methods.

Second, the men who were behind Mondragon and Diaz. These were to be convinced that the man who could master their favorites at all points was now in clear view and must be dealt with before their purposes could be accomplished.

The third political element seemed not especially important, but was one to which the Diaz managers were quite evidently catering. This was the element represented by Manuel Calero. While Cientifico in character it possessed little Cientifico strength because Calero was too openly supercilious and overbearing. But it carried a rather strong corporate influence in the United States not otherwise to be reached, and it enjoyed the advantage of being in close relationship to the American Ambassador, whose government sustained him in all things, and who was able to influence to a great extent the action of the European diplomatic representatives.

The recognition which the Mondragon-Diaz combination was conceding to Calero was not direct; it was applied, and cleverly, too, Huerta thought, through Jorge Vera Estañol, who had been Calero's law partner and was still his warm personal friend despite the most radical difference between them on political issues. What Huerta did not know was that the Diaz-Mondragon managers were slating Vera Estañol for a cabinet position without his consent.

The fourth political element for present consideration

was de la Barra who was understood to be a close friend of Limantour's and an active supporter of financial plans for Mexico emanating from powerful interests in Europe. Huerta knew that de la Barra was not strong in his own person, but he saw that Mondragon and Diaz were finding it wise to make surface peace with the former provisional president by including him in their scheme of a government which they hoped to set up. By this means also they were planning to add the Catholic Party, and what was more important, the Catholic Church, to their strength.

Huerta saw the political wisdom of this very clearly and realized the benefits to follow if he could demonstrate that it was through a man like himself, and not a weakling such as Felix Diaz that the de la Barra element could find what appeared to be an easy way to accomplish the things it had in view.

Support of American and European corporations, and of bankers who ranked among the strongest in the world, was included in successfully combining the Cientifico, the military and the de la Barra influences under his standard. If he could accomplish this he would be invulnerable; he would become a second Porfirio Diaz.

Victoriano Huerto must be credited with a liberal endowment of mental agility because of the demonstration he has since then made before the world, but in nothing has he exhibited more marked political acumen than in holding a tight rein on his ambitions during the days when the Madero Government lay helpless in his hands. With an indifference to human misery upon which his military idol, Napoleon, might have deigned to compliment him, he permitted the wanton slaughter and terrorizing to go on until it had become evident to those whom he wished to impress that he and no other was the man of the hour.

Overtures were made to him before two days had passed,

and the first advances were made by de la Barra. From that time Huerta knew that his reading and his count of the cards had been correct, and that the presidency of Mexico, with strong support already assured, was to be the reward for his manipulation of the trust which Madero had reposed in him.

In all this callous calculation the pitiable figure is Francisco Madero. Knowing how weak in actual military force was the Felix Diaz insurrection, he seemed every day to be on the point of suppressing it and yet was unable to silence the Arsenal guns. He understood that Cientifico influences were behind the Diaz movement, but the apparent strength of the Government forces indicated a broad margin of advantage, even taking into account an element of disaffection among the general officers of the army. And he was supremely confident of success up to the hour of the demand of General Blanquet that he resign.

Before that point was reached, however, the same suggestion in milder and more courteous form had been made by the Spanish Minister, as representing himself and the American Ambassador. The latter could not well accompany the Spanish Minister, because his relations with Madero had become so strained that a personal call at the President's office was out of the question.

It was a fool's errand, and far from edifying. Both the dean of the diplomatic corps and Spanish Minister Cologan would have done better if they had presented their demands, well backed by their governments, to Felix Diaz, the man who most obviously was disturbing the peace; or, if they understood the inwardness of the matter, to General Huerta, who, for reasons of his own, was permitting the peace to be disturbed. Madero's remarks on that occasion reflected the bitterness of his resentment caused by the irritation he had ever experienced at the American Ambassador's hands.

But Ambassador Wilson had taken that military insurrection in Mexico City at a valuation which he thought a true estimate. He knew that the solid men of Mexico were backing it, and the interests of that country, as he viewed them, demanded that it should win. The Huerta overlordship of the situation, however, was something he probably had not, at the time of his colleague's call to ask for Madero's resignation, taken sufficiently into account. He had been an active figure during the insurrection, riding in his car within the field of that preposterous artillery duel, to the rescue of endangered Americans and others; and had doubtless acquired a belief in his personal as well as his official right to be heard on this vital subject. But his share in Cologan's mission seems to me to have been ill advised, like so many other proceedings of his which I have been compelled to criticize, in their official aspect, and without personal malice toward a man who, I believe, was sadly and often absurdly misled.

On February 17 the terms of a bargain were arranged, the parties thereto being Huerta and the representatives of the various elements in the Diaz-Mondragon association. Involved in that bargain were the lives of four men, Francisco and Gustavo Madero, José Maria Pino Suarez and Adolfo Basso.

These men were subsequently murdered, all of them — for the form of a trial in Basso's case has no moral value.

The world was shocked by the killing of Francisco Madero and Pino Suarez because they had been the President and Vice President of the Republic, and their deaths were taken, not altogether wrongly, as an index of the civilization of Mexico. A government had been overthrown, and its chief had been killed, and this practise, familiar in history, is supposed to have been outgrown by enlightened peoples. The crime was naturally charged against the con-

queror, the man who had risen to power in this wreck, Victoriano Huerta.

Now what are the facts? I know far too much about Huerta to defend him as a merciful man, shrinking from bloodshed, governed in his acts by a nice sense of propriety, willing to lose the whole world for an ideal of right. But I know also what he was trying to do, what motives swayed him. He was entirely capable of feeling and yielding to revengeful impulses, but he was sane, requiring to be aroused to vengeance by adequate sense of injury. Toward none of the four men named had Huerta enough personal animosity at this time to account for even a loss of temper.

The President and Huerta had quarreled about the gap in the vouchers which has been referred to, and in addition there had been some jealousy on both sides. But Huerta knew the right and wrong of this matter, and cared little about it now. He had no love for Madero, and no real hatred. This is abundantly proved by his behavior at the conferences where Madero's life was demanded.

He disliked Pino Suarez and would not have lifted a finger to save him, nor would he have made an equal effort in the other direction, to kill him.

He was far from having anything against Basso. On the contrary, he owed a debt of gratitude to the *intendente* of the Palace for his agency in preventing the entry of General Bernardo Reyes. But Basso was not worth saving at any sacrifice. His demonstrated loyalty to Madero disqualified him for immediate usefulness to Huerta, and he was not an important figure, like some other loyal men who represented parties and interests, and could be forced, through desire to save their country, into effective service to the new régime. Basso was a pawn in a bad position, and it is said that when his death was angrily demanded, Huerta answered with a grim and cynical smile.

In the conference on February 17 already referred to, there was plenty of shrill anger and of genuine Mexican desire for vengeance, overruling sober judgment, and blinding men to the trick which was being played upon them at that very moment. But Huerta was the trickster; it was he that was weaving the emotions of the others into a robe of authority for his own shoulders, and any one who pictures him as a bloodthirsty soldier rudely gratifying his resentments in the hour of triumph is absurdly mistaken. A truer picture would be that of an able, crafty, half-educated savage, hiding in his breast the fierce hunger of ambition, and more anxious to devour the men with whom he was at that moment bargaining than to butcher adversaries already overthrown.

He did not haggle over Pino Suarez, knowing that the man was unpopular with all parties and that his death would cause no stir. But toward the killing of Gustavo Madero the attitude of Huerta was very different. In the first place he understood thoroughly the motives which actuated those who clamored for Gustavo's death. Gustavo had stood in the way of men who had been making money through graft in army supplies and in other dealings with the Government. This was not the sole cause of animosity against him, but it was the principal one.

Huerta was not in the least deceived by this anger of the trousers pocket. He himself was an unscrupulous lover of money. He did not believe that Gustavo's conduct had been unselfish or based upon honesty,—probably did not care whether it had or not; but he respected Gustavo for his courage and despised many of his enemies as cowards. Personally, his opinion was that it would make less trouble and be in all ways much better for himself, if Gustavo should be sent out of the country with a whole skin.

But those in the conference who represented the views

of Rodolfo Reyes insisted that Gustavo Madero had been chiefly responsible for the death of Rodolfo's father, and ought to die. Certain military men, notably Manuel Mondragon, supported this view and argued that Gustavo deserved death for violating the laws of war by his assumption of command at the Palace. These accusations were ninety-nine per cent. mere expressions of hatred, and Huerta knew it perfectly well, but the indictments were so numerous and disclosed a feeling so deep and so widely shared, that Huerta yielded, solely from motives of policy.

He could not be made to believe, however, that a sound policy had any place in it for the killing of Francisco Madero which he saw clearly to be an egregious blunder. He at first refused point blank to listen to the suggestion, and the conference was deadlocked on this matter. Argument was long and violent—that is, by the advocates of the measure; Huerta himself said little. It was urged that there could be no peace in Mexico as long as Francisco Madero should be permitted to live. This opinion was advanced not only by the hot-heads, but by the more sober advocates of business interests. Unless this blood should be shed, the thirty pieces of silver in the form of renewed national prosperity would not be paid.

Against Huerta on this point was arrayed the strongest combination that he had faced. Representatives of all interests seemed to be united; and as Huerta surveyed the situation with his own ambition flaring up from his savage breast to light his clever brain, he foresaw the disfavor of many parties, should he stand out for what he knew to be the wiser course. The Diaz-Mondragon-Reyes-de la Barra combination, as represented in the conference, was solid for Madero's death and Huerta stood alone for the man's life.

He finally opposed the policy in words, speaking with

some freedom. The execution of Madero — for it must not be supposed that these acts were discussed as murders, but only in the manner of prejudgments of regular proceedings — would hamper the provisional president in many ways. Foreign relations which would be difficult enough at the best, would be seriously complicated by the trial of Madero for a capital offense — with the inevitable result. For his own part, said General Huerta, he would rather take the chances of success with Madero alive and conspiring, than to cope with the protests which would come from various nations if Madero should be dealt with in the desired manner. Even in Mexico the execution, he predicted, would provoke strong, dangerous and lasting resentment. Nor did Huerta agree in so many words, at that conference, that Madero should be put to death.

With the adroitness of a good bargainer he swung the discussion to the cabinet, and quite readily accepted the one that was handed to him ready made, with Francisco Leon de la Barra, as its head, Manuel Mondragon as Minister of War, Vera Estañol as Minister of Public Instructions, and Rodolfo Reyes as Minister of Justice. In fact, he was well pleased, believing that these four men coming into his Government would greatly strengthen his position with reference to three of the essential groups which his analysis had revealed. As to the other, largest of them all, his own immediate public and the world beyond, there was not much need for fear that they would fail to read the lesson which he had written in letters of blood in the streets of the capital.

Two other members of the projected cabinet represented solid strength. These were Alberto Garcia Granados as Minister of Gobernacion and Toribio Esquivel Obregon as Minister of Finance. Believing himself to be the best soldier in Mexico Huerta reasoned that if he should assume

the Presidency backed by this strong representation of wealth and power he could laugh at Maderism and the peon element which was its chief asset.

And Felix Diaz, the man who stood in the limelight, who had taken all the chances of heading the uprising, and who had been cheered on by his friends and backers as their ideal for the presidential office — what of him?

That question already had been disposed of; Felix Diaz would be the candidate for constitutional president whom all, including Huerta, would support in general elections to be held later on — a most admirable arrangement. Let the election be set, in the privacy of Huerta's mind, for the first Tuesday after the first Monday following the Day of Judgment.

For suggestion as to the outward and visible method by which the cessation of hostilities was to be brought about, and the general agreement of peace and amity officially concluded, the conference was indebted to Senator de la Barra. The American Ambassador was the proper person to carry on the negotiations, and the American Embassy the place. The Ambassador, in fact, had already agreed to act as mediator, if he should be requested. Let General Huerta make such a proposal to him in formal terms — after the preliminary steps had been taken at the National Palace, consisting of the arrest of the President, Vice President and the members of the cabinet.

This suggestion received the hearty approval of all, as pointing to an arrangement of great strategic value which would secure full sanction of their course by the official representative of the United States. But it was urged that certain additional guarantees of Huerta's firmness should be forthcoming prior to such a meeting, namely, the arrest of Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso.

To this Huerta did not demur; but when the previous

question was called up to decide the fate of Francisco Madero he evaded it. Dispensing with all formalities and omitting the extravagant expressions of regard usual on such occasions in Mexico and elsewhere, he abruptly rose and departed, leaving the other gentlemen to interpret his action as they saw fit.

This conference was held at the meeting place which had been used by representatives of the same interests during the preceding days of turmoil in the city. The meetings had begun on Monday, the 10th, when de la Barra conferred with Huerta alone; they had continued, with other interests represented, during the succeeding days while progress was made in the general campaign, that strenuous campaign of popular education which also was to prepare the mind of Felix Diaz for the inevitable change of program.

This meeting place was a room in the great white residence building on Calle Bucareli at the corner of Calle General Priu which since the days of President de la Barra had been used as the headquarters of the Department of Gobernacion. It had been erected by a Mexican gentleman who had found it too elaborate a residence for himself, and had made earnest efforts to sell or lease it to the United States Government to be used as an Embassy. Not succeeding in this, the owner had disposed of the property, including its beautiful gardens reaching back to the quiet Calle Limantour, to the Government of Porfirio Diaz while Ramon Corral was playing the dual rôle of Vice-President of the Republic and Minister of Gobernacion; but the imposing mansion was not utilized as the headquarters of Gobernacion until Emilio Vasquez Gomez was placed at the head of that department by the treaty between the Maderistas and the Diaz envoys in May, 1911.

The Department of Gobernacion was now, in February,

1913, headed by Licenciado Rafael Hernandez, the President's cousin, who since the 9th of the month had remained at the Palacio Nacional, thus leaving the coast clear, not by design, of course, for the unnoted coming and going of prominent men who might logically have business with the Department.

The passing in and out of Senator de la Barra or Senator Calero or Rodolfo Reyes would be regarded as peculiar by no one. Mondragon himself might have called without exciting remark. And as for the ubiquitous Huerta—who could challenge the movements or the motives of the Commander in Chief?

The location of the Gobernacion building emphasizes its adaptability to these uses. It is isolated by many intervening city blocks from all other government offices, and it is not more than six hundred feet distant in an air line from the Arsenal which stands out in unobstructed view from its broad front porch. A battery, on the roof of Gobernacion could have torn the Arsenal to atoms, which is one reason why no guns were ever planted there.

The events of the following day, February 18, succeeded each other with perfect precision of movement. At twelve o'clock General Aureliano Blanquet, tall, dignified, wearing an elegant black dress uniform and accompanied by Enrique Zepeda, a relative of General Huerta's, Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riveroll and several other officers of the so-called Government army, entered the private offices of President Madero without previous announcement and ranged themselves before his desk. With the President were several of his military aides and his cousin, Marcos Hernandez, brother of the Minister of Gobernacion.

General Blanquet plunged at once into the business which had brought him. He told the President that he must resign, that the country had gone from bad to worse, that it

was useless to attempt to take the Arsenal, and that Mexican soldiers were slaying their brothers in bloody and unnecessary combat in the streets of the capital. He said that a change was demanded and that he had come for the purpose of insisting that it be effected at once.

The President replied that he could not consent to resign; that he was willing to arrange for the cabinet and the Vice-President to do so, but that as head of the Government he should remain at the post to which he had been elected by the free voice of the Mexican people.

Blanquet's answer terminated verbal negotiations; it was comprised in the four words, "You are my prisoner."

Instantly the military aides drew their revolvers and fired. Lieutenant Colonel Riveroll fell dead, one other officer was mortally hurt, and Enrique Zepeda was wounded in the hand.

Prompt return of the fire killed Marcos Hernandez outright and wounded two of the aides. A hand to hand struggle followed in which the President and his party were overpowered and made prisoners. Before one o'clock, Vice-President Pino Suarez and every member of the cabinet except two were placed under arrest.

At ten minutes of two Gustavo Madero was arrested at the Gambrinus restaurant on Avenida San Francisco, where he had been lunching with Huerta and others. Shortly before the time set for the arrest a messenger came to call the general away upon some business, real or mythical.

"I have no revolver," said Huerta, turning to Gustavo. "Will you lend me yours?"

"Certainly," replied Gustavo, and obligingly disarmed himself.

He was arrested a few minutes later; and at half-past two Adolfo Basso was taken into custody.

General Huerta returned to his office in the entresol of the National Palace which he had occupied as military commander of the capital. His first act was to despatch a note to Ambassador Wilson which began with these words:

"I have in my power as prisoners in the National Palace, the President of the Republic and his Ministers, and having taken this course I beg that Your Excellency will interpret my conduct as a manifestation of highest patriotism in one who has no other ambition than that of serving his country."

The note ended as follows:

"If Your Excellency would do me the kindness of putting the matter before the rebels who are in the *cuidadela* (arsenal) not only I, but my countrymen as well, would be bound by a new tie of gratitude to yourself and the ever glorious American people.

"With the same respect which I have always entertained for Your Excellency, I remain,

"Your obedient servant,

"VICTORIANO HUERTA."

The Ambassador returned two notes, which were received by General Huerta at half-past four. He wrote one of them as American Ambassador, the other as dean of the diplomatic corps. The former concluded thus:

"I have also unofficially communicated the events related in your note to General Diaz, and shall immediately send him a formal note. I have the honor to be Your Excellency's obedient servant,

"HENRY LANE WILSON."

After despatching his note to the Ambassador, and before the answers arrived Huerta addressed communications

to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress, and received authority which he telegraphed at once to the governors of all the states and to the *jefes politicos* of the territories in these terms:

“By direction of the Senate, I have assumed charge of the Government. President Madero and his Cabinet are prisoners in my power.”

Meanwhile the news had spread throughout the city and crowds were gathering in the streets which opened on the Plaza. They were held back by guards until ten minutes past five, when the sixteen bells of the great cathedral rang out in a wild discord of sound which was generally interpreted as heralding the dawn of peace. The guards then drew back and that same “many headed monster thing” which had demanded the resignation of Porfirio Diaz and welcomed Francisco Madero as the savior of the people, now rushed tumultuously forward with *vivas* for the man who held Madero prisoner. At half-past five Huerta and Blanquet appeared on the balcony of the Palace, and the Plaza quaked with peon joy as Huerta, the hero of the hour, greeted the multitude with the patriotic announcement:

“Mexicans, brothers: there will be no more cannonading. Peace has come.”

At eight o'clock that same night General Huerta met Felix Diaz in the American Embassy in pursuance of arrangements made by the Ambassador, and concluded a compact by which the cabinet agreed upon in the secret conference of the previous day was mutually accepted, and Felix Diaz was formally placed on the presidential waiting list. When the document setting forth the understanding in detail had been duly signed by the contracting parties, they gave out to the press the following joint proclamation:

"To the Mexican People:

"The unendurable and distressing situation through which the capital of the republic has passed obliged the army, represented by the undersigned, to unite in a sentiment of fraternity to achieve the salvation of the country; in consequence the nation may be at rest; all liberties compatible with order are assured under the responsibility of the undersigned chiefs who at once assume command and administration in so far as is necessary to afford full guarantees to nationals and foreigners, promising that within seventy-two hours the legal situation will have been duly organized.

"The army invites the people on whom it relies to continue in the noble attitude of respect and moderation which it has hitherto observed; it also invites all revolutionary factions to unite for the consolidation of National peace.

"FELIX DIAZ. V. HUERTA.

"MEXICO, February 18, 1913."

The downfall of Madero had been accomplished. The influences which had tacitly or actively contributed to this end had now achieved their desires. The knell of Constitutional government in Mexico had been rung, and Victoriano Huerta, by virtue of his own adroitness, reigned in its stead.

CHAPTER XVI

IT has been shown how the new order of things in Mexico came into existence through a bargain by which the demands of various persons and groups were supposed to have been met. Among the considerations in the contract were the deaths of four men. Settlement began at once. The signing of a tangible document by Huerta and Diaz, in the American Embassy on the night of February 18, marks the completion of the intangible and invisible contract that has been mentioned. Huerta and Diaz signed at 9:15 o'clock, according to the notation on the instrument, but in fact the ceremonial was not completed till eleven. At that same hour Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso were taken from the National Palace by separate escorts to the Mondragon-Diaz headquarters at the Arsenal.

At half-past one in the morning, after being held in the Arsenal two hours, and subjected, it is said, to many insults and even to physical torture, Gustavo was marched from the building by an escort of twelve soldiers, who took him toward the Palace. The story subsequently told by the guards is that the prisoner made a dash for liberty as they were passing the little park close by the Arsenal, whereupon the commander of the escort, a former aide to General Bernardo Reyes, drew a revolver and fired. Gustavo fell at the first shot, and then the guard fired into his body, which showed twelve wounds, all from revolver bullets. Later it was carried back into the Arsenal and be-

came item number one in the fulfilment of the "peace pact" made in the conference of February 17.

The next item was checked off with greater formality. At three o'clock that morning, February 19, Adolfo Basso was killed by a firing squad in front of the Arsenal. He faced his executioners bravely, tore his coat open to expose his breast, shouted "Viva Mexico" and called upon the men to fire. The first volley killed him, all the bullets entering his body.

The other items of the pact, to wit, the death of Francisco I. Madero and that of Pino Suarez, were delayed in settlement but there was never a well-founded doubt as to the eventual closing of the account. Assurances from any or all of the opponents of Madero were valueless and to place reliance upon them was inexcusable folly. The two men were in Huerta's power; it was probable that of his own will when sober he would not order them to be killed but it was certain that he would not effectually protect them from those who desired their death. The crime which shocked the world was in plain sight, just ahead.

Huerta's chief interest lay in the matters directly connected with his own accession to power. For a little while the saving of Madero's life was one of these, and Suarez too was under the same ægis of expediency. The resignations of both men were to be obtained.

Brief delays occurred in the preliminaries to the organization of a government. The agreement signed in the American Embassy was not made public till late the next day, because Jorge Vera Estañol, one of the cabinet named in the document, refused to serve. This had been foreseen, however, and the others addressed themselves to the task of bringing him into line. The post of Minister of Public Instruction was not political, they argued, and his name carried weight. Señor Estañol had held this port-

folio, under Diaz and under de la Barra. Surely he would come in now to help at this, the gravest hour in the Republic's life.

But Estañol (who was counsel for more than forty American corporations including Phelps Dodge & Co., whose legal adviser had been Manuel Calero up to April, 1911) held out for hours. In that same white mansion which housed the Department of Gobernacion and which had been the meeting place of the men who pulled the political wires of the country, the issue with Vera Estañol was fought to an end. To avoid invalidating the agreement which Diaz and Huerta had signed at the American Embassy, Señor Estañol finally consented. It was then that the document was published, and the members of Madero's cabinet who had been arrested were released, all excepting Pedro Lascurain handing in their resignations.

At six o'clock in the evening of February 19, Congress was ordered in session to go through the formal process of setting up a new government. For three hours the legislators went through their paces deliberately, but at nine o'clock the proceedings were accelerated and the resignations of Francisco I. Madero, Jr., and José Maria Pino Suarez as President and Vice-President were submitted to the Chamber of Deputies.

There are persons who profess to know how these resignations were procured, but I do not; no reasonable doubt, however, can exist that they were obtained under pressure and therefore were invalid. But no one at that session of the Chamber thought it prudent to challenge their genuineness, and it is remarkable that any members should have voted against the resolutions of acceptance which, having been duly prepared in committee, were passed at 10:15 by a vote of 123 to 4.

At 10:34 Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

succeeded to the Presidency, taking the oath before both houses of Congress. His only official act was to name Victoriano Huerta as Minister of Gobernacion and after this appointment was confirmed, Lascurain presented his resignation as President, which at exactly eleven o'clock was accepted by the Chamber with but one dissenting vote. He had been President of Mexico for twenty-six minutes. In regard to the compliance of Lascurain it should be said that he could not prevent the carrying out of these plans, and that he lent his aid in the interests of peace. He had no faith in the new régime, and he left the country as soon as he could do so safely.

The proceedings in Congress placed General Huerta in direct line of succession, as there was no Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Gobernacion stands next in the constitutional order. At 11:15 Huerta took the oath. He then held a short informal reception in the Green Room of the Chamber and departed for the Palacio Nacional escorted by Chapultepec Forest Guards, and tumultuously cheered by the throngs which were massed in the streets.

All formalities having been complied with Victoriano Huerta was now Minister of Gobernacion, acting as President of Mexico. It has since been held that he could not resign the office of Minister of Gobernacion without destroying his title to the presidential seat, and that in consequence no other minister of that department could be legally appointed until, or unless, Huerta's right to the Presidency had been established by a legal general election. The case of de la Barra is cited in support of this. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he acted as President when Porfirio Diaz resigned, but no other minister could be appointed, and the foreign office was carried on by the sub-secretary. If this reading of the Mexican constitution is

correct, the acts of Ministers of Gobernacion in Huerta cabinets are probably invalid.

But no one was paying attention to such trifles that night, surely not Huerta, who had attained the seat of power which had been the goal of his endeavors from the moment when Madero entrusted to him the command of the troops on February 9. In ten days of bogus warfare and underhand negotiation—tricking not only the Government which he was in honor bound to support, but that Government's enemies also; false toward all, and serving his own ambitions only—he had won the coveted eminence.

Those with whom he had bargained did not yet suspect the truth; they seemed to be sharers in the triumph. The deluded city, after the mockery of strife, rejoiced in the succeeding mockery of peace. The foolish public shouted for Huerta, and almost as loudly for Diaz, who had so confidently stepped aside in the interests of harmony. With the *vivas* for these patriots were mingled others for the American Ambassador who had helped to establish order. Many politicians after lean months hoped for an era of spoils; many merchants took their narrow thoughts to bed with them that night and were not kept awake. A few men of broad mind, equipped with intellectual method, easily and accurately analyzed the situation, finding no solid merit in the new régime. They foresaw much that has come to pass, despaired of their country more completely than ever before, and sorrowfully resolved to leave it at the earliest opportunity.

I have spoken of the resignations of Madero and Suarez as having been secured by unjustifiable means. Among these should be mentioned the promise of permission to depart safely and immediately from the city. It is perhaps conceivable that Huerta thought he saw a way to save

the lives of these men and send them out of the city. It is more probable that the bargain was all the time in force by which their lives were forfeited. Nevertheless ostensible arrangements were made for their departure. While the crowds in the streets were cheering for Huerta, Diaz and Ambassador Wilson, on the evening of February 19 an anxious group was waiting in the Buena Vista Station of the Mexican Railway for two persons who never came.

In the station shed a special train of two Pullman cars stood ready. It had been there since ten o'clock, and by midnight the passengers for whom it was supposed to have been prepared had arrived, all but the two that may be held the most important. Mrs. Madero and Mrs. Suarez were there, and with them many members of both families. Their baggage was on the train; the losers in the game of empire were that night to start for Vera Cruz and so to permanent exile.

It is useless to speak of the mortal anguish which was endured in those hours of vain waiting. At two o'clock in the morning Pedro Lascurain arrived at the station, accompanied by two lieutenants representing President Huerta. Lascurain brought the heart-breaking news that President Huerta had countermanded the order, and that the train would not leave that night. No explanation was forthcoming to comfort the stricken women, and Mrs. Madero broke down for the first time since the revolt began. Unable to walk she was carried to an automobile and taken to the house of a friend of the family.

In order to realize the full enormity of what followed, it must be borne in mind that the 20th, 21st and 22nd of February were still to pass before the tragic climax. It is true that the most lamentable error in this affair had already been made, as will presently be explained, but there was still time for some intelligent effort at reparation. The

Foreign Offices of all important nations were advised of the probability that Madero and Suarez would be murdered. It was recognized, after a fashion, in Washington, and the Government of the United States placed itself on record as objecting in advance to the summary execution of the deposed President and Vice-President. News of this action was given to the Associated Press, with the comment that in so doing the Government did not feel "that it had departed from its policy of strict neutrality."

There is no reason to believe that the timidity revealed by this expression was generally welcomed in the United States, or that it was rightly understood by any considerable number of persons. Various manifestations indicated that active measures to prevent an impending, deplorable crime would have won applause. Out of Texas always comes something new about Mexico, and now — on February 21 — more than forty members of the legislature petitioned their United States Senators, Culberson and Shepard, to use their influence to prevent the execution of Madero.

"We believe," said they, "that Madero has been a credit to Mexico and far ahead of his people. His merciful, humane government is universally recognized and because of his leniency the men have been permitted to live who now desire to destroy him."

Meanwhile in Mexico City diligent efforts were made to blacken Madero's character. A copy of the "list of twenty-two" which had been furnished to Gustavo was found in the deposed President's possession, and it was said to carry the ominous title of "Those who should die." Press correspondents telegraphed this everywhere, and the inference was that Madero was a tyrant who had made up the list himself and labeled it for convenient reference. Madero was also charged with being an epileptic, with being insane

and with having issued a general anti-American order to all governors of states.

It was charged that he had fired the shot which killed Lieutenant-Colonel Riveroll when the latter entered the President's office with General Blanquet, and that the execution of General Ruis, and Colonel Morelos, Commandant of the Palace, was by Madero's arbitrary order without formality. For these crimes he was to be placed on trial.

On the forenoon of Thursday, February 20, Mrs. Madero and Mrs. Suarez were permitted to visit their husbands at the National Palace, where they were under guard in the offices long occupied by Intendente Basso, who had been killed in the early morning of the 19th. It does not appear that the ex-President suggested to his wife any important course of action toward his own safety. He expressed hope, but it is extremely doubtful whether he really entertained any. If he did it must have been based upon the remnants of his peculiar superstitions.

He was a spiritualist, and had come by it honestly, for his father indulged similar fancies. The younger Francisco had believed from the beginning of his crusade that he was shielded, guided and enlightened by the Divine Intelligence working through beings in the world beyond. The inevitable crudity marked these imaginings, and Francisco dealt with his Maker through the humble intermediary of a dead Indian's soul. A series of coincidences, helped by the usual forced interpretation of elastic oracles, had seemed to establish a high degree of credibility for this fantastic counsellor. The optimism which I have mentioned was probably a cause rather than an effect of these revelations, and Francisco unconsciously dictated to his familiar spirit those promises in which he placed reliance — promises that his life should be preserved and his mind inspired for honorable and efficient service to his country.

Doubtless whatever portion of sincerity might be discovered in the charge that Madero was insane sprang from the story of his hearkening to the dead — which is amusing, in superstitious Mexico. And indeed on the whole face of the footstool there exist but a handful of human beings whose brains are not inhabited by superstitions baseless as his. Every question of the day, widely discussed, provides abundant proof. To commune with the ghost of an Indian on affairs of state, and to believe, for instance, that nature has an intelligent interest in the proper mating of the sexes, are equally absurd, both being mere survivals of a primitive demonology, but it happens that the former can be more sanely supported than the latter.

Mrs. Madero was not a spiritualist, though the fabricators of Madero myths portrayed her as a medium, the central figure in the seances at her home. The truth is that she was unconvinced but not contemptuous, a moderate disbeliever, loving her husband, and naturally drawn toward anything in which he was interested, but restrained upon the other side by common sense. She had shared with fortitude Francisco's early disappointments, and his perils whenever this was possible. She had sympathized with his hopes, and rejoiced in his sudden and surprising triumph, though not without foreboding. What she had never shared was his conviction that he would be protected, supernaturally or otherwise, from the malice of his enemies. She had beheld him sitting in the presidential chair with a black curtain hanging just behind him, which might at any moment be pushed forward by invisible hands to enfold him and to hide him from her eyes forever. This long, vague anticipation of disaster intensified her fear for him after his fall from power.

The murder of Gustavo, too plainly ominous to be misread, was known to her but not to Francisco. She did not

tell him. She asked as to his discomforts and what could be done to ameliorate them; gave him such encouragement as she could, and promised to come again in the afternoon. This she did, but the guards refused to admit her. They told her that the prisoner was now held *incommunicado*.

She then rightly regarded the situation as desperate to the last degree, and after consultation with such advisers as were available, she took the only course which seemed open toward any help. Comprehending Mexico she knew that it would be mere folly to rely upon the word of the men who had risen to power. Protection for her husband, if it were to have the least solidity, must come from outside the arena where prejudice, hatred and ambition had fought out their combat to its present stage. Her only possible resort was to the representatives of foreign powers in the capital, and the highest of these in rank was Ambassador Wilson. She knew perfectly well that he was no friend of her husband's, but on the other hand it was not to be supposed that he would countenance assassination.

Accompanied by her sister-in-law, Señorita Mercedes Madero, she went to the Embassy, in the afternoon of February 20, and entreated Mr. Wilson to prevent the murders which were imminent. She pleaded for the life of Suarez as well as for that of Madero. Mr. Wilson told her that he had received assurances regarding her husband's safety; that the new government did not desire his death, but on the contrary would protect him. As to Suarez, the Ambassador declined to express himself so confidently and clearly. Mrs. Madero understood Mr. Wilson to say that Suarez might "disappear," that there was strong feeling against him because he had been a leader of the *Porro* (contemptuous term for the Progressives), and that his fate was uncertain.

The effect upon Mrs. Madero's mind was merely to re-

inforce her conviction that there was no uncertainty as to the fate of either of the prisoners; that both would be killed unless there should be immediate intervention in their behalf. She besought Mr. Wilson to give them a refuge in the Embassy, and to protect them under the flag of the United States, and by his own direct and powerful influence with the persons who had overthrown the Government of Mexico. The Ambassador responded by repeating his previous utterances.

Mrs. Madero then begged him to send to the President of the United States a message which had been written by her husband's mother. As the telegraph and cable offices were now controlled by Huerta such a message would have small chance of being forwarded unless in code and with authority behind it. The Ambassador replied that this communication was unnecessary. He took the writing, however, and put it into his pocket.

These are the essentials of the interview. Mrs. Madero derived no comfort from Mr. Wilson's expressions because she appreciated the situation, and knew that the Ambassador must be relying upon empty words if he really believed that her husband would be efficiently protected by those who had overthrown him. That he did believe what he had said to her there can be no doubt, though his error now seems to have lain at the most distant extremity of reasonable judgment, if not beyond. As to what may be called the basis of his opinion, there were assurances given when the resignations of Madero and Suarez were obtained, and upon other occasions, but it is unnecessary to discuss their value.

It is possible that Mrs. Madero or some other member of the family would have been able to send a telegram to President Taft without the assistance of the Ambassador, for a message dated February 20, from Luis Manuel Rojas,

a member of the Mexican lower house, seems to have been received in Washington. Señor Rojas has exhibited a reply as follows :

Mr. Luis M. Rojas,

Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Mexico, etc.

SIR: The Department acknowledges the receipt by reference hither from the President to whom it was addressed, of your telegram of February 20 requesting that this Government do all it can to save the lives of Francisco I. Madero and José Maria Pino Suarez.

In reply you are informed that this Department had, as a matter of course, several days prior to the death of Madero and Suarez, and immediately after their arrest, informed the authorities of Mexico City, through the Embassy, of the unfortunate effect which would be produced in this country by an unjust or improper treatment of the deposed President and Vice-President.

I am, sir, etc.,

(Signed) KNOX.

No response was ever received to the message asking President Taft to save the life of Madero — that message written by the unfortunate prisoner's mother, and intrusted by his wife to the Ambassador of the United States for transmission two days before the murders. On March 2, eight days after her appeal had been justified by the crime she had striven to prevent, the widow of Madero sent from Havana a letter of inquiry addressed to President Taft, begging to know whether the message of February 20 had ever come to his hands. This also remained unanswered. Doubtless it reached Washington after the accession of President Wilson.

These vain pleas have only a passing sentimental interest. It is not to be supposed that the Washington Government could have been stirred to greater activity by anything except a better view of the situation in Mexico City,

interpreted by some peculiarly enlightened patriot who could foresee what price the United States would have to pay for those two lives which might so easily have been saved. Merely to predict their doom required no major prophet, surely not after the murder of Gustavo Madero. Neither should it have been difficult to form an opinion that Woodrow Wilson, who was to succeed to the presidency a few days later, would not recognize Huerta stained by the blood of his predecessor. But these matters fall to be considered later.

What happened in Mexico City is somewhat obscure as to detail, but is in its essence very simple. Madero and Suarez remained prisoners in the National Palace, and their situation was unchanged by anything that occurred on February 21. On the following day Provisional President Huerta issued his declaration of iron rule in the following

“MANIFESTO TO THE NATION

“In assuming, through the operation of the law, the office of Provisional President of the republic, by virtue of the resignation of the President and Vice-President I must make an appeal to the patriotism of all good Mexicans that they will come forward to cooperate with the new government in the reestablishment of public peace. The country, in the terrible crisis through which it is passing, needs the united effort of all its sons, in order to be saved from the anarchy which menaces it.

“In order to assist me in my administrative labors, I have called to my side men of good will without distinction of political parties. They come without animosity for the past, without desire for revenge, without any other aspiration than that of putting an end to the fratricidal strife which is destroying us and of restoring guarantees for the lives and properties of nationals and foreigners throughout the republic.

"I trust that all Mexicans will aid me in this patriotic work which aims at saving our very nationality, which may be jeopardized, and of restoring to the country the tranquillity which it so much needs for the development of its resources, and I also hope that the methods of conciliation which the Government is initiating will suffice for the end which I propose to myself; but if, unfortunately, bad citizens, blinded by passion, insist on prolonging the strife or opposing obstacles to the Government by violent means, I shall not hesitate an instant in adopting the measures of rigor that may be necessary for the rapid restoration of public peace. The welfare of our country demands it.

"GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA.

"MEXICO, February 22, 1913."

A few hours later, on the night of Saturday, February 22, 1913, the two remaining items of the "peace pact" were checked off as settled in full. Just before midnight, with some attendant mystery rather crudely contrived, Madero and Suarez were slain.

CHAPTER XVII

THE newspapers of Monday morning, February 24, 1913, carried an official statement by the new Mexican Government which had been issued at three o'clock on Sunday morning, February 23, three hours after the deaths of Madero and Suarez were alleged to have occurred. The statement was signed by Provisional President Huerto and began as follows:

"At 12:30 o'clock this morning, I called together my cabinet to report that Madero and Pino Suarez, who were detained in the palace at the disposal of the Department of War, were taken to the penitentiary in accord with a decision as a result of which that establishment was placed yesterday afternoon under the charge of an army officer for better security. When the automobiles had traversed about two-thirds of the way to the penitentiary, they were attacked by an armed group and the escort descended from the machines to offer resistance.

"Suddenly the group grew larger and the prisoners tried to escape. An exchange of shots then took place in which one of the attacking party was killed, two were wounded and both prisoners killed.

"The automobiles were badly damaged."

The document then described the means which would be employed in investigation of the affair, and closed with these words:

"The Government promises that society shall be fully satisfied as to the facts in this case. The commanders of the escort are now under arrest and the facts above recorded have been ascertained so as to clear up this unhappy event."

The British press on Monday morning, February 24, called upon the United States for intervention. The *Standard* stigmatized the killing of Madero and Suarez as "an indefensible crime, imposing a load of infamy on the new Mexican administration," and added that "American intervention can hardly be longer delayed." The *Express* urged the British Government to press for immediate action by Washington, saying that "revolution and anarchy do not wait on presidential etiquette." The *Chronicle* declared that Madero was done to death by Huerta and asked what the United States would do. The *Times* was more explicit in its treatment. It said:

"Civilized nations will put their own construction on the lame and halting story which the successful conspirators now ruling Mexico have chosen to issue. Unless it can be proved to the hilt, foreign observers will retain the opinion that the removal of the two Maderos and Suarez is only fresh proof that the innate ferocity of Mexican politicians and military adventurers remains untamed.

"The most for which the unhappy country can hope is the restoration of a rule not worse than that of Diaz."

The last six words were a genuine contribution to critical history which should not be overlooked by any student.

For an accurate view of the event which had caused so much noise in the world it is natural that the people of the United States should depend upon their Ambassador whose situation was so favorable to correct vision. He expressed himself publicly as follows:

In the absence of other reliable information I am disposed to accept the Government's version of the manner in which the deposed President and Vice-President lost their lives. Certainly the violent deaths of these persons were without Government approval, and

if the deaths were the result of a plot it was of restricted character and unknown to the higher officers of the Government.

Mexican public opinion has accepted this view of the affair, and it is not at all excited. The present Government appears to be revealing marked evidence of activity, firmness and prudence, and adhesions to it, as far as I have been able to ascertain, are general throughout the republic, indicating the early reestablishment of peace.

The Government as constituted is very friendly to the United States and is desirous of affording effective protection to all foreigners.

For the present, American public opinion should deal with the situation calmly and accept with great reserve the lurid and highly colored stories which are being furnished by some few correspondents. The great majority of the correspondents here are endeavoring to deal fairly with the situation.

Within doors at the Embassy, however, Ambassador Wilson was less optimistic. On the afternoon of February 24, during a call from Señor de la Barra, who was now Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new cabinet, the Ambassador's voice was raised to an unusual volume in denunciation of the crime and of the men who either had encouraged or permitted it.

Disregarding the presence of persons in adjoining rooms of the Embassy, to whom his words were distinctly audible, the Ambassador upbraided de la Barra personally for this incident which he said "smelled to Heaven as the blackest of infamies" and would "place the brand of murder upon the brow of every man of authority in the new government." Especially discrediting, he assured the polite Mexican statesman, would this bloodshed prove to de la Barra himself.

Aside from other considerations, the Ambassador declared

a personal grievance against his caller because of solemn assurance given by de la Barra that Madero's life would be spared. Eloquence and emphasis were so combined in this outburst of wrath that de la Barra, as he left the Embassy, shrank from the gaze of those who had been drawn from the other rooms by the noise of the encounter and who watched him go away.

The call of Señor de la Barra had followed an official communication which he had issued on Sunday, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed to Ambassador Wilson and the other diplomats, setting forth at length the measures which the Government purposed taking to discover and chastise those who might be found guilty of the deed, and promising to supply the diplomatic corps with minutes of the judicial proceedings. The luncheon to which the Minister had invited the diplomatic corps for that Monday did not take place.

Sensational accounts of the death of Madero and Suarez, at variance with the Government's report, spread through the capital and were telegraphed to newspapers everywhere. One such account declared that both Madero and Suarez were killed in the Palace early in the evening, after having been subjected to torture; and that their bodies were carried in the automobile to the penitentiary, where shots were fired to give color to the story of attack. The statement to the press by Major Francisco Cardenas, who commanded the escort, differed somewhat from the official account. The two automobiles had been fired upon, Cardenas said, as they were crossing the railway, by men lying down. He had returned the fire with his revolver and had ordered the chauffeurs to put on speed, and the ambush had been passed with no harm done to guard or prisoners. But when the cars approached the penitentiary another band of about twelve men had opened fire and in the resulting

confusion both Señor Madero and Señor Pino Suarez had descended from the automobile and run toward the attacking party. Thus they had come between two fires and had been shot to death.

The body of Madero, Major Cardenas said, disclosed wounds which must have been received in the manner described; that is, by a fire from front and rear. He said further that three of the assailants were dead on the field after the affair.

This story was contradicted by the report of the autopsy made at the order of the Government, for it was therein stated that the body of Madero showed only one gun-shot wound, the bullet having entered at the base of the skull and lodged in the brain. There were abrasions on the forehead, doubtless due to a fall. No member of the Madero family was permitted to be present at the autopsy.

The account furnished by de la Barra on Sunday to the diplomatic corps, mentioned that one person, other than the prisoners, had been killed and two wounded, but that he had not been informed whether these had been of the assailants or of the escort.

After painstaking effort to learn the truth I am inclined to discredit the report that the deposed President and Vice-President were killed in the Palace. I have examined various accounts which place the crime there, some of them plausible, but none convincing. It is said that a man named Ocon was the chief of the assassins, and that an appropriation of 30,000 pesos, afterwards asked of the Mexican Congress, was the price of the deed. The hour is set early in the evening, when Huerta was attending a banquet given by the American Ambassador, who had the diplomatic corps as his other guests, the occasion being the birthday of George Washington. As Huerta is not charged with having an actual hand in the murders the alibi is unimportant.

Moreover, I decidedly favor the theory that Madero and Suarez were taken from the Palace alive.

Certain defenders of the Government have said that Mrs. Francisco I. Madero, Jr., knew that her husband was to be taken from the Palace to the penitentiary, and that she instigated an attempt to rescue him. They say further that Madero asked that a certain route be followed. This is supposed to indicate his knowledge of the plot; but the trouble is that the indication is so clear that it could not have escaped the notice of Major Cardenas, who, unless he desired to meet the rescue party, would certainly have chosen another way. In fact, he said that he did.

Even to one who feels deeply the shameful nature of this tragedy it is difficult to deal seriously with the Mexican Government's defense. If the story of Major Cardenas is believed, the theory of a rescue must be dismissed, for it is obvious that the rescuers would never have fired upon a moving automobile containing the persons whom they desired to save. They would have put an obstacle in the way of the car, and would have rushed upon it, after it had stopped, in sufficient force to overawe the armed men whom it contained. I cannot imagine Mrs. Madero's trusting to any Mexican marksman to pick off the chauffeur and miss her husband; and this is not the worst of it, for there remains the even more forbidding chance that, at the first shots of an assault so ill arranged, the escort would kill the prisoners.

A party of twelve men might have had some hope of success at the penitentiary, where the necessary halt could have been counted upon, and the affair managed with sufficient suddenness to snatch the captives away before their guards could shoot them. The difficulty is that Madero and Suarez were killed on the far side of the penitentiary, at a point beyond the entrance. Why they were taken to that spot

at all, except to murder them more conveniently, has never been explained, but the fact is established, and the question arises, how did the rescuers know where to lie in wait? If they received intimations from Madero's enemies, it would seem that Cardenas must have been in the plot, or he would not have let the car go past the prison. But if he were a party to the attempt, why did it fail?

It is not well to waste words upon this matter. The theory of the rescue will not stand examination from any point of view; the theory of deliberate murder is supported by every probability. As to the place and time I have the testimony of two young Mexicans of my acquaintance who lived not far from the penitentiary, and who visited the scene about five o'clock in the morning. They saw blood upon the ground, and viewed it closely. I think they are not mistaken in their belief that the bodies of Madero and Suarez had lain upon the spots examined, and that the blood was theirs. Its quantity and appearance negatived the theory that the men were brought there dead, having been killed in the Palace.

Except for the fact that the prisoners were carried beyond the penitentiary, it would be easy to acquit Major Cardenas of blame. He would hardly have cared to lead the escort, if he had known that the party was to be fired upon. The etiquette in use for such affairs in Mexico would not have been strained by sending him upon such an errand unadvised, and stationing a squad to shoot prisoners and guard with one volley or as many more as might be necessary. His escape from injury is rather against him. At last accounts he was alive, and possibly the sole repository of the truth, for the three men who served under him in this expedition are dead.

My own opinion is that there was no attack at any point, but I do not pretend to know exactly what took place. The

details would be a proper subject of police inquiry, in a better ordered state. The single fact of importance in the present record is that Madero and Suarez were killed after the whole world had been warned of the probability, the practical certainty that such would be their fate. The United States has paid, is paying, and will pay for this crime, a price which might appear to be sufficient expiation if exacted from the guilty. The cost of it, the shame of it, might have been avoided easily.

Ambassador Wilson should have known, shortly after February 9, that the warfare in Mexico City was a farce, that Huerta had betrayed Madero and was in negotiations with the Mondragon-Diaz-de la Barra coalition probably with personal designs upon the Presidency. He should have suspected that Madero must soon fall, and that he and Gustavo and Suarez and others would be in danger. Perhaps the Ambassador might not have felt constrained to protect Gustavo, whose death was not likely to disturb the peace of nations, but he should certainly have foreseen that serious evils would follow the murder or summary execution of the President and Vice-President.

The exercise of common judgment and the use of his peculiar influence and advantages would have enabled Mr. Wilson to comprehend the bargaining that was under way and the passions and intents of the interested parties, and to perceive that at any moment he might successfully insert a stipulation of his own; to wit, that when the President and Vice-President should be seized, they should immediately be sent unharmed to the American Embassy, there to remain until such time as they could leave that refuge safely.

If the Government at Washington had understood the situation and had looked into the future prudently, the Ambassador would have been directed to take this course. Ponderous arguments may be made upon the other side,

but they will be nonsense to any one who knows where the Ambassador really stood; and if his chief in the State Department did not know, let him now divide the responsibility for his ignorance with ex-Ambassador Wilson, upon any arithmetical basis that may suit them both.

As to the effect of such a request or demand upon the negotiators in Mexico City, there can be no uncertainty. Huerta might have filled the circumambient air with curses, but inwardly he would have been delighted. His hand would have been strengthened to carry out the very policy which his own mind had formulated. The others in the conspiracy would have been unable to resist, at that critical hour when the fortunes of all of them hung in the balance.

To sum up, it matters little in precisely what way this blood was shed. The evidence against the actual assassins is not likely to be called for in any court. But it matters very much that the crime was not prevented; that Madero and Suarez were not protected by the American flag.

It would be unjust to Mr. Wilson to omit all mention of the praise which he won for his activity in protecting Americans and others during the time of the terror in the Mexican capital. I will say frankly, however, that I think a greater injustice was done him through the foolish exaggeration of his heroism and efficiency. The plain truth about this matter would have been much better. Some of his relief work was well inspired and thoroughly done. He was greatly assisted by his wife, who had already won the regard of resident Americans, and who gained deservedly in their esteem by her intelligent, sympathetic and very valuable services in this crisis.

The Embassy became a relief center. An idea of what was done may be gained from the following translation of an account in *El Diario* of February 23:

"The American colony in Mexico City gave a new proof of the practical ability of the race during the days when firing was in progress in this city.

"Opposite the United States Embassy the Americans established what may be called a city within a house. They there organized an asylum in which persons of American nationality having their homes in the danger zone might take refuge and at one time there were about 1000 refugees. They founded a provisional bank by means of which they made remittances to the United States. They arranged a red cross hospital for the care of the wounded, in which the best American surgeons of the city rendered their services, and they improvised a telegraph service, also handling cablegrams.

"On the last day of the firing, the American colony were going to receive cablegrams from New York, sent free by the *Sun* for a small English daily for which a small printing office had been established.

"Besides the American refugees there were many persons of other nationalities and even a fair number of Mexicans who were opportunely received into the curious institution in question.

"It is said that in the American refuge everything needful was supplied, and no end of persons have thanked the American colony for its timely helplessness."

In this work the Ambassador and his wife were naturally the leaders. Mr. Wilson went about the city in his car, risking his life within the danger zone, and rendering assistance to many persons. And because I believe that this work was in itself creditable, I regret the more that it should have been exploited in ways worse than questionable, for political ends by those who were determined not to lose an ambassador committed to the support of the newly risen Huerta administration, if they could possibly retain him. This is not to say that the Ambassador had no friends, no sincere admirers. He had both, and it is much to be regret-

ted that those among them who possessed some grains of discretion did not succeed in controlling the conduct of the political and business combination which took the lead.

At a special meeting of "the colony," held at the American club on February 28, a committee on resolutions was appointed, the most influential member being George W. Cook, the merchant heretofore mentioned. The committee's report contained 300 words in praise of the Ambassador, fifty words for Mrs. Wilson, and 200 for all the other workers. Consul General Shanklin, who had been less conspicuous but no less serviceable than the Ambassador, was grouped with the Rosario Dairy and other objects of gratitude in a vote of thanks which held an average of six words for each.

The committee's commendation of the Ambassador was cheered to the echo; it consisted of an elaborate preamble with these appended resolutions:

"Resolved: that the American colony recognize the fact that to the American Ambassador, the Hon. Henry Lane Wilson, they owe a debt of gratitude the magnitude of which cannot be expressed in words, but which shall remain with them a cherished memory of the noble and patriotic services rendered under most trying conditions, which stamp him as an American of whom his countrymen may well feel proud, and to whom the American colony extends this humble token of appreciation.

"Resolved: That a copy of these resolutions be engrossed and presented to the Honorable Henry Lane Wilson, American Ambassador, and that a copy also be sent to the State Department in Washington."

The last line disclosed the object of the meeting. In four days a new administration would be inaugurated at Washington. The resolutions were the signal guns of the

campaign to be waged for the Ambassador's retention at the Mexico post.

On Monday, February 24, the bodies of the murdered President and Vice-President, which had been placed in coffins in the penitentiary with no member of either family present, were buried — Madero in the French cemetery and Suarez in the Spanish. The members of the immediate families were allowed to attend the ceremonies. Directly afterward the Maderos made all possible speed to leave Mexico City for Vera Cruz, whence they sailed for Havana, accompanied by the Cuban minister, Manuel Marquez Sterling, who declined longer to represent his country at the Mexican capital. In due course the Maderos reached New York, in which city and its suburbs several of them now reside. On that February 24th the portraits and busts of General Diaz and the former ministers and presidents of Mexico which Madero had removed were restored to their original places in the Palacio Nacional.

The Governments of Europe and the United States were now perplexed over diplomatic etiquette; there was no official way in which they could give adequate expression to their sympathy. Neither Washington nor any of the European chancelleries found itself equal to the task of framing official condolence in terms that would not prematurely disclose the condoler's attitude toward the vital subject of recognition.

The Washington Government had telegraphed Ambassador Wilson on February 19, commending the part he had taken in ending the Mexican trouble, and that day the Associated Press described the Washington attitude in the following terms:

"If the constitutional forms are observed and Congress is freely allowed to elect a provisional President

and take steps for providing for free general elections then the Washington Government will cordially and sympathetically support the efforts to establish a permanent government."

But the killing of Madero complicated matters and no one could be found north of the Rio Grande who was indiscreet enough to forecast what Washington's position would be. The Taft administration, however, was well placed for recognition, because its Ambassador had practically committed it to such a course by his acts, and by his official statement on February 24, which has been quoted.

It is idle to speculate as to the course which the Taft administration would have pursued, if it had remained in office. What it did do was to place some 9,000 troops convenient to the Mexican border and despatch four battle-ships into Mexican waters. In deference to the Wilson administration, which was to succeed it nine days after the culmination of the Mexican tragedy, it declined to commit itself on the subject of recognition. It is said, in fact, that this logical method of dividing responsibility in the aggravating Mexican matter went far to reconcile President Taft to giving up the presidential office. The personal letter of Mr. Taft, written several weeks after his term had closed, to Ambassador Wilson in Mexico, and promptly published by the latter, seems to indicate that the incident of Madero's death had in no way affected Mr. Taft's generously favorable judgment of the Ambassador and his acts.

In Mexico itself the killing of Madero gave strong impetus to movements adverse to Huerta, and justified that gentleman's judgment that a dead Madero was the worst of enemies. Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, and Abram Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua, strong partisans of Madero, had been superseded by military officials,

and on February 28 the first real battle of a new and apparently endless war was fought a few miles north of Monclova in the state of Coahuila, and the Carranza forces were defeated. The northern belt of Mexico then sprang promptly into action and insurrectionary bands were soon operating in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, as well as in the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila.

Governor Abram Gonzalez of Chihuahua was a man of character, ability, and judgment. To avoid plunging his state into war he had, after a short delay, accepted Huerta as Mexico's president. But his loyalty to Madero was too well known, and General Antonio Rabago, Huerta's military commander for that section, was directed to supersede him. Armed with credentials from Mexico City, Rabago threw Gonzalez into prison, and took possession of the governor's office. A few days later Gonzalez was placed on a train at night for transfer to another point. When the train had gone a few miles Gonzalez was dragged from the car by seven men, and killed in a manner too brutal for description.

In the record of wholesale executions of prisoners that were reported from various quarters, Abram Gonzalez seemed to the general public but one unfortunate among hundreds who fell victims to the revival of the old tyranny; but many Americans on both sides of the border who had known and greatly respected the man, were decisively influenced by this conspicuous instance of brutality on the part of the new government. If helpless prisoners of such quality who had committed no crime were to be killed at the pleasure of their guards, the future of Mexico was dark indeed.

The development of affairs in the far off northwestern state of Sonora soon became the greatest menace to Huerta's rule. The incidents which placed that state in opposition

have never been fairly sketched in any printed record. They are of value in tracing American responsibility.

General Huerta, on February 18, telegraphed to the governor of Sonora that he held Madero prisoner. Two days later he telegraphed again, announcing his elevation to the provisional presidency and demanding instant acceptance of the new order. To refuse meant war with consequent loss to many important American interests in that state, and with this in mind Louis Hostetter, United States Consul at Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, used his strong personal influence to induce the state government to yield to Huerta's demand. He had succeeded in this when the assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez aroused resentment and overthrew the agreement.

At this stage Mr. Hostetter received a telegram from Ambassador Wilson directing him to do everything in his power to induce Sonora to accept Huerta as president, and telling the consul that the majority of the Mexican states had already done so. Hostetter at once applied himself with increased vigor, and made such progress with the authorities that they directed him to request a list from the Ambassador of the states which he positively knew had accepted Huerta, promising that if this list showed an actual majority, Sonora would not hold out against the new ruler. The consul telegraphed this request with its assurances in the full belief that he had accomplished that which the Ambassador had requested him to do; that the list would be immediately forthcoming, and that all would be well.

Receiving no reply, Consul Hostetter telegraphed again urging the necessity for detailed information. Still there was no answer, whereupon the officials of Sonora declared themselves unwilling to wait for a trap to be sprung which would find them unprepared. The state congress or legislature then framed a resolution refusing allegiance to

Huerta and also voted a leave of absence to Governor Maytorena, who was believed to be too complacent toward the attempt of Huerta to reduce the state to a dependency of an absolute military dictatorship. Governor Maytorena departed for California, and Rafael Pesquiera was made acting governor in his stead.

But Consul Hostetter did not give up his efforts to preserve the peace of the state. For several days he labored with the officials, and finally the legislature passed a resolution which the consul telegraphed to the Ambassador. It provided that if Huerta would guarantee to Sonora state rights, withdraw the few Federal troops then stationed there, and permit the state to elect its own officials, a commission would be sent to Mexico City to arrange details. The legislature was strongly influenced toward caution in these negotiations by the fate which had overtaken Governor Gonzalez of Chihuahua, whose acceptance of Huerta had not been forwarded so promptly as was desired.

In his telegram to the Ambassador, Consul Hostetter informed him that unless the Huerta government could at once send 5,000 troops to Sonora it would be best to accept the terms, as the people of the state, excepting the Cientifico element, were of one mind and would fight hard for their rights.

Neither to this telegram nor to several subsequent ones of an urgent character did the Ambassador make answer of any kind then or afterwards. It was Huerta who furnished the response to these telegrams addressed to the Ambassador by Consul Hostetter, and it was Colonel Garcia, bearing Huerta's credentials as military governor, who delivered it, backed by a strong force of Federal troops. But when Colonel Garcia arrived, Sonora was waiting for him, and the result was war as bitter and brutal as any that has sprung from these troubles in Mexico.

Ambassador Wilson's course in this matter invites criticism. American enterprises in Sonora supplied its life blood, and this is true of the state of Sinaloa, which lies next to it on the south, and which promptly joined Sonora in revolt. None of the Americans who have suffered loss in those states as the result of their Ambassador's strange attitude can regard his management of the affair with complacency.

The Ambassador cannot well say that he was unwilling to meddle, for his record in Mexico City shows him very prone to interfere in local affairs. Moreover, he had already meddled in Sonora when he asked the consul to support Huerta by every means in his power.

The Ambassador's relationship to Huerta from the night the compact was signed in the Embassy was very close. If he had induced the dictator to guarantee to Sonora the autonomy which the Mexican constitution provides, that state would have remained peaceful, Americans and Europeans there would not have been despoiled, and the backbone of Mexico's revolt against Huerta would have been broken. Also this action on Huerta's part would have acted favorably at Washington and elsewhere. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn is that Huerta stood for absolutism pure and simple, and that the Ambassador was unable to dissuade him.

While the North and Northwest of Mexico were getting into action in various ways to demonstrate repudiation of Huerta by force of arms, Zapata and the other bandit leaders to the southward were treating with the new government. The negotiations came to nothing, but they aided the newspapers of the capital in their diligent efforts to support the new order of things. The press was by no means untrammelled and it was uniformly laudatory of the Government as was extremely fitting when arbitrary im-

prisonment was due to follow sharply upon the utterance of a critical word.

Mexico City had cleared its streets as rapidly as possible of the débris resulting from the bombardment. Most of the dead, whose number is variously estimated between three thousand and five thousand, had been carried in carts to vacant fields outside the city, and there soaked in petroleum and burned. No official attempt was made to ascertain the names of the unfortunates thus disposed of. Persons who possessed the means and could identify their dead could give them private burial, but for the most part wholesale incineration in heaps was the method employed. Very few Americans or Europeans had been killed, and the losses of the Federal and revolutionary forces were small. The great majority of the victims were of the poorer classes of citizens who were drawn into the line of fire by curiosity or by mere stupidity.

Almost immediately after the new government was organized the matter of finance was brought forward and its pressing nature was emphasized. It became current talk everywhere that the Maderos had looted the treasury, and many declared that killing was too good for them. Censure of Huerta was expressed for permitting any of the family or the members of the Government to escape. A report gained credence that only 892 pesos remained of all the Government funds; and I think the belief still exists, throughout the part of the world which interests itself, that Mexico was bankrupt when Madero was deposed. Let us therefore enter with exactness at this point the report of balances in treasury offices and banks, made by the Huerta Government on February 21, 1913, two days after that Government was officially installed. This is the account in detail, signed by Huerta officials:

National Bank of Mexico:

Special account 4%.....\$5,000,000.00

Current account 874,524.48 \$ 5,874,524.48

Mexican Central Bank:

5% 1,600,000.00

3% 2,000,000.00 3,600,000.00

Banque de Paris et des

Pays Bas 37,508.16fr. 14,521.16

Bank of England 26,000.00 253,822.50

Commission of Money and Exchange... 18,821,829.43

Financial Agency of

Mexico in London....33,794 3s. 1d. 329,912.30

Treasury of the Federation 432,363.89

National lottery 392,044.46

National mint 9,720.76

Direction of the stamp 672,973.52

Stamp printing office 28,822.86

Direction of taxes of the Federal district 20,884.85

Treasury of the national Congress..... 34,910.23

Direction of the post office 533,080.54

Sundry offices of the Federal district... 304,410.92

Agencies of the treasury department.... 277,079.66

Tax office in Tepic 15,280.06

Custom houses 435,231.11

Provincial branches of the treasury (estimated) 500,000.00

Legations and consulates (estimated)... 300,000.00

 Total amount\$33,078,641.60

This statement was signed by treasury officials and by T. Esquivel Obregon, Minister of Finance.

The bonded indebtedness of Mexico on June 30, 1911, was \$440,186,566.25 (Mexican). To this debt, during Madero's administration, were added \$20,000,000 (Mexican) for general treasury uses, and \$20,000,000 (Mexican) for maintenance of the parity fund in New York.

In fairness to the Madero Government it must be urged that in view of its effort for months to secure permission

from Congress to make a loan, and in view of the fact that it had been maintaining an active army of nearly 60,000 men, this showing is decidedly to its credit. In no way does it justify the criticisms that have been made. The financial record of the Madero Government cannot be analyzed to sustain the random and reckless charges that the treasury was looted or that undue profits were made by Madero favorites. On the contrary, the distribution of available funds among the depositaries, and the operation of fiscal affairs indicate wise financial management.

Freely as I have set forth the peculiar and at times wholly disconcerting features of Francisco Madero's method of government, quite as freely do I accord to it a degree of financial honesty which few governments can safely boast. Thirty-three million pesos was too low for its treasury balances while the Government was under extraordinary army expense, but it was far from bankruptcy, far from furnishing ground for the attacks in Chamber and Senate.

The reason for those attacks is fairly clear; the misrepresentations that have been made with regard to the finances are of a piece with those that were press-agented broadly before Madero's fall to prove his unfitness to the world. Mexico's revenues, as stated elsewhere, were at the highest point when the end came, and it is my firm belief that if Madero had found a way to defeat the loose-jointed military-Cientifico conspiracy of February, 1913, Mexico to-day would be prosperous, and many of those who were most persistently hostile to Madero would be crowding about his standard with professions of loyalty.

CHAPTER XVIII

MEXICO and the United States experienced a change of administration about the same time. On February 24, Madero, the unsuccessful progressive, went to his grave, and on March 4, Taft, the unsuccessful conservative, departed toward a college professorship and a round of lecturing upon pleasant commonplaces, expounded to the taste of the educated simple, and designed to reestablish popularity along safe and sane lines.

Two strong and resourceful men had taken the highest seats in the two countries — strong in different ways, contrasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality. They have been the conspicuous actors in the drama, dwarfing all others in the popular view, except perhaps the comedian, Pancho Villa. The action of the piece has centered on the duel between Huerta and Wilson, a contest much more real than that of a military aspect in which the formidable Indian had recently been engaged — the bombardment in Mexico City — yet not quite what it seemed, as will hereafter be made plain.

The minor characters — Mondragon, Diaz, Calero, Vera Estañol, the survivors of the Madero party, etc. — had little set down for them but exits, which they made when their cues came. De la Barra had a quiet scene or two, and Henry Lane Wilson had the center of the stage for a moment. A new personage, Venustiano Carranza, "first chief of the constitutionalists," appeared conspicuously, then got word from Washington and retired for a time. Upon the

whole the performance, as I have already said, had very much the aspect of a duel between the two presidents.

The world has been asked to believe that events in Mexico since the 4th of March, 1913, may be accounted for by two causes; the unsettling effect of Madero's attempt to establish democracy in a country unprepared for it, and President Wilson's refusal to recognize the Huerta Government as *de jure*.

The preceding chapters have been devoted to disclosing the influences which nullified Madero's honest efforts—the influences, not of twelve or thirteen million peaceful, unlettered Indians, but of educated and powerful men in Mexico and elsewhere. These had consented to the wrecking of the Government, as they might have consented to the wrecking of a corporation in the hope of bettering their own position through a reorganization.

Most Americans and Europeans held this view, or at least had been greatly affected by the constant assertions that the Madero rule was not good for business—a kind of panic talk, that had been a weapon of the late President's enemies. The foreigners did not lament Madero's fall; most of them looked upon him as a disturber, and had accepted the ten days' battle in Mexico City as a full demonstration of his inefficiency. They were shocked by the murders, but hardly a man of them saw what must follow. Nearly all believed that the prospects for an enduring peace had been materially bettered by Madero's death, though the manner of it had been unfortunate. The new government, they supposed, represented all the most powerful cliques. There would be trouble for some time with the Maderistas and the bandits, said the resident foreigners, but they had considerable hope in Huerta as a man capable of reestablishing a Diaz rule—not under Felix, of course—and they were greatly influenced in the new dictator's

favor by the attitude of the American Ambassador toward him.

Severe losses already had been sustained by the foreigners, the largest, without doubt, falling upon Americans and American corporations. Of the 40,000 Americans, which my special canvass in 1910 had disclosed as permanent residents, possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of March, 1913. The number had been smaller directly after the great stampede of March, 1912, but the alarm had been false and many had returned. Practically all who had remained away were heavy losers, and so were many who came back, but the great majority of the English speakers who were in Central Mexico at the time the Huerta Government was set up preferred it to its predecessor, and hoped for better business conditions in the near future.

In Mexico City the Americans saw their Ambassador as diligent for the new government as was any man connected with it, from Huerta down. All knew what his attitude had been toward Madero, and some of them understood the inwards of the matter fairly well, and were very glad of the change. A Mexican President pulling one way and an American Ambassador pulling the other make a bad, in fact an impossible, combination as regards governmental stability, and commercial advantages. Some of these men were well satisfied with Ambassador Wilson, personally, others were not. But in one thing they were thoroughly agreed: they did not wish to see another situation like that which they had just passed through, where the dean of the diplomatic corps was hostile to the government.

They therefore hoped devoutly, for business reasons which were the only potent ones with them, that President Wilson would retain his namesake, the Ambassador, that nothing would mar the latter's cordial relations with Huerta,

and that the new administration in Washington would promptly recognize the man who had seized the helm in Mexico.

Estimates of American investments in Mexico printed in newspapers of the United States were current about that time and were visibly incorrect in detail although not far from fair in total. Railway investments were overestimated by fully \$200,000,000, as a large portion of the railway securities originally floated by American bankers had been sold to Europe. Moreover Mexican Government notes and bonds were named among American holdings, but nearly all of these had been disposed of in Canada and England and the European continent. On the other hand American investments in mining properties, rubber properties, oil lands and haciendas were greatly understated, and when the small individual holdings of resident Americans are fairly figured, I consider the total estimate of a billion dollars, most of which represented actual cash, as not far from correct. These investments now had undergone a great shrinkage, which it would be futile to attempt to estimate.

But the element which seems to have made little impression upon the men who were inside of the game in Mexico City or the observers in Europe and the United States, was the release from active employment of peaceably disposed peons who presently became recruits for the bands which as "constitutionalists," or without attempt to dignify their occupation, preyed upon property. It is estimated that in 1910 fully 1,800,000 Mexicans were employed by American companies and individuals and that by March, 1913, not less than 500,000 of them were entirely idle, while as many more were without regular work. In addition to this the decreased patronage of Americans was seriously felt by a host of Mexican Indians who made a living from produce

which they carried into the towns on their backs and sold to American families.

Reduced to the starvation point the unemployed and the little traders made up a constantly increasing menace to the peace. Let no one permit himself to be impressed with the statement that all Mexicans would rather fight than eat, or would choose murder in preference to legitimate employment as a means by which subsistence may be gained. Of the great body of Mexicans, totalling fifteen millions, no larger percentage were viciously inclined than of peoples in lands more advanced in culture. Let us be just to the ignorant peons; what precept of morality or righteousness would be likely to induce a million starving men in any country to die of hunger and permit their families to suffer the same fate rather than steal from those who have plenty?

Without entering deeply into all the elements of the situation, the Americans in Mexico addressed themselves with vigor to their home government in support of the new order of things which, viewed through the glasses of expediency, seemed to them roseate with promise. In every way by which influence could be exerted at Washington it was promptly applied. Petitions were made up and mailed, delegations were dispatched, individuals of wealth and standing, and corporation men of financial power visited the American capital on this business, all pressing upon the Wilson administration the two vital decisions, recognition of Huerta and retention of Ambassador Wilson.

A political campaign was instituted in Mexico City in the interest of Ambassador Wilson, with the Embassy as headquarters. Americans, Englishmen and Europeans in general were gathered in to join the endeavor. The endorsement of resident Americans was to be made unanimous and the sentiments of other foreigners who appreciated the Ambassa-

dor's efforts during the bombardment, were desirable as a testimonial of high personal regard.

The work was overdone and the design which lay behind it could not remain hidden. It was known not only in Mexico City but in the United States, where versions of the story appeared in the newspapers. Doubt was then thrown upon the spontaneity of the movement. But these considerations merely emphasized the opinion which very early began to be voiced in the press of the United States, that the American Ambassador had meddled deeply in Mexican affairs, and had then endeavored to commit his home government without authority. If these acts of an ambassador were to be sanctioned, unlimited discretion amounting to usurpation of executive power would in effect be conceded to Washington diplomatic agents in general. The result might have been foreseen from the beginning, but it was so long in coming that its effect for good was lost.

The problem which the Mexican tangle presented to the Wilson administration at the very outset was a severe test of its qualities if solution were to be found on a moral and entirely peaceful basis. Later on in these pages the subject will receive further treatment. What impressed the American public, as indicated by the experience of interested individuals and the occasional escape of steam in Congress and the press, was the resisting power of the new administration. For four months no man from Mexico could get a hearing.

On March 6 a slip in routine at the Washington State Department resulted in cabling a note of commendation bearing the signature of the Secretary of State to Ambassador Wilson at Mexico City. Promptly given to the press by its recipient, it was cabled back to the United States and across to Europe. Three days later the Secretary cabled again withdrawing his generous words.

On March 11 President Wilson issued a statement of intent to cooperate with the people of Latin America, and to use the moral force of his Administration in the interest of electoral reform in those countries, to the end that their governments should be based on the consent of the governed. He announced his lack of sympathy with revolutions that served personal ambitions.

The statement was regarded in Europe as too vague to commit the Washington Government to non-recognition of Huerta while an Ambassador was held in Mexico City who was exerting all his power through the American consular service and the diplomatic corps at Mexico's capital to support the Huerta rule. In the months of April and May, 1913, England, France, and Germany accorded recognition to the new Mexican government. This was the logical procedure from the European standpoint. Bankers and other interested persons could see no hope of settled conditions in Mexico, should any other course be pursued. If the advice of Señor Limantour and Lord Cowdray was asked for, it was doubtless supplied — and heeded.

Although Lord Cowdray's name and his much misunderstood oil concession in Mexico have figured prominently in news reports since the setting up of the Huerta government, he has said that he refrained from meddling; and Señor Limantour, in July, 1913, specifically denied having made "intriguing representations to the Powers." It is essential, nevertheless, to consider carefully the positions and the influence of these two men.

They had long been regarded by European financiers and statesmen as the chief authorities on Mexican matters. They had been consulted in preference to all others. Limantour's opinion as to Mexican credits, and as to politics also, was weighty beyond comparison. Lord Cowdray's knowledge of practical business development in

Mexico had been obtained from the closest contact, and from the control of large investments. Each of these men had gained in grasp of the situation by his relations with the other during fifteen years of intimate acquaintance resulting in mutual sentiments of profound respect.

It may be confidently stated that neither would have chosen Victoriano Huerta to rule over the country in which both were so deeply interested. "What a spectacle before the world!" said Limantour in referring to him. Yet Limantour could not view with any degree of tolerance whatever the armed revolt in the North, nor favor by his advice to bankers such action as would precipitate Huerta's fall and put the so-called Constitutionals into power.

The thing to be supported was Mexico; the thing to be averted was a sweeping financial disaster which would pile up the National Railways merger and the Mexican government obligations in a tangled mass of wreckage under which would lie the ruins of every considerable investment that had been made by private individuals. Whatever degree of reticence may have seemed proper to Limantour in his desire to avoid the appearance of participation in Mexican politics, he could not have avoided giving to those who consulted him some disclosure of his conviction as to this matter which was uppermost in his mind.

In default of any evidence of a constructive policy formed by the United States in recognition of its responsibilities toward Mexico, Limantour was compelled to regard a measure of support for the de facto government of his country as offering the only hope of staving off disaster.


Lord Cowdray must have arrived at a similar conclusion through considering his own interests in the petroleum fields in the Mexican states along the Gulf of Mexico. The boring concession which he had secured in 1907, while not productive of direct results on government land, had

led him to undertake extensive operations on areas secured from private owners by purchase and lease. These operations had produced magnificent results, in sharp contrast to the slow progress he was making in the sale at retail of the refined product in Mexican markets. Production of crude petroleum for export and for fuel therefore declared itself as the wise business policy, and preparation was made by him to secure immense tracts in the most promising sections of the oil belt.

For several years the plans to acquire proprietary or leasehold rights in the oil states were followed with vigor, and the actual area thus brought under Lord Cowdray's control reached, in 1913, the vast total of 1,600,000 acres, about half of which is owned in fee by him or his companies, and the remainder held under thirty-year leases. Two hundred and eighty thousand acres of land held in fee had been acquired by Lord Cowdray in 1902 as part of his Tehuantepec railway deal with the Mexican government. A tract of 418,000 acres adjoining this he bought from private owners subsequent to 1907. He bought 100,000 acres more in northern Vera Cruz.

The 800,000 acres acquired on leasehold necessitated nearly a thousand separate leases, some of them requiring the signatures of more than forty persons. This illustrates the complications of land ownership in those sections. The proprietors were of all classes, hacendados, planters, ranchmen, and even the unmodified aborigines whose ancestors had held the land from the days of Moteczuma. The enormous labor which this process entailed throws light upon the difficulties that will confront the framer of any equitable plan for redistribution of Mexican lands.

While Lord Cowdray had been laying this foundation for producing oil in quantities beyond the previous record



LORD COWDRAY

Formerly Sir Weetman Pearson. Head of the world-famous English contracting firm, S. Pearson & Son, Ltd., and of the corporations which own 800,000 acres in the Mexican oil belt and control 800,000 acres more in the same regions through 1,000 leases.

of any individual, others had not been idle. The rights to bore on government land were possessed by him alone, but of purchase and lease of private properties in the oil belt he held no monopoly, and a host of strong competitors had arisen to demand a share of the wealth which flowed in the strata 1,800 to 2,000 feet below the earth's surface.

Lord Cowdray's great unmeasured well, Dos Bocas (two mouths) which in 1909 had exploded and become unmanageable, had startled the oil world. When it caught fire and burned for weeks, laying waste many square miles of property, the truth about Mexico's oil was a trade secret no longer. A year or so later Lord Cowdray's borers "brought in" the gusher Portrero del Llano, which held the world's record till November, 1913, its production for every twenty-four hours that it was permitted to flow amounting to about 700 carloads—by actual measurement 103,000 barrels of forty-two gallons each.

In the spring of 1913 the general development of Mexico's fields had advanced so far that the output of Lord Cowdray's locally organized company, the Mexican Eagle (La Aguila) was barely a half of the total. The heaviest oil concerns in the world were now in the field. The Standard Oil Company, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, the Southern Pacific Railway Company were large holders. The Rothschilds were said to be interested in the reorganization of the Waters-Pierce Company.

Such individuals and firms as William R. Hearst, John Hays Hammond and J. G. White and Co. were prominent. E. L. Doheny, of Los Angeles, California, had made a sensation with his Mexican Petroleum Company and the Huestica Petroleum Company. Maximilian Whittier, Calvin Hunter and other Californians had formed corporations. Richard Mestres, a former employee of Lord Cowdray, had made lucky purchases of Indian lands at twelve

cents to fifty cents an acre, and in association with Hammond and others had organized strong companies. No pumps were needed; every well was a gusher.

Other substantial men had pushed their way in, and many owned producing properties. London promoters were exploiting Mexico oil lands heavily. There were prospects of a boom in oil, approaching that in rubber which had swept through England in 1909. The Mexican Yearbook records the names of 165 corporations operating in the Mexican fields in 1913. Probably as many more had been formed but were awaiting settled conditions before actually beginning work.

The presence of these other interests, however, did not affect Lord Cowdray, so he says, in any injurious way; they were in fact helpful during the development stage. The possibilities of the region could not be less than 1,000,000 barrels a day, a volume of output nearly equal to that of the entire world outside. Lord Cowdray's domination of the crude-oil trade depended upon his facilities for handling his own product and that of others in the belt. In 1913 he made a contract with the British government to supply its navy with 7,200,000 barrels of fuel oil a year. With increase of equipment — pipe-lines, tanks, and tank-steamers — his way was open for rapid enlargement of this business to huge proportions, provided always that Mexico's internal disorders could be kept from spreading to the Tampico and the Tehuantepec regions.

Here were grounds sufficient for desiring that the visible government of Mexico — without regard to its origin or moral qualifications — should receive support, so long as it should be useful as a protective agency.

The financial situation of the Huerta government was so serious in the spring of 1913 that all parties interested were compelled to give it their close attention. Luis de la

Barra, brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations, was sent to Paris via New York to give information to those in the French capital whose aid and advice would be most helpful. Following this a representative of the international banking syndicate which had taken the loan of 1910 and had considered favorably a further undertaking to be secured by the unpledged thirty-eight per cent. of the customs, was sent to Mexico to confer with members of the government and report upon the situation.

The one-year notes of the Mexican treasury for \$10,000,000 were maturing on June 10. The one-year notes of the Monetary Commission, endorsed by the Banco Nacional and the Banco Central (both now under French control) and amounting to \$10,000,000 were due on August 31. In addition there were obligations of the National Railways of Mexico totaling \$23,000,000, to be provided for. Of these obligations \$10,000,000 fell due on June 1 and \$13,000,000 on November 10.

The natural recourse at such a moment would have been to ask the bankers to renew, but a syndicate headed by Speyer & Company held twenty millions of the forty-three millions maturing, and they declined to carry the obligations further unless they should be amply secured. The other twenty-three millions were due to bankers who were members of the new syndicate then negotiating.

The crucial nature of this financial undertaking is emphasized by the fact that if the National Railways should default on its obligations, the corporation would fall into bankruptcy and \$105,000,000 of its outstanding bonds which bore the guarantee of the Mexican Government would become a demand obligation upon the treasury of the guarantor. The time may arrive when this default will come, but June or November, 1913, was premature. Before this important financial event occurs affairs must so shape them-

selves that prompt reorganization may be safely and profitably effected.

The negotiations were conducted with the international syndicate of bankers whose principal members are Morgan, Grenfel & Co., and Henry Schroeder & Co. of London; Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, Credit Lyonnaise, Societe General, and Banque Francaise of Paris; Bleischroeder of Berlin; J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., National City Bank, First National Bank, and Guaranty Trust Company of New York.

Arrangements for a National Railways loan and a Mexican Government loan were rapidly consummated with the international syndicate. The Railways loan consisted of \$27,000,000 in two-year notes. The Mexican Government loan was a ten-year obligation of 20,000,000 pounds sterling, of which 6,000,000 pounds sterling was a firm underwriting by the bankers at 90, and the balance optional. Speyer & Company were compelled to subscribe to the loan in a sum equal to the maturing notes which they then held. Thus the control of Mexico's customs by the international syndicate was made complete, and Speyer & Company exchanged the maturing obligations for ten-year bonds secured, as stated, by the customs. They had, however, surrendered their position as fiscal agents of Mexico.

Out of the 6,000,000 pounds which the bankers positively accepted in the closing days of May, 1913, less than \$7,000,000 reached the Mexican treasury for general uses, the greater part having been devoted as described. No difficulty was experienced with the Mexican Congress in securing authorization of the loan, although the pledge of 38 per cent. of the customs receipts was a feature of it.

The effect of the flotation of this loan on any terms was a distinct gain for the Huerta government at home, and as a

triumph over the United States was greatly relished at the Palacio Nacional. It was a correspondingly distinct shock to the press of the United States, which had sturdily declared that Mexico could borrow no money until Washington accorded recognition. When the administration was interrogated about it no reply could be elicited. Rumors of Lord Cowdray's deals in oil in association with the loan were stamped by him as falsehoods. Rumors of Limantour influence brought equally emphatic denials. No one could be found, excepting routine Mexican Government officials, who had assisted in any way in the transaction; the loans had been effected in the ordinary course of business, no deals had been made, no influence used. Where and by whom the most effective persuasion was exerted may be gathered from the fact that, of the loan so far as floated, Paris took one-half and the remainder was parceled out to bankers in Germany, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and New York.

While financial arrangement for Mexico had been going forward, Mexico itself had steadily retrograded in stability. Practically all the North, including the states of Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Sonora were lost to the Huerta Government. The capitals of all these states except Sonora were still held, and certain posts of entry on the border, but the states were overrun with bands and armies calling themselves Constitutionals. Murder, pillage, torture, outrage, all the crimes that barbarous warfare stimulates, were committed daily in these states and in sections of other states both adjoining and remote.

The general head of the Northern and Northwestern revolt against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, to whom most of the bands acknowledged allegiance as "first chief," but the quality of the men who admitted his leadership was such that little faith was placed by most ob-

servers in any real cohesion when the test should come, and still less in the legitimacy of any enterprise in which they were engaged.

Many pitched battles were fought with Federal troops and it must have puzzled the devil to know which side to favor, their ethics being undistinguishable. Wounded men were killed. Prisoners were executed by a firing squad unless they changed allegiance, and many were shot who were willing to fight against their comrades.

In the South the Zapata bands overran the state of Morelos and made frequent excursions into Puebla and Mexico. Frequently their operations were carried on within twenty miles of the capital itself. The general adroitness of these bands was now established and Madero was cleared of charges of lukewarmness in their pursuit. Victoriano Huerta could not be accused of hesitation for sentimental reasons, and he was the best strategist in Mexico besides.

In Sonora the war was prosecuted with bitterness. The state troops were joined by the Yaqui Indians to repel federal invasion and they nearly always won. The state forces in Sonora were better armed than were the Constitutionalists further east. Border smuggling of munitions of war from Arizona in the United States seemed a far easier matter than from Texas into the Mexican states immediately south; from Arizona the "gun running" was carried on with little or no regard to Washington prohibition. The patrol at this part of the border was too thinly spread out to be effective. Hermosillo, in Sonora, was repeatedly threatened but never taken by Federal forces, a distinction which dignifies it among insurgent capitals.

All this was destructive to legitimate business operations in agriculture, cattle raising, mining and all industries in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon and the northern part of Tamaulipas. In Sonora there was

much interference with mining interests except those under the control of the Phelps-Dodge Corporation at Nacozari and Cananea which, except for slight troubles at the beginning, were not molested. The Southern Pacific Railway of Mexico, upon which nearly \$70,000,000 had been spent and which was nearly completed to Guadalajara to connect with the National Railways, suspended all but tunnel work upon its line and left nearly 1000 miles of completed track to the mercy of events. This railway skirts the Pacific coast through Sonora, Sinaloa and a part of Tepic to a point where it swings abruptly into the state of Jalisco of which Guadalajara is the capital city. The 6000 Mexican laborers and operatives whom the company employed were discharged.

The system of the National Railways of Mexico was disorganized in all the northern states, being used chiefly by Constitutionalists or Federals for the moving of troops. The damage to its lines and its rolling stock by July 1 totaled an enormous sum in addition to loss of income from traffic. No railway line was in operation from Mexico City to the United States border. The only exit from Mexico's capital was by way of the Mexican Railway to Vera Cruz, and thence by steamer.

Damage to property belonging to American and European companies and individuals was of discouraging dimensions. Injury to Americans was constantly being reported in despatches; now and then an American was killed, not apparently because he was an American, but because he happened to be blocking the course of events.

The Wilson administration was doubtless greatly perturbed, but it made no sign. The Secretary of State was absent from Washington the major part of the time lecturing, the State Department and the Executive Mansion established a quarantine against information on the Mexican sub-

ject and held their peace. As the middle of July approached conditions grew worse steadily. There were signs of insubordination in Congress which, for the most part, had heeded with meekness the President's request for a free hand. Newspapers in the states along the Mexican border broke out in violent expressions, and newspapers further east were finding it difficult to construct editorial matter which would bear intelligently upon the news despatches in their columns, and yet be sufficiently inoffensive to Washington to avoid displeasing the President.

The signal for action came from Europe. Various nations were mentioned as taking the initiative, but the reports were surmises. The nation from which the inquiry came as to the course which Washington intended to pursue is a secret of the State Department as yet unrevealed. But it stirred President Wilson; and many Americans at home and abroad congratulated the unknown chancellery for its achievement. It was on July 15, that this mysterious stimulus became effective at Washington, and on the following day the step which seemed to be four months and twelve days overdue was taken — Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, was recalled.

CHAPTER XIX

SO great had been the decline of his importance in the Mexican problem that the removal of Henry Lane Wilson from one side of the primary equation did not change the answer. The apparent policy of the United States was still found to be equal to zero.

There was a plentiful lack of haste in the elimination of the Ambassador. He was summoned to Washington on July 16; he arrived there on the 26th. Nine days afterward, the resignation which he had tendered according to the diplomatic custom, at the change of administration on March 4, was accepted to take effect October 14, an extension of the usual sixty days to ninety.

His public criticisms of the policy of the United States produced no result. If my estimate of that policy is correct, the Ambassador did not know what it was. His attacks were fervid, and perhaps injudicious; his view of the recent chapter of history in which he had figured, seems to me erroneous and his argument unconvincing. These things matter very little. Though he had spoken with the tongues of men and of angels, he would have been just as unsuccessful in affecting the President and the Secretary of State.

It is probable that dissatisfaction with his performance as Ambassador to Mexico was not the determining cause of his deletion from the diplomatic service. He was of no use to the administration; the influence behind him had ceased to have political value. With reference to the problem as it stood, Henry Lane Wilson had nothing to offer

which was acceptable. He expressed his opinions with becoming moderation before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and made a favorable impression upon some of the members, but there is no evidence that the President or Mr. Bryan was brought to see any way in which the Ambassador could be of the least service to them in what they wished to accomplish. From that time forth Henry Lane Wilson was hardly more influential than Cassius M. Gillette.

What the world saw at this period was the struggle between Woodrow Wilson, in the White House, and Victoriano Huerta in the National Palace. It seemed to progress slowly, but some of the moves were very unusual and very interesting even to those who did not comprehend the strategy. Mexico was bleeding to death, in the meantime, and shrill cries often drew away the attention of spectators, yet the contest went on.

Huerta was at first embarrassed by some of his own official family, and he proceeded to dispense with them in order to secure more freedom of action. His ideas as to the importance of certain men, and of the political factions which they represented, and of the influences behind them, had greatly changed since the days of the terror, when he was reckoning up the elements of strength which must be combined in support of his rule. No bestowal of political patronage, no possible assembling of individuals in governmental positions under him, could now secure the solid backing of the largest interests. He could not bargain satisfactorily with those interests because he could not give the necessary guarantees. The failure to secure recognition from the United States had greatly weakened him. He was in a position somewhat analogous to that of a business man who is in straits and heavily indebted to his bank from which he cannot now get the accommodation that he needs,

lacking the requisite security, yet the bank will lend him a few dollars from time to time, not quite daring to let him fail.

In these circumstances it was natural that Huerta should see the best chance for himself in the concentration of power in his own hands; and it is quite possible that some of the better men around him either estimated this situation with their own brains and found it hopeless, or were enlightened by the superior personages whom they served. Be this as it may, the exodus began and those who were comparatively strong went out with some that were weak and useless yet not wholly tractable. What Huerta now desired was a government all Huerta.

In June Garcia Granados resigned as Minister of Gobernacion and Aureliano Urrutia, a full-blooded Xochimilco Indian, was appointed in his place. Urrutia was a surgeon, able and well instructed, a wholly self-made man who had risen to eminence and wealth from the lowest of levels; but he knew nothing of statecraft or politics, and was looked upon by the Cientifico influences which Garcia Granados represented, as a potentially dangerous ally of Huerta's. As Urrutia came in, Vera Estañol resigned from the Department of Education, and with him went the active representation of the great American corporations for which he was counsel.

On June 23 Manuel Mondragon was disposed of after a manner quite Huerta's own. A banquet of army officers was held, at which War Minister Mondragon and President Huerta were guests of honor. At its conclusion General Huerta informed Mondragon that his presence in the United States was required at once and that a train with his luggage aboard was in waiting to carry him to Vera Cruz. To Mondragon's expostulations Huerta gave humorous answers, and calling half a dozen officers from among the

banqueters, he joined them in escorting Mondragon to the station where he embraced him cordially in farewell and assured him that it was "all for the good of the Fatherland." General Blanquet was immediately made Minister of War, *vice* Mondragon resigned.

In July, Felix Diaz was sent away, ostensibly *en route* to Japan on the famous mission of thanks which Gustavo Madero had arranged to undertake, and at the close of the month de la Barra was accredited to Paris as Minister. Ambassador Wilson had already been recalled to Washington. Rodolfo Reyes, though shorn of power, held to his seat in the Cabinet until September in the vain hope that Felix Diaz would rise again to a conspicuous place in Mexican affairs. Thus were the ties severed which had seemed to bind certain influences to Huerta. His cabinet was made up of men whose own wills counted for little; he could look into a hand-mirror and behold the sardonic visage of the whole Mexican Government. And the same view was more and more clear to observers in other parts of the world, notably in Washington where the obstinate Indian's chief adversary played the odd, dilatory game against him, to the perplexity of all nations.

President Wilson's first conspicuous move was made on August 4 when he despatched to the Mexican capital as his personal representative ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota. It was announced that Mr. Lind had gone on a peaceful errand for Mexico's good. August 9 he sailed into Vera Cruz harbor on a warship, with the eyes of the world upon him and the big journals of the United States very anxious about their news facilities, lest these should not operate fast enough to cover the brisk performances of the envoy.

On the following day, despite rumors that danger lurked in the tunnels and bridges along the ascent to Mexico City, Mr. Lind made the journey without mishap. His message

to Huerta was delivered by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, the American chargé d'affaires, and was politely received. Its substance was presently cabled back to the United States where it created more perplexity than in Mexico. Neither the partisans of President Wilson nor his adversaries knew what to make of it. Not that the language was in the least degree obscure; on the contrary it was as clear as a mirror, and as difficult to see through. In the minds of thoughtful editors it begot the question, why should Mr. Lind be sent to Mexico upon a mission that had no chance of success?

The communication which he transmitted to Huerta was a summons to surrender, its demands being covered in four items:

First. Complete cessation of hostilities (that is, an immediate peace, or at least a truce, in Mexico).

Second. That President Huerta resign in favor of a President ad interim.

Third. The fixing of an early date for the Presidential elections.

Fourth. That General Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency.

The task of replying seriously on behalf of Huerta to these suggestions that he expunge himself, fell to Federico Gamboa, who was the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations at that moment. He had been Minister to Belgium for several years, but had been called home by Huerta when de la Barra was accredited to France. Señor Gamboa was personally unacquainted with Huerta who had sent for him, relying upon his reputation as a successful lawyer in Mexico City and as sub-secretary of the Foreign Office under Mariscal, who for many years held that portfolio in the Diaz régime.

The status of John Lind as confidential agent of President Wilson operating under indirect credentials might have

been challenged, but Señor Gamboa made no difficulty over trifles. He possessed the gift of language and the theme invited his muse. Under date of August 16 he responded in a document of seven thousand words.

The paper was summarized for quick transmission of its tenor to Washington. The full text was then translated and forwarded in sections during the three succeeding days. Close study of the English version disclosed obvious and unassailable reasons why none of the four proposals could be acceded to, one of them, the cessation of hostilities, being manifestly impossible. It also revealed a suggestion which was not far from a demand that Huerta be recognized and his Ambassador received at Washington. But the most striking feature of this document was its calm expression of belief that the people of the United States were not of the same mind as His Excellency, their President.

Meanwhile Mr. Lind had gone to Vera Cruz to await instructions. These he received on August 24, and the following day he submitted a new set of proposals, substantially modified as to their terms, but holding firm to the demand that Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency. Twenty-four hours were allowed for consideration and answer.

By request the time limit was extended one day further, but before the reply was received, President Wilson, on August 27, read a message to Congress on the Mexican situation. As it was the first time in a hundred years that an American President had personally addressed Congress on an international subject, the occasion was a decided event, emphasizing the seriousness of the questions at issue.

Naturally it was supposed that the President would declare a more vigorous and definite policy in the Mexican dispute. There was nothing in the United States that might be called general information on the subject, nothing that

resembled a common sentiment, but probably a majority of those who formed an opinion were inclined toward the belief that coercive measures were contemplated and that intervention would follow. This was the easiest inference from the fact that the proposals which had been made to Huerta were obviously such as he would never willingly accede to. Some of the newspapers printed estimates of military strength, and pictures of battleships and generals; but this display meant little because what the President would say was already known in editorial rooms.

His address to Congress was an argument for patience, very impressively delivered. "The steady pressure of moral force," he said, "will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies — and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor."

But by way of assurance that the retarded fulfilment of his prophecy of peace should not endanger American lives he added that "all Americans will be urged to leave Mexico at once, and will be assisted to get away by the United States Government through all the means at its disposal."

Something notable was omitted from the address, a few words which might have supplemented President Wilson's description of the moral force whose steady pressure was to be relied upon. The omission consisted of a sentence in the amended proposal to which Mr. Lind was that day receiving his answer.

"If Mexico acts immediately and favorably upon the foregoing suggestions," the sentence read, "President Wilson will express to American bankers assurances that the Government of the United States will look with favor upon an immediate loan to Mexico."

The answer returned by Señor Gamboa was not so long

as his former paper. It declined the proposals as to the Presidency and the elections, and withdrew the request for recognition. It then disposed of the loan suggestion in these words:

"Permit me, Mr. Confidential Agent, not to reply for the time being to the significant offer in which the Government of the United States of America insinuates that it will recommend to American bankers the immediate extension of a loan which will permit us, among other things, to cover the innumerable urgent expenses required by the progressive pacification of the country; for in the terms in which it is couched, it appears more to be an attractive antecedent proposal to the end that, moved by petty interests we should renounce a right which incontrovertibly upholds us at a period when the dignity of the nation is at stake.

"I believe that there are not loans enough to induce those charged by the law to maintain that dignity, to permit it to be lessened."

Señor Gamboa's reply had the effect of strengthening considerably the position of Huerta. Influential men who had been displeased with the dismissal of their representatives from the cabinet were reconciled, more or less; some of them spoke out in favor of the new régime. Evidences of popular enthusiasm were not lacking; the number of voluntary enlistments in the army was increased, and in many ways the general apathy was broken by sentimental outbursts. Señor Gamboa was loudly praised, and Huerta also. The ill will towards Americans was deepened; the reviling and ridiculing of President Wilson began to give promise of the monstrous lengths to which it went a little later.

Mr. Lind returned to Vera Cruz to await further orders. His movements from the day of his departure from New York were a subject of keen interest to American newspapers. The episode was the strangest journey in diplomacy

with which editorial writers of the United States had been called upon to deal, surpassing the Hawaiian expedition of Paramount Blount.

It is improbable that after the publication of the first demand made by Mr. Lind any extravagant hopes for the success of his mission were entertained by citizens of the United States whose knowledge of Mexican affairs fitted them to form an opinion. But the attention of editors and the public had been drawn to him, negotiations were seen to be in progress between the two countries, and the talk of intervention naturally subsided. By the 28th of August the unpleasant topic had been almost dropped.

There was much praise of President Wilson as a guardian of the peace of nations. Certainly he himself showed no irritation as a result of General Huerta's refusal to abdicate. The stubborn Indian might stick to his capital and the cares of office, but that was no reason why Mr. Wilson should do the like. On the contrary he departed from Washington on the 29th for his vacation in Cornish, New Hampshire; and at the same time Secretary Bryan resumed his lecture tour on the Chautauqua Circuit. The Mexican matter was shelved.

But the Americans in Mexico — those outside of Mexico City where little attention was paid to Washington's warning — were in sad straits. Urged by President Wilson's speech and spurred by Secretary Bryan's announcement, supported by the activity of American consuls, the Americans began a new exodus from all points of departure on Mexico's coasts and borders. Their personal belongings that could not be carried in a hand bag they registered at the nearest consulate and abandoned.

Those who had no money made their way in one fashion or another to ports on the Gulf or on the Pacific, and looked about for the transportation which had been promised. In

due time they discovered it. On the Gulf Coast it consisted of steerage passage on merchant vessels to the southernmost ports of the United States; on the Pacific a transport traveled along the coast to gather in straggling refugees. These unfortunates were carried a few miles beyond Mexico's Pacific coast line and were set ashore at San Diego, California.

President Huerta was distressed at the poverty of the arrangements which President Wilson had referred to as "all the means at the disposal of the Government of the United States." The men who had contributed to Mexico's prosperity, the grim old Indian humorist said, should not travel in the steerage; Mexico would provide first-class accommodations for all who wished to return to their native land. And many Americans, be it said in passing, accepted his offer. On September 7 the Department of State at Washington reversed itself; consuls throughout Mexico were ordered to stop the exodus.

On the night of October 10, President Huerta emulated the example of Napoleon Bonaparte by a coup at the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber had angered him by insurgent resolutions following the disappearance of Senator Belisario Dominguez, who had delivered a speech violently denouncing Huerta and charging him with responsibility for Madero's death. The Mexican Congress seems to have lost its temper in the matter of Dominguez, and when Huerta perceived this, he lost his own. While Congress was in session on the evening of the 10th, the building was surrounded by a large force of troops. A detachment then invaded the Chamber and one hundred and ten deputies were arrested, leaving only members of the Catholic Party exempt.

For two hours the uproar within the building continued, after which the one hundred and ten men were taken through crowded streets to the penitentiary and placed in

cells. The populace sided with the deputies, and attempted to cheer them but were driven into cross streets and hustled out of the way, many persons being injured and a few killed.

As soon as the deputies were arrested the Senate which was in sympathy with the Chamber adjourned *sine die*. Before midnight Huerta dissolved both houses by decree and assumed their function in his own person. By the same convenient method he took to himself the supreme judicial power, and completed his dictatorship by absorbing the powers conferred upon the Departments of Finance, War and Gobernacion. The following morning, while Mexico City held its breath not knowing what arbitrary act might follow, Sir Lionel Carden, the newly arrived Minister of Great Britain, presented his credentials to the dictator and assumed the duties of his post.

The selection of that moment to complete England's recognition of Huerta by the formal presentation of documents was decidedly unfortunate. The incident indicated a new attitude of British representation in Mexico, and it seemed to suggest a forward move at England's Foreign Office. This impression was strengthened ten days later when Sir Lionel was quoted at length in despatches. Much that he said was void of offense, but in one sentence he intimated that Washington was dealing with the Mexican situation superficially, without full knowledge of the real causes of the trouble, and in consequence was complicating affairs rather than contributing to their solution.

The fact that many Americans at home, not directly interested in Mexico, recognized in these remarks a just criticism of President Wilson's endeavors in the Mexican field, did not soften the Minister's offense. But it presently developed that London believed there was an error in the report, an opinion which Sir Lionel sustained a little later by

denying that he had uttered the words which caused the flutter. The episode passed by with no alarming signs of damage, yet a shock had been felt. The statement that Sir Lionel was a close friend of Lord Cowdray's was declared to be without significance, but it was noted by the discerning few.

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 is a remarkable document. It provides more safeguards for those who abide under the shadow of its wing than any other Government charter in the modern world. But somewhere in its tortuous and carefully amended course is successfully concealed the fact that a Mexican ruler, guarded by a careful student, can issue a decree depriving persons of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and still keep within constitutional bounds. Deputies are constitutionally exempt from arrest, yet here were one hundred and ten jailed at one stroke; and no power short of overwhelming armed force could release them but the Dictator alone who put them in prison. No law could operate because the Dictator had decreed to himself the supreme judicial power of the State. The student who had guided the Dictator's acts in this affair was no other than Querido Moheno who had been made Secretary of Foreign Affairs when Federico Gamboa resigned to become a candidate for the presidency, and an object of Huerta's distrust.

It grieved General Huerta to inconvenience these gentlemen among whom were such old friends as Rodolfo Reyes, who had resigned from the Cabinet on September 12, and Jorge Vera Estañol, once a valued member of the same circle. The dissolution of Congress, Huerta said, was the greatest sacrifice he had been called upon to make, but he could not hesitate because it was for the good of the Fatherland. He earnestly hoped, he said, for the support of the people, and he called upon them to elect worthier representa-

tives. To provide them with an opportunity for this, he proclaimed a new election of Senators and Deputies to be held on October 26, the date that had already been set for the presidential election.

On the day following the publishing of these expressions of policy (October 12), forty of the deputies were released; later the doors were unlocked at different times for others, among them Rodolfo Reyes and Vera Estañol who with all convenient speed proceeded to New York. At the time these pages were prepared for the press about thirty of the deputies were still in prison.

On October 14 President Wilson invalidated the Mexican elections in advance by informal pronouncement at Washington. In no sense could the elections now to be held be regarded as "free" and "in accordance with the Mexican Constitution," which had been the condition President Wilson had insisted upon as pre-requisite to his recognition of the results. President Huerta was not greatly disturbed and his simple election program was not altered in the smallest item.

In what may be called the advance puffery, that election of October 26, 1913, was monstrous in volume. The multiplying of descriptive phrases appropriate to a legitimate contest, passed the limits of common sense and went into absurdity. The Madero election was the only one ever held in Mexico which could be called "free," and even that was without effective safeguards. The election carried on by Huerta was of the old Diaz order and consisted of an elaborate system of appointments.

In certain places a vote was manufactured by signatures of soldiers and of peons gathered in to make up a minimum. In most instances these men made their crosses for few could write; none of them knew what they signed. Voting, in short, was a negligible quantity in an election where the

result was made up in advance. A certificate bearing the correct signature was election, whether it was preceded by voting or not. When this certificate had been issued in accordance with the will of the chief, the constitution was supposed to have been suitably respected.

The Huerta officials in recognition of the broad interest in this election determined that no slip in consistency should mar so solemn an event. "Returns" were reported as coming in slowly, and much uncertainty was expressed as to the result. While the calculations were being made Felix Diaz, who had ventured into Vera Cruz in order to be constitutionally entitled to receive votes, found it advisable to depart. Helped by the American consul at the port, he was hustled, in the night of October 27, aboard the American gunboat *Wheeling* lying between the Vera Cruz wharves and the island prison of San Juan d' Ullua. The next day he was placed on board the battleship *Louisiana*. Some days later he made his way to Havana.

An election report was given out early in November at Mexico City and Generals Huerta and Blanquet were said to have been elected President and Vice President. When the new Congress, chosen at the same time, assembled on November 20 it declared its own election valid, but nullified that of Huerta and Blanquet "as a rebuke to the over-enthusiastic people" who in defiance of the constitution had insisted upon voting for these men. The constitutional prohibition of a provisional president's being a candidate to succeed himself applied only to Huerta, but Blanquet was included in the nullification act to simplify matters. By this maneuver Huerta had "tagged" a Congress into office and renewed his lease of the dictatorship until July, 1914.

Meanwhile President Wilson in a speech at Mobile, Alabama, on October 27 had made the important declaration that the United States would "never again seek one foot

of additional territory by conquest." In the same address he dealt at length (and quite incorrectly) with concessions in Latin America. Mexico was not named, but as it had been conspicuous for months, and just then was most prominently in the public eye, it doubtless stood for the Latin America to which his remarks were addressed. He congratulated Latin America on its coming emancipation from the concession evil, a trammel upon true progress from which the United States had long been free.

President Wilson did not distinguish between concession and monopoly which, in Mexico, are terms by no means synonymous, and his lack of clearness on this point must have obscured the meaning of his remarks for Mexicans familiar with affairs in their country. They supposed that the President meant to warn them particularly against granting oil concessions to Englishmen, and to advise them to seek prosperity by heeding the counsels of the United States. But it is a common argument in Mexico that the Latin American countries furthest removed from the influence of the United States are the most prosperous and best governed, and that Mexico should hesitate before she turns a deaf ear to all other counsellors, and heeds only the voice of her great neighbor on the north.

On the next day after President Wilson spoke at Mobile, Secretary Bryan made announcement that England, France, and Germany had agreed, at the request of the United States, to take no further action with regard to Mexico until the Washington Government should declare its future policy. When the statements of the President and the Secretary of State were pieced together they seemed charged with full assumption of responsibility for Mexico and for all Latin America, on a basis of altruism broader than any hitherto conceived. Also they seemed to prepare the way for armed intervention at any moment.

There was no sign, however, of any but a verbal aggressiveness in Mexican affairs. Week after week went by without announcement of a Washington policy. Europe held to its bargain and permitted the United States full enjoyment of the Monroe Doctrine without official protest. On December 2, President Wilson, in his first annual message to the regular session of Congress, definitely relegated Mexican matters to the doldrums.

"Little by little," he said, "Huerta has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting."

It was officially out at last: watchful waiting in the Mexican affair was the policy of the United States. Enthusiasm was hardly to be expected; the American people were not keen for watchful waiting or for any alternative; they had no common opinion on this subject. The press was inclined to ridicule the Wilson policy, but there was no determined attack of such a nature as seriously to disquiet the President. The secret of his procedure in the Mexican affair from the outset of his Administration, though it lay open to every eye, was never seen by friend or foe, if I may judge from my own reading of editorial comment published in the United States and Europe.

The London *Times* in its issue of December 3 contained expressions worth quoting. Under the heading "Mexico in Chaos" the *Times* dealt editorially with the message in these words:

"There is no need, said President Wilson, to alter his policy of watchful waiting. It is just that policy to which opinion in Mexico City ascribes the recent aggravation of the situation and the rapid spread of anarchy accompanied by every sort of horror. If, says

the despatch from our correspondent in Mexico City, the present tactics continue there are no words too strong to paint the disastrous results which will ensue.

"We are convinced that these dangers are realized as fully in Washington as in Mexico City and we shall be surprised if, when Huerta is gotten rid of and the moment for reconstruction has arrived, President Wilson is not found to have thought out and to be ready to apply a plan for restoring order and decent government in the neighboring republic. Presidents, like other heads of States, are not given to betraying their policy in public utterances."

It was not possible for all to be so patient and so confident. There were many interested persons not so near Mexico that they could hear the bullets whistle, who found watchful waiting for Huerta to crumble and collapse a joyless experience. The United States had shut up Huerta in a supposedly air-tight closet, but he was receiving a little oxygen by the help of local bankers with European connections, and foreign corporations which dreaded chaos to follow his extinction. Besides there was more air inside than had been noted in President Wilson's original estimate. To be explicit, the resources of that part of Mexico over which the Dictator exercised a species of control were very large.

In a broad zone across the middle of the country business continued to be done, and the inhabitants could not look to any one but Huerta for protection. They were compelled to pay for it in various ways. For example, the general commanding Federal forces in a district would call together the representatives of important business interests, and announce that the central government was unhappily a little short of funds, wherefore it devolved upon the general to announce with regret that he must withdraw the troops on the following Tuesday unless \$250,000, or some other

amount appropriate to the particular place and occasion, should be provided by those who were to benefit by their retention. In most instances the money was forthcoming.

It must be remembered that though the revolt in the North overran a vast territory, the percentage of inhabitants thus brought under the Constitutionalist banner was comparatively small. If Mexico in the winter of 1914 be thought of as two nations, the one over which Huerta ruled was enormously richer and more populous than that of which Carranza was the reigning prince and "Pancho" Villa the military genius. Conceiving of the two parts as at war, under fair conditions, there would seem to be no doubt as to which would win, or which in peace would be the more affluent.

This is not to say that in the circumstances as they really existed, there was any hope for Huerta, unless he could get support from outside his borders. His situation was worse than precarious. The financial system, that solid structure of the Limantour days, began to totter early in the Huerta régime. The Mexican peso which contains forty-seven American cents of intrinsic value as silver metal in any broad market, declined from its parity of 49½ that had been fixed by decree and sustained by deposits in New York and London. Steadily down the grade the exchange and purchasing value slipped.

In June, 1913, the peso could be exchanged for gold at a valuation of forty-five. In August it had fallen to forty. In November it dropped to thirty-six. In January, 1914, it was down to thirty-four, and early in March it reached twenty-nine cents. The history of the exchange market during this decline is one long tragedy for merchants and others compelled to convert their silver into gold. The banks of issue which had made use of their circulation privileges, and had put out bank bills to something like the

limit allowed by the Limantour law, were unable to redeem in coin on demand. The result was a violent shock to credit.

In December, 1913, Huerta came to the rescue of the big banks and decreed holidays; three days first, then ten, then a month. Between Christmas, 1913, and the first of the March, 1914, no bank in Mexico was compelled to meet its obligations on demand. The banks, as a matter of fact, met all the obligations that were actual items of legitimate routine, but checked every attempt to deplete their reserves. No man could present a demand for one thousand or five hundred or even two hundred pesos and receive peso coins for it unless he could prove that the sum was asked for to supply a legitimate need of his business. The half-peso coins, carrying much less proportionate value than the pesos, could be more readily secured, but the days of abnormal financial insecurity were upon the nation, and the result was demoralizing to all honest effort.

The every-day-a-holiday-system caused monstrous derangement of ordinary business relations. Rents in Mexico City were almost impossible to collect; interest on mortgages and similar obligations went unpaid, and creditors found it virtually useless in most cases to take legal action. It is folly to displace a tenant who does not pay and substitute another who has no money nor means of getting any. Pecuniary distress absurd and cruel afflicted thousands of men and women who were not rightfully poor.

Graft and commissions in government supplies were the only healthy and going industries. The commissions and profits of the traders were scaled to bottom levels, but the graft never lessened. War is very favorable to dishonesty in the best ordered nations, and Mexico under such a rule as I have described, was in the throes of civil war. A big army requires arms and uniforms. In Mexico, except about the capital, they are not so particular about shoes, and food

is left for the women to gather as they can. But forage for horses, and essentials for military service furnished business for dealers who knew the methods.

Two of Huerta's sons were supposed to have controlling influence in these matters. If any man had arms or ammunition for sale he must see Don Jorge; if it was uniforms, he made his proposition to Don Victoriano, chico. These young men were said to drive hard bargains and to leave a narrow margin of profit for the dealers, after all commissions were paid, but the money was sure. According to current reports the General and his sons went over the figures of these transactions every morning.

Early in the year 1913, a gambling house was opened which was known in Mexico City as "The President's House," and was said to be conducted upon capital furnished by Huerta himself who each day called for the winnings. Later on there was a chain of houses, and the sons took charge of the business. There were establishments for all classes of trade distinguished by the minimum wager permitted — the centavo houses for the peons and the peso and five-peso resorts for the opulent. Soldiers lacked their pay sometimes, but the graft and the gambling went merrily on.

The bull ring at the capital seats thirty thousand persons. Half of the seats are in the shade. The charge for these is three pesos. The other half are in the sun and the price is one peso. Each Sunday the ring was filled; where the money came from is a mystery which has been observed before but never adequately solved in cities similarly cursed with idleness and empty stomachs.

For another aspect of the widespread Mexican disaster we must look to the northward. What may be called the Constitutionalist capital was Hermosillo, chief city of Sonora. Here Carranza maintained his headquarters for sev-

eral months, providing himself with a cabinet and other features of an actual government. Hermosillo was a wise selection because the northwest state, Sonora, was the solidest part of the Constitutionalist territory, and the least likely to be attacked. There was a federal army holding the Pacific port of Guaymas, less than a hundred miles away, but a much larger force hemmed it in.

The selection was wise also because Sonora possesses certain revenues which have been available for the Constitutionalist cause. The State made an issue of fiat currency in July which was followed by a larger issue of Constitutionalist currency whose recognized trading value in Constitutionalist territory on the first of March, 1914, was 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ cents on the dollar. Three such dollars were regarded as a fair trade for an American coin of the same name. Another argument in favor of Sonora as the headquarters of Carranza was the ease and convenience with which arms were run across the border from Arizona before the embargo was lifted.

The border is but an imaginary line and for several months the American patrol was lamentably insufficient along the stretch from El Paso westward to the Pacific. The "gun running" industry in that section thrived mightily and it was not conducted under a bushel, or by the story-book variety of smugglers. The deliveries were made in automobiles and the most important concerns in that section were engaged in it. The Phelps-Dodge Corporation and the Dodge Mercantile Company were among those accused. There is no evidence that they were carrying on this business for profit; rather it was thought that they were doing it to assist the Carranzistas, and in the interests of the preservation of order by the only means available.

Despite some facts which will be presently set forth, it is not possible to say that the alleged "gun running" for Car-

ranza by Mr. Dodge's companies was winked at by the United States. In September they, along with others, were indicted for the offense in the United States Courts in Arizona, and although the first indictments were declared faulty, new ones were found. The defendants were discharged without fine or imprisonment, but the proceedings seem to have been regular.

Much of the help which Carranza received from Americans came in the course of plain business. He was a good customer for munitions of war, and there was a combination of dealers engaged in supplying the demand. The combination did what it could and all that it dared to increase the sales and reduce the difficulties of transportation and delivery. Persons profiting in this way will exert influence in fomenting and maintaining disorder in northern Mexico, as long as the possible market seems to justify the effort. There is no sentiment here, no conscience.

I do not think it is proved that Carranza is much of a fighting man himself, but he is not a bad manager. Comfortably settled in Hermosillo, with an active junta in Washington, he could await the reduction of Chihuahua by Pancho Villa and be prepared with solemn explanations of any departure from modern standards in Villa's military ethics. It is not credible that Carranza evolved this policy unassisted.

After Villa captured Juarez and the City of Chihuahua and drove the remnants of the federal army across the Rio Grande at Ojinago, thus making himself master of the largest state in Mexico, the question frequently arose as to whether a man of Villa's successful fighting record and disposition to be nervous under restraint, would long consent to be second to Carranza. If there had been only Carranza in the problem, it is likely that Villa would have thrown off the yoke, light as it doubtless actually was. But

Carranza plus Washington was a different matter, and Villa was restrained by the obvious advantages that lay in keeping within the charmed circle which the light of Washington's countenance threw around the First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement.

The understanding between Washington and Carranza was maintained partly by means of United States Consuls, notably George C. Carrothers. Another route of communication between the State Department and Carranza led through the Maderista headquarters at No. 115 Broadway, New York. Francisco Madero, whose office was at No. 32, had fallen out of favor with Mr. Bryan. The recognized spokesman of the Maderos was Rafael Hernandez, the murdered President's cousin, a negotiator of remarkable gifts, courteous, cool, and very hard to read. I am speaking now of February and March, 1914, when a coalition of monied interests was formed for the purpose of restoring peace in Mexico. Enormous capital was represented, and the plan proposed was apparently the best of fifty that had been laid before Mr. Bryan. I say "fifty" because that was his own hasty estimate on an occasion when there was no need to be accurate. He preferred this plan to the others, and seriously inclined his ear to its advocates.

Congress had been controlled during all these months by a maximum of skilfully exercised authority combined with an irreducible minimum of real information; upon the whole a miracle of management made possible only by a lack of coherent opinion in the legislative body. There had been ebullitions of jingo sentiment, but no appearance of anything solid in the shape of a Mexican policy in either house.

On July 22, 1913, the Senate talked Mexican matters in the open, but that night the leaders were counselled, and there was no immediate repetition of the offense. On

July 31, the House developed symptoms of acute distress over Mexico, but the trouble soon quieted under palliative treatment. On August 8 Senator Bacon declared that the Mexican situation was one of the gravest problems which the United States had ever been called upon to face. After that statement Mr. Bacon subsided and did not again offend. On August 15 Senator Penrose, stirred by the first hand reports of injury to Americans, used strong terms in the Senate Chamber. He promised to resume the following day but was dissuaded.

On August 19 the Senate endeavored to press a resolution demanding a full account of Mexican matters from the President, but Senators Lodge, Bacon and Stone caused it to be postponed. On November 16, an attempted revolt in the House against the censorship was fought down by Administration men, and on January 27, the Senate, though greatly alarmed over Mexican affairs, was brought into line, and the subject was dropped.

Viewed as a political performance it is entitled to rank high, that holding back for months of the floods of oratory on a subject so inviting, so full of opportunity to stir America with authentic stories of wrong done to its citizens, of vast pecuniary loss, of insult, dire hardship, and atrocious murder; so full, too, of potential European complications which always tempt a certain class of orators. The Senators and Representatives who held their peace under such provocation were untrammelled men; many were of the opposition. Never before had a Congress at Washington been so well controlled; never had a Congress bowed to such a master.

The foregoing summary is not to be taken as a table of reference; it is designed merely to give an impression. The tale of horrors in Mexico was not told as it would have been if a superior power had not prevented the sub-

ject from being thoroughly opened up. In fact nobody in Congress knew the truth. Certain Senators and Representatives were equipped with lists of outrages, but the lists were not accurate. The State Department may have had better information but it was not available; the records of 1913 on this subject were closed to all. When by chance a resolution calling for the data was passed, the Department met it with a refusal.

Close following of Mexican events through private channels, supplemented by a not too credulous reading of press despatches, led me, early in March, 1914, to set the number of Americans who have lost their lives by violence in Mexico since January, 1913, at one hundred and fifty. Of these not more than thirty were killed because they were Americans; the others fell victims to a condition which the American Government might have prevented.

There have been exaggerations in accounts of Mexican troubles, but much has been missed altogether. What can the comfortably situated readers at a distance comprehend of the suffering and insult barely hinted at in vague reports of isolated cases or described so crudely that the exaggeration destroys all feeling of reality? What estimate can he form of the twenty-four days' reign of terror in Durango, of the looting and the re-looting of Torreon, of the flight of American refugees on foot two hundred miles in mud and rain to Saltillo, of the evacuation of Chihuahua, and the entry of Pancho Villa, the bandit conqueror of the north? Who can sit in security and grasp the horrors of the Cumbre Tunnel?

Washington was moved by the well authenticated cases of distress; it issued demands on Huerta and on Carranza and on Villa that the perpetrators of crimes against Americans must be punished. The State Department made a long record of those whom it would hold personally re-

sponsible for acts of violence. Ever since the awakening which caused the despatch of John Lind, a well supported and clearly meritorious story of mortal injury in Mexico could command a hearing. But with the demand started on its endless journey, the record made, and the hearing over, the incident was closed.

The Americans are a patient people. Many thousands of despoiled refugees from Mexico who could get no redress have found that out. These refugees and their relatives and friends wondered what dimensions this record of disastrous wrong to Americans must reach before a stir would be caused which resembled purposeful action.

On February 17, 1914, they supposed that their question had been answered. The death of one man seemed for a few days to have strained the resistance of the Washington Government to the breaking point.

The individual in question was William S. Benton, an Englishman. He was killed by the order, if not by the hand, of Pancho Villa, whose immediate chief was Carranza, over whom was no superior but the Government at Washington.

The early accounts of this crime which made it out to have been an execution following a court martial, were hardly more credible than the Huerta government's account of the killing of Madero. There had been no one to punish Madero's murderers; it was obvious that Carranza would not and could not punish Benton's. But the formidable reputation of the British Government for protecting its citizens seemed to make some action necessary on the part of the United States, which was the guardian of Mexico, and in a very special sense the guardian of the Constitutionalists whose nominal chief was Carranza — now for good cause as truly an impossible as Huerta, unless Villa

should be brought to book, an outcome not included in any sane man's forecast.

It seemed, then, that the United States was cut off from any peaceful contact with Mexico, and was hopelessly involved in trouble inside its borders. What alternative remained but intervention? Yet it did not come. Inquiry as to Benton's death brought fiction after fiction, and a tangle of falsehood and mockery, absurd and offensive. Yet the weeks dragged away, and England waited with unexampled patience, while the United States did nothing that the eye of man could discern, "and did it very well," to quote appropriately from a familiar lyric of W. S. Gilbert's.

Five weeks after the murder of Benton, Villa was still at the head of his army, about to lead it in what promised to be a critical engagement of the civil war in Mexico. And aside from the forthcoming battle at Torreón the chief news from Mexico was that John Lind had resumed negotiations with Huerta, in the hope that the usurper would consent to efface himself in favor of a new provisional President.

Surely this is a remarkable page of history, requiring for its explanation some very careful reading between the lines.

CHAPTER XX

TORREON fell to Pancho Villa on April 2. From that day the Washington authorities declined to listen to plans for the elimination of Huerta on a cash basis. They pinned their faith to Villa as the man whose destiny it was to drive out the usurper. Much more than had been generally understood they had encouraged the fighting Constitutionalist leader who had been permitted to gain such ascendancy that he had become the alternative to intervention. To depose him from command of his army — if that were possible — or even to permit him to be defeated would eventually force an invasion of Mexico, not only from the Gulf ports but from the North. His victory at Torreon was essential.

I do not suppose that the Wilson Administration knew what were Villa's plans for subsequent campaigning or how he expected to pay his troops. I prefer to think that the President and his advisers were imperfectly informed as to the character and motives of the leader, and as to the incentives of the great majority of his officers and men. A kind of patriotism, easily exaggerated and misunderstood, animated a few, and all seemed to be fighting for a cause not unworthy. Ample evidence has been furnished that Washington did not believe Villa to be so black as he was painted; that he was thought to be amenable to control. I firmly believe that President Wilson would have been shocked to learn that the rebel leader would rather fight his way across Mexico to the National Palace in the capital

than to have full possession of the government delivered to him without a struggle.

There was a deal of mystery about the Torreon fight which was carried on mostly in the districts north and west of the city itself. At first the attacking force suffered reverses, but after several days of battle they turned the tables and the Federal General Velasco evacuated the city. Losses were very heavy on both sides. Villa's army numbered about 12,000 and Velasco's 9,000. Estimates which are not to be relied upon place Villa's loss from all causes at 5,000, and that of the Federals at 3,000. It would seem that Velasco should have held the city, but he failed, whether from bad tactics, poor troops, deficient ammunition, or the superior skill of his opponent. The victory was Villa's and his conquest of Mexico was fairly under way.

Torreon is seven hundred miles from the capital, and the richest section of Mexico lies between. Four armies were required to make a lasting success of the southward movement, and three of them were already in the field. To the east, in the Gulf of Mexico state of Tamaulipas, one large force had been operating for several weeks. It had taken Victoria, capital of the state, and had seriously menaced the port of Tampico which Villa now needed more than ever, for reasons which will presently appear.

In the West a Constitutionalist force was active in the Pacific Coast state of Sinaloa, and the territory of Tepic. In the center, under Villa himself, was the remainder of the army which had captured and was now occupying Torreon.

Another army must speedily be raised to act in concert with Villa's own forces in their campaign for possession of the cities on the two trunk lines of railway in Central Mexico. Recruiting seemed surprisingly easy for Villa. Immediately after Torreon he was able to send a force toward

Monterrey in pursuit of the Federals, and start another southeastward in the direction of Saltillo.

In addition to these forces pressing east and south there were smaller armies and garrisons in all the border states of the North and in the northwest state of Sonora. I think it fair to estimate that on April 5 the Constitutionals had 40,000 men in the field, well armed and many of them fairly well equipped. The only visible means of support for this very considerable military establishment was the country in which the various detachments operated. The only discoverable brain directing the widely separated bodies of men and keeping them supplied with arms was under the hat of First Chief Carranza. I can but think this a remarkable showing, not wholly devoid of mystery.

Fiat Constitutional currency, well backed by force, accounted for such of the equipment as could be drawn from local sources. Force alone took care of wages and food for men, and forage for horses. But rifles, sabers, revolvers, automatics, machine guns, cannon and ammunition, to say nothing of cartridge belts and other such necessities for 40,000 men, must come from a source which demands real money. Let us not attempt to answer this riddle otherwise than by crediting Carranza and Villa with financial ability of a high order.

Doubtless it would be better to say plainly that I believe Carranza and Villa received advice and assistance in matters of finance. The propriety of this depends, perhaps, upon the method employed, in regard to which I have no trustworthy information. Certainly Carranza was advised in the matter of withdrawal from active participation in conspicuous military operations, and this resulted in raising Villa to such an eminence that some outward alteration in the man became a necessity. After the Benton affair he was constantly under tutelage, by which he was clever

enough to profit. In the Torreon campaign he also benefited by advice in military matters. The allegation that American troops fought with him is wholly unsupported, and should require no denial; but there were a few American soldiers of fortune under his banner, and three of them were artillerymen.

Villa had learned something about publicity too, perhaps from his experience with the moving-picture men for whom he had posed at Juarez. A good press agent had been added to his staff, and the official reports to Washington were made by George C. Carothers, confidential agent of the State Department. Thus there were various presentations of Villa before the eyes of the world, and various external sources now contributed to the sum of his apparent qualities. Like other famous men he had become several persons in one. He was no longer a mere individual, he was a syndicate.

But in spite of all surface amelioration Villa and his soldiers remained much the same as they had been at Durango and at Juarez. A recital of their crimes would have no end. I do not think the newspaper reports of their cruelties were materially exaggerated; more probably, taking into account the limitations of language, they were less than the truth. From what I have seen and heard I believe that a more accurate mental picture would be gained by magnifying the printed reports some four or five diameters. But it should be remembered that Villa and his men were not created by the government of the United States; they were found upon the scene, and whatever has been done to influence their behavior toward the proprieties of civilized warfare may count as meritorious.

It remains to be said that on April 5 Villa was acquitted of all blame in the Benton affair, by Carranza's court of inquiry whose verdict was in accord with Secretary Bryan's

frequently expressed belief. Though this decision carried little weight, it helped somewhat to make Villa a more possible figure in the design of the Washington government for the expulsion of Huerta.

As has been intimated the cover of Villa's military code had been cleansed, and he had been taught to keep the volume closed in public, whenever he could remember to do so. This saved some lives after the fall of Torreon, but there are other punishments than death. In the captured city there were good and bad persons, in Villa's estimation, and he drew the line between them with quick decision. The good were inconvenienced but not despoiled. The bad, consisting of Spaniards and every variety of Huertista, were subjected to a forfeiture of goods without delay.

More than six hundred Spaniards were driven at the bayonet point into box cars and shipped five hundred miles to El Paso. Their property, both real and personal, was seized. Several thousand bales of cotton valued at about \$4,000,000 were among the items which Villa appropriated as spoils of war.

The deported Spaniards endured great suffering on the journey to El Paso. Scantily clothed and stripped of everything negotiable they had been crowded like sheep into the cars, and during the forty-eight hours in transit they had little water and less food. Their condition at the end of their journey was pitiable. The Spanish government asked the United States to look after the interests of its subjects, and accordingly a protest was addressed to Carranza who solemnly replied that the Spaniards had been dealt with very leniently considering their offenses.

The spoil from this proceeding must have been large for some of the deported men were rich. Efforts were immediately made to sell the cotton which had fallen into Villa's hands, but negotiations for its sale in the United

States failed. Two agents were sent to Europe to find a purchaser, but there was a serious obstacle in the way of closing a bargain. This was the difficulty of transportation. About four hundred cars were required, and so much of the rolling stock of the railways had been destroyed that no such supply was available.

Even should the cars be got, and the cotton be carried to El Paso, there would be many chances yet to be taken. The United States government might fear complications with Spain, if it should allow the goods to pass through its territory to the Gulf Coast for shipment abroad. And the railway which should haul the cotton under the known circumstances would be in an unenviable position, if the rightful owners should present claims. There was but one alternative; the purchasers of the goods must take delivery at a point in Mexico and that point must be the port of Tampico. The distance from Torreon was only five hundred and fifty miles but the port itself was in the hands of the Federals, and the railway route to it led through Monterrey, a city of eighty thousand people, which had resisted rebel attacks. If the cotton were to be carried to tidewater both Monterrey and Tampico must be captured.

The movement against Monterrey was promptly begun. Federal General Velasco with about 2,500 of his men had retreated in the direction of that city after evacuating Torreon on April 2, the remainder of his forces having fled toward Saltillo. Two days later he was overtaken at San Pedro by General Rosalio Hernandez of Villa's army, and many of Velasco's command were killed. Hernandez, co-operating with other generals of the Constitutionalists, then pushed on for Monterrey.

The force threatening Tampico was spurred forward, and the city destined to be the greatest oil center in the world was more closely invested. The Federal garrison which

had held its ground for weeks, was cut off by rail from its base of supplies at San Luis Potosi and had been supported from Vera Cruz, two hundred miles south, by means of vessels plying between the two ports. Great anxiety was felt by the oil interests in the neighborhood. A miracle had saved the Lord Cowdray and Waters-Pierce refineries at Tampico from destruction during the days when the rebels were actively attacking. The same army, substantially reinforced, was preparing for assault, and any day a great disaster might befall the stores of inflammable wealth together with the equipment for industrial operation.

Threats were made by the rebels against Lord Cowdray's properties because he was suspected of having aided Huerta in negotiations for loans. None of the companies doing business in the oil fields took sides however. If the Waters-Pierce interests hoped for Constitutionalist supremacy they made no sign, and the Huerta forces did not single them out for attack. The Dutch-Schell managers were also painstakingly neutral. Their great well, La Carona, had flowed more than 150,000 barrels in a single day when it sprang into life in November, 1913, distancing Lord Cowdray's famous Portrero del Llano and succeeding to the world's producing record for a single well. If the course of war should lead over their property the loss would be incalculable.

Active business in the oil fields could not continue with skirmishing between the rebels and the defenders going on, but no outside government cared to take the step of landing troops to protect its nationals or the property they owned. The Federal garrison awaited the attack and the besiegers threatened continually. Foreign residents understood that the next vigorous move of the Constitutionalist forces would place them in great peril and they prepared to take to the ships at short notice. Affairs at

Tampico were in this state when the incident occurred which brought the United States into armed clash with Huerta to the material benefit of the Constitutionalists' plans.

On April 9 a whaleboat from the United States gunboat *Dolphin* lying in the Panuco River before Tampico, was sent ashore for gasoline, and put in at the Iturbide Bridge. The boat was manned by a crew of nine sailors in charge of an assistant paymaster of the United States navy, and displayed American colors at bow and stern. The men were unarmed. While part of the crew were still in the launch Colonel Hinoza, commanding a detachment of Mexican Federals placed the American officer and the whaleboat's crew under arrest. Immediately afterward he paraded them through the streets to jail amid the jeers of bystanders and cries of "Death to the Gringos."

The American Admiral Mayo, being promptly informed of the occurrence, demanded instant release of his men, an apology in due form by General Zaragoza, the Federal commander at Tampico, and a formal salute to the American flag, consisting of the firing of twenty-one guns in its honor before six o'clock the following evening, April 10. The men were at once released and the apology offered, but the matter of the salute was referred by wire to Mexico City, Admiral Mayo at the same time forwarding an account of the affair to Washington.

It seems quite clear that the right procedure would have been instant direction from Washington to Admiral Mayo to enforce his demand to the letter, as this would have tended to restrict the affair. But Washington temporized; directed the Admiral to extend the time one day for the salute to be fired, and took up negotiations with Huerta through the American Chargé at Mexico City with the result of aggravating the incident.

The history of Washington's previous demands upon Huerta repeated itself. Temporizing argument was the only response which could be elicited, and day after day the time for firing the salute was extended. What seemed like a division of sentiment among high government officials at Washington was indicated by the statements given to the press. Hesitation there certainly was for three days at least. Suddenly on the 14th, the Atlantic war fleet of seventeen battleships was ordered to proceed with haste to Vera Cruz and Tampico.

On the 16th formal notice to salute was served on Huerta, and this was followed on the 18th by an ultimatum demanding that the twenty-one guns be fired by 6:00 P. M. on the 20th. On the 19th Huerta made flat refusal to comply, unless the salute should be answered gun for gun which would have condoned the offense and have been construed as a recognition of his government. That day more ships were despatched for Mexican waters.

On the 20th President Wilson laid the case before both houses of Congress in a personal address, reciting the Tampico incident and supplying the additional information that a uniformed orderly from the U. S. S. *Minnesota* had been detained in the city of Vera Cruz while ashore on mail service for his ship, and also stating that government despatches from Washington to the embassy in Mexico City had been withheld from delivery until the American Chargé d'Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, had gone in person to demand resumption of the service.

President Wilson, in view of these offensive acts — the two latter being in natural sequence to that at Tampico — asked for quick joint action of Congress in support of his demands upon Huerta.

"I therefore come," said he, "to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such



RAFAEL HERNANDEZ

Minister of Fomento (Promotion) in the Cabinet of Provisional President de la Barra. Minister of Gobernacion in the Cabinet of his cousin, President Madero.

ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amid the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico."

The House, after a stormy session of four hours, passed the following resolution by a vote of 337 to 37:

"Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives, in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States of America is justified in the employment of armed forces of the United States to enforce the demands made upon Victoriano Huerta for unequivocal amends to the government of the United States for affronts and indignities committed against this government by General Huerta and his representatives."

The Senate in a session that same night objected to the naming of one man as an enemy against whom the Army and Navy were to be used. The Tampico affair was called a pretext, in the course of the debate. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed a resolution which recited the wrongs suffered by American individuals, in person and property. Debate was heated. The Senate adjourned over midnight; then reassembled and passed a substitute resolution. The House concurred. This is the text of the resolution as passed by both bodies:

"Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that the President is justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States; be it further

"Resolved, That the United States disclaims any

hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."

In one respect the President's address was similar to that which he had made to Congress in August, 1913: it was notable for an omission. On the former occasion he had refrained from mentioning the financial offer which he had authorized John Lind to make to Mexico as a reason why Huerta should resign. The second address contained no reference to the true cause of haste in the despatching of the warships to the Mexican gulf ports. The urgency was due to information that a large shipment of munitions of war was on its way from a German port to Vera Cruz. The cargo included some thousands of rifles, a number of machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition; and the receipt of these supplies by Huerta would greatly strengthen him against the Constitutionalists, and perhaps against the United States, should war result from the increasing complications. At the moment, however, this was a move against Huerta and in favor of the Constitutionalists who had been receiving all the arms for which they could pay.

On April 21, when the Senate and House agreed upon the resolution, the German ship *Ypiranga*, carrying the munitions of war, arrived at Vera Cruz. To prevent the cargo from reaching its intended destination a large body of American marines was landed at that port and the custom house was seized. The landing party was under orders not to fire unless fired upon, and to occupy only a small portion of the city in the immediate neighborhood of the custom house which is on the water front.

The marines met resistance of a scattering and irregular sort. The opposition gathered strength as the movement swept up the broad, open pier, and it presently became necessary for one of the smaller warships lying within easy

range to shell some of the positions of the enemy, including the naval academy building. Before actual possession of the custom house was secured, four American marines were killed and twenty wounded. The number of Mexicans killed was about two hundred.

"Sniping" or isolated fire from concealment picked off Americans for the next two days. The entire city was occupied by the American forces on the 22nd, the Federal troops having retreated several miles to a point on the Mexican railway, a mile of which they tore up. In all, seventeen Americans were killed and sixty-two wounded. "Sniping" being punishable by death according to usages of war, it was reported that forty Mexicans were summarily executed for this offense.

Meanwhile the republic of Mexico was becoming an unfit place of residence for Americans, and in Monterrey violent demonstrations were being made. On April 21 a Huerta captain commanding a detachment of Federal troops, acting no doubt under orders, tore down and stamped upon every American flag in the city including that over the United States general consulate in which many Americans had taken refuge. That night the consulate was surrounded by Federal troops and the lives of its inmates were threatened.

On the following day, the United States Consul General, Philip C. Hanna, was taken before a military tribunal, charged with aiding Constitutionalist generals, and thrust into prison where he remained incommunicado until April 24, when the Constitutionalist army under Generals Villareal and Castro entered the city in triumph, the Federal forces evacuating the place. The conduct of the Constitutionalist after this victory, as reported by the grateful consul general, was a decided improvement over that which they had exhibited elsewhere.

On April 22, Chargé O'Shaughnessy of the embassy at Mexico City received his passports, and the same service was rendered in Washington to the Mexican chargé, Señor Algara, who notified the State Department of his intention to leave the territory of the United States. O'Shaughnessy and his family, with the attachés of the embassy excepting interpreter d'Antin, arrived in Vera Cruz on the evening of the 24th, accompanied by Consul General Shanklin and the attachés of the Mexico City consulate. No other Americans were permitted to leave the capital, it having been reported that Mexicans were being detained in Vera Cruz against their will.

Two days later, however, Huerta learned that he had been misinformed, and all Americans who desired to do so were allowed to depart. Some were conveyed to Tejera, the Mexican camp near Vera Cruz, whence they were escorted on foot to the American lines under flags of truce. Others were sent to Puerto Mexico, the eastern terminus of the Tehuantepec railway.

Excitement throughout Mexico was intense. Americans were everywhere insulted. As fast as possible those in the interior made their way out, the majority going to the capital and thence to Puerto Mexico or Vera Cruz. The United States Government chartered the Ward line steamers to carry refugees to Galveston and New Orleans, and expectation of immediate war was general.

Huerta prepared to destroy the railways from Mexico City to Vera Cruz. The United States sent an army brigade of 5000 men under General Funston to Vera Cruz, and the control of the city passed from the navy to the army, the sailors and marines returning to the ships. Fifty-two American war vessels of all classes were now in Mexican waters. Washington denied that war existed, but prepared to supply large bodies of troops at short notice.

In Tampico the demonstrations against Americans were violent, and the American warships in the river and harbor were said to be a menace rather than a safeguard to their nationals in the city. There is some dispute about this, but none at all about the withdrawal of the ships, leaving the Americans to be protected by the German and English vessels. More than five hundred Americans were taken aboard these warships, and transferred to a merchantman which conveyed them to New Orleans, without their previous knowledge or consent, as some of them have alleged. The refugees declared further that the American warships had brought down the trouble upon them and had then deserted them while they were in great danger. It was a peculiar incident, not the first of that class experienced by Americans who have lost everything they possessed in Mexico and have found themselves without a country.

While these events savoring of tragedy were in progress, Washington's relations with Carranza were disturbed by complications in the vein of comedy. On Wednesday, April 22, the day after the marines landed at Vera Cruz, Mr. Carothers, the State Department's representative with the Constitutionalists, transmitted to Carranza at Juarez, by request of Secretary Bryan, a note of explanation of the Vera Cruz incident. The note stated that the landing of troops and the seizure of the custom house "was made necessary by Huerta's refusal to make proper amends for the arrest of unarmed American sailors." The secretary suggested that the "proper attitude" for the Constitutionalists was to "stand aloof," and concluded with the hope that they would "not misunderstand President Wilson's position or misconstrue his acts."

This communication I take to be one of the most unusual productions of the State Department, even in the incumbency of Mr. Bryan; but the true comedy resides in the

unexpected results to both parties. At that time the United States was on the very point of recognizing the belligerency of the Constitutionals; the documents, so to speak, were already drawn up; and the communication which has been mentioned was in a sense the forerunner of the recognition.

But Carranza had not been advised of the good things in store, and Secretary Bryan's conciliatory despatch took him unawares. In less than three hours after receipt of the message the First Chief of the Constitutionals sent a communication to President Wilson through Mr. Carothers which amounted to a threat that if the United States did not retire at once from Vera Cruz the Constitutionals would join in an effort to expel them. He also suggested that after withdrawal of its forces, the United States should recognize the Constitutionals as the actual and permanent Mexican government, which courtesy would be requited with as much saluting as might be desired.

Pancho Villa was then at Torreon pushing forward his plans for campaigning against Saltillo and San Luis Potosi. Advised of Carranza's action by telegrams from that gentleman and from Mr. Carothers, Villa hurried to Juarez, and at dinner with the State Department's agent quite pointedly reversed the First Chief. Talk of strained relations between Carranza and the military genius of the Constitutionals was revived. An open break was declared to be imminent, if it did not already exist.

This was a situation which Washington viewed with alarm as indicating a lack of cohesion in the Constitutionalist enterprise. But the tactful Carothers restored harmony between the two leaders; and Carranza slowly shifted his position until it became evident that he and Villa, on the surface at least, were in accord.

In the United States there was a disposition to look upon Carranza's reply as prearranged with Washington, but this

seems to be an error. The truth is that the State Department had put the First Chief into a place where he was compelled to be haughty, in order to preserve his hold upon the Mexicans. He had already gone as far as he dared in obedience to Mr. Bryan's instructions, and his reputation in Mexico was in danger. Thus he was compelled to reply to Mr. Bryan's note in some manner which should comport with his professions of independence. This was perceived in Washington, after patient study, and the anxiety was relieved. It was not thought necessary to restore the embargo on arms at the Mexican border, though in regard to this traffic certain precautionary measures were taken, as will hereafter be noted.

The actual gain to the Constitutionalists by the Vera Cruz operations was too clear to be ignored. The revenues of Mexico's principal seaport had been cut from Huerta's visible means of existence, and the cargo of war munitions had been turned back to the high seas. Villa certainly perceived all this, and he was satisfied with the assurances of Carothers that the United States did not desire to advance inland from Vera Cruz. There can hardly be a doubt that Carranza's irritation, if he had really felt any, yielded to the same arguments.

But Carranza's vigorous pronouncements had excited the Texans, the Arizonians and the New Mexicans, and preparations for a state of war along the 1800 miles of Mexico's frontier were speedily under way. The War Department at Washington urged upon President Wilson the necessity for immediate restoration of the embargo on traffic in arms across the border, and adduced evidence to show that in the eight days which had elapsed since April 14, when the war fleet was ordered to Mexican waters, 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 10,000 rifles had gone into Mexico from the United States. But the President de-

clined to replace the embargo in full force. There were several thousand rifles, ten machine guns, and 500,000 pounds weight of ammunition in El Paso ready for delivery across the river. These the War Department was permitted to order withheld. The conversation between Carranza and Villa which resulted from this would, I fancy, throw a bright light on many matters at present woefully obscure. And on the top of it all they had lost, for the time, their recognition as belligerents.

On April 25 the Ambassador of Brazil and the Ministers of Chile and the Argentine Republic at Washington tendered their good offices to the Wilson Administration to bring about a peaceful solution of the Mexican troubles. After consultation with Secretary Bryan, their proposal was formally tendered as follows:

(Translation)

LEGATION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC,

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 25, 1914.

Mr. Secretary of State:

With the purpose of subserving the interests of peace and civilization in our continent, and with the earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed, to the prejudice of the cordiality and union which has always surrounded the relations of the governments and peoples of America, we, the plenipotentiaries of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, duly authorized thereto, have the honor to tender to your Excellency's government our good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement of the conflict between the United States and Mexico.

This offer puts in due form the suggestions which we had occasion to offer heretofore on the subject to the Secretary, to whom we renew the assurances of our highest and most distinguished considerations.

D. DA GAMA,

R. S. NAON,

EDUARDO SUAREZ MUJICA.

The offer was accepted by the Washington State Department in a response whose most significant paragraph ran thus:

"This government feels bound in candor to say that its diplomatic relations with Mexico being for the present severed, it is not possible for it to make sure of an uninterrupted opportunity to carry out the plan of intermediation which you propose. It is, of course, possible that some act of aggression on the part of those who control the military forces of Mexico might oblige the United States to act, to the upsetting of hopes of immediate peace; but this does not justify us in hesitating to accept your generous suggestion."

On Monday, April 27, the Spanish ambassador at Washington, who had acted for Mexico since the breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, announced to the State Department General Huerta's acceptance of the mediation proposals of the "A. B. C." powers of South America. In the interval before the gathering of the delegates at Niagara Falls to open the conference on May 20 specific charges were made by Huerta that the government of the United States had violated the armistice which had been agreed upon. There seemed to be no tangible foundation for the charges, but they were annoying.

The Huerta delegates, Señores Elguero, Rabassa and Rodriguez, arrived at Washington, May 16, accompanied by their families and immense quantities of luggage. All of the gentlemen were important lawyers of Mexico, of the group which once flourished under the name Científico. The United States government provided for their use two private cars from the Florida coast and elaborate suites at hotels. The delegates utilized the cars and the hotel suites,

but insisted upon paying the charges. One of the delegates, Señor Luis Elguero, was a director of the National Railways of Mexico and also of Lord Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company, prominent in the Mexican fields.

Mediation as a means of settling the differences between the United States and General Huerta need not be considered seriously. It was accepted for the sake of advantages which each party perceived. The United States welcomed the chance to strengthen its position by dividing the general Latin-American sentiment, so that subsequent action with regard to Mexico, if anything forcible should be necessary, might not antagonize all the southern nations of the hemisphere. The move tended to satisfy the numerous advocates of peace, and gave the Constitutionalists more time to overrun Mexico and drive Huerta out, while the United States forces sat quiet at Vera Cruz. Carranza was invited to suspend hostilities and send representatives to Niagara Falls, but it was not within reason that he should accept at that juncture. If he had done so, it might have been a distinct disappointment to the United States.

Huerta saw his own importance increased, and the price of his abdication raised. A truce with the United States was valuable; it eventually enabled him to get the shipment of munitions of war ashore from the *Ypiranga* while Washington looked on ridiculously helpless. Moreover there was strong pressure upon him to send delegates to Niagara Falls, for mediation inspired the survivors of the old Diaz circle with hope. A prominent Mexican exile described the mediation congress to me as "the last stand of the Cientificos"—with which body he himself had been affiliated.

The mediators were all favorable to property rights, and it was unthinkable that any plan of government which they

might devise would satisfy the desire of the radical Constitutionalists and the feeling of the masses behind them that the rich ruling class of Mexico should be killed or driven out, and the Catholics oppressed and despoiled. The Huerta delegates, very keen negotiators, went to the congress for the purpose of tying the United States up in a hard knot. The whole proceeding was manifestly absurd as long as the Constitutionalists were not represented. Without their concurrence no result could be reached which a few more victories by Pancho Villa would not upset. Meanwhile the United States might easily be committed to the plans of the mediation congress so far as to be in honor bound to back them, even to the extent of armed invasion. And it is conceivable that this was the true goal toward which the Científicos and the other business interests represented by the participants in the congress were striving.

On May 13 Tampico fell to the Constitutionalist forces, the garrison withdrawing to Tuxpan after suffering serious losses. Comparatively little damage was done to foreign interests. The Dutch warship had landed a guard to protect the great La Carona well; but from no other vessel of the foreign fleet were troops sent ashore.

The fall of Tampico still further weakened Huerta's position, and the gain of this port completed the Constitutionalists' line of communication from the interior to the Gulf.

The great properties controlled by Lord Cowdray escaped serious damage when Tampico passed into the hands of the Constitutionalists, but that change introduced new complications for the Englishman. From the advent of Huerta, in February, 1913, to May in the following year, Lord Cowdray's investments in the Tampico oil fields steadily increased at the rate of £50,000 a month — a total

of about £750,000 added to the great capital already engaged there. His continued enlargements of operations in the oil field had been regarded as evidence of his confidence in the stability of the Huerta government, and as corroboration of the reports that he had aided its financial negotiations. He was not in good odor with the Constitutionalists, and if they were to have anything like a free hand in setting up a new government, its attitude would certainly be hostile to him.

Another important item of Lord Cowdray's relationship to the Mexican government was his interest in the Tehuantepec Railway of which mention has already been made. Unknown to the Mexican people and the Mexican Congress his negotiations with the Madero government for the sale of this railway interest had been concluded, and the agreement covering the transaction was to have been signed on February 10, 1913. The outbreak of February 9 with its fatal consequences to Madero prevented the signing of the papers. This left the Tehuantepec proposals to be presented to the government of the usurper. Efforts were constantly made during the early months of Huerta's rule to effect a bargain, but a plan was formed by Lord Cowdray, looking toward an alternative, if negotiations should fail, as they actually did.

This plan was intended to enable the Tehuantepec Railway to do a profitable business despite the competition soon to be introduced by the Panama Canal. The disadvantages of the Tehuantepec route for Hawaiian sugar lay in the necessity of transshipping from vessel to train at Salina Cruz, and from train to vessel at Puerto Mexico on the eastern coast. Lord Cowdray's idea was to do away with one of these handlings by the use of seagoing barges upon each of which sixteen of the cars could be run, at Puerto Mexico, to be delivered at Galveston or New Orleans.

Orders for eight of these barges were placed, and four were nearly ready for delivery on April 1, 1914.

But the partnership of the Mexican government in this railway makes it indispensable to Lord Cowdray that he shall be on fair terms with its officials who, on their part, must be affected by similar considerations. The Constitutionalists, looking forward with confidence to the control of Mexico, might well hesitate to make an enemy of Lord Cowdray, whose favorable influence would be of so great help to them in operations of finance, and whose antagonism would work powerfully against them in the money markets of the world. For this reason too serious oppression of Lord Cowdray in the oil fields by the rebels who at this hour control that region, will be a grave tactical error.

The United States on May 18 added two nations to its highest diplomatic grade, thus increasing its embassies to thirteen — which is said to be the President's lucky number. The nations were Chile and Argentina. Ministers to the capitals of those countries were promoted to Ambassadorships. The inevitable result of this would be reciprocal action by Chile and Argentina in favor of their Ministers at Washington. Previously Brazil was the only one of the "A. B. C." nations enjoying this distinction in the Washington scheme of statecraft and it was agreed that it would be well if all the mediators were of equal rank.

Argentina, with its eight millions of people, and Chile with four and a half are prosperous nations. There is no doubt that the United States would welcome a larger portion of their trade, and all the usual benefits which recognition of one nation's worth brings to another. But selection of that particular moment to confer these honors carrying personal benefits to two of the mediators called forth unfavorable criticism.

The sustained successes of the Constitutionalist arms in April and May did violence to the hopes of two aspirants for Mexico's presidency both of whom had secured backing in New York, including the advice and guidance of eminent counsel. One of these ambitious men was Felix Diaz, well known to fame and misfortune. The other was General Fernando Gonzales, the son of that president of Mexico who held the office from 1880 to 1884 by the permission of Porfirio Diaz.

The Felix Diaz enterprise need not be considered at length, although \$100,000 was wasted upon it by men who should have known better. But the scheme of General Gonzales, formerly governor of the State of Mexico, was more formidable. Early in April Gonzales left New York for Mexico city with a proposal to lay before Huerta which involved the payment of three million dollars to the dictator and certain of his generals in consideration of the appointment of Gonzales to a place in the cabinet from which he would succeed to the presidency. Huerta's resignation was to be handed in before the money in the form of drafts on Paris should be paid. Seated as provisional president, Gonzales was to announce an open election in which Carranza, Felix Diaz, and all and sundry aspiring to the position, should have a fair chance to win on their merits.

Gonzales reached Mexico's capital, laid his proposal before Huerta, and was not shot; at least he had escaped that fate as late as May 9, when a cablegram in code was received from him by his counsel in New York. The cablegram conveyed the intelligence that matters seemed to be progressing favorably and might be concluded without violence, but that if violence proved to be necessary, the arrangements for its successful application had been made. If the transaction should be consummated on a peaceful basis, General Huerta was to leave the country unostenta-

tiously via Puerto Mexico, taking passage in a vessel carrying the French flag.

Some thirty millions was to be supplied by loan to Mexico's treasury to start the Gonzales government. The three millions of cash had been provided for by negotiations of a large block of an old issue of bonds similar in appearance to those which Gustavo Madero had endeavored unsuccessfully to negotiate on a five-for-one basis in 1910, but of a better quality. These bonds to the amount of \$15,000,000, face value, were to be passed over in return for the three millions in money, and were to be acknowledged by Gonzales when he should have achieved the presidency. The thirty millions to be loaned to Mexico was to be provided by men of large interests in that country in association with men of New York who hoped by this plan to stave off intervention by the United States with its shock to the security market. The market already was staggering under the heavy strain of the tariff and currency measures, and intervention in Mexico might break it down.

This story, fantastic as it seems, is sober fact, and demonstrates the lack of information and judgment among men, otherwise sane, regarding the actual trouble in Mexico and how to remedy it. Pancho Villa's victories and those of other Constitutionalist leaders which have been recorded made the Gonzales scheme impracticable from every point of view, especially the financial. Carranza loomed larger and larger as a presidential possibility, even taking into account the lack of adequate provision for Villa in any new government which might be set up.

Carranza's platform has been a rather startling one, but I do not find that it has seriously interfered with Washington's attitude toward him. Carranza is a Constitutionalist to the backbone and this is the foundation of his creed: every man who has voluntarily aided Huerta must be shot.

To some minds this may seem objectionable, but if relegated to the realms of purely academic discussion, by the operation of sufficient restraints, it might not matter.

Be Carranza's merits what they may, he was fortunate in having a good lawyer which is often better than a good cause. The Constitutionals were ably served in this respect at Washington, having a lawyer more successful than Mr. S. G. Hopkins, who had acted for the Maderos. The new attorney, Mr. C. A. Douglas, smoothed the way of the latterday revolutionists of Mexico over many difficult places.

But the elevation of Carranza or any other man of the Constitutionalist party to the presidential chair will be no more than a beginning of the Mexican task. The pressing and vital problem is the finances of the government and of the railways. Few realize the harm that Huerta has done in nullifying the solemn pledge of Mexico's customs receipts to bankers as security for loans. It is hard to see how the great sums needed can be borrowed in Europe or America unless arrangements are made to place such pledges beyond the possibility of violation. This will demand a collector at every port to act as trustee for the bankers. The trustee must be powerful enough to enforce the rules. The United States can permit no other nation to undertake this business.

CHAPTER XXI

FOR many months the Mexican policy of President Wilson had been the theme of jests, or of serious discussion which was even more amusing. It had been treated by the world as a peculiarly difficult and entertaining riddle; it had been supposed to hide mysterious and menacing international relations; it had been scoffed at as the mask put on to hide mere indecision. There is a sense, however, in which editorial comment in the United States, with few exceptions, had been constantly favorable. The dread of war, of trouble and expense, of injurious effect on business was constantly in evidence, and as Mr. Wilson's policy seemed to be safe, it may be said to have been praised in all these utterances.

Before he took his seat—in the days of the overthrow and murder of Madero—leading articles in thousands of papers began with statements of the Mexican situation which read like the most earnest arguments for intervention, but almost invariably there was a paragraph or two at the end which deprecated any action on the part of the United States tending toward invasion of Mexico or costly interference with her lamentable condition.

When the developments recorded in the preceding chapter had disclosed the relations of the Washington administration with the Constitutionalists, and had caused the President to use the armed forces of the United States against Huerta, the tone of criticism speedily became adverse and the President was censured for too much energy and haste by the same pens that had mildly ridiculed him for endur-

ance of the antics of an intolerably bad neighbor. It seemed that the true inwardness of Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy was not understood, even so late; that it was not seen to have been a perfectly simple device to meet a very obvious requirement of his situation.

There is no doubt that in the latter part of February, 1913, the Mexican question presented itself to the President-elect in the form of a riddle which, as a public man and as an earnest, intelligent and humane individual, he would have been very glad to answer. But the situation in which he conceived himself to stand with reference to his interests and his highest duty seemed to demand that he should ask not, "How shall I solve that problem?" but rather, "How long will it wait unsolved?"

The public which he had been chosen to serve was excited by the ten days' bombardment in the Mexican capital (a performance not detected as a farce) and by the subsequent murders, and the peril to American lives and property; but as to what should be done, the public had no conviction. The tone of the press was decidedly against warlike measures. There was no clearness anywhere as to their justification, as to the cost and difficulties that would have to be met, or as to the essential truth that intervention in some form was inevitable, the only real question being, shall the thing be done now or later? Above all there was no sentiment against delay as a policy in itself, harsh and bloody.

The absurdity of private comment in high places at that time is beyond belief to-day. It was almost openly said in Washington by influential men that the overthrow of Madero was fortunate for Mexico, that his death though regrettable would make for peace, and that Huerta was the strong man needed to bring back the days of Diaz. These views are of no importance except as indicating the prev-

alent mental confusion. There was no unified public opinion tending to influence Mr. Wilson in his choice of a policy, except such as was expressed by the general deprecation of war at a time when the business situation was so unsatisfactory.

When President Wilson took office he encountered organized pressure exerted for the recognition of Huerta. Ambassador Wilson advocated that course, and went beyond the bounds of propriety in his efforts favorable to the usurper's interest; but the President was unalterably opposed to recognition. He saw Huerta for what he was, vicious, unreliable, treacherous, bespattered with the blood of his predecessor. Personal distaste for such a man was mingled with considerations of another sort, and there was never a chance that Huerta would receive the least support from the government at Washington while Woodrow Wilson was at the head of it.

Among the other considerations was the desire to safeguard American interests in northern and northwestern Mexico. Revolt against Huerta was under way in Sonora, Chihuahua and other states. Already some of the more important industrial corporations controlled by Americans were preparing to make terms with the rebels in order to save valuable property from destruction, and avoid the great loss which would result from enforced suspension of operations. Whatever would enable Huerta to carry war into those states would threaten irreparable damage or even confiscation; but so long as the areas should be securely held by one party to the struggle, business might go on, at the cost of moderate tribute paid to the Constitutionalist leaders.

The best way to keep Huerta's armies out of the northern states was to cut down his pecuniary resources. This was the immediate necessity in President Wilson's view,

and it could be met without taking the active measures which he desired to avoid as long as possible. To withhold recognition from Huerta, to prevent foreign nations from giving him aid, to damage his credit in every way that seemed proper under the circumstances — these expedients would suffice to prevent such injury to American interests in northern Mexico as would compel the United States to interfere.

The President hoped and expected to solve the Mexican problem, but his first desire was to postpone it. The policy of watchful waiting looked forward rather vaguely to the defeat of Huerta by the Mexican rebels and to the setting up of recognizable government by the Constitutionalists; but its transcendent merit in the President's mind was that it would enable him to baffle the uncertain and divided advocates of quick action in Mexico, and would give him time to force through Congress those measures of economic reform to which he was pledged. Revision of the tariff, banking and currency legislation, and the anti-trust bills were the matters upon which he was determined to focus his own energy, the services of his party in Congress, and the attention of the country. He believed that these enactments were essential to the nation's welfare, and that the time was ripe. His political future and his place in history seemed to depend upon his success along the lines that have been mentioned. It would have been extremely bad strategy to permit the Mexican question to push in ahead of those domestic issues which were, in his opinion, more momentous and more urgent.

Any immediate action, even a definite declaration in the Mexican matter would have excited antagonism in Congress, would have jeopardized the President's authority over the party leaders. His margin of control was narrow and he was well aware of it; he could afford no quarrels.

And the event has amply proved his sagacity; the policy of watchful waiting was too bare to be a bone of contention. It could be explained privately, where that was unavoidable, and to each man according to his special need; but for the most part it excused a mighty silence.

From March 4, 1913, until the end of that year it was nearly impossible for any man who had interests in Mexico, and desired light upon the future, to get a single ray of it from the State Department in Washington. It was difficult to approach Mr. Bryan on that subject, and the President was wholly inaccessible. There was a channel of communication open between Washington and Hermosillo, after Carranza had established his headquarters there, and it may be said that from the outset the influence of the United States was exerted in favor of the Constitutionalists; but the policy of giving them direct and undeniable support against Huerta developed slowly. All action in the Mexican matter was postponed, retarded or suppressed, by every possible means, while President Wilson struggled with his Congress for the enactment of those laws which he had set himself to procure.

Business in the United States did not improve; the tariff and the income tax had yet to disclose their capacity for revenue. There was trouble with the banks, and with the railroads. The manufacturing interests were suffering serious depression. The tolls exemption repeal, with its veiled threats of international complications, and open assault on harmony in the Democratic party, presently intruded to make matters worse. The first year of President Wilson's administration was a hard one at home, giving excuse for doubt whether time could be spared for setting a neighbor's house in order.

But the excuse lost its value through the disclosure that the United States had been meddling with its neighbor's

affairs for many months. There was war in Mexico, and the United States seriously hampered one of the contending parties while giving important support to the other. It would appear, at the date of this writing, that nothing more need be done to insure the triumph of the Constitutionalists; and that, when this shall have been achieved, the United States must interfere to deprive Carranza and Villa of the usual rewards of victory, or must permit a government to be set up by them and their adherents. Having gone so far with these men President Wilson can hardly turn his back upon them. The obligations incurred cannot be evaded by mediation. By supporting the Constitutionalists the United States has become responsible in part for their fortunes and their behavior. Despoiled Europeans are recognizing this; so are their home governments.

It is a very grave responsibility. What pledges have been given by Carranza and Villa I do not know, but as to the value of those pledges I have a very definite opinion, which is that they are upon a par with those given to Ambassador Wilson in the matter of the lives of President Madero and Vice President Suarez. If Madero and Suarez had been efficiently protected by the United States they would not have suffered death; and the same may be said prophetically of many a Spaniard and abhorred Huertista who will come into Villa's power during his military operations, and afterwards. Those whom the United States succeeds in protecting, whether by arms or threats or promises, will live, and those whose fate depends upon the inward reformation of Pancho Villa will be fortunate if they suffer nothing worse than death.

The mediation at Niagara Falls may result in an excellent plan for the government of Mexico, but if this shall exclude Carranza and Villa from high office, it must involve a questionable bargain with them, or must leave them

cheated by the United States. For something must have been promised them in the course of these prolonged relations, otherwise the bare encouragement would have amounted to a promise that they should rule their country when their armies should have conquered it.

If a Constitutionalist government shall be established, its chief claim to favor will reside in the projected reform of land tenure. This seems to be President Wilson's conviction. Samuel G. Blythe, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, May 23, 1914, gives a long account of a conversation with the President on April 27, and the following sentences occur in that article:

"He (the President) sketched the conditions in Mexico under Diaz and came to the underlying cause for all the unrest in that country for many years. This, he said, was a fight for the land — just that and nothing more."

A considerable assortment of other causes for unrest — causes which the land question can not be said to underlie, and which no reform in that matter alone can remove — were visible to me during my residence in Mexico; but that is another story. The land question, as I have already said, depends for its equitable solution upon a proper method, not to mention the means of putting it honestly into practical operation. This reform was the chief plank in the platform of San Luis Potosi, and Francisco I. Madero believed in it very sincerely, to which fact I bear witness from personal knowledge. But under the circumstances and in the time allotted to him, he did not find an answer to the problems which it presented. No safer wager could be made than that Carranza, Villa and all their domestic counsellors will prove equally inadequate.

If the United States is truly committed to that reform

in Mexico, it must provide the method, and will be extremely fortunate if not called upon to provide the power also. But, to speak of the plan alone, Madero would have been devoutly grateful for it; and since land tenure is alleged to have been for many years the sole underlying cause of Mexico's unrest, it seems a pity that the United States did not work out a scheme for the removal of the landless peon's discontent, and give the use of it to the predecessor of General Huerta, thus solving the Mexican question which has cost so many lives, and so much money.

For the inauguration of a Constitutionalist president will be the completion of a blood-red circle drawn on the map of Mexico. There may be — though I doubt it — a brief time of quiet afterwards in which to balance the books of the transaction. On the credit side will be the favorable difference, if any may be discovered, between the stability and merit of the new Mexican administration and that of President Madero. I put emphasis on stability, for in default of it no land tenure change can be of any value. The peon will not have much profit of his land, if it becomes a battlefield between seedtime and harvest, nor will he dwell upon it, even though the fighting may be miles away. He will have learned to prefer looting to the dull pursuit of agriculture.

Let this instruction be the first item on the debit side of the account covering the last two years. There must be added many thousands of Mexican lives sacrificed in battles, massacres of prisoners, and incidental murders; the wreck of cities and the devastation of rural districts; the killing of Americans in numbers which it is too early to estimate; the hardships suffered by a multitude of others, and their property loss, very large in the aggregate. Hatred of Americans will be bitter and enduring, and will tend to retard the business recovery of the country, even

under the best possible conditions. It is an item not to be overlooked.

Many of these evils might have been prevented, I believe, by more judicious action on the part of the United States after the accession of Madero. He had come to the presidency after a revolution very mild and brief, yet violent impulses had been in some degree stimulated, and it was not easier to predict that night would follow day than that anarchy would follow another revolutionary overturn in Mexico. Peace, and some degree of permanency for the new government, were the first essentials, and this fact seems to have been recognized in Washington. Madero, though he came unwelcome, treading on de la Barra's heels, was recognized in due time, with kindly expressions.

I have no doubt that it would be possible to trace the diplomatic relations of the two governments, and find evidence on which to base a very plausible contention that President Taft was the great and good friend of President Madero. It seems to me that he was hasty and ill advised in his action relative to the disorders which presently appeared in Mexico, of which the most conspicuous was the wholly mercenary revolt of Orozco. I have asserted for example, that the threat of military interference did great mischief and no good; that it tended vastly to increase the evils which were supposed to have been its justification; that it hurt Mexico's credit, embarrassed Madero in many serious ways, and needlessly excited enmity toward the United States in Mexican bosoms.

Yet it may be shown that President Taft's attitude was friendly throughout, that his language was temperate and courteous even when it conveyed threats, and that he never ceased to express a hope that the sister republic would emerge triumphant from her troubles. Along this line I

will concede all that reason will allow ; but afterwards there will remain one matter in which the United States was persistently and fatally unfriendly to Mexico from the beginning of Madero's rule until its tragic end. In regard to this particular matter I assert that there can be no difference of opinion, but only of information ; that two or a thousand right-minded men will inevitably agree, if they know the facts.

President Taft maintained in the capital of Mexico an ambassador who should not have been there ; who was lamentably misplaced, unsympathetic, injudicious, and disastrously harmful. Knowing as I do how narrowly Madero missed a triumph over the extraordinary difficulties and deadly enemies that beset him, I am constrained to believe that the least value which can be assigned to the unfortunate influence of the American ambassador is still sufficient to have turned the scale. The right man in the place, tactful, well disposed, keenly discerning, a man who earnestly desired the established government to continue because he had the foresight to perceive what must follow its violent overthrow — such a man as dean of the diplomatic corps and representative of the most influential nation, could have lent enough support to Madero to keep him up until the wave of violence had subsided and the revival of prosperity had turned the minds of the masses toward peaceful means of living. And he could have done it without offensive interference, without going beyond the bounds of diplomatic propriety.

If the reader doubts this let him think upon a single phase — upon the situation when Calero was in Washington and Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico City. How was President Madero then placed with regard to diplomatic relations? If there was any help that might have been given, what chance had Madero of getting it? Much help

was possible, at that time and before and afterwards, but I know that it was not forthcoming.

The brevity of Madero's term in office, the manner of his fall, and the murders that followed were in the highest degree deplorable. They were evidences of inherent instability and incitements to all who saw personal profit in such conditions. It was inevitable that there should be a season of violence more serious than any that had gone before. I believe that the conditions in Mexico City and in many parts of the country amply justified intervention by the United States, and that the day on which it should have been declared was February 18, 1913, when Huerta seized control of the government. It seemed to me then that, sooner or later, it must come, and I have never changed my opinion. The situation has not improved but has become worse, and intervention as the ultimate answer to the Mexican question has never been more probable than it is to-day. It might come before this book is off the press, and not surprise me in the least; but should it be delayed a long time I shall still believe that nothing has been gained. It would have cost less time, less money, and fewer lives if it had followed as speedily as possible the events of the day I have just named. The resistance would have been inconsiderable compared to that which will be encountered when the thing is done.

Though Ambassador Wilson worked for the immediate recognition of Huerta, such action would have been manifestly improper. President Taft did nothing of importance in the matter, and the Mexican problem was passed on to his successor as it stood, a scandal to the world.

President Wilson let it be known immediately that his attitude toward Huerta was unfriendly, yet he retained Ambassador Wilson in Mexico City, and thus gave his administration the appearance of facing both ways, for

all the world was aware of the Ambassador's efforts in Huerta's interest. It is probable that Huerta's position was strengthened by this dubious procedure, and that he received more aid from interested persons abroad than would have come to him if the Ambassador had been recalled immediately.

There was no serious pressure exerted by European nations, either then or afterwards, to influence the Mexican policy of the United States. There was a certain amount of bluffing, but that was all, despite persistent reports to the contrary. It was believed in Europe, if not in America, that the United States would be compelled to intervene; that its credit would be engaged to ensure payment of Mexico's obligations, including all damage claims. Nothing better was desired; no suasion was necessary to bring on the fortunate result. Jealousy of one another, and the hazard of their own trade interests were sufficient to deter European Powers from action.

Except for the fateful nature of the situation which had come to exist during the administration of his predecessor, President Wilson was free to answer the Mexican question in various ways. Real non-interference, however, was not within the scope of his choice. There were too many Americans in Mexico, and too many interests interlocking the two countries. It was strictly impossible to contemplate indefinite continuance of disorder in Mexico as endurable by the United States. I believe that the proper course would have been the restoration of peace by the speediest practicable use of the armed forces of the United States; but this action was not favored by the President, for reasons which I have attempted to deduce and set forth. After some months of apparent hesitation he began to accept with gradually increasing definiteness a policy of depending upon the Mexican revolutionists to

accomplish the pacification of the country through a series of military triumphs.

He might have taken sides with Huerta instead. There are those who still believe that if this had been done the rebellion would have been put down promptly; but this is an error. The circumstances under which Huerta had come to power were such that the greater his resources, the longer would be the war in Mexico. It would have been brought to an end only by the intervention of the United States, never in any other way while Huerta lived, and held his seat.

There was, however, another procedure possible to President Wilson. To my mind it was the only acceptable alternative to immediate intervention. He might have attempted to solve the Mexican problem peaceably with the help of men who were deeply, vitally interested in the welfare of the country, and who could exert a powerful influence toward satisfactory readjustment even in a situation so difficult. Beyond question the man to be consulted first was Limantour. It would not have been easy to gain his confidence, but it would not have been impossible. If his advice had been sought, accepted, and followed, and his efforts toward the establishment of a stable government in Mexico had been tactfully and strongly supported, a creditable success might have been achieved. My criticism of Limantour's course in the spring of 1911 will be recalled, but no contradiction will be seen by those who have read with comprehension.

I think that so far as the President neglected any opportunity to secure information and advice on the Mexican problem, it was a grave error; and that a continuance in this course would be unfortunate. With the deepest respect I wish to say that the President's published utterances on the Mexican question do not reveal a full understanding

of it. The Mexican people are not fitted for self-government, in the sense in which he seems to use the expression. To stand by willingly while some millions of uneducated Indians, vastly outnumbering the cultivated inhabitants of the country in which they live, try to evolve a working democracy from a state of demoralization only to be relieved by the exercise of the most highly developed judgment, would be as cruel and absurd as to wait for a sick child to grow up and evolve the theory and practice of medicine. What the Mexicans really require is a business government much better, much more modern than that of the United States, a business government equipped with every device of science, and above all with the method.

There is no doubt as to the duty of the United States; it is the same as that of every organization and every individual in relation to the general welfare, and consists in unremitting effort to extend the gains of scientific research and the use of the scientific method into all the details of human life, governmental, industrial and personal. That is what the United States ought to do for Mexico, so far as may be practicable.

The idea that ignorance plus liberty plus providence is the formula for a commonwealth is no more respectable today than Rousseau's theories of a return to nature and the golden age. And it will be well for the United States to consider in all the long future of the Mexican question that what is really desired is the welfare of the Mexican people, not their mere momentary gratification. The aspiration for liberty has often seemed to come from below, though its real source has usually been in a few elevated minds. The scientific principles upon which, at some future time, the first truly free state will be organized and conducted are just now beginning to come down from above, from the brains of men trained for methodical research. The more

diligently this fact is remembered in connection with the rehabilitation of Mexico, the better it will be for all concerned, including the humblest peons who will never be able to understand the source from which will come their help.

These remarks seem to me pertinent because I believe that the United States will be compelled to take control of Mexico. At the date of this writing it seems certain that President Wilson will find it necessary to thwart Villa and Carranza, and that war will result. Although the Constitutionalists have been permitted to become a formidable host, their power will be registered only in the number of the invaders who will be slain, not in substantial military successes. In the end they will be dispersed and driven to the mountains, and the United States, for a space, will rule Mexico. It is then that I shall wish to see politics and all antiquated methods forgotten, and the public affairs of that country administered with real enlightenment.

Whoever doubts the eventual restitution of Mexico to its own people, questions the honor of the United States. The obligation will be explicit; the American public will indorse it, and will make it good. If that public will condemn, while the occupation lasts, every worn-out device of politics and every foolish tendency towards sentimentalism, the incident will be brief and the results beneficial. The Mexicans do not need another dictator, domestic or imported. The era of Diaz is closed. What they need would be better described as a good board of directors to manage the corporation of which they are the stockholders, and a reformed policeman strictly under the orders of the board. If they have an experience of this rule, they may like it so well that they will gladly undertake its perpetuation. That will be self-government.

Whatever may be done in Mexico, there will be the same

need as heretofore that the United States should have a definite and continuous policy toward Latin American countries, not one that varies with political changes, or mere shifts of sentiment, in the great northern republic. The questions to which that policy will be directed will be business questions, and should be handled by business men. To permit the development of trade with Latin America to be further retarded through neglect of this plain fact is manifestly unwise. A self perpetuating commission of representative business men should be established to deal with all Latin American relations. Their recommendations would not be final, but radical departures from them would be very infrequent.

If such a board had been in existence in 1912 there would probably have been no Mexican revolution in February of the following year, because the men composing the board would have known what was being hatched, and what was to be looked for in Mexico if the mischief should be left unchecked. It is hardly possible that the President and the Secretary of State would have been deaf to the representations sure to have been made by watchful men of sound business training and adequate foresight, serving the government at that time in the capacity suggested.

THE END

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